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ABSTRACT
Modern scholars cannot agree how extant fragments of thought attributed to 
Leucippus and Democritus integrate (or do not) to form a coherent perspective on the 
ancient Greek world.  While a certain degree of uncertainty is unavoidable, given the 
nature of the evidence available and the fact that Democritus wrote many different works 
(including at least one in which he deliberately argued against positions that he defended 
elsewhere), this study demonstrates that we know enough to take a more integrative view 
of the early atomists (and of Democritus in particular) than is usually taken.  In the case 
of Democritus, this study shows that it makes good sense to read what remains of his 
works (physical, biological, and ethical) under the presumption that he assumes a single 
basic outlook on the world, a coherent perspective that informed every position taken by 
the atomist philosopher. 
Chapter 1 provides an in-depth portrait of the historical and philosophical context 
in which early atomism was born.  As part of this portrait, it offers thumbnail sketches of 
the doctrines attributed to a representative catalogue of pre-Socratic philosophers to 
whom published work is attributed (Anaximander, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, 
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Philolaus).  It demonstrates how each philosopher presumes 
that his theory offers a universal outlook on human reality, a perspective on the universe 
which purposely encompasses (and builds into a single theoretical framework) physics 
and biology and practical ethics.  
Chapter 2 introduces the early atomists as respondents to the pre-Socratic 
movement before them (a movement which this study refers to as the Critical Tradition).  
iv
It presents evidence for an integrated reading of early atomist fragments, a reading that 
construes the Leucippus and Democritus as men of their time (working with and 
responding to the positions taken by their predecessors in the Critical Tradition).  
Chapter 3 shows how Democritus' ethics arise naturally from his physics via an 
historical process of development.  Like his predecessors in the Critical Tradition and 
many of his contemporaries, the atomist deliberately imagines nature (physics) providing 
the raw material from which culture (ethics) naturally and inevitably rises.  
Chapter 4 offers an original reading of extant ethical fragments of Democritus, 
showing how the atomist uses his unique outlook on the world to develop a practical 
approach to living well.
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INTRODUCTION. DEMOCRITUS THE PARADOX
Setting the Stage (i.1)
Democritus of Abdera is a paradox.  An instructive instance of the problem he 
presents occurs in the Πρὸς Κωλώτην, where Plutarch defends him and other ancient 
thinkers from the accusation (advanced by the Epicurean Colotes) that their doctrines 
make life impossible.  In answer to this charge, Plutarch distinguishes two opposing 
views of life, one deriving from philosophy in general (Plutarch names Democritus, 
Stilpon, Empedocles, Parmenides, and Melissus among its exponents)1 and the other 
coming from Epicurus:
TEXT (Einarson & De Lacy)2 TRANSLATION (Einarson & De Lacy)
καίτοι τὸ μὲν ζῆν οἱ γονεῖς μετὰ τῶν θεῶν 
ἡμῖν  ἔδωκαν,  παρὰ  δὲ  τῶν  φιλοσόφων 
δίκης καὶ νόμου συνεργὸν οἰόμεθα λόγον 
ἐπιθυμιῶν κολαστὴν λαβόντες  εὖ ζῆν·  τὸ 
δὲ εὖ ζῆν ἐστι κοινωνικῶς ζῆν καὶ φιλικῶς 
καὶ  σωφρόνως  καὶ  δικαίως,  ὧν  οὐθὲν 
ἀπολείπουσιν  οἱ  περὶ  γαστέρα  τἀγαθὸν 
εἶναι βοῶντες, οὐκ ἂν δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ὁμοῦ 
πάσας τετρημένου χαλκοῦ πριάμενοι δίχα 
τῆς  ἡδονῆς,  πάσης  πανταχόθεν  ἐξ-
ελαθείσης· ἐνδεῖν δὲ αὐτοῖς τὸν περὶ θεῶν 
καὶ  ψυχῆς  λόγον  ὡς  ἡ  μὲν  ἀπόλλυται 
διαλυθεῖσα,  τοῖς  δὲ  οὐθενὸς  μέλει  τῶν 
καθ'  ἡμᾶς.   τοῖς  μὲν  γὰρ  ἄλλοις  φιλο-
σόφοις ἐγκαλοῦσιν οὗτοι διὰ τὸ σοφὸν ὡς 
τὸ ζῆν ἀναιροῦσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τούτοις ὅτι 
ζῆν ἀγεννῶς καὶ θηριωδῶς διδάσκουσι.
Life  was  bestowed  on  us  by  our  parents 
with the aid of heaven; but the good life, in 
our view, we owe to the philosophers, who 
gave us the reasoning that helps justice and 
law  in  curbing  our  lusts;  and  to  live  the 
good life is to live a life of participation in 
society, of loyalty to friends, of temperance 
and honest dealing.  But none of this is left 
to us by those who keep shouting that the 
good is to be found in the belly; that they 
would not give a copper with a hole in it 
for  all  the  virtues  in  a  lump  apart  from 
pleasure,  supposing  pleasure  totally 
banished from every one of them; and that 
the account they need of the gods and of 
the soul is an account that tells how the one 
is  dissolved  and  perishes,  and  the  others 
care  nothing  for  our  affairs.   Thus  these 
people charge the other philosophers with 
making  life  impossible  by  their  wisdom, 
1 See Plut. Adv. Colot. 1108b.
2 The text and translation throughout are from Einarson and De Lacy (1967), 153-315.
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whereas  the  other  philosophers  charge 
them with teaching us to live ignobly and 
like the brutes.
Plut. Adv. Colot. 1108c-d
Accepting the commonplace exploited by Colotes, that the object of philosophy is the 
good life, Plutarch construes this life positively as “a life of participation in society, of 
loyalty to friends, of temperance and honest dealing” (κοινωνικῶς ζῆν καὶ φιλικῶς καὶ 
σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως) and derives it from (1) parents (οἱ γονεῖς), (2) gods (μετὰ τῶν 
θεῶν), and (3) the inhibition of human desires through reason, the helpmeet of justice 
and law (δίκης καὶ νόμου συνεργὸν ... λόγον).  He then accuses the Epicureans of 
abandoning this ideal for its opposite: an animal life (1) divorced from divine providence 
(τὸν περὶ θεῶν ... λόγον ὡς ... τοῖς δὲ οὐθενὸς μέλει τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς) and (2) guided by 
pleasure (τῆς ἡδονῆς) in place of rational restraint.  The contrast is transparently polemic, 
as the critique of Colotes appears to have been.  What interests us is Plutarch's attempt to 
claim Democritus as an advocate for the civilized and philosophical life rather than the 
bestial and Epicurean.  This two-pronged claim is not unproblematic, as evidenced by 
Plutarch's awkward rhetorical posturing when he comes to deal with Democritus directly.  
Democritus and Epicurus: Good Atomism versus Bad (i.2)
The first order of business is to address the relationship between Democritus and 
Epicurus,   which Plutarch broaches by noting that Colotes' ungracious rejection of the 
Abderite is a fitting reward for such a teacher (καλὰ καὶ πρέποντα διδασκάλια: Adv. 
Colot. 1108e), who presumably should have known better than to create the atomist 
2
physics that facilitated Epicureanism.  Plutarch's objective is to distance master from 
pupil while undermining the claim that only the latter construes life as it really is (making 
life possible).  Colotes makes this task easy.  First, he conflates Democritus with 
Protagoras, making the atomist a dogmatic relativist incapable of perceiving real things 
(since atoms and void elude sensory perception).  This gives Plutarch excuse to point out 
that Democritus actually composed arguments (γεγραφέναι πολλὰ καὶ πιθανὰ) against 
the Protagorean claim that “nothing is more this than that” (ἕκαστον … οὐ μᾶλλον τοῖον ἢ 
τοῖον εἶναι: Adv. Colot. 1108f).  Having established Democritus as a realist, Plutarch 
proceeds to lay waste to Epicurus' assertion that “all perceptions reaching us through the 
senses are true” (πάσας εἶναι τὰς δι' αἰσθήσεως φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς: Adv. Colot. 1109b = 
Epicurus, fr. 250 Usener), an idea Plutarch dismisses as relativist rubbish (and a black 
mark against Colotes, who rejects nonexistent relativism in Democritus only to embrace 
the real thing in Epicurus).  Plutarch conveniently ignores evidence that Democritus 
might have accepted Epicurus' formulation, depending on the context in which it was 
given.3  His only concern is to point out (1) that Democritus is not a total relativist 
(Colotes is wrong) and (2) that Epicurus might be (Epicureanism is not realism).  Colotes' 
second mistake is disparage Democritus' assertion that perceived qualities are relative: 
“color, sweetness, combination, and the rest exist by convention” (νόμωι χροιὴν εἶναι 
3 See Aristot. Metaph. 3.5.1009b.7 (= Democritus, fr. 80 Luria; fr. 177 Taylor); Makin (1993), 71-84.  
Assuming that  Aristotle and Makin understand him correctly, Democritus appears to have made a 
distinction between ontological and epistemic reality.  Ontologically, some perceptions would be true 
(accurate reflections of extant combinations of atoms and void) and others false (distorted reflections of 
extant combinations of atoms and void).  Epistemically, humans cannot tell the difference.  Thus the 
real difference between Protagorean or Epicurean relativism and Democritean realism becomes much 
less pointed than Plutarch would have it here.  
3
καὶ νόμωι γλυκὺ καὶ νόμωι σύγκρισιν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα: Adv. Colot. 1110e).4  Plutarch 
responds by again finding in Epicurus the relativism Colotes rejects in Democritus: the 
only material difference between the two is that Democritus admits the qualitative 
relativism following from his atomist principles while Epicurus fudges, trying to save 
realism by avoiding an explicit confession that perceived qualities are conventional 
constructs.  Plutarch will not allow this kind of waffling:       
TEXT (Einarson & De Lacy) TRANSLATION (Einarson & De Lacy)
οὐκ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑποθέσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ 
ὑφελέσθαι Δημοκρίτου, ἀτόμους εἶναι τῶν 
ὅλων  ἀρχάς·  θεμένωι  δὲ  τὸ  δόγμα  καὶ 
καλλωπισαμένωι  ταῖς  πρώταις  πιθανό-
τησιν  αὐτοῦ  προσεκποτέον  ἐστὶ  τὸ 
δυσχερές, ἢ δεικτέον ὅπως ἄποια σώματα 
παντοδαπὰς  ποιότητας  αὐτῶι  μόνωι  τῶι 
συνελθεῖν παρέσχεν.
There was no necessity to assume, or rather 
to filch from Democritus, the premise that 
the first  elements of all  things are atoms. 
But once you have laid down the doctrine 
and  made  a  fine  showing  with  its  initial 
plausibilities,  you  must  drain  the  dis-
agreeable conclusions along with it, or else 
show  how  bodies  without  quality  have 
given rise to qualities of every kind by the 
mere fact of coming together.
Plut. Adv. Colot. 1111c
This critique is rhetorically perfect, undercutting atomism while making Democritus look 
better than Epicurus.  Unfortunately, Plutarch forgets that the atoms posited by 
Democritus and Epicurus are not strictly ἄποια σώματα, since the former gives his shape 
(ῥυσμός), order (διαθιγή), and orientation (τάξις) and the latter recognizes each as an 
indissoluble magnitudes with parts (solida primordia … quae minimis stipata cohaerent 
partibus arte).5  In the case of Democritus, Plutarch further overlooks that the 
4 See Democritus, frr. 61 (where Diogenes of Oenoanda echoes the critique of Colotes, which thus 
appears as an Epicurean τόπος), 79-80, 382, 434 Luria (where Philoponus quotes Aristotle to the effect 
that οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον make πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀληθῆ). 
5 For the qualities of the Democritean atom, see Aristot. Metaph. 985b4-22 (= Democritus, fr. 173, 241 
Luria; fr. 46a Taylor; Leucippus, fr. A6 DK).  For the parts of the Epicurean, see Lucret. 1.599-634 (ll. 
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conventional nature of perceived qualities does not necessarily mean that these offer no 
access to reality (a truth that his own earlier refutation of Colotes might have led him to 
suspect), only that the true nature of the reality they reflect remains unclear (since all 
possible perceptions of every possible combination of different atomic parts extant in the 
universe cannot be calculated with precision: Democritus actually ventured to speculate 
at some length about how an infinite variety of color might be created by endless 
iterations of his three atomic qualities).6  It is hard to avoid the impression that Plutarch is 
simplifying atomism here (to make it appear untenable) and exaggerating the difference 
between Democritus and Epicurus (to make the master look better than the pupil).
The result of Plutarch's comparison of the two atomists is revealing.  Atomism on 
the whole emerges as an untenable relativism (denying the ontological reality of 
perceived qualities that are essential to real life as imagined by Plutarch).  Contrary to 
Colotes' claim, Epicurus is dismissed as a thoroughgoing relativist with no claim to 
special knowledge about real life, a fate from which Democritus is only barely saved (by 
his arguments against Protagoras).  Plutarch's efforts to rescue Democritus are intriguing 
both for their failure and their success: in affirming the conventional nature of perceived 
qualities but denying the dogmatic relativism of Protagoras, the Abderite resists the 
absolute dichotomy that Plutarch (like Colotes) recognizes between relativism and 
realism.  Voilà our first glimpse of Democritus the paradox: a realist who sees the world 
in relative terms such that others cannot decide whether to categorize him with 
609-610 quoted in the text).
6 See Theophr. De Sensu 72-82 (= Democritus, fr. 484 Luria; fr. A135 DK).
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Protagoras (thus Colotes) or Plato (thus Plutarch here and Sextus Empiricus, who 
likewise puts idealist and atomist together as opponents of Protagoras).7
Democritus and the Good Life: Man and the Animals (i.3.1)
Plutarch's principal objective is not to quibble about physics but to articulate and 
defend a non-Epicurean vision of the good life.  We have already seen the theory on 
which he bases that life: its underpinnings are parents, gods, and λόγος (Adv. Colot. 
1108c-d, quoted above).  As material evidence of its soundness, Plutarch offers a 
catalogue of the lifework of the philosophers whose doctrine Colotes disparages.  In 
addition to proving (against Colotes) that lack of Epicureanism is no inhibition to real life 
(a negative), the catalogue also illustrates positively that the good life is grounded apart 
from Epicurean ἡδονή (which Plutarch continues to construe polemically as mere animal 
pleasure, the  insatiable greed of an uninhibited γαστήρ) and ἀταραξία (which Plutarch 
understands correctly as advocating a withdrawal from political activity).  The catalogue 
thus represents a challenge not only to Colotes (who has failed to understand earlier 
philosophers) but also to Epicurus (who has failed to understand the good life, replacing 
the active life of the ancients—a life centered on parents, gods, and λόγος—with a 
passive sloth devoted to bestial ἡδονή and unengaged ἀταραξία).
The catalogue of philosophers supporting Plutarch's active life includes several 
familiar faces: Parmenides gives laws to his πατρίς, laws that endure up to Plutarch's day, 
at least rhetorically (καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξορκοῦν τοὺς πολίτας ἐμμενεῖν τοῖς 
7 See Sext. Adv. math. 7.388-389 (= Democritus, fr. 76 Luria; fr. 181 Taylor; fr. A114 DK).
6
Παρμενίδου νόμοις: Adv. Colot. 1126b); Empedocles delivers his city from corrupt rulers 
in court and improves the local landscape to defeat barrenness and plague; Socrates 
exemplifies the supremacy of law by sacrificing his life rather than flee into exile to 
escape punishment; Melissus leads the navy of his πατρίς to victory over the Athenians; 
Plato improves on Democritus by leaving behind not only excellent writings on law and 
government (καλοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι λόγους περὶ νόμων καὶ πολιτείας ἀπέλιπε: Adv. 
Colot. 1126b-c), but also a band of ἑταῖροι whom the partisan Plutarch credits with 
liberating Sicily (where Dion took power from Dionysius the Younger, tyrant of 
Syracuse) and Thrace (where Python and Heracleides killed the tyrant Cotys) as well as 
providing Athens with generals (Chabrias and Phocion) and other Greek states with 
constitutions and rules for royal government (courtesy of Aristonymus, Phormio, 
Menedemus, Eudoxus, Aristotle, Xenocrates, and Delius); the last record of achievement 
goes to Zeno, the pupil of Parmenides, who fails to kill Demylus but is ultimately content 
to bite off his own tongue and spit it in the tyrant's face, providing an excuse for Plutarch 
to emphasize the moral of the whole catalogue:    
TEXT (Einarson & De Lacy) TRANSLATION (Einarson & De Lacy)
καὶ ἀπέδειξεν ἔργοις ὅτι τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀνδρὶ 
μεγάλῳ  φοβερόν  ἐστιν,  ἀλγηδόνα  δὲ 
παῖδες  καὶ  γύναια  καὶ  γυναίων  ψυχὰς 
ἔχοντες ἄνδρες δεδίασι
[Zeno] demonstrated by the evidence of 
deeds that what a great man fears is shame, 
whereas pain is feared by children and 
weak women and men with such women's 
souls
Plut. Adv. Colot. 1126e
The contrast between ancient philosophers' ἔργα and Epicurean ἀταραξία is clear here, 
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like the contrast between Zeno's indifference to fear and pain and the Epicurean addiction 
to pleasure.  Another rhetorical coup for Plutarch.  But where is Democritus?  As it 
happens, he occurs first in the list, where his one notable achievement is to recommend 
the study of war and the pursuit of hard work (παραινεῖ τήν τε πολεμικὴν τέχνην 
μεγίστην οὖσαν ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι καὶ τοὺς πόνους διώκειν, ἀφ' ὧν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ 
γίνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: Adv. Colot. 1126a).  While this contribution is enough to set the 
Abderite at variance with Epicurus (who has no stomach for πόνοι, πολεμικὴ τέχνη, or 
the μεγάλα καὶ λαμπρὰ that come from them), it is remarkably tame when compared with 
the great deeds that come after, and remarkably sparse when compared with even the 
scraps of moral and ethical thought that survive from Democritus' writings.8  Why leave 
those other writings out of the record here?  Why omit all reference to Democritus' 
Nachleben through various students (including at least one, Nausiphanes, who put a 
positive value on the public life that Plutarch is championing)?9  The obvious inference to 
draw is that Democritean ideas might not square nicely with the dichotomy between 
civilized philosophical life and bestial Epicurean life that Plutarch constructs.  As it 
happens, we have evidence that supports this inference.  Among numerous ancient 
testimonia attesting Democritus' interest in animals are several that compare animals 
favorably to human in ethical contexts.  The most pointed of these is preserved by 
Plutarch (in a different treatise):
8 See Democritus, frr. 595-732 Luria.
9 For more on the career and teaching of Nausiphanes, see Warren (2002), 160-192.
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TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
γελοῖοι δ' ἴσως ἐσμὲν ἐπὶ τῶι μανθάνειν τὰ 
ζῷα  σεμνύνοντες,  ὧν  ὁ  Δημόκριτος 
ἀποφαίνει  μαθητὰς  ἐν  τοῖς  μεγίστοις 
γεγονότας ἡμᾶς· ἀράχνης ἐν ὑφαντικῆι καὶ 
ἀκεστικῆι,  χελιδόνος  ἐν  οἰκοδομίαι,  καὶ 
τῶν  λιγυρῶν,  κύκνου  καὶ  ἀηδόνος,  ἐν 
ὠιδῆι κατὰ μίμησιν.
Perhaps we are ridiculous to make a fuss 
about  animals  who  can  learn,  when 
Democritus  shows  that  in  the  most 
important  things  we  have  learned  from 
them,  spinning  and  mending  from  the 
spider,  housebuilding  from  the  swallow, 
and  singing  by  imitation  from songbirds, 
the swan and the nightingale.
Democritus, fr. 559 Luria 
     = fr. 187a Taylor
     = fr. B154 DK
Plut. De sollert. animal. 20, p. 974a
  
This Democritean testimonium takes a positive view of animals, giving them priority 
over humans in developing some of the more prominent τέχναι characteristic of human 
civilization.  Other testimonia flesh out this assessment, making animals participants with 
mankind in λόγος (see fr. 448 Luria) and δίκη (see frr. 620-622 Luria), not to mention the 
business of child-rearing (fr. 562 Luria) and the perception of εἴδωλα that we call divine 
(fr. 572 Luria).10  This positive view of animal nature in Democritean thought contrasts 
starkly with the position Plutarch takes to oppose Epicurus:
TEXT (Einarson & De Lacy) TRANSLATION (Einarson & De Lacy)
καὶ γὰρ ὁ τῶν θηρίων βίος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν 
ὅτι  τῆς  ἡδονῆς  οὐδὲν  ἑπίσταται  κάλλιον 
οὐδὲ  δίκην  θεῶν οἶδεν  οὐδὲ  σέβεται  τῆς 
ἀρετῆς  τὸ  κάλλος,  ἀλλ'  εἴ  τι  θαρραλέον 
αὐτοῖς  ἢ  πανοῦργον  ἢ  δραστήριον  ἐκ 
φύσεως ἔνεστι, τούτῳ πρὸς ἡδονὴν σαρκὸς
Indeed, wild animals lead the kind of life 
that  they  do  because  they  have  no 
knowledge  of  anything  higher  than 
pleasure,  no  conception  of  divine  justice, 
and no reverence for the intrinsic worth of 
virtue; they use instead whatever natural 
10 τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεποίηκεν εἴδωλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προσπίπτοντα καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώιοις ἀπὸ τῆς θείας 
ουσίας (Clem. Strom. 5.88 = fr. 572 Luria).  The problem of the divine in Democritean thought is not 
simple: at the stage, the most we can say is that other testimonia confirm the physical reality of 
perceptible images commonly identified as being divine (see frr. 472a, 581 Luria).   
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καὶ ἀποπλήρωσιν ὀρέξεως χρῆται … gifts  they  have  of  boldness,  cunning,  or 
industry  to  get  pleasure  of  the  flesh  and 
satisfaction of the appetite …
Plut. Adv. Colot. 1125a
Unlike Democritus' animals, Plutarch's have no part in the philosophical life.  Their 
achievements are vitiated by the fact that they aim for nothing but fleshly ἡδονή (a cut at 
Epicurus), and they certainly have no share in human λόγος (which inhibits ἡδονή in 
Plutarch's formulation, as already seen).  The only philosophy they can profess is that of 
Epicurus (recognizable from Adv. Colot. 1108c-d):
TEXT (Einarson & De Lacy) TRANSLATION (Einarson & De Lacy)
καὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ δόγματα λόγων 
καὶ  γραμμάτων  ἀπορίαι  τὰ  θηρία 
βρυχήμασι καὶ χρεμετισμοῖς καὶ μυκήμασι 
δηλοῖ,  καὶ  πᾶσα  φωνὴ  γαστρός  ἐστιν 
αὐτοῖς καὶ σαρκὸς ἡδονὴν ἀσπαζομένη καὶ 
σαίνουσα παροῦσαν ἢ μέλλουσαν, εἰ μή τι 
φύσει φιλόφωνόν ἐστι καὶ κωτίλον.
It is these feelings and these doctrines that 
the brutes for want of speech and writing 
express by roars and whinnies and lowings; 
and  every  sound  they  utter  serves  to 
welcome and fawn upon present or future 
pleasure of the belly and the flesh, except 
for  the  few who  have  an  inborn  love  of 
song and chatter.
Plut. Adv. Colot. 1125b-c
 
This seems like a rhetorically brilliant position for Plutarch, but it is not as perfect as it 
looks.  First, the proximate source for the πάθη καὶ δόγματα espoused by Plutarch's 
inarticulate Epicurean beasts is not Epicurus himself but Metrodorus of Chios (καθάπερ 
οἴεται δεῖν ὁ σοφὸς Μητρόδωρος: Adv. Colot. 1125b), whom Clement of Alexandria 
(Strom. 1.64.4), Eusebius (Praep. Evang. 14.17.10), and Diogenes Laertius (9.58) all 
identify as a Democritean.11  This raises (and promptly ignores) the fact that the 
11 See frr. lxxxi-lxxxii Luria.  The lineage is construed differently by different sources, but it is not hard to 
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Epicureanism Plutarch ridicules is not exclusively Epicurean: it shares attitudes and 
outlooks with other worldviews, including worldviews associated with Democritus (who 
certainly provided its foundations in theoretical physics).  Then there is the awkward 
concession that some beasts “have an inborn love of song and chatter” (εἰ μή τι φύσει 
φιλόφωνόν ἐστι καὶ κωτίλον), a observation that undermines their alleged lack of λόγος 
(since Plutarch does not distinguish clearly between λόγος as speech and λόγος as 
rational thought) and recalls Democritus' positive assessment of songbirds.  Why include 
this potentially problematic observation at all?  Perhaps Plutarch needed to indicate 
awareness of atomist positions that he did not want to cross-examine too closely, thus 
dealing with a Democritus he did not wish to refute—accepting the early atomist's high 
regard for the active life as an indictment of Epicureanism and fobbing his elevation of 
animal morality off on Metrodorus (who may have made the hatchet job easier by not 
explicitly invoking the Abderite in the passage referenced by Plutarch).
Voilà Democritus the paradox: he unites a high view of civilized human activity 
(which Plutarch here affirms) with a concomitantly high valuation of animal morality 
(which Plutarch here ignores), thinking like antiquity's earliest Cynic or Epicurean 
without actually becoming such (since his attitude towards social conventions and 
political engagement remains more constructive than either of the later positions allows).  
A civic-minded Stoic or Platonist (like Plutarch) could find common ground with him 
where his most obvious successors might not. 
reconcile them if we allow that Metrodorus read the atomist's books and associated with more than one 
of his other acolytes.
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Democritus and the Good Life: Theories of Pleasure (i.3.2)
Democritus' fondness for animals is not the only thing Plutarch casts in the 
shadows to make the atomist a strong advocate for his philosophical life.  He also ignores 
the Abderite's problematic attitude toward pleasure, an attitude whose Epicurean flavor 
appears clearly in testimonia like the following:
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
ὅρος συμφορέων καὶ ἀσυμφορέων τέρψις 
καὶ ἀτερπίη.  (Taylor)
Joy and sorrow are the distinguishing mark 
of things beneficial and harmful. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. D26 Taylor
     = fr. 734 Luria
     = fr. B188 DK
Stob. 3.1.46
Δημόκριτος  δὲ  γάμον  καὶ  παιδοποιίαν 
παραιτεῖται  διὰ  τὰς  πολλὰς  ἐξ  αὐτῶν 
ἀηδίας …  (Luria)
Democritus advised against marriage and 
having children as causing much 
unpleasantness … (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. 723 Luria
     = fr. 191 Taylor
     = fr. A170 DK
Clem. Strom. 2.138
Stobaeus quotes Democritus to the effect that pleasure is a definitive characteristic of 
human reality, and Clement shows how Democritus applies that idea to practical 
situations, recommending against private entanglements much as Epicurus later 
recommends against public ones.12  Before we rush to identify Democritus as a partisan 
on the side of Colotes, however, we must acknowledge the existence of further 
12 Other positive valuations of pleasure occur in the Democritean testimonia: for examples, see frr. 748, 
751, 757, 786, 788, 790, 795 Luria. 
12
Democritean testimonia which are as ascetic as anything Plutarch writes. One example:
TEXT (Taylor) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
ὅσοι  ἀπὸ  γαστρὸς  τὰς  ἡδονὰς  ποιέονται 
ὑπερβεβληκότες  τὸν καιρὸν ἐπὶ βρώσεσιν 
ἢ πόσεσιν ἢ ἀφροδισίοισιν, τοῖσι πᾶσιν αἱ 
μὲν  ἡδοναὶ  βραχεῖαί  τε  καὶ  δι'  ὀλίγου 
γίνονται,  ὁκόσον  ἂν  χρόνον  ἐσθίωσιν  ἢ 
πίνωσιν,  αἱ  δὲ  λῦπαι  πολλαί.   τοῦτο  μὲν 
γὰρ τὸ  ἐπιθυμεῖν  ἀεὶ  τῶν αὐτῶν πάρεστι 
καὶ  ὁκόταν  γένηται  ὁκοίων  ἐπιθυμέουσι, 
διὰ  ταχέος  τε  ἡ  ἡδονὴ  παροίχεται,  καὶ 
οὐδὲν  ἐν  αὐτοῖσι  χρηστόν  ἐστιν  ἀλλ'  ἢ 
τέρψις βραχεῖα, καὶ αὖθις τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖ.
Those who take their pleasures from their 
belly, exceeding what is appropriate in food 
or  drink  or  sex,  to  all  of  them  their 
pleasures are meagre and brief, lasting just 
so long as they are eating and drinking, and 
their pains are many.  For this desire for the 
same thing is always with them, even when 
they get what they desire, and the pleasure 
soon passes, and they have no profit except 
brief delight, and then they need the same 
things again.
Democritus, fr. B235 DK
     = fr. D99 Taylor
     = fr. 750 Luria
Stob. 3.18.35
On the one hand, Democritus' disdain for ἡδοναί coming from the γαστήρ is precisely in 
line with Plutarch's anti-Epicurean polemic (see Adv. Colot. 1108c-d).  On the other, the 
positive rhetoric of pleasure that the atomist employs to dismiss gastric ἡδοναί flies in the 
face of the approach that Plutarch adopts to neutralize Colotes.13  For Democritus (as for 
later Epicureans), pleasure is bad when it precludes greater pleasure: as Christopher 
Taylor (1967) has it, stable accumulation of pleasure trumps momentary experiences of it, 
no matter how intense the latter may be.14  This does not fit Plutarch's position against 
Colotes, which avoids the need to distinguish different kinds of pleasure in the good life 
13 In Adv. Colot. 1108c-d, λόγος inhibits ἐπιθυμίαι without distinction, and there is no positive value 
assigned to ἡδονή (which is at best only morally neutral).
14 The Cyrenaics invert this approach, preferring temporary instances of pleasure to long-term 
accumulation.
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by making all of them unreservedly subject to philosophical λόγος, the governing reason 
that guarantees the integrity of δίκη and νόμος.15 In brief, Democritus construes a moral 
universe where pleasure is a meaningful ὅρος (fr. D26 Taylor); in Plutarch's world, on the 
other hand, the only important ethical ὅρος is the philosophers' λόγος, rendering pleasure 
a distraction that is at best neutral, at worst destructive (Adv. Colot. 1108c-d, 1124d-
1125a).  Predictably, given the polemical nature of the Πρὸς Κωλώτην, bad pleasure gets 
a lot more attention from Plutarch than neutral, and Democritus' embarrassing 
concessions to the Epicurean idea that pleasure might be something good in itself gets 
swept under the rug without comment.
Voilà Democritus the paradox again: he unites a positive doctrine of pleasure with 
intense asceticism (combining Plutarch's philistine Epicurus with Parmenidean Zeno the 
would-be tyrannicide) and once more bridges gaps between later extremes (e.g. indulgent 
Epicureanism and ascetic Stoicism).  He does this without making himself obviously 
liable to charges of Cyrenaic or Epicurean hedonism (judging from the testimonia and the 
fact that Plutarch feels safe ignoring his ideas on pleasure in the Πρὸς Κωλώτην, where 
extreme views would demand a more active intervention to save the atomist as an 
advocate for the philosophical life as opposed to the Epicurean).
15 See Adv. Colot. 1108c-d (quoted above) and 1124d-1125a: ἂν γὰρ ἀνελών τις τοὺς νόμους τὰ Παρμενί-
δου καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἡρακλείτου καὶ Πλάτωνος ἀπολίπῃ δόγματα, πολλοῦ δεήσομεν ἀλλήλους 
κατεσθίειν καὶ θηρίων βίον ζῆν· φοβησόμεθα γὰρ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τιμήσομεν ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ δικαιοσύνην, 
θεοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δαίμονας ἔχειν τοῦ βίου φύλακας ἡγούμενοι καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς καὶ ὑπὸ 
γῆν χρυσὸν ἀρετῆς ἀντάξιον μὴ τιθέμενοι καὶ ποιοῦντες ἑκουσίως διὰ τὸν λόγον, ᾗ φησι Ξενοκράτης, 
ἃ νῦν ἄκοντες διὰ τὸν νόμον.
14
Solving the Paradox (i.4)
Thus far, my investigation is just a collection of interesting anomalies: a catalogue 
of ways that Democritus flouts philosophical distinctions applied (none too rigorously) in 
antiquity.  Read against extant fragments of Democritus, the Πρὸς Κωλώτην brings these 
anomalies forward, revealing elements in the early atomist's thought that do not square 
comfortably with (1) Epicureanism, certainly his most well-known legacy, (2) Cynicism, 
where he likewise appears to have made a constructive impression,16 or (3) Skepticism, 
where his writings found an audience in Pyrrho17 and Sextus Empiricus.18  Reading the 
Πρὸς Κωλώτην against the Democritean testimonia shows us how Democritus precedes 
historical developments that separated pleasure from reason, man from animals, and 
ethical idealism from physical materialism.  But the Πρὸς Κωλώτην does more than this: 
its greatest contribution to the memory of Democritus is to invoke him (albeit none too 
loudly, since for reasons already discussed he is not Plutarch's best witness) in a practical, 
commonsense discussion of human life (τὸ ζῆν)—specifically, a discussion of what it 
means to live well (τὸ εὖ ζῆν: Adv. Colot. 1108c-d).  The modern ivory tower did not 
exist in Democritus' day: fifth-century Greek philosophers were men of action, fighting 
wars, governing cities, and (in Democritus' case) composing books that balanced 
Aristophanean cloud-walking with a healthy dose of practical know-how.19  Active 
16 See Stewart (1958).
17 See Diog. 9.67 and von Fritz (1963).
18 See Sext. Adv. math. 7.53, 116-117, 135, 137, 138-139, 140, 265, 321, 349, 369, 388-389; 8.6, 56, 184, 
327; 9.19, 24, 42, 112-113, 363; 10.181, 252-256, 318; Pyrrh. hypot. 1.23; 2.23, 63; 3.32.   
19 Note the titles collected under the rubric technical works (τεχνικά) in the Thrasyllan booklist (Diog. 
9.48 = fr. cxv Luria) as well as Plutarch's reference to his writings on war and politics (Adv. Colot. 
1126a).
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varieties of the human life were not a purely theoretical concern for these men (a point 
which Plutarch exploits to good effect against Colotes).  The Πρὸς Κωλώτην provides 
important insights into the active philosophical life of the fifth century.  Consider the 
following assessment of Parmenides:
TEXT (Einarson & De Lacy) TRANSLATION (Einarson & De Lacy)
ὅς  γε  καὶ  διάκοσμον  πεποίηται,  καὶ 
στοιχεῖα μιγνὺς τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ σκοτεινὸν 
ἐκ  τούτων  τὰ  φαινόμενα  πάντα  καὶ  διὰ 
τούτων ἀποτελεῖ.  καὶ γὰρ περὶ γῆς εἴρηκε 
πολλὰ  καὶ  περὶ  οὐρανοῦ  καὶ  ἡλίου  καὶ 
σελήνης  καὶ  ἄστρων  καὶ  γένεσιν 
ἀνθρώπων  ἀφήγηται  καὶ  οὐδὲν  ἄρρητον, 
ὡς  ἀνὴρ  ἀρχαῖος  ἐν  φυσιολογίαι  καὶ 
συνθεὶς  γραφὴν  ἰδίαν,  οὐκ  ἀλλοτρίαν 
διαφορῶν, τῶν κυρίων παρῆκεν.
He  [Parmenides]  has  actually  made  a 
cosmic order, and by blending as elements 
the light and the dark produces out of them 
and by their operation the whole world of 
sense.   Thus  he  has  much  to  say  about 
earth,  heaven,  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  and 
has recounted the genesis of man; and for 
an  ancient  natural  philosopher—who  has 
put forward a book of his own, and is not 
pulling apart the book of another—he has 
left nothing of real importance unsaid.
Plut. Adv. Colot. 1114b-c
Parmenides is credited with a written account of the world, including the genesis of man.  
Plutarch calls this work a διάκοσμος, and finds it typical of an ancient natural philosopher 
(ἀνὴρ ἀρχαῖος ἐν φυσιολογίαι), indicating that it stands in a tradition.  In the context of 
our current discussion, this immediately calls to mind two physics books credited to 
Democritus in the Thrasyllan booklist preserved by Diogenes Laertius (9.46): the Μέγας 
διάκοσμος (which Theophrastus' disciples ascribe to Leucippus) and the Μικρὸς 
διάκοσμος.  Ancient doxography has the former work as his best (ἁπάντων τῶν αὐτοῦ 
συγγραμμάτων προέχει), noting that it earned his estate some income from public 
reading (Diog. 9.39).  Impossible as it is to say anything definitive about the content or 
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authorship of either διάκοσμος (besides noting that Thrasyllus puts them among τὰ 
φυσικά in the corpus ascribed to Democritus), it is hard not to see them as parallel to the 
Parmenidean διάκοσμος referred to by Plutarch.  Presumably, given Plutarch's assertion 
that Parmenides' work left nothing important unsaid (οὐδὲν ἄρρητον … τῶν κυρίων 
παρῆκεν), that work was not wholly unrelated to the νόμοι ἄριστοι that were the Eleatic's 
greatest legacy to posterity.  Plutarch lends deliberate strength to this presumption: 
Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδα διεκόσμησε νόμοις ἄριστοις (Adv. Colot. 1126a-b).  
Granting Plutarch's assertion that Parmenides wrote a διάκοσμος with ethical 
implications, is it not at least likely that at least one of the Democritean διάκοσμοι came 
similarly endowed?  As an ἀνὴρ ἀρχαῖος ἐν φυσιολογίαι, is it not likely that Democritus 
(and/or Leucippus) would have concerned himself with the business of human life as 
assiduously as he treated the physical principles that make it possible?
Plutarch strengthens the case for a solid pre-Socratic nexus between (practical) 
ethics and (theoretical) physics when he identifies the single, overarching question asked 
by πάντες οἱ φύσικοι (Adv. Colot. 1119b):
TEXT (Einarson & De Lacy) TRANSLATION (Einarson & De Lacy)
φέρε τίς ὢν οὗτος ὁ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω; πότερον 
ὡς κρᾶμα, τὸ μεμιγμένον ἔκ τε τῆς ψυχῆς 
καὶ  τοῦ  σώματος,  ἢ  μᾶλλον  ἡ  ψυχὴ  τῷ 
σώματι  χρωμένη,  καθάπερ  ἱππεὺς  ἀνὴρ 
ἵππῳ χρώμενος, οὐ τὸ ἐξ ἵππου καὶ ἀνδρός; 
ἢ  τῆς  ψυχῆς  κυριώτατον,  ὧι  φρονοῦμεν 
καὶ  λογιζόμεθα  καὶ  πράττομεν,  ἕκαστος 
ἡμῶν ἐστι,  τὰ  δὲ  λοιπὰ  καὶ  ψυχῆς  μόρια 
πάντα καὶ σώματος ὄργανα τῆς τούτου 
Let  me  see  now,  what  am I  in  fact,  this 
thing  called  I?   Am  I  like  a  blend,  the 
combination  of  this  soul  with  this  body? 
Or am I rather my soul using my body, as a 
horseman  is  a  man  using  a  horse,  not  a 
compound of horse and man?  Or is each of 
us  not  the  soul,  but  the  chief  part  of  the 
soul, by which we think and reason and act, 
all the other parts of soul as well as body 
being mere instruments of its power?  Or is 
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δυνάμεως; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία 
ψυχῆς  ἀλλ'  αὐτὸ  τὸ  σῶμα  κεκραμένον 
ἔσχηκε τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ ζῆν δύναμιν;
there no substance of soul at  all,  and has 
the  body  unaided  acquired  by  its 
composition the power of thought and life?
Plut. Adv. Colot. 1119a-b
This question resonates strongly with the Democritean corpus.  The fifth-century CE 
grammarian Orion of Thebes and a Homeric scholiast record that the atomist interpreted 
the divine name Athena Tritogeneia as referring to the trilogy of proper thought, speech, 
and action,20 echoing the part of Plutarch's question that wonders whether we are the 
governing part of our ψυχή, the part “by which we think and reason and act” (ᾧ 
φρονοῦμεν καὶ λογιζόμεθα καὶ πράττομεν).  The Thrasyllan booklist includes a treatise 
entitled Τριτογένεια among the ethical writings of Democritus; this treatise is glossed as 
containing three things from the goddess which comprise all of human affairs (τρία ... ἐξ 
αὐτῆς ἃ πάντα ἀνθρώπινα συνέχει: Diog. 9.46).  It is difficult not to conclude that this 
book dealt on some level with the human question Plutarch finds central to the early 
Greek science practiced by φύσικοι.
The foregoing gives us reason to suspect that Democritus was concerned (at least 
practically) with ethics, and that he treated ethics from a standpoint informed by his 
physics (which like their Parmenidean counterpart construed a διάκοσμος with moral 
implications for man).  For historical reasons, this suspicion has not been exhaustively 
20 Τριτογένεια ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ κατὰ Δημόκριτον φρόνησις νομίζεται.  γίνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ φρονεῖν τρία ταῦτα· 
βουλεύεσθαι καλῶς, λέγειν ἀναμαρτήτως καὶ πράττειν ἃ δεῖ (Etym. Orion. 153.5).  Δημόκριτος δὲ 
ἐτυμολογῶν τὸ ὂνομά [Τριτογένεια] φησιν, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῆς φρονήσεως τρία ταῦτα συμβαίνει· τὸ εὖ 
λογίζεσθαι, τὸ εὖ λέγειν καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἃ δεῖ (Schol. Genev. 1.111 Nicole = Democritus, fr. 822 
Luria).  
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investigated by modern scholarship.  The primary impediment to investigation has been 
the disorganized survival of Democritus, whose historical remains are scattered thin over 
a wide range of ancient authors that cite him piecemeal to make divergent points of their 
own.  Philosophers outside atomist tradition (like Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Sextus 
Empiricus) cite him to make their own philosophical arguments.  Within his tradition, 
Epicurus cites him only to correct his physics (as being overly deterministic), and builds 
his own ethics around the non-Democritean idea of the atomic swerve.  Doctors (like 
Galen) and natural historians (like Aelian) cite him to make physiological (physical, 
biological) arguments.  Moralists (like Stobaeus) cite him to make ethical arguments.  
Inevitably, any original unity in the Democritean concept of the universe (διάκοσμος) is 
obscured—not because it was never there, but because later authors do not need it to 
make their own arguments (which come from worldviews that are not Democritean, for 
all that they may resemble the Democritean διάκοσμος in certain aspects).   
Picking up where Democritus' ancient readers left off, modern scholarship has 
been understandably hesitant to unify all the little pieces of the early atomist διάκοσμος 
scattered among the literary remains of antiquity.  Historically, modern readers of 
Democritus show a tendency to fall into two camps.  Some scholars have found it 
profitable to make Democritean ethics (and the considerable collection of Democritean 
ethical fragments) a field unto itself, unique and separate from early atomist physics.21  
21 E.g. Dyroff (1899), Zeller (1919-1923), Bailey (1928), Alfieri (1936), Stella (1942), Mesiano (1951), 
Colvin (1974), Procopé (1989, 1990), Taylor (1967, 1999, 2007), Lanzillota (2001).  Scholars who 
separate ethics and physics in early atomism do so in different ways, for different reasons.  According 
to Dyroff, Zeller, Bailey, and Alfieri, Democritus never imagined any continuity between physics and 
ethics: any continuity apparent in the fragments is purely specious, an accident that we should not take 
seriously.  According to Mesiano and Stella, Democritus originally envisioned physics and ethics as a 
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Others have looked for evidence of continuity in early atomist thought about physics and 
ethics.22  There has been some dialogue between the two camps, e.g. when Taylor (1967) 
attempted to debunk Vlastos (1945, 1946),23 but no consensus has been reached.  It has 
even been stated that the problem (of defining the relationship between early atomist 
physics and ethics) is insoluble.24  I do not believe this.  To me it seems that we stand on 
the brink of an important synthesis: over the past two centuries modern scholarship has 
carefully sifted all that remains of the early atomists' legacy (in physics and ethics and all 
the other sciences to which they contributed), and we are at last ready to begin putting the 
fragments together as they originally fit—not only with one another, but with the broader 
cultural milieu in which they grew up (a milieu which produced more than one διάκοσμος 
as different Greek thinkers grappled with the problem of how to explain existence).  
Toward the accomplishment of that synthesis, I offer this study.
unity and approached both from the same first principles, but then contradicted himself when his 
investigation revealed a physics denying free will and an ethics demanding it.  (Notice how well this 
interpretation lends itself to a vindication of Epicurus, who solves the contradiction that stumps 
Democritus.)  Colvin, Procopé and Lanzillota avoid the problem by ignoring atomist physics and 
concentrating entirely on ethics—though Colvin does offer a small appendix discussing the 
disagreement between Vlastos (1945, 1946) and Taylor (1967).  My study takes many valuable insights 
from all these scholars, but it rejects their conclusion (where offered) that ethics and physics were 
separate matters for the early atomists, and it challenges the Epicurean narrative that Democritean 
atomism necessarily created the dichotomy between absolute physical determinism and ethical free will 
that Epicurus solved with the swerve.
22 E.g. Natorp (1893), Reinhardt (1912), Uxkull-Gyllenband (1924), Vlastos (1945, 1946), Mugler 
(1959), Luria (1964), Cole (1967), Sassi (1978), Mueller (1980), Thrams (1986), Warren (2002).  These 
scholars all see the early atomists positing the existence of a physical world whose natural 
characteristics give rise inevitably to certain moral patterns (including human beings and societies).  
My study follows this tradition of thought in modern scholarship, with special thanks to Cole, Mueller, 
and Thrams, whose readings of several key texts coincide with my own.
23 When Sassi (1978) accepted Vlastos (1945, 1946) over his original objections, Taylor (1999) offered 
another rebuttal (this one more cautious) to those who see atomist physical doctrine lurking behind 
Democritean ethical fragments in any cogent or explicit manner. 
24 Thus Warren (2002, 72).
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The distinguishing feature of my work is its historical approach to the διάκοσμος 
that features so prominently in the titles of early atomist books.  My first and second 
chapters explore the historical milieu in which the early atomist διάκοσμος arises and 
takes shape, showing that it is merely one of many articulate world-orders created by 
Greek thinkers prior to and contemporary with Leucippus and Democritus.  My third and 
fourth chapters build on the first and second to situate early atomist physics and ethics 
properly relative to one another.  In my view, the early atomists follow established 
tradition in positing a world-order with certain constants and/or inconstants that obtain 
universally (crossing all boundaries posed by human understanding, including the 
boundaries that we moderns point to with words like ethics and physics).  Recognizing 
this fact explicitly allows me to formulate a much clearer idea of early atomist thought 
than I have found elsewhere, and to offer what I believe is the most thorough and 
thoroughly integrated reading of the early atomist corpus to date.25  In simple terms, when 
we put the early atomist διάκοσμος together using prior and contemporary διάκοσμοι as a 
guide, Democritus the man makes a good deal of sense—and Democritus the paradox is 
revealed to be a straw man created by later authors (whether modern or ancient) more 
interested in their own arguments than in early atomism. 
25 The well-read student will find my interpretation of early atomist physics and psychology anticipated 
in Mugler (1959) and Vlastos (1945, 1956), and hammered out at greater length in Sassi (1978).  He 
will see my perspective on material necessity anticipated in Cole (1967), Mueller (1980), and Drozdek 
(2007).  He will see my understanding of atomist happiness anticipated by Lanzillota (2001).  But he 
will not find any historical study of the entire early atomist διάκοσμος as explicit and comprehensive as 
mine, which is the first (that I am aware of) to treat Democritean ethics and physics as a unity whose 
continuity does not necessarily require the swerve of Epicurus to make sense.
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CHAPTER 1. BEFORE THE ATOMISTS
Introduction: Context (1.1)
Every human artifact comes from a particular cultural environment, a unique 
confluence in time and space.  When confronted with an unfamiliar artifact, particularly 
something as complicated and wrought as a written text, scholars in the classical tradition 
historically make every effort to place it in the context where it originated, examining its 
relationship to the unique set of spatio-temporal circumstances that called it into being.  
Even if a careful examination of these circumstances fails to reveal the original purpose 
of the artifact perfectly, it can restrict the field of possible uses, separating blatantly 
anachronistic interpretations of the artifact from interpretations that are at least plausible.  
Then a history of the artifact can be constructed, showing its reception from creation to 
the present and tracing the evolution of its use over time.
Unfortunately, the textual artifacts created by Democritus exist only as scattered 
fragments quoted or summarized by later authors.  Naturally, these authors present the 
ideas of Democritus in terms that make sense to them (not necessarily to the atomist or 
his original public), and it is not always obvious where interpretation overshadows  the 
original thought.  There is also the problem of false attribution: some people took nothing 
more from Democritus than his name, attempting to claim the authority of a well-
published ancient for their own work rather than let the latter stand alone on its merits 
(Diog. 9.49).  In this situation, with only pieces of our original artifacts extant and those 
pieces mingled with foreign material, contextualization is still the best interpretive 
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strategy.  The more we know about the situation in which Democritus wrote, the more 
sense authentic remnants of his thought will make for us, and the nearer that sense will 
approach the author's original meaning (before latecomers adapted it to suit their own 
disparate ends).  This requires two things: (1) a general idea of the immediate cultural 
environment that Democritus inhabited (fifth-century Abdera and its environs); and (2) a 
more specific idea of the larger philosophical tradition (starting with Thales in the sixth 
century) in which Democritus stands.1  Having a clear picture of the circumstances that 
gave birth to Democritean atomism will ground this study, focusing attention on matters 
significant to the original author (and so helping me to identify his ideas in the received 
corpus of fragments and interpret them as he or one of his first readers might have done).  
This will minimize the authority allotted to extraneous, inauthentic material (whether 
later interpretation or interpolation) and ensure the historical plausibility of my 
reconstruction of the early atomist's thought.
Fifth-century Abdera (1.2)
Located near the mouth of the river Nestus on the Thracian seaboard, fifth-century 
Abdera occupied an important position in the web of cultural exchange connecting the 
Greek peoples (and their trading partners) to neighboring Thracians and Macedonians.  
The πόλις Democritus knew was one of at least two foundations on a geographically 
attractive region (furnished with two harbors, plenty of fresh water, fertile earth for 
cultivating grain, and a rich supply of silver and gold).  The city's name suggests a 
Phoenician origin (perhaps a trading post), and the historical record includes a failed 
1 I refer to this tradition throughout as the Critical Tradition.  See section 1.3 below.
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seventh-century colony from Clazomenae (destroyed by Thracians) before the colony 
from Teos that created Democritus' hometown in the sixth century (circa 544 BCE).2  In 
Democritus' day (before the fourth century), Abderan silver was coined and circulated 
widely: it appears in Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and even further afield, showing that 
Democritus' Abdera was well-connected to long-distance, cross-cultural trade networks.3  
Relations with the Persians were diffident: on the one hand, Abdera owed its second 
foundation to the Tean colonists' determination to avoid submitting to Cyrus II, and the 
colony maintained a very close relationship with her metropolis (which participated in the 
Ionian Revolt that began in 499).4  On the other hand, when Xerxes I brought his army 
across the Hellespont to invade the Peloponnesus in the year 480, he bivouacked in 
Abderan territory (Herodot. 7.120) and made a solemn pact of friendship (ξεινίη) with the 
city during his retreat (Herodot. 8.120).5  This agreement did not stop Democritus' fellow-
citizens from joining the Delian League, where their yearly contribution put them among 
the richest Athenian tributaries;6 and in 431, the Abderite Nymphodorus helped to 
increase Athenian power in the region even further by brokering a treaty between Athens 
and the Thracian king Sitalces (Thuc. 2.29).  It is unclear whether Abdera remained 
2 Herodot. 1.168; Graham (1992), 44-53; Freeman (1950), 221-239; OCD s.v. “Abdera.”   
3 May (1966), 1-4.  May interprets Egyptian finds as emanating from Ionian traders at Naucratis (who 
exchanged silver for grain imported by the Ionian cities of Asia Minor) and speculates that Syrian and 
Mesopotamian finds may have come through Tyre and Sidon with Greek or Phoenician traders.  The 
most distant finds come from modern Afghanistan, where it appears they were brought by Persians 
(like Darius I, who included an Abderan tetradrachm in the foundation deposit of the Apadana in 
Persepolis). 
4 Graham (1992).
5 The Abderites reported that the king sealed this agreement with gifts (a golden sword and tiara), 
following long-standing Greek custom (e.g. Homer, Il. 6.215-236).
6 Graham (1992), 59-62; OCD s.v. “Abdera.” Abdera's tribute was regularly 15 talents until it was 
reduced to 10 in 432/1.  It may also have been paying tribute to the Odrysian kingdom (Thracian) at the 
same time.
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faithful to Athens for the duration of the Peloponnesian War: all we know is that the city 
started minting coins to a Peloponnesian standard in the year 411 (after the rebellion of 
Athens' Ionian allies that began at Chios in 412).7  Leaving the fifth century behind, 
Abdera survived being sacked by Thracians (in 375)8 to become part of the empire ruled 
by Philip I of Macedon.9  What little we know of the political institutions of Abdera 
throughout this period makes it a typical πόλις, with legal procedures for allocating 
periodic magistracies (including important local priesthoods) and some kind of popular 
assembly controlling at least the courts.10  
The foregoing locates Democritus in a cultural environment that is at once diverse 
and dynamic.  Seen in terms of diversity, it includes multiple locations (some as near 
Abdera as the neighboring Thracian court, some as far away as Athens, Egypt, or 
Persepolis), multiple ethnicities (Greek, Thracian, Macedonian, and Persian, as well as 
others), and many different sources of culture (artifacts and people from all over the 
ancient near East).  Seen in terms of power, it is precarious: the balance of power in 
Abdera belongs to no person or persons for more than a few years, and it does not require 
much to upset the status quo, filling the city with armed Persians, Thracians, or Greeks 
allied with different internal political factions.  The threat of annihilation, already present 
7 May (1966), 177-183.  This has been interpreted by some to indicate that Abdera joined the revolt, but 
until further evidence appears this is merely speculation.
8 The invaders (Triballians) were not Abdera's Thracian allies (Odrysians), but some accounts of the 
conflict have these allies deserting at a crucial moment, assuring the invaders' victory.  The Athenian 
general Chabrias was instrumental in putting the city back on its feet; under his tutelage, Abdera joined 
the Second Athenian League.  See Freeman (1950); May (1966), 241-242, 266.
9 May (1966) supports the consensus that Philip acquired Abdera during the Thracian campaign that 
followed his taking Olynthus in 348 (286-287).
10 Graham (1992), 53-57; Liddel (2010), 120.  
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in the tale of the original colony from Clazomenae, is never absent.  In this situation, it is 
not always clear what words and gestures mean: solemn friendship with the Persian king, 
or the Thracians, or Athens might be a serious undertaking or a political feint, a 
democratic motion from the people or the decision of a powerful aristocrat like 
Nymphodorus.  This will be an important point to keep in mind.
The Critical Philosophical Tradition (1.3)
In many ways, the story of the philosophical tradition that enters history with 
Thales (referred to from this point forward as the Critical Tradition)11 is the story of 
Democritus writ large.  First, a word about background.  As far back as the historical 
record extends, the world of the Greeks is diverse and precarious (like Abdera), defined 
by continuous conflict between Greeks, other Greeks, and different tribes of barbarians 
struggling to control valuable ports along the coasts of the Euxine, the Aegean, and the 
Mediterranean Seas.  This diffuse struggle between rival seafaring folk appears already in 
the Homeric poems that contain our earliest written representations of that world, and it 
shows up again in the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, where its most destructive 
effects are amply recorded.  But this enduring conflict was creative as well, driving the 
curious (and the desperate) to discover new lands, new markets, new cultural artifacts, 
and a new public to enjoy these inventions.  The universe of the Greeks was always 
11 The modern word pre-Socratic says little about those it purports to describe.  I had thought of calling 
them Ionians, but the traditional distinction between Ionian and Italian schools of early philosophy 
renders this epithet problematic.  Following ancient precedent (e.g. Aristot. Metaph. 986b14, 1005a34), 
I could have called them φυσιόλογοι or φυσικοί, but these words come loaded with interpretive freight 
that I am not certain I wish to carry here.  Thus I have decided to call the first philosophers Critical, an 
epithet which accurately captures their interaction not only with one another but with the world in 
general (especially the Greek world, where they competed with poets, orators, and eventually prose 
authors, whose work they judged critically).  
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expanding, moving west, north, and east along trade-routes old and new toward the 
unseen boundaries of the world.  This expansion brought the Greeks into continuous 
contact with new lands, plants, animals, peoples, and gods.  It also gave them access to 
great wealth, which, when it was not being plundered, facilitated the evolution of new 
forms of culture, including some forms not immediately necessary for survival (though 
they might ultimately prove useful in that regard).12  The Critical Tradition came into 
being in this realm of novel culture, mediating between the old cultural forms of the 
ancestral Greeks and the new forms emerging from modern circumstances.  The essential 
problem the tradition faced was one of too much information: as the Greek universe 
expanded beyond its old limits, old maps of reality needed to be redrawn to match 
modern discoveries.  
For the original Critical philosophers, the expanding world they inhabited was 
more than just a geographic or historic novelty: it challenged their understanding of the 
universe in fundamental ways, leading them to look critically at the meaning of old words 
and carefully consider the nature of the reality those words were intended to indicate.13   
Revising the particular conceptual map(s) of reality that they carried meant evaluating the 
constituent parts from which such maps are generally made.  This meant asking difficult 
questions: In a world characterized by constant novelty (the byproduct of political and 
12 The minutely researched portrait of Phocaea and her colony Elea provided by Kingsley (1999), 11-24,  
237-238, provides an excellent individual instance of the general Ionian experience passing from the 
Archaic Age to the Classical.  Note the similar reciprocal relationship between Teos and Abdera.   
13 See e.g. Democritus, fr. 563 Luria (= Proclus, in Crat. 5.25), which contrasts Pythagoras' understanding 
of diction (that words have intrinsic meaning) with that of Democritus (who maintains that they have 
not).  Other testimonia confirm that these were not the only thinkers in the Critical Tradition who self-
consciously dealt with the relationship between language and meaning; see e.g. Heraclitus, frr. 14, 21, 
39, 84 Marcovich; Parmenides, fr. 8.37 Coxon; Empedocles, fr. 22 Inwood.   
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cultural evolution), what is real?  How do new things (lands, plants, animals, peoples, 
gods) come into being and pass away?  Where do we draw the boundary between change 
and continuity?  How do we deal with uncertainty on a practical level?  What is the 
proper relationship between individual and city, subject and ruler, rich and poor, learned 
and ignorant, stranger and citizen?  The Greeks were certainly not the first to grapple 
with questions like these, but a number of historical factors separate their inquiry from 
others before it. 
From our modern perspective, the most important of these factors was the 
fortuitous invention of the Greek alphabet.  Whereas their predecessors in the Near East 
made use of cryptic writing that required considerable time to master and did not 
faithfully represent spoken language, the Greeks were fortunate enough (perhaps owing 
to the widespread song culture that produced Homer and Hesiod) to create a writing 
system that was at once easy to master (with only a few simple characters instead of 
hundreds of increasingly complicated glyphs) and a relatively transparent map of spoken 
language.14  This innovative technology has stood the test of time, allowing successive 
generations ongoing access to ideas in the Critical Tradition (which remains an object of 
study today largely because of what ancient and less ancient thinkers have written about 
it).  As we prepare to examine some of this material in detail, it is important to remember 
that the Critical Tradition was historically much more than just a written tradition.  Some 
of its most important exponents, men like Thales (traditionally the first philosopher) and 
14 See Powell (2009), 227-244.  In the eighth century, Greek became the first language in which one 
could read words without already knowing them.  (The West Semitic characters that the Greeks used to 
create their alphabet did not include the vowels necessary to indicate how a word was pronounced.)
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Pythagoras (the most famous), produced no written work (as far as we know).  Oral 
teaching was very important, as was unmediated personal contact between practitioners 
(who were frequently accomplished travelers).15  While we cannot directly access these 
admittedly important sources of cultural information in the Critical Tradition, we can 
consult the body of extant written texts that preserve some account of it.  Some of these 
texts go back to original written works composed by Critical thinkers; others preserve 
records of oral teachings remembered.  Unfortunately, none of the original Critical 
writings has survived wholly intact; this leaves us dependent on outsiders for quotations, 
summaries, and commentary.
In the balance of this chapter, I delve into the received record of the Critical 
Tradition, conducting a close examination of several thinkers who worked within it 
before the early atomists.  The Critical thinkers selected for review here anticipate the 
early atomists in important ways, providing comparative material useful for evaluating 
what the historical record tells us about Leucippus and Democritus and the unique vision 
of reality that they created.  In the received record of the Critical Tradition before the 
early atomists, we see historical issues and approaches that informed the atomists' work.
Anaximander (1.3.1)
Ancient tradition remembers Anaximander of Miletus (c. 610-c. 547/6) as one of 
the first published authors in the Critical Tradition (Diog. 2.2; Agathem. 1.1; Them. Or. 
36, p. 317 = frr. 1, 6-7 DK), and modern scholarship has confirmed him as the first on 
15 For an overview of the importance of oral tradition in the Critical Tradition, see the discussion of 
Pythagorean ἀκούσματα in Burkert (1972), 166-192.  For the importance of travel in the Ionian 
tradition, see Lesher (1992), 3 (Xenophanes); Kingsley (1994), 1-5 (Pythagoras and the early 
Pythagoreans); Naddaf (2005), 64 (Anaximander); Montiglio (2005), 100-105.   
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record with a text Περὶ φύσεως (though the originality of the title is disputed).16  Even 
though this text is no longer extant, we know several things about it. (a)  It was written in 
prose rather than poetry (the more ancient medium for discussing questions of ultimate 
reality).17  (b)  It constructed an account of the world.18  (c)  It explained material 
phenomena—τὰ ὄντα (“the things that are”)—as secondary products of a primary 
material entity (ἀρχή) that Anaximander called τὸ ἄπειρον (Simpl. in Phys. 24.13 = fr. B1 
DK). (d)  It used ethical language to describe how material things relate to one another 
after taking their being from τὸ ἄπειρον:
TEXT (DK) TRANSLATION (KRS)
ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν 
φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα 'γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· 
διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις 
τῆς  ἀδικίας  κατὰ  τὴν  τοῦ  χρόνου  τάξιν' 
ποιητικωτέροις  οὕτως  ὀνόμασιν  αὐτὰ 
λέγων.
And  the  source  of  coming-to-be  for 
existing  things  is  that  into  which 
destruction,  too,  happens,  'according  to 
necessity;  for  they  pay  penalty  and 
retribution to each other for their injustice 
according to the assessment of Time,' as he 
describes it in these rather poetical terms.
Anaximander, fr. A9, B1 DK
     = fr. 110 KRS
Simpl. in Phys. 24.13, 17 
The doxographical record contains several testimonia purporting to set forth in 
more detail the original argument that held points (b), (c), and (d) together.  These 
testimonia have been correlated multiple times by modern scholars, yielding competing 
reconstructions of the details surrounding Anaximander's central thesis (point c).19  
16 Kahn (1960), 7; Naddaf (2005), 17.
17 Hahn (2001), 55-66; Naddaf (2005), 63. 
18 λόγον ... περὶ φύσεως συγγεγραμμένον (Them. Or. 36 p. 317 =  fr. A7 DK).
19 See esp. Kahn (1960), who lays out the most extensive passages side by side (28-71).
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Naddaf (2005) divides these reconstructions into four types: mythical (supported by 
Tannery, Diels, Heath, Burnet, Robin, Cornford, Sambursky, Rescher, Guthrie, Burkert, 
West, and Furley); astronomical (supported by Burch, Baccou, Kahn, Conche, and 
Couprie); architectural (supported by McEwen and Hahn); and political (supported by 
Gomperz and Vernant).20  All reconstructions wrestle with the repeating occurrence of 
numbers that give the dimensions of the universe.  (Some scholars read these numbers as 
mythical projections, some as astronomical or architectural or political calculations.)  
Despite these differences, there is general consensus (1) that Anaximander wrote about 
the origin and development of the universe, possibly describing it as a growing plant;21 
(2) that he composed an account of the origin of animal life;22 and (3) that that account 
included speculation on the origins of man.23  This information will be important. 
One of the most important doxographical testimonia available comes from 
pseudo-Plutarch summarizing Theophrastus (c. 372-c. 288).  It is worth quoting in full:
TEXT (DK) TRANSLATION (KRS, Naddaf)
Ἀναξίμανδρον  ...  τὸ  ἄπειρον  φάναι  τὴν 
πᾶσαν  αἰτίαν  ἔχειν  τῆς  τοῦ  παντὸς 
γενέσεώς  τε  καὶ  φθορᾶς,  ἐξ  οὗ  δή  φησι 
τούς  τε  οὐρανοὺς  ἀποκεκρίσθαι  καὶ 
καθόλου  τοὺς  ἅπαντας  ἀπείρους  ὄντας 
κόσμους.  ἀπεφήνατο  δὲ  τὴν  φθορὰν 
γίνεσθαι καὶ πολὺ πρότερον τὴν γένεσιν 
[KRS]  Anaximander  …  said  that  the 
apeiron contained the whole cause of the 
coming-to-be and destruction of the world, 
from which  he  says  that  the  heavens  are 
separated off, and in general all the worlds, 
being  apeirous (innumerable). He declared 
that destruction, and much earlier coming-
20 For bibliographical references, see Naddaf (2005), 79-86 (with notes).
21 KRS frr. 101-121, 122-124; Baldry (1932); Conche (1991), 142; Hahn (2001), 192-194; Naddaf 
(2005), 72-73.
22 KRS frr. 133-137; Kahn (1960), 68-69; Lloyd (1970), 17-18; Naddaf (2005), 88-90.
23 KRS frr. 133-137; Kahn (1960), 69-71; Lloyd (1970), 17-18; Naddaf (2005), 88-92.  According to the 
doxographers, Anaximander imagined biological life originating in the water with primitive, fish-like 
creatures encased in thorny bark.  These creatures emerged onto dry land, burst (as they dried out), and 
produced the first animals and the first human beings (who were born as fully-fledged adults).
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ἐξἀπείρου  αἰῶνος  ἀνακυκλουμένων 
πάντων αὐτῶν. ὑπάρχειν δέ φησι τῶι μὲν 
σχήματι  τὴν  γῆν  κυλινδροειδῆ,  ἔχειν  δὲ 
τοσοῦτον βάθος ὅσον ἂν εἴη τρίτον πρὸς τὸ 
πλάτος. φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀιδίου γόνιμον 
θερμοῦ  τε  καὶ  ψυχροῦ  κατὰ  τὴν  γένεσιν 
τοῦδε  τοῦ  κόσμου  ἀποκριθῆναι  καί  τινα 
ἐκτούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῶι 
περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι ὡς τῶι δένδρωι φλοιόν· 
ἧστινος  ἀπορραγείσης  καὶ  εἴς  τινας 
ἀποκλεισθείσης  κύκλους  ὑποστῆναι  τὸν 
ἣλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας. 
ἔτι  φησίν,  ὅτι  κατ'  ἀρχὰς  ἐξ  ἀλλοειδῶν 
ζώιων  ὁ  ἄνθρωπος  ἐγεννήθη,  ἐκ  τοῦ  τὰ 
μὲν ἄλλα δι' ἑαυτῶν ταχὺ νέμεσθαι, μόνον 
δὲ  τὸν  ἄνθρωπον  πολυχρονίου  δεῖσθαι 
τιθηνή-σεως·  διὸ  καὶ  κατ'  ἀρχὰς  οὐκ  ἄν 
ποτε τοιοῦτον ὄντα διασωθῆναι. 
to-be, happen from infinite ages, since they 
are all occurring in cycles. He says that the 
earth  is  cylindrical  in  shape,  and  that  its 
depth is a third of its width. [Naddaf] He 
states that what produces hot and cold (i.e. 
a  germ)  was  secreted  from  (or 
separated/ejected  from)  the  eternal  vital 
force  [KRS:  from the  eternal]  during  the 
generation  of  the  universe,  and from this 
(i.e.  the  germ)  a  sort  of  sphere  of  flame 
grew  round  the  air/mist  surrounding  the 
earth,  like  bark  round a  tree.   When this 
(i.e. the flame) was broken off and shut off 
in certain rings, the sun, the moon and the 
stars were formed. [KRS] Further he says 
that in the beginning man was born from 
creatures of a different kind; because other 
creatures are soon self-supporting, but man 
alone  needs  prolonged  nursing.  For  this 
reason he would not have survived if this 
had been his original form.
Anaximander, fr. A10 DK
     = fr. 101c, 121, 134 KRS
[Plut.] Strom. 2 
Here the discussion of earth's shape (and the vexed problem of the cosmic numbers) 
appears as an elaboration (not strictly necessary) of a simpler underlying idea.  In the 
universe imagined here, τὸ ἄπειρον spontaneously produces a seed (τὸ γόνιμον) that give 
birth to physical opposites (θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ) whose interaction creates endless 
orders (κόσμοι) like the material world the Greeks lived in.24  In that plastic world (with 
24 Kahn (1960, 33-35, 46-53) and KRS (frr. 111-114) point out that the idea of cosmic infinity is unclear 
before the atomists (who become its most vigorous proponents and may have colored later discussions 
of it, especially in Theophrastus).  Still, Kahn concedes sequential cosmic infinity to Anaximander 
(world succeeding world forever), and KRS ultimately (p. 126) leaves the door open to the existence of 
some kind of cosmic infinity in Anaximander's worldview.  This demonstrates that the origin of cosmic 
infinity in the Ionian tradition remains unclear: it need not have originated with the atomists. 
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its new lands, plants, animals, peoples, and gods), individual material things are 
temporary, subject to birth and death, but the iterating cycle of generation and destruction 
(ἀνακυκλουμένων πάντων αὐτῶν) that these things describe depends upon a material 
infinity (ἐξ ἀπείρου αἰῶνος) that is eternal (fr. A10 DK).  Thus temporary phenomena 
become manifestations of an eternal reality following rules that may be likened to the 
customs governing human δίκη and τίσις (fr. B1 DK).  This metaphor (the closest thing 
we have to a verbatim quote from Anaximander)25 raises an important question: where do 
δίκη and τίσις belong in the Anaximandrean cosmic narrative? or in other words, what is  
the relationship between ethics and physics in Anaximander's world?  
A final answer is impossible, given the fragmentary state of the evidence, but 
recent scholarship suggests that the question was at least part of Anaximander's conscious 
thought, and that as such it may have found some kind of treatment in his written work.  
The strongest documentary support for this position comes from Anaximander's attested 
interest in cartography (Agathem. 1.1; Strabo 1.7 = fr. AK DK) and colonization (Ael. V. 
h. 3.17 = fr. A3 DK).26  In addition to being the author of the first attested map of the 
Greek world (fr. A6 DK), the Milesian is remembered as a geometer who made the earth 
the center of his universe because it maintained an equal distance from all things outside 
it and so avoided the control of any one of them (Aristot. De caelo 2.13.295b 10; Hippol. 
Refut. 1.6.3 = frr. A26, A11 DK).  Some scholars have pointed to a confluence of political 
25 See Kahn (1960), 166-196.
26 Naddaf (2005), 82-88.  Accepting that Anaximander took a leading role in founding the Milesian 
colony Apollonia (fr. A3 DK), is it likely that he would consider the origin and development of every 
thing in the world but human custom and law?    
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and physical terminology in the doxographical authors recording this point: there is some 
evidence this may indicate an original confluence in Anaximander's thought.27 Taking all 
of this into account, it seems justified to conclude that Anaximander's Περὶ φύσεως is our 
first written exemplar in the tradition that ultimately produces the atomists' Διάκοσμοι 
(Introduction i.4).  As noted already, this original treatise appears to have included (1) a 
cosmogony, (2) a zoogony, and (3) an anthropogony.  To this we add now the possibility 
that it included (4) some reflections on how these origin stories are relevant to human 
beings acting in the context of a sixth-century Greek πόλις.     
Xenophanes (1.3.2)
Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 575-c. 475) provides an early witness to the diversity 
of the Critical Tradition.  Like Anaximander, he appears in the historical record as a 
published author (frr. A1, A18-27 DK); unlike Anaximander, he composed and performed 
his own poetry, standing in the tradition of itinerant bards and rhapsodes that is one of the 
earliest cultural legacies of ancient Greece (frr. A1, A27, B8, B45 DK).28  Given the
27 See Vernant (1985, 212-213) and Naddaf (2005, 84-85).  Aristotle (fr. A26 DK) notes that the earth 
abides in the middle (ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου) because it maintains a relationship to outer things defined by 
similitude (διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα), and Hippolytus (fr. A11 DK) says that being suspended in mid-air 
(μετέωρον), the earth is ruled by nothing (ὑπὸ μηδενὸς κρατουμένην).  Per Naddaf, “the terms 
'centrality,' 'similarity,' and 'absence of domination' in Anaximander's cosmology are clearly linked 
together as they were in political thought such that, in both cases, what we have is a type of isonomia, 
in the sense that no individual element or portion of the universe would be allowed to dominate 
another. It is therefore legitimate to say that, just as in the old oriental cosmologies, Anaximander's 
cosmology exhibits a solidarity between physical and political space” (84).  Vernant and Naddaf both 
recall the city-planning of Meton (Aristoph. Aves 1002-9), who squares the circle to locate the ἀγορά in 
the very center of his new πόλις, from which roads are said to diverge like rays from a star, a feat for 
which Pisthetairos calls him Thales.  This points to practical, political applications of the Milesians' 
physical research, particularly if we give any credence to the tradition that makes Anaximander an 
οἰκίστης (see note 26 above).   
28 Lesher (1992), 69-71.
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poetic conventions governing this context, it comes as little surprise that his work attacks 
competing accounts of the world (including those of his most successful rivals, Homer 
and Hesiod: frr. A1, A22, B11-12) and preserves a good deal of reflection on proper 
human conduct (i.e. ethics), one of the primary concerns of the ancient poet (e.g. Hesiod, 
Solon, Theognis, Phocylides).  Nonetheless, there are interesting parallels that can be 
drawn between what remains of Xenophanes' compositions and what we have already 
seen in the work of his older contemporary Anaximander.  While there is scant evidence 
that Xenophanes produced a single work περὶ φύσεως (on the contrary, the fragments we 
have appear to come from multiple elegies),29 his extant work does reveal significant 
engagement with the core issues addressed by Anaximander.
(1) Cosmology. Xenophanes' understanding of the universe is preserved in frr. 
B27-33 DK, from which Lesher (1992) draws the following summary:
The whole natural cosmos should be understood as a product of the operations of 
earth and water (fragments 29, 33), with all natural processes starting from and 
ending in the earth (fragment 27), especially in the sea (the source of all forms of 
moisture [fragment 30], including the clouds, which constitute the sun [fragment 
31], the rainbow [fragment 32], and other celestial bodies) (5).
This is the most accurate overview that the evidence allows.  Turning to particulars, frr. 
B27-28 offer food for thought:
29 Lesher (1992), 7.  Antiquity credits him with at least one work bearing the title (see e.g. Schol. in Il. 
21.196 = fr. 30 DK), but there is not enough evidence to determine whether this (relatively late) 
assignation is authentic or a retrojection.  Likewise, it remains uncertain whether the poet composed his 
work orally (in the style of the earliest Greek poets) or in writing (see Diog. 9.18), though a balanced 
assessment of the testimonia inclines toward the former.  See especially DK21A24: Ξενοφάνους 
πρώτου λόγος ἦλθεν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἄξιος γραφῆς (Arius Did. ap. Stob. 2.1.18). 
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TEXT (Lesher) TRANSLATION (Lesher)
ἐκ  γαίης  γὰρ  πάντα  καὶ  εἰς  γῆν  πάντα 
τελευτᾶι.
… for all things are from the earth and to 
the earth all things come in the end.
Xenophanes, fr. B27 DK
Theodoret. Affect. 4.5
γαίης  μὲν  τόδε  πεῖρας  ἄνω  παρὰ  ποσσὶν 
ὁρᾶται / ἠέρι  προσπλάζον,  τὸ κάτω δ'  ἐς 
ἄπειρον ἱκνεῖται.
This upper limit of the earth is seen here at 
our feet,  /  pushing up against the air,  but 
that below goes on without limit.
Xenophanes, fr. B28 DK
Achilles Tatius 4.34.11
Here we have the hint of a theory of cyclical development similar to Anaximander's (in 
which τὸ ἄπειρον spawns κόσμοι that disintegrate into it over time).  In Xenophanes' 
scheme, all things come from earth (γαῖα, γῆ) which extends into (or constitutes in itself) 
some kind of material infinity (ἐς ἄπειρον).  This hint is fleshed out in the doxography, 
where Xenophanes is supposed to have explained the contemporary Greek world-order 
(κόσμος) as resulting from an endlessly iterating cycle of generation and destruction 
whose imprint appears evident in fossils from Syracuse, Paros, and Malta:
TEXT (Lesher) TRANSLATION (Lesher)
ὁ  δὲ  Ξενοφάνης  μίξιν  τῆς  γῆς  πρὸς  τὴν 
θάλασσαν  γίνεσθαι  δοκεῖ  καὶ  τῶι  χρόνωι 
ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ λύεσθαι, φάσκων τοιαύτας 
ἔχειν  ἀποδείξεις,  ὅτι  ἐν  μέσηι  γῆι  καὶ 
ὄρεσιν  εὑρίσκονται  κόγχαι,  καὶ  ἐν 
Συρακούσαις  δὲ  ἐν  ταῖς  λατομίαις  λέγει 
εὑρῆσθαι τύπον ἰχθύος καὶ φωκῶν, ἐν δὲ 
Πάρωι  τύπον  δάφνης  ἐν  τῶι  βάθει  τοῦ 
λίθου,  ἐν  δὲ  Μελίτηι  πλάκας  συμπάντων 
τῶν θαλασσίων. ταῦτα δέ φησι γενέσθαι, 
Further, Xenophanes thinks that a mixture 
of the land with the sea comes about, but 
that in time (the land) becomes freed from 
the moisture, and he asserts that there are 
proofs for these ideas: that shells are found 
inland and in mountains, and he says that in 
quarries  in  Syracuse  imprints  of  fish  and 
seals were found; and in Paros the imprint 
of coral in the deep of the marble and on 
Malta slabs of rock containing all sorts of 
36
ὅτε  πάντα  ἑπηλώθησαν  πάλαι,  τὸν  δὲ 
τύπον  ἐν  τῶι  πηλῶι  ξηρανθῆναι. 
ἀναιρεῖσθαι  δὲ  τοὺς  ἀνθρώπους  πάντας, 
ὅταν ἡ γῆ κατενεχθεῖσα εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν 
πηλὸς  γένηται,  εἶτα  πάλιν  ἄρχεσθαι  τῆς 
γενέσεως,  καὶ  ταύτην  πᾶσι  τοῖς  κόσμοις 
γίνεσθαι μεταβολήν.
sea  creatures.  He  says  that  these  things 
came about when long ago everything was 
covered  with  mud,  and  then  the  imprint 
dried in the clay.  And he says that all men 
will perish when the land sinks into the sea 
and  becomes  mud,  at  which  time 
generation  begins  again,  and  this  change 
comes about in all worlds [properly 'world-
arrangements' (Lesher)].
Xenophanes, fr. A33 DK
Hippol. Refut. 1.14.5-6
The latter part of this account describes the cosmic generation-destruction cycle already 
discovered in Anaximander, with a wet-dry opposition plays the role of the hot-cold 
dichotomy that drives Anaximander's cycle in the doxographical account given by 
pseudo-Plutarch (fr. A10 DK).  The cycle begins with a drying of the land (leaving fossils 
in the landscape as the seas recede) and culminates in a flood, after which it begins again 
(εἶτα πάλιν ἄρχεσθαι τῆς γενέσεως).  Thus, once more, we have a cosmic scenario in 
which change is non-arbitrary, reducible to rule (a regular oscillation between wet and 
dry).  But judging from extant writings, Xenophanes offered more than Anaximander 
here: instead of the vague τὸ ἄπειρον (about which it must have been hard even for 
Anaximander to say anything too definitive, since any attempt to define it narrowly 
would artificially limit it), he offered an almighty deity.  
The historical record preserves only four direct quotes in which Xenophanes 
discusses his god: 
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TEXT (Lesher) TRANSLATION (Lesher)
εἷς  θεὸς  ἔν  τε  θεοῖσι  καὶ  ἀνθρώποισι 
μέγιστος,  /  οὔτι  δέμας  θνητοῖσιν  ὁμοίϊος 
οὔτε νόημα.
One god is greatest among gods and men, / 
not at all like mortals in body or in thought.
Xenophanes, fr. 23 DK
Clem. Strom. 5.109
οὖλος  ὁρᾶι,  οὗλος  δὲ  νοεῖ,  οὖλος  δέ  τ' 
ἀκούει.
…  whole  he  sees,  whole  he  thinks,  and 
whole he hears.
Xenophanes, fr. 24 DK
Sext. Adv. math. 9.144
ἀλλ'  ἀπάνευθε  πόνοιο  νόου φρενὶ  πάντα 
κραδαίνει.
 … but completely without toil he shakes 
all things by the thought of his mind.
Xenophanes, fr. 25 DK
Simpl. in Phys. 23.19
αἰεὶ  δ'  ἐν  ταὐτῶι  μίμνει  κινούμενος 
οὐδέν,  /  οὐδὲ  μετέρχεσθαί  μιν  ἐπιπρέπει 
ἄλλοτε ἄλληι·
… always he abides in the same place, not 
moving at all, nor is it  seemly for him to 
travel to different places at different times.
Xenophanes, fr. 26 DK
Simpl. in Phys. 23.10
Xenophanes' god bears notable resemblance to the more ancient Zeus, whom he replaces 
as superlative mover and shaker.30  His explicitly inhuman (fr. B23) attributes are senses 
that pervade his whole body (fr. B24), as opposed to the localized senses of mortals, and 
a telekinetic mind (fr. B25 DK).  He is motionless, anticipating (or perhaps expressing in 
some incipient form) ideas of perfection as being outside development or change.  Most 
30 For the likeness between Zeus and the Xenophanean μέγιστος θεός (especially as presented in frr. 23, 
25 DK), see Il. 1.530 (Zeus shakes Olympus with a nod); Aesch. Suppl. 96-103 (Zeus destroys mortals 
without exerting force); KRS, frr. 170-172; Lesher (1992), 110.
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obvious here is the pointed break with ancient Greek traditions that portrayed the gods as 
exaggerated men and women.  Elsewhere, Xenophanes explicitly rejects these traditions, 
noting that such gods are artificial creations whose appearance changes depending on the 
artist imagining it (frr. B14-B16 DK).  Leaving a more thorough study of Xenophanean 
deity for later, we can summarize his view of cosmology thus: (a) the Greek universe 
exists in a cycle of perpetual oscillation between dry and wet that depends on the 
boundless earth; (b) the cycle is moved somehow (or at least movable) by the thought of 
an immovable god at once like and unlike traditional Greek deities.31         
(2) & (3) Zoogony and Anthropogony.  Three fragments present all that remains of 
Xenophanes' original thought on the genesis of plants, animals, and human beings.  One 
is fr. B27 DK (quoted above on page 36), which makes the earth the source of all things 
and their ultimate destination.  The others are a little more explicit:
TEXT (Lesher) TRANSLATION (Lesher)
γῆ  καὶ  ὕδωρ  πάντ'  ἐσθ'  ὅσα  γίνοντ'  ἠδὲ 
φύονται.
All things which come into being and grow 
are earth and water.
Xenophanes, fr. 29 DK
Philopon. in Phys. 1.5.125
πάντες  γὰρ  γαίης  τε  καὶ  ὕδατος 
ἐκγενόμεσθα.
For we all come into being from earth and 
water.
Xenophanes, fr. 33 DK
Sext. Adv. math. 10.314
31 Lesher (1992), 106-110; Naddaf (2005), 117.
39
These fragments confirm that for Xenophanes, biological life is part of the physical cycle 
of wet and dry that creates κόσμοι like the Greek universe.  While the precise origin and 
evolution imagined for life in this cycle remain unclear, the doxography has Xenophanes 
identifying the sun as a proximate cause for generation (perhaps because it dries the land 
and allows primeval forms of animal and human life to emerge from the water).32  For our 
purposes here, it is enough to notice that the origin and evolution of life were on 
Xenophanes' mind when he created the poetry that we read about the world-order in 
which he lived.
(4) Ethics.  The majority of Xenophanean fragments extant comprise reflections 
on proper human behavior, which Lesher (1992) summarizes thus:
The measures of personal excellence are piety in thought and deed (fragment 1), 
service to the city (fragment 2), and a life of moderation, avoiding the pursuit of 
unlimited wealth and useless luxuries (fragments 3, 4, 5, 22) (5). 
Most interesting are the ethical fragments that discuss human thought, criticizing popular 
ideas of deity and the universe.  As noted by Lesher (1992, 117-118), Xenophanes 
effectively turns his back on many parts of traditional Greek religion, rejecting (a) divine 
epiphanies (since deity does not move or appear in human form: frr. B26, B14 DK); (b) 
omens (since these occur naturally without intervention, and divine revelation does not 
guide human invention: frr. B32, A39, B18 DK); (c) poetic and popular mythologies
32 See Aet. 2.30.8 (= fr. A42 DK); Naddaf (2005), 118.  Note too that Xenophanes appears to have 
understood the sun to be a plural entity (Aet. 2.24.4, 9 = frr. A41-41a DK), not without plausible 
reasons: see Lesher (1992), 146. 
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(since poets imagine the gods as wicked and pass that idea on to all the people: frr. B10-
B12 DK); (d) anthropomorphism (since deity is not like humanity: fr. B15-16, B23 DK); 
(e) charismatic authority (the wisdom of contemporary teachers such as Pythagoras and 
Epimenides is rejected: frr. B7, A1 DK); (f) divine possession (fr. B26 DK); and (g) seers 
and oracles (since there is no recognizable knowledge of futurity available to humans: frr. 
A52, B34.3-4 DK).  Instead of these traditional paths to a traditional divine wisdom 
(which he conceives as too positive in its assertion of human knowledge), Xenophanes 
offers a novel path to his novel god, who remains an all but inaccessible mystery.
In Xenophanes' world, human knowledge is fundamentally unclear and imperfect. 
This means that men can never know anything with absolute certainty:33
TEXT (Lesher) TRANSLATION (Lesher)
καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ 
τις ἔσται / εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα 
λέγω περὶ πάντων· / εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα 
τύχοι  τετελεσμένον εἰπών,  /  αὐτὸς  ὅμως 
οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.
… and of course the clear and certain truth 
no man has seen /  nor will  there ever be 
anyone  who  knows  about  the  gods  and 
what I say about all things. / For even if, in 
the best case, one happened to speak just of 
what  has  been  brought  to  pass,  /  still  he 
himself  would  not  know.  But  opinion  is 
allotted to all.
Xenophanes, fr. 34 DK
Sext. Adv. math. 7.49.110
Still, with this proviso, people can improve their situation in the universe: 
33 Or in other words, all human knowledge is necessarily subject to revision, since we are unable to 
experience directly the fundamental realities upon which our knowable reality rests.  All we can know 
is contextual, contingent truth: the absolute truth that produces this (i.e. Xenophanes' deity?) lies 
beyond our ken, outside any context in which we could approach it with clarity.  This is my 
harmonization of the six different interpretations of fr. B34 DK recognized by Lesher (1992), 161-166.  
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TEXT (Lesher) TRANSLATION (Lesher)
οὔτοι  ἀπ'  ἀρχῆς  πάντα  θεοὶ  θνητοῖς 
ὑπέδειξαν,  /  ἀλλὰ  χρόνωι  ζητοῦντες 
ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον. 
Indeed  not  from  the  beginning  did  gods 
intimate all  things to mortals, but as they 
search in time they discover better.
Xenophanes, fr. 18 DK
Stob. 1.8.2
The context in which Xenophanes imagines human improvement here is unclear: other 
fragments (e.g. frr. B1-B3 DK) suggest a pessimistic assessment, in which individuals 
learn better while the society as a whole remains imprisoned by illusions, pursuing false 
knowledge and useless luxury, valuing sport over wisdom such as Xenophanes offers 
(ἡμετέρη σοφίη: fr. B2 DK).34  Judging from the extant fragments, the practitioner of this 
wisdom steered a careful course between uncivil rudeness (ὕβρις: fr. B1.17 DK) and the 
unprofitable excesses of civilization (ἁβροσύνας ... ἀνωφελέας: fr. B3.1 DK), drinking 
wine without getting drunk (fr. B1.17-18 DK)35 and singing at symposia without 
repeating (or giving credence to) “fictions of old” (πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων: fr. B1.22 
DK, trans. Lesher).36  Having rejected the illusion of absolute, perfect knowledge (as 
something available to humans), he was free to shape his imperfect opinions to match 
whatever discoveries he might make.  While this made him a skeptic where traditional 
ideas of divinity were concerned, it did not make him an atheist or a social outcast: his 
god was different (an inhuman mystery) rather than non-existent, and he followed 
accepted patterns of pious behavior conducive to εὐνομίη (fr. B2.19 DK).
34 This is the verdict of Lesher (1992), 149-155 (with ample bibliography).
35 Unlike the uncivilized Polyphemus (Od. 9.362) or centaurs (Xenophanes, fr. B1.22 DK).
36 Unlike the civilized men of the time (e.g. poets, rhapsodes, and their audiences): see frr. B1.21-24 DK.
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The suggestive temporal phrasing of fr. B18 DK (ἀπ' ἀρχῆς .. ἀλλὰ χρόνωι) has 
led some to speculate that Xenophanes may have constructed some kind of theory of 
human cultural development (an illustration of how men began the process of discovering 
better after emerging from primeval mud).37  While the doxography is suggestive (as with 
Anaximander), noting that Xenophanes composed poems recording the foundation of 
Colophon and Elea (Diog. 9.20 = fr. A1 DK), it is not decisive: we do not know what he 
said about the origins of human institutions.  The most we can say is that Xenophanes 
represents a writer in the same broad tradition as Anaximander: like the Milesian, the 
Colophonian approaches the Greek universe from a viewpoint that unites cosmology, 
zoology, anthropology, and human ethics—though the precise relationship(s) between all 
of these things in Xenophanes' mind remains unclear, owing in some part to the 
fragmentary state of our evidence.          
Heraclitus (1.3.3)
Diogenes Laertius (9.5-6 = fr. A1 DK) makes Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 540-c. 
480) the author of a book Περὶ φύσεως which contained three λόγοι, one about 
everything (περὶ τοῦ παντὸς), one about the πόλις (πολιτικόν), and one about the gods 
(θεολογικόν).  Other doxographical sources are less specific, mentioning that  Heraclitus 
wrote without saying much about the nature of his work, except that it was not easy to 
understand.38  The Suda (s.v. Ἡρακλεῖτος = fr. A1a DK) makes him the author of many 
things “in a poetic style” (καὶ ἔγραψε πολλὰ ποιητικῶς).  The result is modern 
37 Naddaf (2005), 118-119.  This is supported by DK21B4, which has Xenophanes attributing the 
invention of coinage to the Lydians (confirming that he composed Kulturgeschichte: see chapter 3.2).
38 See fr. A4 DK = Aristot. Rhet. 3.5.1407b11; Demetr. 192; Diog. 2.22.
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uncertainty regarding the original textual provenance of the fragments that have come 
down to us,39 the vast majority of them riddling aphorisms that amply justify the ancient 
consensus that Heraclitus was obscure.  Nevertheless, there is enough material extant and 
interpretable to show that Heraclitus was concerned with the same issues that occupied 
Anaximander and Xenophanes, and that his work tried to capture the Greek universe in a 
single, unified theory (as theirs apparently did).
(1) Cosmogony, (2) Zoogony, & (3) Anthropogony.  Given the nature of the 
evidence, it is impossible to determine the particulars of Heraclitus' vision of the Greek 
universe, but several familiar things stand out.  First, there is the idea of a physical cycle 
governing the world-order: 
TEXT (Marcovich) TRANSLATION (Marcovich)
κόσμον  τόνδε,  τὸν  αὐτὸν  ἁπάντων,  οὔτε 
τις  θεῶν  οὔτε  ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν,  ἀλλ' 
ἦν  ἀεὶ  καὶ  ἔστιν  καὶ  ἔσται·  πῦρ  ἀείζωον, 
ἁπτόμενον  μέτρα  καὶ  ἀποσβεννύμενον 
μέτρα.
This  world-order,  the  same for  all  (men), 
no  one  of  gods  or  men has  made,  but  it 
always  was and always will  be:  an ever-
living fire, kindling in measures and going 
out in measures.
Heraclitus, fr. 51 Marcovich
     = fr. B30 DK
Clem.  Strom. 5.103.6 (with various partial 
quotations elsewhere)
The exact nature of the fiery cycle described here is disputed: some assert that it is an 
active cycle in which orders are born and extinguished periodically;40 others maintain that 
it is a passive cycle in which eternal equilibrium describes a single, unchanging order.41  
39 Robinson (1987), 3-4.
40 Thus Mondolfo, Kahn, and Robin: for bibliography, see Naddaf (2005), 130.
41 Thus Kirk and Guthrie: for bibliography, see Naddaf (2005), 129.
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In the first scenario (which is supported in the doxography),42 it is possible to talk about 
the origin and temporal development of a world (κόσμος); in the latter, this is somewhat 
problematic.  Either way, however, the reduction of cosmic phenomena to a cycle 
governed by measure (μέτρα) is familiar to us.
Heraclitus' reflection on biological life (including humans and animals) survives 
only in dark hints like the following:
TEXT (Marcovich) TRANSLATION (Marcovich)
(a) πυρὸς  τροπαί·  πρῶτον  θάλασσα, 
θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ γῆ, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ 
πρηστήρ  ... (b) <γῆ>  θάλασσα  διαχέεται, 
καὶ μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος 
πρόσθεν ἦν ἢ γενέσθαι γῆ.
(a)  The transformations (turnings) of fire: 
first sea, and of the sea the half is earth, the 
half  prester  (burning)  …  (b)  <Earth>  is 
liquified as sea, and it is measured in the 
same  proportion  as  existed  before  it 
became earth.
Heraclitus, fr. 53a-b Marcovich
     = fr. 31 DK
Clem. Strom. 5.104.3
ψυχῆισιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ 
θάνατος  γῆν  γενέσθαι·  ἐκ  γῆς  δὲ  ὕδωρ 
γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή.
For souls it is death to become water, for 
water it is death to become earth; but out of 
earth water comes to be, and out of water, 
soul.
Heraclitus, fr. 66 Marcovich
     = fr. B36 DK
Clem. Strom. 6.17.1-2 
The idea that life comes from water (ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή: fr. 66 Marcovich) is familiar to 
us already (see page 40).  If we take the accompanying assertion that water and earth are 
42 Diog. 9.8 (= fr. A1.8 DK); Simpl. in Phys. 23.33 (= fr. A5 DK); Aet. 1.3.11 (= fr. A5 DK).  The modern 
interpreters are divided on whether the Stoics were correct (as these sources assert) in ascribing to 
Heraclitus a doctrine of ἐκπύρωσις. 
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mutually procreative (fr. 66 Marcovich) and assume it to cohere with the idea that the 
world-order consists ultimately of metamorphosing fire (fr. 53 Marcovich), it is possible 
to draw a map of life's origin and development which has it as the expression of various 
temporal forms of an underlying eternal fire (which constitutes either one endless world 
or an eternal succession of worlds).43
Like Xenophanes, Heraclitus criticizes ideas of divinity current in contemporary 
Greek religion (e.g. frr. 47, 50, 86 Marcovich).  Unlike Xenophanes, he does not reject 
traditional images of deity entirely or attempt to replace them with something radically 
new and different:
TEXT (Marcovich) TRANSLATION (Marcovich)
ἓν  τὸ  σοφόν·  ἐπίστασθαι  γνώμην  † ὁτέη 
κυβερνῆσαι † πάντα διὰ πάντων
Wisdom is one thing: to know the Thought 
(Intelligence)  by  which  all  things  are 
steered through all (ways).
Heraclitus, fr. 85 Marcovich
     = fr. 41 DK
Diog. 9.1
ἓν τὸ σοφόν μοῦνον, λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει 
καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα.
One (being), the only (truly) wise, is both 
unwilling and willing to be called by the 
name of Zeus.
Heraclitus, fr. 84 Marcovich
     = fr. 32 DK
Clem. Strom. 5.115.1
Like Xenophanes (fr. 25 DK), Heraclitus talks about thought controlling all things (fr. 85 
Marcovich).  Unlike Xenophanes, he does not avoid naming the incorporate author of this 
43 KRS, frr. 217-220; Marcovich (1967), 284-286; Robinson (1987), 184-185; Naddaf (2005), 132.
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thought (fr. 84 Marcovich).  Rather than reject the nomenclature of tradition, he reclaims 
it as indicative of a reality that his fellow-citizens have failed to grasp fully (as they have 
failed to assimilate the divine law or the universal λόγος in frr. 23 and 1 Marcovich).  
Elsewhere, Heraclitus refers to fire as a ruling principle in the world,44 perhaps indicating 
that he regarded the traditional god Zeus as an acceptable allegory for fire.45    
(4) Ethics.  Heraclitus left many fragments with ethical resonance, allowing us to 
create a fairly detailed picture of human life as he imagined it.  The first thing to notice is 
his insistence that life rests on universal principles that people can perceive and express:
TEXT (Marcovich) TRANSLATION (translator)
ξὺν  νόωι  λέγοντας  ἰσχυρίζεσθαι  χρὴ  τῶι 
ξυνῶι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις καὶ 
πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως·  τρέφονται  γὰρ  πάντες 
οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνός, τοῦ θείου· 
κρατεῖ  γὰρ  τοσοῦτον  ὁκόσον  ἐθέλει  καὶ 
ἐξαρκεῖ  πᾶσι  καὶ  περγίνεται.  διὸ  δεῖ 
ἕπεσθαι τῶι <ξυνῶι>· τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος 
ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες 
φρόνησιν.
Those who will speak [i.e. act] with sense 
must rely on what is  common to all  as a 
city  relies  on  its  law,  and  much  more 
firmly: for all human laws are nourished by 
one law, the divine law; for it extends its 
power as far as it will and is sufficient for 
all  [human  laws]  and  still  is  left  over. 
Therefore  one  ought  to  follow  what  is 
common.  But  although  the  Logos  is 
common  the  many  live  as  if  they  had  a 
religious  [sic]  wisdom  of  their  own. 
(Marcovich)
Heraclitus, fr. 23a Marcovich
     = fr. B114, B2 DK
Stob. 3.1.179; Sext. Adv. math. 7.133
44 See frr. 79, 80, 82 Marcovich.
45 Marcovich (1967), 446.
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τοῦ  δὲ  λόγου  τοῦδ'  ἐόντος  αἰεὶ  ἀξύνετοι 
γίνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι 
καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον· γινομένων γὰρ 
πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείροισιν 
ἐοίκασι  πειρώμενοι  καὶ  ἐπέων καὶ  ἔργων 
τοιουτέων  ὁκοίων  ἐγὼ  διηγεῦμαι  κατὰ 
φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅκως 
ἔχει· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει 
ὁκόσα  ἐγερθέντες  ποιοῦσιν  ὅκωσπερ 
ὁκόσα εὕδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.
But  of  this  account,  which  holds  forever, 
people  forever  prove  uncomprehending, 
both  before  they  have  heard  it  and when 
once they have heard it.  For, although all 
things  happen  in  accordance  with  this 
account,  they  are  like  people  without 
experience  when  they  experience  words 
and deeds such as I set forth, distinguishing 
as  I  do  each  thing  according  to  its  real 
constitution, i.e., pointing out how it is. The 
rest of mankind, however, fail to be aware 
of what they do after they wake up just as 
they  forget  what  they  do  while  asleep. 
(Robinson) 
Heraclitus, fr. 1 Marcovich
     = fr. B1 DK
Sext. Adv. math. 7.132
Fr. 23a Marcovich asserts a divine law (νόμος) or word (λόγος) that is common to all 
(τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων): sensible people rely on this law, but the many live without it as 
though possessing their own thought (ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν).  Fr. 1 Marcovich makes 
this word (λόγος) communicable (ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι) and construes it as discerning 
and expressing the nature of every individual thing (κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ 
φράζων ὅκως ἔχει), but, once again, people fail to notice it.  Certainly this law or word is 
a matter of ethics for Heraclitus (δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῶι <ξυνῶι>: fr. 23a Marcovich).  It also 
appears to be a matter of physics (κατὰ φύσιν: fr. 1 Marcovich), an inference confirmed 
when we learn elsewhere that dry souls (those most fiery) are wisest and best (αὔη ψυχὴ 
σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη: fr. 68 Marcovich), by which Heraclitus seems to mean that they 
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perceive material (physical) reality (i.e. the eternal cosmic fire) most accurately.46
There is a certain degree of elitist pessimism evident in frr. 1, 23a Marcovich, 
with a sizable number of people consistently failing to recognize the λόγος.  But it would 
be wrong to conclude that Heraclitus sees the πολλοί (or those with wet souls) as 
fundamentally incapable of apprehension.  Several fragments indicate that all people 
(possibly even all things)47 have access to sound thought (τὸ φρονεῖν, σωφρονεῖν, 
λόγος), implying that they can all eventually ground their behavior on accurate 
perceptions of the reality of the divine νόμος that underlies Heraclitus' λόγος.48  
Likewise, there are clear indications that no concrete instance of a physical phenomenon 
(such as a wet soul) endures unchanged:
TEXT (Marcovich) TRANSLATION (Robinson)
τὰ  ψυχρὰ  θέρεται,  θερμὸν  ψύχεται, 
ὑ<γρὸν>  αὐαίνεται,  καρφαλέον  νοτί-
ζετ<αι>.
Cold things  become warm,  a  warm thing 
becomes cold; a moist thing becomes dry, a 
parched thing becomes moist.
Heraclitus, fr. 42 Marcovich
     = fr. B126 DK
Tzetz. Ex. p. 126 Hermann
From this, it seems safe to conclude that Heraclitus admitted the possibility of human 
46 See fr. 69 Marcovich (with commentary), which explains the drunk's inability to perceive his path as a 
result of his soul being wet: ἀνὴρ ὁκόταν μεθυσθῆι, ἄγεται ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἀνήβου σφαλλόμενος, οὐκ 
ἐπαΐων ὅκη βαίνει, ὑγρὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων (Stob. 3.5.7).  Note that here, as throughout Ionian 
philosophy, the soul (ψυχή) is a material entity whose function in the world depends on physical 
factors (e.g. the proportion of fire to water in its composition).
47 Reading fr. 23d (1) Marcovich as Heraclitus' adaptation of the saying πάντα πλήρη θεῶν attributed to 
Thales by Aristotle, De anima 1.5.411a7 (= DK11A22). See Robinson (1987), 155.
48 See frr. 23d(1) (ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονεῖν: Stob. 3.1.179) and 23e Marcovich: ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι 
μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν (Stob. 3.5.6).  See also fr. 23f Marcovich: σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ 
μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας (Stob. 3.1.178). 
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progress (e.g. some who miss the common λόγος can eventually perceive it, and wet 
souls can become drier).49  Assuming that he did, we know the general mechanism by 
which he would have imagined it occurring:
TEXT (Marcovich) TRANSLATION (Marcovich)
εἰδέ<ναι>  χρὴ  τὸν  πόλεμον  ἐόντα  ξυνὸν 
καὶ  δίκην  ἔριν  καὶ  γινόμενα  πάντα  κατ' 
ἔριν καὶ χρεών·
One must  know that  war  is  common and 
strife is justice and that all things come to 
pass by strife and necessity.
Heraclitus, fr. 28 Marcovich
     = fr. B80 DK
Celsus ap. Origen, Contra Cels. 6.42
πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι,  πάντων 
δὲ  βασιλεύς,  καὶ  τοὺς  μὲν  θεοὺς  ἔδειξε 
τοὺς  δὲ  ἀνθρώπους,  τοὺς  μὲν  δούλους 
ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.
War is father of all (beings) and king of all, 
and so he renders some gods, others men, 
he makes some slaves, and others free.
Heraclitus, fr. 29 Marcovich
     = fr. 53 DK
Hippol. Refut. 9.9.4
In the Greek universe as imagined by Heraclitus, everything is decided by conflict, which 
is universal (ξυνὸν), just like the divine νόμος or λόγος (fr. 23a Marcovich).  It settles 
everything (γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔριν), including ethical problems (δίκην ἔριν: fr. 28 
Marcovich).50  In identifying this universal πόλεμος as πατήρ (fr. 29 Marcovich), 
Heraclitus implies that a genealogy of it could be given.  Thus, even if explicit details are 
lacking, we have all the basic ingredients necessary for an account of the origin and 
development of human institutions (politogony).  If Heraclitus were to offer such an 
49 This is supported by the doctrine of opposites attested in the fragments (e.g. frr. 32-50 Marcovich, 
including fragment 42 quoted on this page), according to which a thing entails its opposite.  For further 
arguments in favor of an Heraclitean theory of human progress, see Naddaf (2005), 133.
50 See also fr. 103 Marcovich: μάχεσθαι χρὴ τὸν δῆμον ὑπέρ γε τοῦ νόμου ὅκωσπερ τείχεος (Diog. 9.2).
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account, it would clearly envisage the ethical world of man as part of the greater universe 
described by the universal law of his λόγος (which is explicitly all-encompassing).
The last important thing to notice here about Heraclitus' λόγος (as extant) is its 
approach to divinity.  Unlike Xenophanes, who rejects the traditional pantheon as human 
fiction (DK21B11-12, B14-16, B32) and imagines something at once radically different 
(DK21B23-26) and ethically admirable (DK21B1, B11), Heraclitus retains the old gods 
(in name at least, as we have seen in fr. 84 Marcovich) and embraces their suspect ethical 
character as part and parcel of real life in the Greek universe: 
TEXT (Marcovich) TRANSLATION (Robinson)
ὁ  θεὸς  ἡμέρη  εὐφρόνη,  χειμὼν  θέρος, 
πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός ... ἀλλοιοῦται 
δὲ  ὅκωσπερ  <πῦρ>,  <ὅ>κοταν  συμμιγῆι 
θυώμασιν  ὀνομάζεται  καθ'  ἡδονὴν 
ἑκάστου.
God is day and night, winter and summer, 
war  and  peace,  satiety  and  famine,  and 
undergoes  change  in  [the]  way  that  fire, 
whenever  it  is  mixed  with  spices,  gets 
called  by the  name that  accords  with  the 
bouquet of each spice.  (adapted)
Heraclitus, fr. 77 Marcovich
     = fr. B67 DK
Hippol. Refut. 9.10.8
τῶι  μὲν  θεῶι  καλὰ  πάντα  καὶ  δίκαια, 
ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἃ μὲν ἄδικα ὑπειλήφασιν ἃ δὲ 
δίκαια.
To god all things are fair and just, whereas 
humans have supposed that some things are 
unjust, others just.
Heraclitus, fr. 91 Marcovich
     = fr. B102 DK
Porphyr.  Quaest.  Hom. ad  Il. 4.4  (p.  69 
Schrader)
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Instead of cultivating respect for morally upright divinity, Heraclitus invites his readers to 
consider the limitations imposed by their human morality, limitations that do not exist for 
gods indifferent to human ideas of right and wrong.  Xenophanes' deity projects inhuman 
goodness (as far as we can tell: at the very least, the poet-philosopher encourages us to 
think well of gods and to avoid making them responsible for human crimes).  Heraclitus' 
deity, in contrast, projects fundamental moral ambiguity, like the old gods rejected by 
Xenophanes.  Justice for Heraclitus is a practical reality,51 but as with everything else, its 
ultimate arbiter is conflict (δίκην ἔριν: fr. 28 Marcovich), where deity (or the ultimate 
reality that deity represents allegorically) sides with the victors for reasons hidden from 
man (at least in the aggregate).52  The result is an ethically ambiguous world: every action 
brings retribution (in an inevitable coincidence of opposites),53 and so whatever happens 
must (at least eventually) be right, no matter how wrong it might seem.  In such a world,  
action (what one does) is not as important as attitude (how and why one does it).54  This is 
an important perspective to keep in mind as we move forward.
51 See fr. 45 Marcovich: Δίκης ὄνομα οὐκ ἂν ἤιδεσαν εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν (Clem. Strom. 4.9.7).
52 In addition to fr. 91, see fr. 90 (ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει: Celsus ap. 
Origen, Contra Cels. 6.12) and fr. 92 Marcovich: ἀνὴρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὅκωσπερ παῖς 
πρὸς ἀνδρός (Celsus ap. Origen, Contra Cels. 6.12).
53 For the coincidence of opposites, see note 49.  For the principle of retribution, see frr. 52 (Ἥλιος οὐχ 
ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα ... εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν: Plut. De exil. 604a); 19 
(Δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας: Clem. Strom. 5.9.3); and 82 Marcovich: πάντα ... 
τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται (Hippol. Refut. 9.10.6).
54 See frr. 94-98 Marcovich.  What makes men great in these fragments is not what happens to them, but 
their intention (going into action) and reaction (when things happen to them).
52
Parmenides (1.3.4)
The next author in the Critical Tradition is Parmenides of Elea (born c. 515).55  
While Theophrastus knows only one written work (σύγγραμμα) of his (Diog. 1.16 = fr. 41 
Coxon), the Suda (s.v. Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης = fr. 41a Coxon) mentions a poetic 
physical treatise (ἔγραψε δὲ φυσιολογίαν δι' ἐπῶν) and other writings in prose (ἄλλα 
τινα καταλογάδην).56  All extant fragments are poetic hexameters, generally agreed to 
come from a single composition Περὶ φύσεως.57  These preserve a theophany much 
debated by modern scholars, who cannot agree whether its principal subject is material 
reality (φύσις) or ontology (εἶναι).58  Without trivializing this dichotomy, there is good 
reason to suspect that it is probably false (or at least overdrawn): as we have already seen 
(most clearly in Heraclitus), the Critical Tradition does not separate reality into neat 
categories like this.  It addresses everything (with no explicit break between material 
reality, ontology, and whatever else contributes to the construction of world-
arrangements: note that the backbone of everything so far is consistently some kind of 
material, whether ἄπειρον, γαῖα ἐς ἄπειρον, or πῦρ).  From this perspective, it is not 
55 The Critical Tradition thus includes all the different schools of early Greek philosophical thought, e.g. 
the philosophers that Diogenes Laertius (1.13-15) refers to as Ionians (including Thales, Anaximander, 
Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, and Socrates) and Italians (including Pherecydes, Pythagoras, 
Telauges, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Leucippus, and Democritus).  For the purposes of this study, 
the similarities between these thinkers are more important than the differences: thus all appear here as 
representatives of a single cultural movement in archaic and classical Greece, a movement which was 
never monolithic or univocal.  While our philosophers shared many important things in common, each 
one also went his own way, and had more things in common with some of his fellows than with others. 
56 The Suda's source for this is Plato (perhaps Soph. 237a).  Xenocrates is supposed to have written a 
volume περὶ τῶν Παρμενίδου (Diog. 4.13 = fr. 16a Coxon).
57 See Sext, Adv. math. 7.111-114 (= fr. 136 Coxon); Simpl. in De caelo 556.25 (= fr. A14 DK); 
Mourelatos (2008), 1-4; Coxon (2009), 1-34.
58 For bibliography, see Naddaf (2005), 135.
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surprising that ancient readers interpreted Parmenides as another φύσικος rather than an 
untimely anticipation of Heidegger.59  In what follows, I start from the ancient reading of 
Parmenides (which treats his poem as a commentary on φύσις) without denying either 
Parmenides' role as an innovator or the usefulness of unique modern approaches to what 
remains of his text.
(1) Cosmogony.  In Parmenides' poem, the goddess who receives him beyond the 
gate of Night and Day tells him that he must learn everything: χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα 
πυθέσθαι (fr. 1.28 Coxon = Sext. Adv. math. 7.111).  Elsewhere, the poet is promised 
knowledge of the physical universe:  
TEXT (Coxon) TRANSLATION (Coxon)
εἴσηι δ' αἰθερίην τε φύσιν τά τ' ἐν αἰθέρι 
πάντα  /  σήματα  καὶ  καθαρῆς  εὐαγέος 
ἠελίοιο  /  λαμπάδος  ἔργ'  ἀίδηλα,  καὶ 
ὁππόθεν ἐξεγένοντο, / ἔργα τε κύκλωπος 
πεύσηι  περίφοιτα  σελήνης  /  καὶ  φύσιν, 
εἰδήσεις  δὲ  καὶ  οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς  ἔχοντα,  / 
ἔνθεν ἔφυ τε καὶ ὥς μιν ἄγουσ' ἐπέδησεν 
ἀνάγκη / πείρατ' ἔχειν ἄστρων.
You will understand the aether's origin, and 
likewise all the signs in the aether and the 
invisible  deeds  of  the  pure  torch  of  the 
brilliant sun, and whence they sprang; and 
you will learn of the migratory deeds of the 
round-faced  moon  and  of  its  origin;  you 
will  understand  also  the  heaven  which 
surrounds them, whence it  originated  and 
how necessity led and chained it to control 
the stars.
Parmenides, fr. 9 Coxon
Clem. Strom. 5.138
59 See Aristot. Phys. 1.184b15-25, 1.186a11-25, Metaph. 1.986b24; Plato, Theaet. 152d-e, Soph. 242c-e; 
and Sext. Adv. math. 7.5, 7, 111-114 (= fr. 135-136 Coxon) summarized by Naddaf (2005): “The 
ancient tradition clearly saw Parmenides as a phusikos.  Plato associated Parmenides' doctrine of being 
and unity with the physical universe, and this is corroborated by Aristotle.  Moreover, Sextus 
Empiricus, from whom we derive a good part of Parmenides' poem, states that he copied the reference 
from Parmenides' poem Peri phuseôs. In the final analysis, Parmenides' poem must be understood in 
the context of Ionian historia of the peri phuseôs type” (135).  See also Kingsley (2003), 564. 
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πῶς γαῖα καὶ ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη / αἰθήρ τε 
ξυνὸς  γάλα  τ'  οὐράνιον  καὶ  ὄλυμπος  / 
ἔσχατος  ἠδ'  ἄστρων  θερμὸν  μένος 
ὡρμήθησαν / γίγνεσθαι.
…  how  earth  and  sun  and  moon  and 
universal  aether  and  celestial  galaxy  and 
extreme olympus and the stars' hot power 
started to come into being.
Parmenides, fr. 10 Coxon
Simpl. de Caelo 559
Here we find familiar hallmarks of a Critical cosmology, which (a) imagines physical 
phenomena in terms of regular repeating cycles (like the ἔργα περίφοιτα of the moon and 
the rotation of the stars chained by necessity in fr. 9 Coxon); and (b) attempts to explain 
the origin and development of these phenomena (ὁππόθεν ἐξεγένοντο, ἔνθεν ἔφυ, πῶς … 
ὡρμήθησαν γίγνεσθαι).  Judging from what remains of Parmenides' poem, light (φάος) 
and night (νύξ) appear to have been dual causes of generation in his story of the Greek 
universe, functionally equivalent to Anaximander's ἄπειρον, Xenophanes' γαῖα, or 
Heraclitus' πῦρ:
TEXT (Coxon) TRANSLATION (Coxon)
πᾶν πλέον  ἐστὶν  ὁμοῦ  φάεος  καὶ  νυκτὸς 
ἀφάντου  /  ἴσων  ἀμφοτέρων,  ἐπεὶ  οὐδε-
τέρωι μέτα μηδέν.
All  is  full  of  light  and  invisible  night 
together,  both  of  them  equal,  since  in 
neither is there Nothing.
Parmenides, fr. 11.3-4 Coxon 
Simpl. in Phys. 180
The doxographers concur that Parmenides recognized two cosmogonic principles, which 
(following Aristotle) they identify as fire (alternately τὸ θερμόν) and earth (alternately τὸ 
ψυχρόν), feasible interpretations of poetic φάος and νύξ.60  
60 See frr. 300-308 KRS; frr. 22, 25, 26, 30, 32, 40, 41, 55, 61, 83, 88, 90, 92, 113, 189, 193, 195, 196, 
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Like Xenophanes and Heraclitus, Parmenides has a deity in charge of the light-
night system that creates the Greek world-order: 
TEXT (Coxon) TRANSLATION (Coxon)
ἐν  δὲ  μέσωι  τούτων  δαίμων,  ἣ  πάντα 
κυβερνᾶι· / πάντη γὰρ στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ 
μίξιος ἄρχει
Between these is the divinity who governs 
all  things.   For  everywhere  she  initiates 
hateful birth and union ...
Parmenides, fr. 12.3-4 Coxon
 
Simpl. in Phys. 39
The relationship between this mysterious goddess and physical forces like the ἀνάγκη 
that chains the stars (fr. 9.6 Coxon) remains unclear.61  It is not out of the question that 
Parmenides might have viewed his goddess as an allegorical representation of the same 
reality that he refers to elsewhere with words like ἀνάγκη (taking the same approach to 
deity as that adopted by Heraclitus, who could call the ruling principle of his universe 
Zeus or fire, depending on context).   
(2) Zoogony & (3) Anthropogony.  Parmenides' poetic fragments offer scant 
information to work with here, but they do preserve some indication that Parmenides was 
interested in animal and human life, including especially the physical process(es) of 
development whereby human beings become capable of thought.62  The doxography is 
more vocal, crediting Parmenides with explicit ideas about zoogony and anthropogony.  
204, 207, 213, 215 Coxon.  Note the following quote from Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1114b: [Παρμενίδης] 
γε καὶ διάκοσμον πεποίηται, καὶ στοιχεῖα μιγνὺς τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ σκοτεινὸν ἐκ τούτων τὰ φαινόμενα 
πάντα καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ (fr. 113 Coxon).
61 Fr. 1.14 Coxon has δίκη controlling access to the gate of Night and Day.  This is the only other 
reference in the poetic fragments to a controlling entity in Parmenides' universe.
62 See frr. 12, 17-20 Coxon.  In fr. 12, the ruling goddess brings male and female together (μίξιος ἄρχει / 
πέμπουσ' ἄρσενι θῆλυ μιγῆν τό τ' ἐναντίον αὖτις / ἄρσεν θηλυτέρωι: 12.4-6).  In fr. 17, thought is a 
function of the physical κρῆσις of the members. 
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We are told that he discussed the origin of animals down to the origin of their individual 
members (μόρια)63 and that the sun was involved in the origin of humans.64 
(4) Ethics.  Parmenides is remembered as a geographer65 (like Anaximander) and a 
legislator.66  As already noted (see note 27 above), these interests (particularly the latter) 
presuppose an understanding of human behavior which presumably integrated with his 
physical doctrine in some way (and might possibly have incorporated stories explaining 
the origin and development of human societies defined by custom and law).  While this  
understanding has not left obvious traces in the poetic fragments, the latter do contain 
some interesting reflections on the nature of human thought, a subject which exercised 
Xenophanes and Heraclitus too, as we have seen.67  Like Xenophanes (DK21B34) and 
Heraclitus (frr. 90, 92 Marcovich), Parmenides recognizes the limitations of human 
knowledge.  But where Xenophanes gives men no more than δόκος, Parmenides follows
63 Fr. 203 Coxon: Παρμενίδης δὲ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄρξασθαί φησι λέγειν, «πῶς γαῖα καὶ ἥλιος ... 
ὡρμήθησαν γίγνεσθαι» [fr. 10 Coxon], καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ φθειρομένων μέχρι τῶν μορίων τῶν 
ζώιων τὴν γένεσιν παραδίδωσι (Simpl. in De caelo 559.20-25).
64 Frr. 41 (ἀπέφηνε [Παρμενίδης] ... γένεσιν τ' ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἡλίου πρῶτον γενέσθαι: Diog. 9.21-22); 113 
Coxon (καὶ γένεσιν ἀνθρώπων ἀγήγηται [Παρμενίδης]: Plut. Adv. Colot. 1114c).  Note the resonance 
with similar accounts about the cosmogonies of Xenophanes (page 40 above) and Anaximander (note 
23 above).
65 Frr. 74 Coxon (Παρμενίδης πρῶτος ἀφώρισε τῆς γῆς τοὺς οἰκουμένους τόπους ὑπὸ ταῖς δυσὶ ζώναις 
ταῖς τροπικαῖς: Aet. 3.11); 99 Coxon (φησὶ δὴ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τῆς εἰς πέντε ζώνας διαιρέσεως ἀρχηγὸν 
γενέσθαι Παρμενίδην: Strabo 2.2.1-2); and 99a Coxon: πρῶτος δὲ Παρμενίδης τὸν περὶ τῶν ζωνῶν 
ἐκίνησε λόγον (Achill. Isag. 31).
66 Frr. 16 Coxon (λέγεται δὲ καὶ [Παρμενίδης] νόμους θεῖναι τοῖς πολίταις, ὥς φησι Σπεύσιππος ἐν τῶι 
περὶ φιλοσόφων: Diog. 9.23); and 116 Coxon: Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδα διεκόσμησε νόμοις 
ἀρίστοις, ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξορκοῦν τοὺς πολίτας ἐμμένειν τοῖς Παρμενίδου 
νόμοις (Plut. Adv. Colot. 1126a-b).
67 For Xenophanes, see the discussion of DK21B34 on pages 41-42 above.  For Heraclitus, see the 
discussion of relevant fragments discussed on p. 49 and note 48 above.
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Heraclitus (e.g. frr. 23d-f Marcovich) in positing the possibility that humans have access 
to something better (what Heraclitus calls alternately τὸ φρονεῖν, σωφρονεῖν, or λόγος).  
Witness the poet's initial encounter with the goddess at the gate:
TEXT (Coxon) TRANSLATION (Kingsley)68
χρεὼ  δὲ  σε  πάντα  πυθέσθαι,  /  ἠμὲν 
ἀληθείης  εὐπειθέος  ἀτρεμὲς  ἦτορ  /  ἠδὲ 
βροτῶν  δόξας,  τῆις  οὐκ  ἔνι  πίστις 
ἀληθής. / ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι 
ὡς τὰ δοκεῦντα / χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ 
παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.
And what's needed is for you to learn all 
things:  both  the  unshaken  heart  of 
persuasive  Truth  and  the  opinions  of 
mortals in which there is nothing that can 
be  truthfully  trusted  at  all.   But  even so, 
this too you will learn—how beliefs based 
on  appearance  ought  to  be  believable  as 
they travel through all there is.
Parmenides, fr. 1.28-32 Coxon
Sext. Adv. math. 7.111
Admitting with Xenophanes that the opinions of mortals are untrustworthy (βροτῶν 
δόξας, τῆις οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής), the goddess nevertheless holds out some hope that 
Parmenides can apprehend (πυθέσθαι) “the unshaken heart of persuasive Truth” 
(ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ) and learn (μαθήσεαι) to perceive accurately the 
shifting appearances apparent to human beings throughout the Greek universe (ὡς τὰ 
δοκεῦντα χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα).  
The dichotomy between truth and false approximations of it recurs elsewhere in 
the goddess' teaching:
68 Kingsley (2003), 27.
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TEXT (Coxon) TRANSLATION (Kingsley)69
εἰ δ' ἄγε, τῶν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον 
ἀκούσας, / αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιος εἰσι 
νοῆσαι· / ἡ μὲν, ὅπως ἐστίν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ 
ἔστι  μὴ  εἶναι,  /  πειθοῦς  ἐστι  κέλευθος, 
ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ, / ἡ δ', ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν 
τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι, / τὴν δή τοι 
φράζω  πανταπευθέα  ἔμμεν  ἀταρπόν·  / 
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐόν,  οὐ γὰρ 
ἀνυστόν, / οὔτε φράσαις.
I will do the talking; and it's up to you to 
carry away my words once you have heard 
them.  What I will tell you is which roads 
of inquiry, and which roads alone, exist for 
thinking.  The one route, that is, and is not 
possible not to be, is the way of Persuasion; 
for Persuasion is Truth's attendant.  And as 
for the other, that  is not, and is necessary 
not to be: this, I can tell you, is a path from 
which no news returns.  For there is no way 
you can recognize what is not—there is no 
travelling that path—or tell anything about 
it.
Parmenides, fr. 3 Coxon
Procl. in Tim. 1.345; Simpl. in Phys. 116
Here there are only two ways of thinking, the real way (which exists and is the path of 
persuasion: πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος) and the unreal (which does not and cannot exist: οὐκ 
ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι).  No matter how hard humans try to walk the unreal 
path (abstracting themselves and their thought from the reality that exists), they cannot.  
To borrow a modern metaphor, there is no such thing as thinking outside the box that 
necessarily contains all human thought; or, in Parmenides' words, it is impossible (οὐ γὰρ 
ἀνυστόν) to perceive what is not there (οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐόν), i.e. to travel a 
path that does not exist.70
But the path of reality proves difficult to travel:
69 Kingsley (2003), 60.
70 This does not stop many (ἄκριτα φῦλα: fr. 5.7 Coxon) from trying (recall the πόλλοι of Heraclitus who 
live as though there were no common λόγος in fr. 23a Marcovich): see fr. 5.4-9 Coxon.  
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TEXT (Coxon) TRANSLATION (Kingsley)71
χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι, ἔστι 
γὰρ εἶναι, / μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τά σ' ἐγὼ 
φράζεσθαι  ἄνωγα·  /  πρώτης  γάρ  σ'  ἀφ' 
ὁδοῦ  ταύτης  διζήσιος  <εἴργω>,  /  αὐτὰρ 
ἔπειτ'  ἀπὸ  τῆς,  ἣν  δὴ  βροτοὶ  εἰδότες 
οὐδὲν / πλάζονται δίκρανοι, ἀμηχανίη γὰρ 
ἐν  αὐτῶν  /  στήθεσιν  ἰθύνει  πλαγκτὸν 
νόον,  οἱ  δὲ  φωρεῦνται  /  κωφοὶ  ὁμῶς 
τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες,  ἄκριτα φῦλα, / οἷς 
τὸ  πέλειν  τε  καὶ  οὐκ  εἶναι  τωὐτὸν 
νενόμισται  /  κοὐ  τωὐτόν,  πάντων  δὲ 
παλίντροπος ἐστι κέλευθος. 
What  exists  for  saying  and  for  thinking 
must  be.   For  it  exists  for  it  to  be;  but 
nothing  does  not  exist.  You  ponder  that! 
This is the first road of inquiry that I hold 
you back from.  But then I hold you back 
as well from the one that mortals fabricate, 
twin-heads,  knowing  nothing.  For 
helplessness  in  their  chests  is  what  steers 
their wandering minds as they are carried 
along in a daze, deaf and blind at the same 
time:  indistinguishable,  undistinguishing 
crowds  who  reckon  that  being  and  non-
being are the same but not the same. And, 
for all of them, the route they follow is a 
path that keeps turning backwards on itself.
Parmenides, fr. 5 Coxon
     = fr. 6 DK
Simpl. in Phys. 117
Not only must the poet avoid the way created (πλάζονται) by the double-headed who try 
to unite existence with non-existence, alienated from their powers of perception (κωφοὶ 
ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα): he is also warned off naïve entry into the path 
of reality,72 where the existence of that which people think and talk about is taken for 
granted (χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι).73  Here Parmenides is caught in a 
paradox characteristic of the human condition (generally) and the Greek universe 
(specifically).  On one hand, the human mind imagines regularity extending throughout 
71 Kingsley (2003), 83.
72 From the point of view adopted by this study, the debate over the number of paths presented by the 
goddess (three paths: one real, one unreal, one real-unreal created by mortals; two paths: one real, one 
unreal) is moot.  Either way, fr. 5 Coxon warns the poet off reality (the first path), impeding his 
journey.  For a bibliography on the paths, see Kingsley (2003), 563-565.
73 Since they could not speak or think about it if it were unreal.  See Heraclitus, fr. 45 Marcovich: Δίκης 
ὄνομα οὐκ ἂν ἤιδεσαν εἰ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν (Clem. Strom. 4.9.7).
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its familiar environment (as the cosmologies presented thus far imagine the Greek 
universe constituted in its entirety by repetitive physical processes).  On the other, 
experience shows us that the real world is irregular and discontinuous (like the Greek 
universe, which was constantly exceeding its geographical barriers and transforming 
itself internally through revolutions in politics and culture).  Many different stories can be 
told to reduce human reality to some kind of order (as we have seen already in this 
chapter), but inevitably these leave something out, giving the lie to human wisdom and 
challenging human pretensions to knowledge.  So Parmenides comes to the Critical 
Tradition suspicious of every mortal δόξα, including the explanations of absolute reality 
(φύσις) offered by thinkers like himself.74
Parmenides' solution to the problem of imperfect human δόξα is complicated and 
controversial.  At its core is a revelation of Being:
TEXT (Coxon) TRANSLATION (Kingsley)75
μόνος  δ'  ἔτι  μῦθος  ὁδοῖο  /  λείπεται,  ὡς 
ἔστιν·  ταύτηι  δ'  ἐπὶ  σήματ'  ἔασι  /  πολλὰ 
μάλ',  ὡς  ἀγένητον  ἐὸν  καὶ  ἀνώλεθρόν 
ἐστιν, / οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς 
ἠδ' † ἀτέλεστον, / οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, 
ἐπεὶ  νῦν  ἐστιν  ὁμοῦ  πᾶν,  /  ἕν,  συνεχές· 
τίνα  γὰρ  γένναν  διζήσεαι  αὐτοῦ;  /  πῆι 
πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσω / 
φάσθαι σ'  οὐδὲ νοεῖν, οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ 
νοητόν / ἐστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι· τί δ' ἄν μιν 
καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν / ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν τοῦ 
μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον φῦν; / οὕτως ἢ
There is only one tale of a path left to tell: 
that is. And along this way there are many, 
many signs that as well as being birthless 
it's also deathless and whole and of a single 
kind  and  unmoving—and  neither  is  it 
incomplete. It never was and never will be 
because it is now, all together, one, holding 
to itself. For what possible birth of it will 
you look for? In what  way could it  have 
grown? From what? To say or think “from 
what  is  not”  is  something  I  won't  allow 
you, because there is no saying or thinking 
74 Xenophanes (DK21B34) and Heraclitus (frr. 84, 90, 92 Marcovich) were similarly open to their own 
fallibility.  The question they all seem to grapple with is how to present positive visions of reality 
without ignoring the fact that such visions inevitably distort the the image they are meant to transmit. 
75 Kingsley (2003), 160, 163-164.
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πάμπαν  πελέναι  χρεών  ἐστιν  ἢ  οὐκί.  / 
οὐδέ  ποτ'  ἐκ  μὴ  ἐόντος  ἐφήσει  πίστιος 
ἰσχὺς / γίγνεσθαί τι παρ' αὐτό· τοῦ εἵνεκεν 
οὔτε γενέσθαι / οὔτ' ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε δίκη 
χαλάσασα πέδηισιν / ἀλλ' ἔχει, ἡ δὲ κρίσις 
περὶ τούτων ἐν τῶιδ' ἐστιν, / ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ 
ἔστιν·  κέκριται  δ'  οὖν,  ὥσπερ  ἀνάγκη,  / 
τὴν  μὲν  ἐᾶν  ἀνόητον  ἀνώνυμον,  οὐ  γὰρ 
ἀληθής / ἐστιν  ὁδός,  τὴν δ'  ὥστε πέλειν 
καὶ  ἐτήτυμον  εἶναι.  /  πῶς  δ'  ἂν  ἔπειτα 
πέλοιτο ἐόν; πῶς δ' ἄν κε γένοιτο; / εἰ γὰρ 
ἔγεντ',  οὐκ  ἔστ',  οὐδ'  εἴ  ποτε  μέλλει 
ἔσεσθαι. / τὼς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ 
ἄπυστος ὄλεθρος.
that  is  not.  And,  besides:  if  it  started out 
from  nothing,  what  could  have  made  it 
come into being later  rather  than sooner? 
So it must either be, completely, or not be. 
Neither  will  the  strength  of  persuasive 
proof  ever  permit  anything  to  come  into 
being  out  of  non-being  alongside  it.  And 
this is why Justice has not allowed freedom 
for creation or destruction by relaxing her 
constraining  grip.  Instead,  she  holds  fast. 
And  the  decision  in  these  matters  comes 
down  to  this—is or  is  not.  But  it  has 
already  been  decided:  the  judgement  has 
already been passed as necessary that  the 
second of these paths is to be dismissed as 
unthinkable and unnameable because it's no 
true way while the other is to be allowed to 
be, and really be.  And how could it be that 
being  could  be  at  some  later  time?  How 
could it come into being? For if it came to 
be, it is not; and if at some point it intends 
to  be,  then  again  it  is  not.  So  it  is  that 
creation  has  been  extinguished,  and  of 
destruction there is not a word to be heard.
 
Parmenides, fr. 8.1-21 Coxon
Simpl. in Phys. 145-146
Without getting more technical than necessary,76 it is possible to discern here an attempt 
on the poet's part to avoid founding his approach to reality on a naïve narrative of origin 
and development such as we have found at the core of extant writings in the Critical 
Tradition.  Outside such narratives, Parmenides discovers an undifferentiated, eternal 
reality (reminiscent of Anaximander's ἄπειρον in its lack of explicit boundaries): 
76 For a thorough treatment of the various problems with this passage and its place in the Parmenidean 
corpus, see Coxon (2009), 312-352; Mourelatos (2008), 299-386; Kingsley (2003), 160-191, 570-576. I 
have tried to steer clear of controversy in my summary remarks here.
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ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν (fr. 8.3); οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται (fr. 8.5); οὔτε 
γενέσθαι οὔτ' ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε δίκη (fr. 8.13-14); γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ ἄπυστος 
ὄλεθρος (fr. 8.21 Coxon).  Just as Xenophanes' god is an undoing of popular Greek 
religion (see page 40), so Parmenides' Being is an undoing of all mortal attempts to 
explain the world-order(s) definitively (including attempts in the Critical Tradition).  
Where human powers of perception and expression necessarily dictate a world-order 
defined by change reducible to some kind of fixed physical order (today as in antiquity), 
Parmenides posited a reality that resists reduction, a wholeness too vast to be named 
completely by conventional language (or stories created with such language): the most 
anyone can say of it is that it exists, independent of the limits imposed by our powers of 
perception, which as a matter of course show us parts instead of the whole and change 
instead of continuity.  The attributes he gives it (ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, 
οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ' † ἀτέλεστον: 8.3-4) are given with the intention of 
separating it from human perceptions of it (the δόξα of Parmenides and Xenophanes, 
which includes definitions of φύσις in the Critical Tradition).  In terms of Critical 
physics, this reduces all things to unitary Being (since there is no such thing as non-
existence in Parmenidean reality), and radically undercuts the authority of origin-and-
development narratives (such as those we have already examined from Anaximander, 
Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Parmenides himself), since the distinctions that these make 
between one instance of Being and another are arbitrary and incomplete, separating 
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Being from itself without compelling reason.77  Thus, when Parmenides does offer a 
traditional Critical cosmology, he conscientiously refuses to endorse it as entirely true:
TEXT (Coxon) TRANSLATION (Coxon)
ἐν τῶι σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα / 
ἀμφὶς  ἀληθείης,  δόξας  δ'  ἀπὸ  τοῦδε 
βροτείας  /  μάνθανε  κόσμον  ἐμῶν  ἐπέων 
ἀπατηλὸν  ἀκούων.  /  μορφὰς  γὰρ 
κατέθεντο  δύο  γνώμας  ὀνομάζειν,  /  τῶν 
μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν, ἐν ὧι πεπλανημένοι 
εἰσίν,  /  ἀντία  δ'  ἐκρίναντο  δέμας  καὶ 
σήματ'  ἔθεντο /  χωρὶς  ἀπ'  ἀλλήλων,  τῆι 
μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ, / ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ' 
ἐλαφρόν, ἑωυτῶι πάντοσε τωὐτόν, / τῶι δ' 
ἑτέρωι  μὴ  τωὐτόν,  ἀτὰρ  κἀκεῖνο  κατ' 
αὐτὸ / τἀντία, νύκτ' ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας 
ἐμβριθές  τε.  /  τόν  σοι  ἐγὼ  διάκοσμον 
ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω, / ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς 
σε βροτῶν γνώμηι παρελάσσηι.
Therewith  I  put  a  stop  for  you  to  my 
reliable  discourse  and  thought  about 
reality; from this point learn human beliefs, 
heaving the deceptive composition of  my 
verse.  For  they  resolved  to  name  two 
Forms (of which it is wrong to name only 
one,  wherein men have gone astray),  and 
they chose opposites in body and assigned 
them marks separate from one another, on 
the one hand aetherial fire of flame, being 
mild, immensely light, the same with itself 
in every direction but not the same as the 
other;  that,  on  the  other  hand  being 
likewise  in  itself  the  opposites, 
unintelligent  night,  a  dense  and  heavy 
body.  This order of things I declare to you 
to be likely in its entirety,  in such a way 
that never shall any mortal outstrip you in 
practical judgment.
Parmenides, fr. 8.50-61 Coxon
Simpl. in Phys. 38-39
Parmenides' goddess here exposes her own διάκοσμος (the physical world-order defined 
by light and dark, fire and earth) as a deceptive rhetorical ornament (κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων 
ἀπατηλὸν), an artificial imposition on reality that can only be likely (ἐοικότα): it cannot 
capture the whole truth of Being, which transcends the limits of the simple oppositions 
77 See fr. 6 Coxon: λεῦσσε δ' ὅμως ἀπεόντα νόωι παρεόντα βεβαίως· / οὐ γὰρ ἀποτμήξει τὸ ἐὸν τοῦ 
ἐόντος ἔχεσθαι / οὔτε σκιδνάμενον πάντηι πάντως κατὰ κόσμον / οὔτε συνιστάμενον (Clem. Strom. 
5.15). Remember that persuasion is an essential part of the path of being: χρεὼ δὲ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ... 
ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ (fr. 1.28-29 Coxon); πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος (fr. 3.4 Coxon).
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that define all cosmologies in the Critical Tradition (including the light-dark dichotomy in 
Parmenides' poem).  It is just another instance of mortal opinion (δόξας ... βροτείας) as 
opposed to real knowledge of Being, which it approaches (τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον 
ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω) without attaining.  The most that the poet-philosopher can do 
with it is avoid being passed (on the road of perceiving and expressing absolute Being?) 
by other mortals (ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμηι παρελάσσηι).78
One more thing remains to be addressed here.  I originally presented Parmenides' 
ideas on Being as ideas about human thought (see page 57), a decision justified by the 
poet's constant usage of “thought” words: δόξας (1.30, 8.51); νοῆσαι (3.2); γνοίης (3.7); 
νοεῖν (5.1, 8.8); εἰδότες (5.4); νόον (5.6); νοητόν (8.8); ἀνόητον (8.17); νόημα (8.50); 
γνώμας (8.53); γνώμηι (8.61 Coxon).  But there are many indications that Parmenides 
does not separate thought strictly from other forms of perception (especially sight and 
hearing) and expression (especially speech) available to human beings.  Thus, the 
goddess speaks of ἄκριτα φῦλα who cannot see (being τυφλοί) as they struggle in vain to 
fashion an alternative to the path of Being (fr. 5.6-7 Coxon).79
Likewise, she makes audible words—e.g. κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας (fr. 3.1 
78 For δόξα as a mediator between mortals and being (i.e. everything), see Mourelatos (2008), 259-263.  
For the significance of the metaphor of being passed (taken from epic depictions of charioteering), see 
Kingsley (2003), 221-224, 578-579.
79 See also fr. 7 Coxon: οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε τοῦτο δαμῆι, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα, / ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος 
νόημα· / μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω, / νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν 
ἀκουὴν / καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον / ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα· μόνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος 
ὁδοῖο / λείπεται (varia).  The nature of the λόγος here is unclear: some have seen it as the voice of 
(dialectical) reason, but this is not necessarily true: see Kingsley (2003), 120-131, 568-570.  The safest 
conclusion is that whatever Parmenidean λόγος is, it represents an expressible synthesis of what we 
would see as separate human perceptions (e.g. sight, hearing, and thought, which are the poet's favorite 
three). 
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Coxon); μόνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο λείπεται (fr. 8.1-2 Coxon)—signs along that path, with 
thinking and speaking paired together as parallel facets of Being—e.g. χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε 
νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι (fr. 5.1 Coxon); ἐν τῶι σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα ἀμφὶς 
ἀληθείης (fr. 8.50-51 Coxon).  The blurring of boundaries between different forms of 
perception and expression invoked in Parmenides' poem is probably intentional, since all 
are ultimately one and the same thing for the poet, namely Being.  
As extant, Parmenides' way of Being is perceptual, with signs (σήματα: fr. 8.2 
Coxon) existing in perceived reality (and its reflections in human δόξα) that allow the 
poet to recognize the artificial (and incomplete) nature of his understanding, giving him 
the perspective he needs to reject the absolute reality of competing signs (σήματα: fr. 
8.55 Coxon) that appear when undiscerning people separate Being from itself improperly 
by distinguishing distinct forms (μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν: fr. 8.53 
Coxon).  The idea of perception and expression (including thought) as something real 
(i.e. Being)80 that leaves traceable marks in material reality is an important insight that 
Parmenides shares with the atomists, an insight for which later thinkers take them both to 
task.81  Parmenides' concern with the inadequacy of human expression to capture reality 
with transparent accuracy provides another point of contact with extant atomist thought 
(e.g. Democritus, fr. 563 Luria).  While we know little about the ethics that Parmenides 
married to these ideas, the record has been kinder in the case of the atomists (as we will 
see).  For now it is enough to notice Parmenides' interest (1) in finding the limits that 
80 See fr. 4 Coxon: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι (varia).
81 See e.g. Theophr. De Sensu 4 (Parmenides), 58 (Democritus).  
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constrain ordinary human perceptions and expressions of material reality, and (2) 
transcending those limits (with a divine revelation: χρεὼ δὲ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ... 
ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ [fr. 1.28-29 Coxon]).
Empedocles (1.3.5)
Empedocles of Acragas (c. 492-432) is credited with various written works, none 
of which survives intact.  All that we have is a large collection of fragments in hexameter 
(138 in the latest collation), of which only eleven come with specific attribution to one of 
two original texts: eight purport to derive from a poem on physics (sometimes referred to 
under the title Περὶ φύσεως) and three from a poem Καθαρμοί.82  Modern students of the 
fragments have been unable to discover any clear distinction between these two poems: it 
is impossible to tell whether the first (Περὶ φύσεως) is original (and separate from the 
second) or an illusion created by ancient readers referring to the same work in different 
contexts.  Most recent work has tended to support the thesis that Empedocles originally 
wrote only one poem (whose original title was probably Καθαρμοί).83  Whatever the 
original form(s) in which Empedocles' ideas were published, their remains offer a 
familiar perspective on the Greek universe.
(1) Cosmogony.  Like other authors in the Critical Tradition, Empedocles  
recognizes the existence of a permanent material reality (analogous to Anaximander's 
ἄπειρον, Xenophanes' γαῖα, Heraclitus' πῦρ, and Parmenides' ἐόν) underlying the 
perceived reality observed by human beings (a reality that seems impermanent, subject to 
82 See frr. 1, 13, 21, 25, 67, 62, 85, 95, 98 Inwood, and fr. B153a DK; Inwood (1992), 11-12. 
83 Naddaf (2005), 141; Kingsley (1995), 217-232; (2002); (2003), 322-325; Inwood (1992), 13-19.
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creation and destruction).84  He calls that permanent reality φύσις, using terminology 
which characterizes the world-order as live and growing85 even as he deliberately denies 
the implication that that order arises from nothing or dies away into nothing (as living, 
growing things seem to do in the world perceived by humans):  
TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
ἄλλο  δέ  τοι  ἐρέω·  φύσις  οὐδενός  ἐστιν 
ἁπάντων  /  θνητῶν,  οὐδέ  τις  οὐλομένου 
θανάτοιο τελευτή, / ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις  τε 
διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων / ἐστί, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ 
τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν.
I shall tell you something else. There is no 
growth of any of all mortal things nor any 
end in destructive death, but only mixture 
and interchange of what is mixed exist, and 
growth is the name given to them by men.
Empedocles, fr. 21 Inwood
     = fr. 12 Wright
     = fr. B8 DK
Aet. 1.30.1
Unlike Parmenides' Being or Anaximander's ἄπειρον, Empedocles' φύσις does not resist 
authoritative deconstruction: it can be broken down into component parts without losing 
its integrity.86  These parts are four roots (τέσσαρα ... πάντων ῥιζώματα: fr. 12 Inwood) 
whose mixture (μίξις) and separation (διάλλαξις: fr. 21 Inwood) provide a permanent 
reality behind the illusion of material change (e.g. birth, growth, decay, death) that human 
beings perceive as real.  Each root is a homogenous material element (earth, air, fire, 
84 In addition to fr. 21 Inwood (quoted in the text), see fr. 18 Inwood (ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἐόντος ἀμήχανον 
ἐστι γενέσθαι, / καί τ' ἐὸν ἐξαπολέσθαι ἀνήνυστον καὶ ἄπυστον· / αἰεὶ γὰρ τῆι γ' ἔσται ὅπηι κέ τις αἰὲν 
ἐρείδηι: [Aristot.], MXG 975a36; Philo, Aet. mund. 2) and fr. 23 Inwood: νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχό-
φρονές εἰσι μέριμναι, / οἳ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν, / ἤ τι καταθνήισκειν τε καὶ 
ἐξόλλυσθαι ἁπάντηι (Plut. Adv. Colot. 1113c).
85 See page 32 above (Anaximander) and Naddaf (2005), 70-74.
86 Contrast Empedocles' confidence in frr. 14-15 Inwood (where he insists that human perception is clear 
and human power over nature effective) with the ambivalence of Parmenides' goddess in fr. 8.50-52 
Coxon (quoted on page 64 above).  Note that Anaximander's use of the word ἄπειρον to describe the 
material universe puts similar emphasis on the lack of effective, definitive boundaries.
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water) named after a god (Hera, Zeus, Hades, Nestis).87  In familiar fashion, the constant 
mixture and separation of the four elements create a cosmic cycle:
TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
δίπλ' ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἠυξήθη μόνον 
εἶναι  /  ἐκ  πλεόνων,  τοτὲ  δ'  αὖ  διέφυ 
πλέον'  ἐξ  ἑνὸς  εἶναι  /  πῦρ καὶ  ὕδωρ καὶ 
γαῖα καὶ ἠέρος ἄπλετον ὕψος· / νεῖκός τε 
οὐλόμενον  δίχα  τῶν,  ἀτάλαντον 
ἁπάντηι,  /  καὶ  φιλότης  ἐν  τοῖσιν,  ἴση 
μῆκός τε πλάτος τε·
I  shall  tell  a double tale.  For at  one time 
they grew to be one alone from many, and 
at  another,  again,  they  grew  apart  to  be 
many from one—fire and water and earth 
and  the  boundless  height  of  air;  and 
destructive strife apart  from these, like in 
every respect, and love among them, equal 
in length and breadth. 
Empedocles, fr. 25.16-20 Inwood
     = fr. 8 Wright
     = fr. B17 DK
Simpl. in Phys. 157.25
The elements grow together to make one whole (ἓν ἠυξήθη μόνον εἶναι) under the 
influence of love (φιλότης, also referred to as the goddess Aphrodite: fr. 25.24 Inwood).  
They grow apart to create many things (διέφυ πλέον' ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι) under the influence 
of strife (νεῖκος).  The progression from one (the world-order of love) to many (the 
world-order of strife) and back again recurs continually: ἧι δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς 
οὐδαμὰ λήγει, ταύτηι δ' αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον (fr. 25.12-13 Inwood).88  From 
the perspective of the elements caught in eternal oscillation between love and strife, 
mortality is an illusion, since the dissolution (or death) of one  temporary combination of 
87 See frr. 12, 39, 40 Inwood; Kingsley (1995), 13-68. 
88 “But insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging, in this respect they are always 
unchanged in a cycle” (trans. Inwood).  Notice the resonance with Anaximander's creation of the 
world-order(s) from warmth and cold (DK12A10) and Parmenides' invocation of light and dark (fr. 
11.3-4 Coxon and the sources referenced in note 60 above).
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the elements is really just the creation (or birth) of another combination of those same 
elements: δοιὴ δὲ θνητῶν γένεσις, δοιὴ δ' ἀπόλειψις· τὴν μὲν γὰρ πάντων σύνοδος τίκτει 
τ' ὀλέκει τε, ἡ δὲ πάλιν διαφυομένων θρεφθεῖσα διέπτη (fr. 25.3-5 Inwood).89  While 
much is lacking, there is evidence (in other fragments and the doxography) that 
Empedocles told a more detailed story of the origin and development of the Greek 
universe, tracing its development from an original unity (an instantiation of the world-
order defined by love) toward increasing disunity (an instantiation of the world-order 
defined by strife, whose realization will reset the cycle at some future period).90 
(2) Zoogony & (3) Anthropogony.  Empedocles' story of the growth of the Greek 
κόσμος91 explicitly included plant, animal, and human life.92  A number of fragments hint 
that it included κόσμοι before and after the familiar Greek, world-orders wherein 
biological life exists in alternative forms (the antecedents or descendants of the normal 
forms of life familiar to the Greek world-order).  In orders prior to the Greek, limbs and 
organs exist independent of bodies,93 coalescing occasionally to form different kinds of 
89 “And there is a double coming to be of mortals and a double waning; for the coming together of them 
all gives birth to and destroys the one, while the other, as they again grow apart, was nurtured and flew 
away” (trans. Inwood).  For more on mortality as an illusion, see frr. 18, 22, 23 Inwood. 
90 See frr. 39-40, 61-62, 103 Inwood; frr. 360-372 KRS.  Synthesizing the quotations and doxographical 
entries in KRS, it appears that a vortex (δίνη) separates the four elements into homogenous masses at 
the height of strife's influence and then begins the process of combining them that leads eventually to 
the formation of a world-order dominated by unifying love.  Strife infiltrates this arrangement, creating 
conflicted world-orders like the one familiar to Empedocles' audience on the way toward separating the 
elements to begin the cycle over again.  See Inwood (1992), 43-46.
91 Empedocles uses this word to indicate world-order in fr. 28.5 Inwood.
92 See the discussion of the four elements in fr. 28.4 (γίγνοντ' ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα θηρῶν) and 
the story of the wandering limbs in fr. 38.6-7 Inwood (ὡσαύτως θάμνοισι καὶ ἰχθύσιν ὑδρομελάθροις / 
θηρσί τ' ὀρειλεχέεσσιν ἰδὲ πτεροβάμοσι κύμβαις). 
93 See fr. 38.1-5 Inwood (τοῦτο μὲν ἀμ' βροτέων μελέων ἀριδείκετον ὄγκον· ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερ-
χόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα γυῖα, τὰ σῶμα λέλογχε, βίου θαλέθοντος ἐν ἀκμῆι· ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε κακῆισι διατ-
μηθέντ' ἐρίδεσσι πλάζεται ἄνδιχ' ἕκαστα περὶ ῥηγμῖνι βίοιο: Simpl. in Phys. 1124.7); fr. 62 Inwood (ἡ 
δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐτύκτοις χοάνοισι τὰς δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μοιράων λάχε Νήστιδος αἴγλης, τέσσαρα δ' 
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strange monsters.94  According to doxographers, Empedocles says that some monsters 
accidentally acquire attributes necessary for survival,95 enabling them to continue the 
compounding mixture of elements that eventually (in a later κόσμος) produces modern 
species of life96 (including human beings)97 familiar to the Greeks.  The multi-stage 
evolution of life offered here—e.g. (a) wandering limbs; (b) monsters; (c) modern species
—is more developed than earlier accounts (as extant: if we had more material from 
Ἡφαίστοιο· τὰ δ' ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο, ἁρμονίης κόλληισιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίηισιν: Simpl. in Phys. 
300.19); fr. 64 Inwood (ἧι πολλαὶ μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν. γυμνοὶ δ' ἐπλάζοντο βραχίονες 
εὔνιδες ὤμων, ὄμματά τ' οἶ' ἐπλανᾶτο πενητεύοντα μετώπον (Simpl. in De caelo 586.7) and fr. 98 
Inwood: ἡ δὲ χθὼν τούτοισιν ἴση συνέκυρσε μάλιστα, Ἡφαίστωι τ' ὄμβρωι τε καὶ αἰθέρι 
παμφανόωντι, Κύπριδος ὁρμιθεῖσα τελείοις ἐν λιμένεσσιν, εἴτ' ὀλίγον μείζων εἴτ' ἐν πλεόνεσσιν 
ἐλάσσων. ἐκ τῶν αἷμά τ' ἔγεντο καὶ ἄλλης εἴδεα σαρκός (Simpl. in Phys. 32.6).  Fr. 38 discusses 
wandering limbs generally as being separated by cosmic strife.  Fr. 62 records the origin of bones (and 
cartilage?).  Fr. 64 gives heads without necks, arms without shoulders, and eyes without foreheads.  Fr. 
98 records the origin of blood and other forms of flesh (brought together under the influence of 
Aphrodite, i.e. cosmic love).    
94 Fr. 66 Inwood: πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφίστερνα φύεσθαι, βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωιρα, τὰ δ' 
ἔμπαλιν ἐξανατέλλειν ἀνδροφυῆ βούκρανα, μεμιγμένα τῆι μὲν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν τῆι δὲ γυναικοφυῆ, 
σκιεροῖς ἠσκημένα γυίοις (Ael. N. a. 16.299).  See also fr. 61.11-17 Inwood, which credits the origin of 
mortal beings to the influence of love (φιλότης) in the wake of strife's reaching the outer limits of the 
vortex (δίνη). 
95 Fr. 380 KRS: ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἕνεκα του ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ 
αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς 
λέγει τὰ «βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωιρα» (Aristot. Phys. 2. 8.198b29 = Empedocles, fr. B61 DK).
96 The most complete account of this evolution is preserved by Aetius (5.19.5 =  fr. 375 KRS), who 
distinguishes four stages in Empedoclean biological evolution: (1) isolated body parts; (2) fantasy 
creatures with body parts combined; (3) homogenous creatures; (4) creatures with the ability to 
reproduce sexually (unlike previous generations, which came from earth and water).  In the text above, 
stage (a) wandering limbs corresponds to Aetius' stage (1), stage (b) monsters to Aetius stages (2) & 
(3), and stage (c) modern species to Aetius stage (4). 
97 The evolution of human beings from primitive limbless ὅρπηκες is described briefly in fr. 67 Inwood 
(νῦν δ' ἄγ' , ὅπως ἀνδρῶν τε πολυκλαύτων τε γυναικῶν ἐννυχίους ὅρπηκας ἀνήγαγε κρινόμενον πῦρ, 
τῶνδε κλῦ· οὐ γὰρ μῦθος ἀπόσκοπος οὐδ' ἀδαήμων. οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον, 
ἀμφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδεος αἶσαν ἔχοντες· τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἱκέσθαι, 
οὔτε τί πω μελέων ἐρατὸν δέμας ἐμφαίνοντας, οὔτ' ἐνοπὴν οὔτ' αὖ ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι γυῖον: Simpl. 
in Phys. 381.31) and in more detail by Aetius: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὅτε ἐγεννᾶτο τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἐκ 
τῆς γῆς, τοσαύτην γενέσθαι τῶι μήκει τοῦ χρόνου διὰ τὸ βραδυπορεῖν τὸν ἥλιον τὴν ἡμέραν, ὁπόση 
νῦν ἐστιν ἡ δεκάμηνος· προιόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου τοσαύτην γενέσθαι τὴν ἡμέραν, ὁπόση νῦν ἐστιν ἡ 
ἑπτάμηνος· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ δεκάμηνα καὶ τὰ ἑπτάμηνα, τῆς φύσεως τοῦ κόσμου οὕτω μεμελετηκυίας, 
αὔξεσθαι ἐν μιᾶι ἡμέραι ἧι τίκτεται [νυκτὶ] τὸ βρέφος (5.18.1 = fr. 382 KRS; Empedocles, fr. A75 
DK).  See also fr. 72 Inwood, which puts the origin of masculine beings in the warmer part of the earth 
to explain male darkness, strength, and hairiness. 
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previous authors, then it might seem less innovative).98  The precise place of this theory 
of biological evolution in Empedocles' cosmic love-strife cycle is disputed, owing to gaps 
in the evidence;99 for our purposes, it is enough that this theory exists, and that it was 
joined (somehow) to the love-strife cycle:
TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
ἐν  δὲ  μέρει  κρατέουσι  περιπλομένοιο 
κύκλοιο,  /  καὶ  φθίνει  εἰς  ἄλληλα  καὶ 
αὔξεται ἐν μέρει  αἴσης.  / αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν 
ταῦτα,  δι'  ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα / γίγνοντ' 
ἄνθρωποί  τε  καὶ  ἄλλων  ἔθνεα  θηρῶν,  / 
ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἕνα 
κόσμον,  /  ἄλλοτε  δ'  αὖ  δίχ'  ἕκαστα 
φορούμενα  νείκεος  ἔχθει,  /  εἰσόκεν  ἓν 
συμφύντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται.
And  in  turn  they  [the  four  elements] 
dominate  as  the  cycle  goes  around,  and 
they shrink into each other and grow in the 
turns  assigned by destiny.  For  these  very 
things are, and running through each other 
they  become men and the  tribes  of  other 
beasts, at one time coming together by love 
into  one  cosmos,  and at  another  time  all 
being  borne  apart  separately  by  the 
hostility of strife, until by growing together 
as one they are totally subordinated.
Empedocles, fr. 28.1-7  Inwood
     = fr. 16 Wright
     = fr. B26 DK
Simpl. in Phys. 33.18 
A final important piece of Empedocles' account of zoogony and anthropogony is 
his view of deity.  Like other authors in the Critical Tradition, Empedocles is a 
materialist: all things are material things. This includes the gods, among whom are the 
four roots (named after traditional deities) as well as cosmic love (sometimes called 
Aphrodite) and strife, which are conceived as particular material arrangements that wax 
98 Notice that Parmenides too is supposed to have discussed the origin of body parts separate from bodies: 
see note 63 above.
99 It is not exactly clear how things work when the world-order of love begins to disintegrate as strife 
regains dominance.  For a summary of the problems, see Inwood (1992), 41-46.
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and wane throughout the cycle that defines existence.100  In addition to these six gods, 
explicitly immortal,101 Empedocles recognizes others: (a1) long-lived gods (θεοὶ 
δολιχαίωνες: fr. 26.12 Inwood) or δαίμονες (frr. 11.5; 65 Inwood); and (b1) an ambiguous 
divinity or divinities reminiscent of Xenophanes' god (frr. 109-110 Inwood).
(a1) We know two things about the long-lived gods.  (a1 .1)  First, they have sworn 
off murder (φόνος); any god who breaks faith is condemned by an oracle of necessity 
(ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν: fr. 11.1 Inwood) to leave the others (ἀπὸ 
μακάρων ἀλάλασθαι: 11.6) and pass through every form of mortal existence (plant, 
animal, and human) in the cycle of love and strife (φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα 
θνητῶν ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους: 11.7-8) before returning.  Every 
living thing is thus (at least potentially) divine in two senses: it is constituted by the six 
immortals, and it might contain an exiled δαίμων.102  (a1 .2) Second, outcast gods 
experience certain kinds of human life near the end of their exile: prophets, singers, 
doctors, and leaders are reborn as θεοί (fr. 136 Inwood), restoring their exiled δαίμονες 
to communion with the μάκαροι who have forsworn murder.103
100 On the material reality of cosmic love and strife, see Inwood (1992), 31-39.
101 See fr. 25.30-35 Inwood: καὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὐδ' ἄρ τι ἐπιγίγνεται οὐδ' ἀπολήγει· εἴτε γὰρ ἐφθείροντο 
διαμπερές, οὐκέτ' ἂν ἦσαν. τοῦτλ δ' ἐπαυξήσειε τὸ πᾶν τί κε, καὶ πόθεν ἐλθόν; πῆι δέ κε κἠξαπόλοιτο, 
ἐπεὶ τῶνδ' οὐδὲν ἐρῆμον; ἀλλ' αὔτ' ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ 
ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα (Simpl. in Phys. 157.25).
102 See fr. 113 Inwood (σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι: Stob. 1.49.60), fr. 135 Inwood (ἐν 
θήρεσσι λέοντες ὀρειλεχέες χαμαιεῦναι γίγνονται, δάφναι δ' ἐνὶ δένδρεσιν ἠυκόμοισιν: Ael. N. a. 
12.7), and frr. 401-409 KRS.
103 Empedocles portrays himself as a god returning from exile and mentions his δαίμων spending time in 
other mortal bodies: see frr. 1.4 Inwood (ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός: varia); 11.13-14 
Inwood (τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, νείκεϊ μαινομένωι πίσυνος: varia); 111 
Inwood: ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε θάμνος τ' οἰωμός τε καὶ †ἐξ ἁλὸς ἔμπορος† 
ἰχθύς (Hippol. Refut. 1.3.1).
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(b1) Two fragments recognize a familiar kind of deity: 
TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
οὐκ  ἔστιν  πελάσασθαι  ἐν  ὀφθαλμοῖσιν 
ἐφικτόν / ἡμετέροις ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν, ἧιπερ 
τε μεγίστη /  πειθοῦς ἀνθρώποισιν ἀμαξι-
τὸς εἰς φρένα πίπτει.
It  is  not  achievable  that  we  should 
approach  [it/him]  with  our  eyes  or  grasp 
[it/him]  with  our  hands,  by  which  the 
greatest  road  of  persuasion  extends  to 
men's thought organ. 
Empedocles, fr. 109  Inwood
     = fr. 96 Wright
     = fr. B133 DK
Clem. Strom. 5.81.2
οὐδὲ  γὰρ  ἀνδρομέηι  κεφαλῆι  κατὰ  γυῖα 
κέκασται, / οὐ μὲν ἀπὸ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι 
ἀίσσουσι,  /  οὐ  πόδες,  οὐ  θοὰ  γοῦν',  οὐ 
μήδεα λαχνήεντα,  /  ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ  καὶ 
ἀθέσφατος  ἔπλετο  μοῦνον,  /  φροντίσι 
κόσμον ἅπαντα καταίσσουσα θοῆισιν.
For [it/he] is not fitted out in [its/his] limbs 
with a human head, nor do two branches 
dart from [its/his] back nor feet, nor swift 
knees nor shaggy genitals; but it/he is only 
a sacred and ineffable thought organ daring 
through  the  entire  cosmos  with  swift 
thoughts.
Empedocles,  fr. 110 Inwood
     = fr. 97 Wright
     = fr. B135 DK
Ammon. in Int. 249.1
Clement identifies Empedocles' sense-elusive deity as τὸ θεῖον.  Ammonius uses the 
same generic term to identify the sacred φρῆν, but adds that it is nominally Apollo.104  
Whatever the original idea of divinity here, it is reminiscent of Xenophanes, whose 
μέγιστος θεός is similarly non-anthropomorphic (DK21B11-12, B14-16) and difficult to 
perceive (καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν ... ἀμφὶ θεῶν: DK21B34.1).  Thus, it is 
104 διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος σοφὸς ἐπιρραπίσας τοὺς περὶ θεῶν ὡς ἀνθρωποειδῶν ὄντων παρὰ 
τοῖς ποιηταῖς λεγομένους μύθους, ἐπήγαγε προηγουμένως μὲν περὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, περὶ οὗ ἦν αὐτῶι 
προσεχῶς ὁ λόγος, κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ θείου παντὸς ἁπλῶς ἀποφαινόμενος [fr. 
110 Inwood follows].
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not surprising that a case can be made for recognizing the sacred φρῆν as Empedocles' 
highest deity (equivalent to the μέγιστος θεός).
Elsewhere we learn that the shape of the world-order dominated by cosmic love is 
spherical (fr. 33 Inwood =  fr. 21 Wright), and we find the love-sphere described in terms 
reminiscent of the sacred φρῆν:
TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι ἀίσσονται, / 
οὐ  πόδες,  οὐ  θοὰ  γοῦν',  οὐ  μήδεα 
γεννήεντα … ἀλλ' ὅ γε πάντοθεν ἶσος <ἐοῖ> 
καὶ  πάμπαν  ἀπείρων,  /  σφαῖρος  κυκλο-
τερὴς μονίηι περιηγέι γαίων.
For two branches do not dart from its back, 
nor feet nor swift knees nor potent genitals 
… but it indeed is equal <to itself> on all 
sides  and  totally  unbounded,  a  rounded 
sphere rejoicing in its surrounding solitude.
Empedocles, fr. 34  Inwood
     = fr. 22 Wright
     = fr. B29, B28 DK
Hippol. Refut. 7.92.13; Stob. 1.15.2
The love-sphere is homogenous, lacking the same distinct members that the sacred φρῆν 
does not have (branches from the back, feet, knees, and gonads).  Its homogeneity is an 
expression of harmony (ἁρμονίη),105 the same harmony that mixes the four roots to form 
mortal bodies (e.g. fr. 62.4 Inwood).  It is tempting to understand the sacred φρῆν as the 
most powerful expression of this harmony (which waxes with cosmic love and wanes 
with cosmic strife).  On this reading of Empedocles, the spherical κόσμος that love 
creates constitutes (or perhaps better embodies or facilitates) a universal φρῆν whose 
awareness reaches the entire κόσμος perfectly, like the thought of Xenophanes' god.106  
105 Fr. 33.2-3 Inwood: οὕτως ἁρμονίης πυκινῶι κρυφῶι ἐστήρικται, σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονίηι 
περιγηθέι γαίων (Simpl. in Phys. 1183.24).
106 See fr. 110.4-5 Inwood (ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον, φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα 
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Then strife separates the homogenous κρῆσις of the roots, interrupting the integration of 
the sphere (and the awareness of the sacred φρῆν) and creating (the illusion of) mortality 
(defined by disintegration).  But the φρῆν never ceases to exert some control over 
everything,107 and it eventually recovers full awareness and expression with the 
reintegration of the love-sphere.108  One is reminded of Xenophanes' god perceiving 
everything οὗλος (DK21B24) and moving all things with thought (DK21B25): 
Empedocles' sacred φρῆν seems similarly immanent, the only obvious difference being 
that its power waxes and wanes (tracking the love-strife cycle) while Xenophanes' god 
remains the same always, never moving (DK21B26).109
(4) Ethics (Politogony?).  Like Parmenides, Empedocles is fundamentally 
concerned with perception in the human individual, who must open his mind (one or 
more thinking organs referred to as the φρῆν, σπλάγχνα, πραπίδες, νόος, or καρδίη) to 
(material) emanations coming from the entire κόσμος (the constant mixture and 
separation of the four roots, presided over by cosmic love and strife, embodying the 
sacred φρῆν).110  As the sacred φρῆν is the center of awareness in the κόσμος, so the 
individual's φρῆν is the center of his personal awareness, the place where all his 
perceptions (impressions from incoming emanations) come together (through the πόροι 
καταίσσουσα θοῆισιν: quoted on page 74) and DK21B25 (Xenophanes): ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου 
φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει (Simpl. in Phys. 23.19).
107 See fr. 16.10 Inwood (πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν: Hippol. Refut. 7.29.25) in 
addition to the frr. quoted in note 106 above.
108 This is the thesis of Drozdek (2007), 77-78.
109 See Drozdek (2007), 78-79.
110 See frr. 3, 4, 6, 8, 16, 88, 96 Inwood, Theophr. De Sensu 7-12, and Drozdek (2007), 78-80.
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that are sense-organs, i.e. eyes, ears, etc.)111 and integrate to form a coherent perspective 
on reality (φύσις: fr. 21 Inwood).  The individual perceives reality (φύσις) by his 
(physical) likeness to it:
TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
γαίηι  μὲν  γὰρ  γαῖαν  ὀπώπαμεν,  ὕδατι  δ' 
ὕδωρ,  /  αἰθέρι  δ'  αἰθέρα  δῖον,  ἀτὰρ πυρὶ 
πῦρ ἀΐδηλον, / στοργὴν δὲ στοργῆι, νεῖκος 
δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῶι.
By earth we see earth; by water, water; by 
aither,  shining  aither;  but  by fire,  blazing 
fire;  love  by  love  and  strife  by  baneful 
strife.
Empedocles, fr. 17  Inwood
     = fr. 77 Wright
     = fr. B109 DK
Aristot. De anima 404b8
The six immortals (four roots, love, and strife) integrate the individual as well as the 
κόσμος: through his own earth, water, air, fire, love, and strife, the individual perceives 
earth, water, air, fire, love, and strife in his environment.  The interplay between cosmic 
elements (the four roots, love, and strife) creates a world-order characterized by growth 
(φύσις), an embodied cosmic φρῆν whose awareness waxes and wanes (i.e. grows).  In 
the same way, the interplay between these elements in the individual integrates his φρῆν, 
simultaneously effecting and affecting its growth (φύσις: fr. 16.5 Inwood): 
111 Frr. 14.4-8 Inwood (ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἄθρει πάσηι παλάμηι πῆι δῆλον ἕκαστον, μήτε τιν' ὄψιν ἔχων πιστὴν 
πλέον ἢ κατ' ἀκούην ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης, μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσηι πόρος 
ἐστι νοῆσαι, γυίων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἧι δῆλον ἕκαστον: Sext. Adv. math. 7.125); 68 Inwood (τῶι δ' 
ἐπὶ καὶ πόθος εἶσι δι' ὄψιος ἀμμίσγεσθαι: Plut. Quaest. nat. 917e).  The senses admit thought and 
emotion, which lead to action.  See also Theophr. De Sensu 7-12.
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TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
εἰ  γὰρ  καὶ  [ἐν]  σφ'  ἁδινῆισιν  ὑπὸ 
πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας / εὐμενέως καθαρῆι-
σιν ἐποπτεύσεις μελέτηισιν, / ταῦτά τέ σοι 
μάλα πάντα δι' αἰῶνος παρέσονται, / ἄλλα 
τε  πόλλ'  ἀπὸ  τῶνδε  κτ<ήσε>αι·  αὐτὰ  γὰρ 
αὔξει / ταῦτ' εἰς ἦθος ἕκαστον, ὅπηι φύσις 
ἐστὶν ἑκάστωι.
For if,  thrusting them deep down in your 
crowded thinking organs, you gaze on them 
in  kindly  fashion,  with  pure  meditations, 
absolutely all these things will be with you 
throughout  your  life,  and from these  you 
will acquire many others; for these things 
themselves  will  expand  to  form  each 
character, according to the growth [nature] 
of each.
Empedocles, fr. 16.1-5  Inwood
     = fr. 100 Wright
     = fr. B110 DK
Hippol. Refut. 7.29.25
ἀλλ'  ἄγε  μύθων  κλῦθι,  μάθη  γάρ  τοι 
φρένας αὔξει·
But  come!  Hear  my  words;  for  learning 
will expand your thought organs.
Empedocles, fr. 25.14 Inwood
     = fr. 8 Wright
     = fr. B17 DK
Simpl. in Phys. 157.25
So the individual φρῆν is a small copy of the cosmic one, growing in a cycle that mirrors  
(and is included in) the love-strife cycle that creates the κόσμος.  Drozdek (2007, 78) 
finds the most important correspondence between cosmic and personal φρένες: cosmic 
fire holds (or embodies) thought (φρόνησις, γνώμη)112 the way the individual's blood 
(αἷμα) holds (or embodies) his personal thought (νόημα).113  This understanding of fire 
112 Fr. B110 DK: ἐνόμιζε [Empedocles] τὰ μέρη τοῦ πυρὸς τὰ <ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ> ἀόρατα φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ 
γνώμην ἴσην (Hippol. Refut. 6.12).  The authenticity of this reading is disputed.  For arguments for and 
against it, see Drozdek (2007, 73-74, 78), who ultimately receives it as genuine.  I am convinced he is 
correct.
113 Fr. 96 Inwood:  αἵματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραμμένη ἀντιθορόντος τῆι τε νόημα μάλιστα κικλήσκεται 
ἀνθρώποισιν· αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα (Stob. 1.49.53).
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and blood as parallel entities justifies the central ethical standard of Empedocles, which 
demands punishment for bloodshed.114  Just as cosmic strife interrupts the ἁρμονίη of the 
love-sphere, separating immortal roots and breaking the awareness of the cosmic φρῆν 
(because fire is separated from the other roots, unable to embody thought the same way 
as before) so φόνος interrupts the ἁρμονίη of the individual living being, breaking the 
awareness of his personal φρῆν (because his blood is separated from his body, unable to 
embody thought the same way as before).
Other fragments confirm the close correspondence between ethics and physics 
evident here.  For Empedocles, the ethic of avoiding φόνος is a matter of material, 
physical (mis)perception:
TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
μορφὴν  δ'  ἀλλάξαντα  πατὴρ  φίλον  υἱὸν 
ἀείρας / σφάζει ἐπευχόμενος μέγα νήπιος, 
οἱ δ' ἀπορεῦνται / λισσόμενον θύοντες· ὁ 
δ'  αὖ  νήκουστος  ὁμοκλέων  /  σφάξας  ἐν 
μεγάροισι κακὴν ἀλεγύνατο δαῖτα. / ὡς δ' 
αὔτως  πατέρ'  υἱὸς  ἑλὼν  καὶ  μητέρα 
παῖδες / θυμὸν ἀπορραίσαντε φίλας κατὰ 
σάρκας ἔδουσιν.
A father  lifts  up  his  dear  son,  who  has 
changed his form, and prays and slaughters 
him, in great folly, and they are at a loss as 
they sacrifice the suppliant. But he, on the 
other hand, deaf to the rebukes, sacrificed 
him in his halls, and prepared an evil meal. 
In the same way, a son seizes his father and 
the children their  mother,  and tearing out 
their life-breath devour their own flesh.
Empedocles, fr. 128 Inwood
     = fr. 124 Wright
     = fr. B137 DK 
Sext. Adv. math. 9.129
114 See frr. 122, 124, 126 Inwood, and recall the story of the exiled δαίμονες (fr. 11.3 Inwood, discussed 
above on page 73). 
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οὐ  παύσεσθε  φόνοιο  δυσηχέος;  οὐκ 
ἐσορᾶτε / ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείηισι 
νόοιο;
Will  you  not  desist  from  harsh-sounding 
bloodshed?  Do  you  not  see  that  you  are 
devouring each other in the heedlessness of 
your understanding?
Empedocles, fr. 126 Inwood
     = fr. 122 Wright
     = fr. B136 DK
Sext. Adv. math. 9.119
Ignorant of φύσις (the love-strife cycle, including the incorporation of δαίμονες), people 
kill family members (δαίμονες incorporated as sacrificial animals), failing to perceive 
what they are really doing (οἱ δ' ἀπορεῦνται … ὁ δ' αὖ νήκουστος [fr. 128]; οὐκ ἐσορᾶτε 
ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείηισι νόοιο; [fr. 126 Inwood]).  By teaching φύσις in his 
poetry, Empedocles enlarges the individual human φρῆν115 of his auditor, amplifying its 
entire expression in thought, word, and action,116 and facilitating right action (like the 
avoidance of animal sacrifice).117  
In this world, physics are ethics:
115 Fr. 25.14 Inwood: μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει (Simpl. in Phys. 157.25).
116 See e.g. fr. 93 Inwood: πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν (Aristot. Metaph. 1009b17). See 
also fr. 124 Inwood, where thinking devises doing (σχέτλι' ἔργα βορᾶς περὶ χείλεσι μητίσασθαι: 
Porphyr. De abst. 2.31), and fr. 6 Inwood, where the thinking man is a master of deeds who enjoys 
augmented perceptual abilities (ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς, ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων 
ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον. παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων· ὁππότε γὰρ πάσηισιν ὀρέξαιτο 
πραπίδεσσιν, ῥεῖ' ὅ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον, καί τε δέκ' ἀνθρώπων καί τ' εἴκοσιν 
αἰώνεσσιν: Porphyr. Vita Pythagor. 30).
117 Other actions to avoid include eating laurel leaves (fr. 129 Inwood) and beans  (fr. 132 Inwood).  These 
prohibitions link Empedocles with Pythagoras of Samos (Riedeweg [2002], 71) and ritual incubation, 
an important part of early Pythagoreanism (Kingsley [1995], 283-288).
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TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
ἀλλὰ  τὸ  μὲν  πάντων  νόμιμον  διά  τ' 
εὐρυμέδοντος  /  αἰθέρος  ἠνεκέως  τέταται 
διά τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.
But  what  is  lawful  for  all  extends 
continuously through the wide-ruling aither 
and through the boundless gleam.
Empedocles, fr. 125  Inwood
     = fr. 121 Wright
     = fr. B135 DK
Aristot. Rhet. 1373b16118
And ethics are physics:
 
TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
φάρμακα δ' ὅσσα γεγᾶσι κακῶν καὶ γήραος 
ἄλκαρ  /  πεύσηι,  ἐπεὶ  μούνωι  σοι  ἐγὼ 
κρανέω  τάδε  πάντα.  /  παύσεις  δ' 
ἀκαμάτων ἀνέμων μένος οἵ τ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν / 
ὀρνύμενοι  πνοιαῖσι  καταφθινύθουσιν 
ἀρούρας·  /  καὶ  πάλιν,  ἤν  κ'  ἐθέληισθα, 
παλίντιτα πνεύματ' ἐπάξεις· / θήσεις δ' ἐξ 
ὄμβροιο  κελαινοῦ  καίριον  αὐχμόν  / 
ἀνθρώποις,  θήσεις  δὲ  καὶ  ἐξ  αὐχμοῖο 
θερείου  /  ῥεύματα  δενδρεόθρεπτα,  τα'  τ' 
αἰθέρι  ναιετάουσι,  /  ἄξεις  δ'  ἐξ  Ἀίδαο 
καταφθιμένου μένος ἀνδρός.
All the potions which there are as a defence 
against evils and old age, you shall learn, 
since  for  you alone  will  I  accomplish all 
these  things.  You  shall  put  a  stop  to  the 
strength  of  tireless  winds,  which  rush 
against the land and wither the fields with 
their  blasts;  and  again,  if  you  wish,  you 
shall bring the winds back again; and you 
shall  make,  after  dark  rain,  a  drought 
timely for men, and after summer drought 
you  shall  make  tree-nourishing  streams 
which dwell in the air; and you shall bring 
from Hades the strength of a man who has 
died.
Empedocles, fr. 15 Inwood
     = fr. 101 Wright
     = fr. B111 DK
Diog. 8.59
The cosmic cycle of love and strife contains (and is reflected in) human love and strife, a 
correspondence that the poet-philosopher's pupil can use to perform physical miracles.119
118 Aristotle confirms that this fragment seeks to equate human and natural justice.
119 Note that Empedocles is credited with miraculous feats of engineering in the doxography: blocking the 
Etesian winds with an artificial barrier (Diog. 8.60); and removing a plague from the city of Selinus by 
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One more point remains to be made.  Like Xenophanes,120 Empedocles seems to 
have created a basic narrative about human institutions, laying the groundwork for an 
origin-and-development story for the Greek πόλις analogous to origin-and-development 
stories for the Greek κόσμος (including organic life) like those we have already seen:
TEXT (Inwood) TRANSLATION (Inwood)
οὐδέ  τις  ἦν  κείνοισιν  Ἄρης  θεὸς  οὐδὲ 
Κυδοιμός  /  οὐδὲ  Ζεὺς  βασιλεὺς  οὐδὲ 
Κρόνος  οὐδὲ  Ποσειδῶν,  /  ἀλλὰ  Κύπρις 
βασίλεια  …  /  τὴν  οἵ  γ'  εὐσεβέεσσιν 
ἀγάλμασιν  ἱλάσκοντο  /  γραπτοῖς  τε 
ζώιοισι  μύριοισί  τε  δαιδαλεόδμοις  / 
σμύρνης  τ'  ἀκρήτου  θυσίαις  λιβάνου  τε 
θυώδους,  /  ξανθῶν  τε  σπονδὰς  μελίτων 
ῥίπτοντες  ἐς  οὖδας,  /  …  /  ταύρων  δ' 
ἀκρήτοισι φόνοις οὐ δεύετο βωμός, / ἀλλὰ 
μύσος  τοῦτ'  ἔσκεν  ἐν  ἀνθρώποισι 
μέγιστον, / θυμὸν ἀπορραίσαντας ἐέδμεναι 
ἠέα γυῖα.
They had no god Ares or Battle-Din,  nor 
Zeus the king nor Kronos nor Poseidon; but 
Kupris the queen [Aphrodite] … her they 
worshipped  with  pious  images,  painted 
pictures  and  perfumes  of  various  odours, 
and  sacrifices  of  unmixed  myrrh  and 
fragrant  frankincense,  dashing  onto  the 
ground  libations  of  yellow  honey  … her 
altar  was  not  wetted  with  the  unmixed 
blood  of  bulls,  but  this  was  the  greatest 
abomination  among  me,  to  tear  out  their 
life-breath and eat their goodly limbs.
Empedocles, fr. 122 Inwood
     = fr. 118 Wright
     = fr. B128 DK
Porphyr. De abst. 33.18
Once upon a time, in an era less dominated by cosmic strife,121 mankind observed 
customs different from those familiar to the Critical Tradition: they worshipped different 
gods (cosmic love under the name Aphrodite)122 with different rituals (peaceful offerings 
in place of bloody sacrifices).  While there is not enough here to restore anything very 
altering the course of a nearby river (Diog. 8.70).  His pupil is explicitly promised one of these 
achievements: παύσεις δ' ἀκαμάτων ἀνέμων μένος οἵ τ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν (fr. 15.3 Inwood). 
120 See the discussion of DK21B18 on page 43 above.
121 See note 90 above.
122 For the identity between Kupris here and cosmic love, see Wright (1981), 282-283.
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substantial,123 it is clear that Empedocles envisioned some kind of progression from (a2) 
the way things were under the regime of love to (b2) the way things are now under the 
regime of strife.  This progression was definitely integrated with the larger narrative the 
poet-philosopher creates for the entire Greek κόσμος.
Anaxagoras (1.3.6)
A contemporary of Empedocles,124 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (born c. 500; 
floruit 470-460) is remembered as the author of at least one book (which Simplicius 
refers to by the title Περὶ φύσεως: fr. B4a DK = Simpl. in Phys. 34.18-20).125  What 
remains of his thought includes some familiar elements.
(1) Cosmogony, (2) Zoogony, & (3) Anthropogony.  Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras 
explains all perceptual phenomena (e.g. γένεσις: fr. B10 DK) as the result of regular 
123 Wright (1981): “The passage from Porphyry occurs in an extract from Theophrastus on early sacrifices. 
The first libations were of water, then of honey, oil, and wine; E.'s lines are given in support. The whole 
is set in the early history of man: 'When friendship and a proper sense of the duties pertaining to 
kindred natures was possessed by all men, no one slaughtered any living being, in consequence of 
thinking that other animals were allied to him [see Empedocles, fr. 123 Inwood]. But when strife and 
tumult (Ares and Kydoimos), every kind of contention,and the principle of war, invaded mankind, then, 
for the first time, no one in reality spared any one of his kindred natures' (abst. 2.21, trans. T. Taylor, 
1823). The connection with the Physics [Wright believes there were two original Empedoclean poems], 
reinforced by the identification of Kypris with Philia [by Theophrastus], is clear. There is here a 
particular description of the life of men (ἐν ἀνθρώποισι in line 9 is unambiguous) at the beginning of 
their generation, when Love was dominate over Strife, but now the positions are being reversed” (282).
124 Aristot. Metaph. 1.3.984a11, Simpl. in Phys. 25.19 = Anaxagoras, frr. A43, A8 DK.  See also Curd 
(2007), 133.
125 Frr. A1, A35-40 DK.  Fr. A36 (Clem. Strom. 1.78) records that some make Anaxagoras “the first to 
publish a book” (πρῶτον διὰ γραφῆς ἐκδοῦναι βιβλίον).  This need not invalidate accounts of earlier 
writings in the Ionian tradition, which need not have circulated as freely (or in precisely the same 
format) as Anaxagoras' writing, which was apparently sold to all buyers in the marketplace (fr. A35 DK 
= Plato, Apol. 26e7-d9).  Note that Heraclitus' book is supposed to have been deposited at the temple of 
Artemis in Ephesus for the use of elite adepts (Diog. 9.6 = DK22A1) and to have employed unusual 
punctuation (Aristot. Rhet. 3.1407b11 = DK22A4).  Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles 
composed epic poetry, a genre with distinct conventions (including a strong emphasis on oral 
performance).  The precise genre of Anaximander's written work remains unclear (like its audience).
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interactions between physical ἀρχαί whose essential nature remains the same over 
time.126  However, his ἀρχαί are not as obvious or simple as the four roots.  From the 
perspective of a human observer, Anaxagorean elements are infinite (ἄπειρα: fr. B3 DK), 
transcending limiting categories imposed by human perception (like size and number)127 
and inhering continually in every perceptible thing (rather than separating entirely from 
one another like the roots in the love-strife cycle that Empedocles imagines).128  
Anaxagoras' unique construction of the physical cycle that constitutes the universe (a 
cycle ubiquitous in the Critical Tradition, as we have seen) appears most clearly in the 
famous fragment on νοῦς:
TEXT (Curd) TRANSLATION (Curd)
καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς 
ἐκράτησεν,  ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν. 
καὶ  πρῶτον  ἀπό  του  σμικροῦ  ἤρξατο 
περιχωρεῖν,  ἐπὶ  δὲ  πλέον  περιχωρεῖ,  καὶ 
περιχωρήσει  ἐπὶ  πλέον.  καὶ  τὰ  συμμισ-
γόμενά  τε  καὶ  ἀποκρινόμενα  καὶ  δια-
κρινόμενα  πάντα  ἔγνω  νοῦς.  καὶ  ὁποῖα 
ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὁποῖα ἦν ἅσσα νῦν μή 
ἐστι,  καὶ  ὅσα  νῦν  ἐστι  καὶ  ὁποῖα  ἔσται, 
πάντα  διεκόσμησε  νοῦς,  καὶ  τὴν  περι-
χώρησιν ταύτην, ἥν νῦν περιχωρέει τά τε 
ἄστρα καὶ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ 
καὶ ὁ αἰθὴρ οἱ  ἀποκρινόμενοι.  ἡ δὲ περι-
χώρησις αὐτὴ ἐποίησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. καὶ 
ἀποκρίνεται ἀπό τε τοῦ ἀραιοῦ τὸ πυκνὸν   
And Nous controlled the whole revolution, 
so  that  it  started  to  revolve  in  the 
beginning. First it began to revolve from a 
small region, but it is revolving yet more, 
and  it  will  revolve  still  more.  And  Nous 
knew  them all:  the  things  that  are  being 
mixed  together,  the  things  that  are  being 
separated off, and the things that are being 
dissociated.  And whatever  sorts  of  things 
were going to be, and whatever sorts were 
and now are not, and as many as are now 
and whatever sorts will be, all these  Nous 
set  in  order.  And  Nous also  ordered  this 
revolution,  in  which  the  things  being 
separated off now revolve, the stars and the 
126Frr. B5, B10 DK.
127 Frr. B1, B3 DK: «ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα·» (Simpl. in Phys. 
155.23, 164.14-22).
128 Fr. B6 DK: καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραί εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ πλῆθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ἐν 
παντὶ πάντα· οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει. ὅτε τοὐλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν 
εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅπωσπερ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν 
πάντα ὁμοῦ. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ πολλὰ ἔνεστι καὶ τῶν ἀποκρινομένων ἴσα πλῆθος ἐν τοῖς μείζοσί τε καὶ 
ἐλάσσοσι (Simpl. in Phys. 164.25).
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καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ 
ζοφεροῦ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ 
ξηρόν.  μοῖραι  δὲ  πολλαὶ  πολλῶν  εἰσι. 
παντάπασι  δὲ  οὐδὲν  ἀποκρίνεται  οὐδὲ 
διακρίνεται  ἕτερον  ἀπὸ  τοῦ  ἑτέρου  πλὴν 
νοῦ.
sun  and  the  moon  and  the  air  and  the 
aether.  This  revolution  caused  them  to 
separate off. The dense is being separated 
off from the rare, the warm from the cold, 
and the bright from the dark, and the dry 
from the moist.  But there are many shares 
of  many  things;  nothing  is  completely 
separated off  or  dissociated  one from the 
other except Nous. 
Anaxagoras, fr. B12 DK
Simpl. in Phys. 156.13 
According to Anaxagoras, the Greek world-order owes its existence to a continuous 
revolution (περιχώρησις) that began in the past (πρῶτον ἀπό του σμικροῦ ἤρξατο 
περιχωρεῖν),129 continues in the present (ἐπὶ δὲ πλέον περιχωρεῖ), and will go on 
indefinitely into the future (καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλέον).  This revolution constantly 
mixes things (τὰ συμμισγόμενα), separates them from one another (ἀποκρινόμενα), and 
breaks them down (διακρινόμενα).130  Each thing is a compound containing every kind of 
element (παντάπασι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται) in different proportions.  As the proportions 
of different elements in a thing change, so do its perceptible physical characteristics (e.g. 
density, temperature, brightness, wetness).  Thus warm things contain more “warm stuff” 
than cold things, and bright things contain more “bright stuff” than dark things, etc., but 
nothing is entirely without warm or bright stuff (the elements warm and bright).  The 
129 For more about the beginning of Anaxagoras' περιχώρησις, see fr. B4b DK (quoted below on page 87), 
which discusses the initial wholeness composed of all material stuff before things began to separate 
(ἀποκρίνεσθαι).
130 See fr. B17 DK (τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς νομίζουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες· οὐδὲν γὰρ χρῆμα 
γίνεται οὐδὲ ἀπόλλυται, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐόντων χρημάτων συμμίσγεταί τε καὶ διακρίνεται. καὶ οὕτως ἂν 
ὀρθῶς καλοῖεν τό τε γίνεσθαι συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι διακρίνεσθαι: Simpl. in Phys. 163.18) 
and fr. B10 DK, where the human body grows from the dissociation (διάκρισις, διακρίνεσθαι) of 
different physical elements in the semen. 
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driving force behind the revolution is a cosmic mind that knows all things (πάντα ἔγνω 
νοῦς) and orders them (πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς)131—including things past (and perished), 
present, and future (καὶ ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὁποῖα ἦν ἅσσα νῦν μή ἐστι, καὶ ὅσα 
νῦν ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα ἔσται).  This mind is separate (οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ 
ἑτέρου πλὴν νοῦ) from the other physical stuff in the universe that cannot be broken 
down into pure categories (like Empedocles' roots).132  Thus, instead of being an emergent 
property of ἀρχαί (like the Empedoclean sacred φρῆν), Anaxagoras' νοῦς is itself an 
ἀρχή: a material principle (λεπτότατον πάντων χρημάτων: fr. B12 DK) which initiates 
and controls the process (περιχώρησις) that makes things seem to come into existence 
and pass away, constituting the familiar Greek κόσμος.133 
Another essential part of Anaxagoras' cosmology (in addition to the ἀρχαί and the 
περιχώρησις) is the incorporation of parallel world-orders existing contemporary but 
(most likely)134 non-contiguous with the Greek κόσμος.135  As it happens, one of the 
131 See also fr. B13 DK, which makes νοῦς the original source of universal motion (and an ἀρχή): 
Ἀναξαγόρου δέ, φησὶν Ἀλέξανδρος, οὐκ ἐμνημόνευσε [Aristotle] καίτοι τὸν νοῦν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς 
τιθέντος, ἴσως, φησίν, ὅτι μὴ προσχρῆται αὐτῶι ἐν τῆι γενέσει. ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν προσχρῆται, δῆλον, εἴπερ 
τὴν γένεσιν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἔκκρισιν εἶναί φησι, τὴν δὲ ἔκκρισιν ὑπὸ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ 
κινήσεως αἴτιον εἶναι τὸν νοῦν. λέγει γὰρ οὕτως Ἀναξαγόρας· καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ 
κινουμένου παντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὁ νοῦς, πᾶν τοῦτο διεκρίθη· κινουμένων δὲ καὶ 
διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῶι μᾶλλον ἐποίει διακρίνεσθαι (Simpl. in Phys. 300.27).
132 Though mind does apparently associate (and in some way, inhere in) with physical matter: λέγει δὲ 
σαφῶς, ὅτι ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστι πλὴν νοῦ, ἔστιν οἷσι δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἔνι (B11 DK = Simpl. in 
Phys. 164.22).
133 For doxographical confirmation that Anaxagoras explained the origin of natural phenomena, see frr. 
A42 (= Hippol. Refut. 1.8.1, recounting the origin of the heavenly bodies, the earth, seas and rivers, 
winds, thunder and lightening, and animal life) and A71 DK (= Aet. 2.13.3, recounting the origin of the 
stars).  See also Curd (2007), 206-225; Naddaf (2005), 148-149.
134 Following Curd's (2007, 213-216) rejection of the theory of microscopic worlds defended by Leon, 
Strang, Mansfeld, and Schofield.  Note the difference between world-orders that exist separately at the 
same time (thus Anaxagoras) and endless iterations of the same world-order (such as Heraclitus, 
Empedocles, and possibly Anaximander seem to have imagined: see note 24 above). 
135 Fr. B4a DK (see the following section on zoogony and anthropogony).  For more thorough discussion, 
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fragments upon which this datum depends also includes our only Anaxagorean quote on
 the origins of animal and human life:
TEXT (Curd) TRANSLATION (Curd)
πρὶν δὲ ἀποκριθῆναι [ταῦτα] πάντων ὁμοῦ 
ἐόντων  οὐδὲ  χροιὴ  ἔνδηλος  ἦν  οὐδεμία· 
ἀπεκώλυε  γὰρ  ἡ  σύμμιξις  πάντων 
χρημάτων, τοῦ τε διεροῦ καὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ 
τοῦ  θερμοῦ  καὶ  τοῦ  ψυχροῦ  καὶ  τοῦ 
λαμπροῦ καὶ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ, καὶ γῆς πολλῆς 
ἐνεούσης καὶ σπερμάτων ἀπείρων πλῆθος 
οὐδὲν  ἐοικότων ἀλλήλοις.  οὐδὲ  γὰρ  τῶν 
ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἔοικε τὸ ἕτερον τῶι ἑτέρωι. 
τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἐν τῶι σύμπαντι 
χρὴ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι πάντα χρήματα. 
Before there was separation off, because all 
things  were  together,  there  was  not  even 
any colour evident;  for the mixture of all 
things prevented it, of the wet and the dry 
and  of  the  hot  and  the  cold  and  of  the 
bright  and the  dark,  and there  was much 
earth  present  and  seeds  unlimited  in 
number, in no way similar to one another. 
For  no  one  of  the  others  is  similar  to 
another. Since these things are so, it is right 
to think that all things were present in the 
whole.
Anaxagoras, fr. B4b DK
Simpl. in Phys. 34.20-27
τούτων  δὲ  οὕτως  ἐχόντων  χρὴ  δοκεῖν 
ἐνεῖναι πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς 
συγκρινομένοις  καὶ  σπέρματα  πάντων 
χρημάτων καὶ  ἰδέας  παντοίας  ἔχοντα καὶ 
χροιὰς  καὶ  ἡδονάς.  καὶ  ἀνθρώπους  τε 
συμπαγῆναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶια ὅσα ψυχὴν 
ἔχει.  καὶ  τοῖς  γε  ἀνθρώποισιν  εἶναι  καὶ 
πόλεις συνημμένας καὶ ἔργα κατεσκευασ-
μένα,  ὥσπερ  παρ'  ἡμῖν,  καὶ  ἡέλιόν  τε 
αὐτοῖσιν  εἶναι  καὶ  σελήνην καὶ  τὰ ἄλλα, 
ὥσπερ  παρ'  ἡμῖν,  καὶ  τὴν  γῆν  αὐτοῖσι 
φύειν πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ 
ὀνῆιστα  συνενεγκάμενοι  εἰς  τὴν  οἴκησιν 
χρῶνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μοι λέλεκται περὶ 
τῆς  ἀποκρίσιος,  ὅτι  οὐκ  ἂν  παρ'  ἡμῖν 
μόνον ἀποκριθείη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλληι.
Since these things are so, it is right to think 
that there are many different things present 
in everything that is being combined, seeds 
of  all  things,  having  all  sorts  of  forms, 
colours, and flavours, and that humans and 
also the other  animals were compounded, 
as many as have soul. Also, that there are 
cities  that  have  been  constructed  by 
humans and works made, just as with us, 
and that  there are a sun and a  moon and 
other heavenly bodies for them, just as with 
us,  and  the  earth  grows  many  different 
things for them, the most valuable of which 
they  gather  together  into  their  household 
and use. I have said this  about separation 
off, because there would be separation off 
not only for us but also elsewhere.
Anaxagoras, fr. B4a DK
Simpl. in Phys. 34.18-20, 27 
see Curd (2007), 212-222.
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The latest reading of these fragments runs as follows.136  First, before the περιχώρησις 
begins, all material stuff (with the possible exception of νοῦς) is gathered in one whole 
(reminiscent of the Empedoclean love-sphere, but seemingly less seamlessly integrated: 
see fr. B4b DK above, with its mention of various things in the primeval whole) which 
contains seeds of later things.  After cosmic νοῦς initiates the περιχώρησις, stuff scatters 
(including the seeds of everything), forming multiple κόσμοι like the one familiar to the 
Critical Tradition.  Like the Greek κόσμος (ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν), these too possess sun, 
moon, stars, etc., as well as earth, plant life (τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖσι φύειν πολλά τε καὶ 
παντοῖα), animals, and humans (which, like animals, have ψυχή).       
This fragment does not offer many details about the origins of life: all we get is 
the verb συμπαγῆναι used to describe how humans and animals are brought together 
from material stuff.  The doxographers provide a slightly more detailed account of how 
Anaxagoras imagined life evolving with the progression of the περιχώρησις.  After the 
earth coalesces (fr. B16 DK) and there is water on it (fr. A42 DK = Hippol. Refut. 1.8.1), 
the first animals are born directly from it, only later making use of sexual reproduction 
(ζῶια γίνεσθαι ἐξ ὑγροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ γεώδους, ὕστερον δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων: Diog. 2.9 =  
fr. A1 DK; ζῶια δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἐν ὑγρῶι γενέσθαι, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων: Hippol. 
Refut. 1.8.1 = fr. A42 DK).  This account recalls Anaximander's ancestral animals (fish-
like creatures emerging from the sea in thorny bark)137 as well as the asexual ancestral 
136 See note 134 above: I am following Curd.
137 See note 31 above.
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life-forms of Empedocles (see pages 70-72 above).138    
(4) Ethics.  We have already seen that Anaxagoras explicitly includes the πόλις, 
human ἔργα, and the οἴκησις in his vision of the κόσμοι integrated (συμπαγῆναι) by the 
περιχώρησις (fr. B4a DK, quoted on page 87 above).  From his perspective, these things 
constitute physical realities like the biological and celestial phenomena that he mentions 
in the same breath with them: καὶ τοῖς γε ἀνθρώποισιν εἶναι καὶ πόλεις συνημμένας καὶ 
ἔργα κατεσκευασμένα, ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡέλιόν τε αὐτοῖσιν εἶναι καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ 
ἄλλα (fr. B4a DK).  He identifies the οἴκησις as the place to which all people (including 
those in other κόσμοι) bring the most useful things that their earth produces (τὴν γῆν 
αὐτοῖσι φύειν πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ὀνῆιστα συνενεγκάμενοι εἰς τὴν 
οἴκησιν χρῶνται: fr. B4a DK), showing some idea of a universal human life (and 
character) consistent across different world-orders.  Elsewhere, there are tantalizing hints 
of more developed insights into this life (and character):
TEXT (DK, Babbit) TRANSLATION (Curd)
ἀλλ'  ἐν  πᾶσι  τούτοις  ἀτυχέστεροι  τῶν 
θηρίων ἐσμέν, ἐμπειρίαι δὲ καὶ μνήμηι καὶ 
σοφίαι  καὶ  τέχνηι  κατὰ  Ἀναξαγόραν  † 
σφῶν  τε  αὐτῶν  χρώμεθα  καὶ  βλίττομεν 
καὶ  ἀμέλγομεν  καὶ  φέρομεν  καὶ  ἄγομεν 
συλλαμβάνοντες· ὥστ' ἐνταῦθα μηδὲν τῆς 
τύχης ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς εὐβουλίας εἶναι καὶ 
In  all  these  [physical  skills  that  animals 
possess] we are more unfortunate than the 
beasts, but by experience and memory and 
wisdom and art  according to  Anaxagoras, 
we make use of their activity [?] and take 
their  honey  and  milk  them  and  herding 
them together,  use  them at  will.  There  is 
138 For more on the Anaxagorean story of biological evolution, see Naddaf (2005, 149), who notes the 
similarity between the theory of universal seeds in the primordial whole (fr. B4b DK) and Anaxagoras' 
account of plant germination as summarized by Theophrastus: Ἀναξαγόρας τὸν ἀέρα πάντων φάσκων 
ἔχειν σπέρματα καὶ ταῦτα συγκαταφερόμενα τῶι ὕδατι γεννᾶν τὰ φυτά (H. pl. 3.1.4 = fr. A117 DK).  
The original Anaxagorean animals seem to sprout from the moist earth (enriched with seeds from the 
primordial whole?) in the manner of plants, which grow from air-born seeds when these are brought 
down (to earth?) with water.   
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τῆς προνοίας. nothing of chance here, but all is wisdom 
and forethought.
Anaxagoras, fr. B21b DK
Plut. De fort. 3.98f
Recall that Anaxagoras' portrait of biological life begins with a likeness between humans 
and animals; both are physical compounds endowed with ψυχή (καὶ ἀνθρώπους τε 
συμπαγῆναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶια ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει: fr. B4a DK).  This fragment discusses 
how they are different, locating that difference in humanity's unique access to the noetic 
qualities of experience (ἐμπειρία), memory (μνήμη), wisdom (σοφία), and art (τέχνη).  
With these qualities, human beings control animals (χρώμεθα καὶ βλίττομεν καὶ 
ἀμέλγομεν καὶ φέρομεν καὶ ἄγομεν συλλαμβάνοντες) the way cosmic mind controls the 
universe: γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον [νοῦς]. καὶ ὅσα γε 
ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω, πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ ... πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς 
(fr. B12 DK = Simpl. in Phys. 156.13).  Man uses his limited noetic qualities to dominate 
animals purposefully, and cosmic mind uses its universal γνώμη to arrange all things 
purposefully.  Luck (the random, unforeseen event) becomes a human (mis)perception, 
something that we see only because we do not have access to cosmic mind (ὥστ' ἐνταῦθα 
μηδὲν τῆς τύχης ἀλλὰ πάντα τῆς εὐβουλίας εἶναι καὶ τῆς προνοίας).  This insight will be 
important later.        
Given the importance Anaxagoras allots to cosmic mind (as the driving force 
behind all physical reality), it is no surprise to find him emphasizing the importance of 
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human mind (and thought).139  A number of testimonia show Anaxagoras making thought 
(a) the central purpose of human life (frr. A29-30 DK) and (b) an effective means for 
dealing with the vicissitudes of human life (frr. A28, A33 DK):
TEXT (DK) TRANSLATION (Curd)
(a1) τὸν  μὲν  οὖν  Ἀναξαγόραν  φασὶν 
ἀποκρίνασθαι  πρός  τινα  διαποροῦντα 
τοιαῦτ'  ἄττα καὶ  διερωτῶντα,  τίνος  ἕνεκ' 
ἄν  τις  ἕλοιτο  γενέσθαι  μᾶλλον  ἢ  μὴ 
γενέσθαι,  «τοῦ» φάναι  «θεωρῆσαι  τὸν 
οὐρανὸν  καὶ  τὴν  περὶ  τὸν  ὅλον  κόσμον 
τάξιν.»
They  report  that  someone  was  raising 
difficulties  about  this  sort  of  thing  and 
quizzing  Anaxagoras  about  why someone 
should choose to be born rather than not. 
Anaxagoras  replied,  “For  the  sake  of 
contemplating  the  heavens and the  whole 
of the universe.”
Anaxagoras, fr. A30 DK
Aristot. Eth. Eud. 1.4.1215b6
(a2) Ἀναξαγόραν μὲν γὰρ τὸν Κλαζομένιον 
τὴν  θεωρίαν  φάναι  τοῦ  βίου  τέλος  εἶναι 
καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν λέγουσιν.
Anaxagoras  of  Clazomenae,  they  say, 
claimed  that  the  goal  (telos)  of  life  is 
contemplation and the freedom it brings.
Anaxagoras, fr. A29 DK
Clem. Strom. 2.130
(b1)  Ἀναξαγόρου  δὲ  καὶ  ἀπόφθεγμα 
μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἑταίρων τινάς, ὅτι 
τοιαῦτ'  αὐτοῖς  ἔσται  τὰ  ὄντα  οἷα  ἂν 
ὑπολάβωσιν.
A saying  of  Anaxagoras  to  some  of  his 
friends is also recorded, that things will be 
for them such as they suppose them to be.
Anaxagoras, fr. A28 DK
Aristot. Metaph. 4.5.1009b25
139 For alternative readings of the Clazomenian that come to this same general conclusion, see Drozdek 
(2007), 91-93; Naddaf (2005), 149-152.
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(b2)  διὸ  καὶ  «προενδημεῖν» φησι  τοῖς 
πράγμασι μήπω τε παροῦσιν οἷον παροῦσι 
χρῆσθαι.  βούλεται  δὲ  τὸ  «προενδημεῖν» 
ῥῆμα  τῶι  Ποσειδωνίωι  τὸ  οἷον  προανα-
πλάττειν  τε  καὶ  προτυποῦν  τὸ  πρᾶγμα 
παρὰ ἑαυτῶι τὸ μέλλον γενήσεσθαι καὶ ὡς 
πρὸς  ἤδη  γενόμενον  ἐθισμόν  τινα 
ποιεῖσθαι  κατὰ  βραχύ.  διὸ  καὶ  τὸ  τοῦ 
Ἀναξαγόρου παρείληφεν ἐνταῦθα, ὡς ἄρα 
τινὸς  ἀναγγείλαντος αὐτῶι  τεθνάναι  τὸν 
υἱὸν εὖ μάλα καθεστηκότως εἶπεν «ἤιδειν 
θνητὸν  γεννήσας» καὶ  ὡς  τοῦτο  λαβὼν 
Εὐριπίδης  τὸ  νόημα  τὸν  Θησέα  πεποίηκε 
λέγοντα· «ἐγὼ δὲ παρὰ σοφοῦ τινος μαθὼν 
/ εἰς φροντίδ' ἀεὶ συμφορὰς ἐβαλλόμην / 
φυγάς τ' ἐμαυτῶι προστιθεὶς πάτρας ἐμῆς / 
θανάτους  τ'  ἀώρους  καὶ  κακῶν  ἄλλας 
ὁδούς,  /  ἵν',  εἴ  τι  πάσχοιμ'  ὧν  ἐδόξαζον 
φρενί, / μή μοι νεῶρες προσπεσὸν μᾶλλον 
δάκοι.»
For  this  reason  [Posidonius]  says  to  
familiarize oneself with things before they 
occur and experience them as though they 
were present. For Posidonius the word  to  
familiarize means something like to resolve 
to  anticipate  or  to  conceive  for  oneself 
beforehand what is about to happen and so 
to have already become habituated to make 
little of it. And that is why he has adopted 
here the saying of Anaxagoras, who, when 
someone announced the death of his son to 
him,  said very calmly,  “I  knew I  begat  a 
mortal,” just as Euripides took the thought 
for  himself,  and  made  Theseus  say  (fr. 
964),  “Having  learned  from  some  wise 
man, / I always put fitting thoughts in my 
mind  /  anticipating  to  myself  banishment 
from  my  country,  /  untimely  deaths,  and 
other sorts of evil, / so if something should 
befall that I have conceived in my heart, / 
what befalls would no longer sting me as 
something new.” 
Anaxagoras, fr. A33 DK
Galen, De Hipp. et Plat. dogm. 4.7
The related ideas holding these four testimonia together (assuming for the moment that 
they are genuine) are (a) that thought is the highest expression of humanity140 and (b) that 
140 Here it is worth noting the difficulty that Aristotle has in distinguishing between νοῦς and ψυχή (the 
life-force of animals and humans) as conceived by Anaxagoras (De anima 1.2.404b1, 405a13, 405b19, 
3.4.429a18 =  fr. A100 DK), a difficulty that Philoponus (in De anima 72.9-10) resolves “by saying that 
Anaxagoras distinguished Mind and soul at the stage of creating the cosmos, after which Mind and soul 
are identified” (Drozdek [2007], 91) such that “Mind is God in all of us” (ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν 
ἑκάστωι θεός: Eur. fr. 1018 = Anaxagoras, fr. A48 DK, with various other testimonia confirming that 
νοῦς is the only god recognized by Anaxagoras).  The upshot of this seems to be that the cosmic mind 
communicates with other minds (including human minds) somehow, guiding them to do in part what it 
does for the whole and so using them to create an order greater than they can conceive on their own.  
See Drozdek (2007), 91-92, and Naddaf (2005), 150-151, who summarizes thus: “Anaxagoras states 
that if cosmic nous were mixed with other things it would not be able to rule things with the same 
consistency (DK59B12.4). Since humans are composed of mind and matter they constitute a mixture. 
Consequently, humans are not omniscient, autonomous, and free from mistakes” (151). 
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thinking can enable a person to exercise a degree of control over his life (ὅτι τοιαῦτ' 
αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολάβωσιν), specifically to suffer (inevitable) trials (like 
the death of loved ones) well, i.e. “very calmly” (μάλα καθεστηκότως) through a kind of 
pre-visualization (Posidonian προενδημεῖν, Anaxagoras' ἤιδειν, and Euripides' εἰς 
φροντίδ' ἀεὶ συμφορὰς ἐβαλλόμην … προστιθεὶς).141  It is not clear how much Euripides 
may have added to the original idea taken from Anaxagoras (assuming Galen had good 
reason for identifying him as the σόφος alluded to in fr. 964), or how much of Posidonius' 
construction depends on later insights, but it is undoubtedly significant that Anaxagoras is 
associated here with a constructive approach to human suffering that is dependent on a 
perceptive, controlling νοῦς.  This is interesting for two reasons.  
In the first place, there are striking similarities between the Anaxagorean approach 
to suffering as outlined here and the Democritean approach to happiness (εὐθυμία), 
similarities which will occupy us later.  For now it is enough to notice that, as far as we 
can tell, Anaxagorean ethics are entirely congruent with Anaxagorean physics.  The 
simplest explanation for this congruence is that Anaxagoras viewed ethics as an extension 
of physics, much like all of the other authors examined thus far.  The νοῦς that gave order 
(διεκόσμησε: fr. B12 DK) to all things (with the inclusion of πόλεις συνημμένας, ἔργα 
κατεσκευασμένα, and the οἴκησις: fr. B4a DK) also arranged the smaller order of the 
human mind, with its noetic qualities (ἐμπειρία, μνήμη, σοφία, τέχνη: fr. B21b DK) that 
facilitate gathering the most useful products of the earth to the household (fr. B4a DK), 
141 Remember the εὐβουλία and πρόνοια that characterize cosmic and human mind (with its ἐμπειρία, 
μνήμη, σοφία, τέχνη) in fr. B21b DK (quoted above on page 90).
93
controlling lesser animals (fr. B21b DK), and (at least potentially) dealing with inevitable 
human suffering (frr. A28, A33 DK).
Philolaus (1.3.7)
A contemporary of Democritus, Philolaus (c. 470-c. 380s) is included here as one 
of the earliest authors142 extant in the Critical Tradition with some claim to preserve ideas 
deriving from Pythagoras of Samos (c. 570-c. 480).143  Diogenes Laertius credits him 
alternately with one book (Diog. 3.9, 8.85) or three (Diog. 3.9, 8.15), with a detailed 
reading of the evidence favoring the former scenario (the latter being a myth invented to 
lend authenticity to a Pythagorean trilogy composed in the third century).144  The single 
book is referred to by the familiar title Περὶ φύσεως (Diog. 8.85). A few other titles are 
referenced in the doxography (Περὶ κόσμου, Περὶ ψυχῆς, Περὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ μέτρων, 
Βάκχαι), with the Βάκχαι showing the most promise of being genuine.145  What we find in 
the extant fragments of Philolaus is familiar.
(1) Cosmogony, (2) Zoogony, & (3) Anthropogony.  As recognized by Philolaus, 
φύσις is composed of two different kinds of material, the limiting and the unlimited 
142 The others are Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Empedocles.  Xenophanes (DK21B7) and Heraclitus (frr. 
16-17 Marcovich) attack Pythagoras as a charlatan, ridiculing the Pythagorean idea of μετεμψύχωσις 
(Xenophanes) and criticizing his approach to ἱστορίη (Heraclitus).  Empedocles incorporates 
Pythagorean μετεμψύχωσις into his work, along with ritual prohibitions consonant with what we know 
about the Pythagorean life.  See Riedeweg (2002), 48-52, and note 117 above.
143 Huffman (1993), 14-16; Burkert (1972), 223-229.  
144 Huffman (1993), 12-14.
145 Kingsley (1995), 262-264; Huffman (1993), 16, 417-418.  Stobaeus cites a fragment that appears to be 
genuine from this title (1.15.7 = fr. 17 DK), and Proclus (in Eucl. 22.9) reports that it taught secret 
doctrine about the gods using mathematics: διὸ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων πολλὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ δόγματα περὶ θεῶν 
διὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἰδῶν ἡμᾶς ἀναδιδάσκει καὶ ἡ τῶν Πυθαγορείων φιλοσοφία παραπετάσμασι 
τούτοις χρωμένη τὴν μυσταγωγίαν κατακρύπτει τῶν θείων δογμάτων. τοιοῦτος γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἱερὸς 
σύμπας λόγος καὶ ὁ Φιλόλαος ἐν ταῖς Βάκχαις καὶ ὅλος ὁ τρόπος τῆς Πυθαγόρου περὶ θεῶν 
ὑφηγήσεως (fr. B19 DK).
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(functional equivalents of Anaxagorean stuff, Empedoclean roots, Parmenidean light and 
dark, Heraclitean fire in its various forms, Xenophanean earth in its various forms, and 
the material opposites produced by Anaximander's ἄπειρον):
TEXT (Huffman) TRANSLATION (Huffman)
ἁ  φύσις  δ'  ἐν  τῶι  κόσμωι  ἁρμόχθη  ἐξ 
ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαινόντων καὶ ὅλος <ὁ> 
κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῶι πάντα.
Nature  in  the  world-order  was  fitted 
together  both  out  of  things  which  are 
unlimited  and  out  of  things  which  are 
limiting,  both the world-order as a whole 
and all the things in it.
Philolaus, fr. B1 DK = Diog. 8.85
ἀνάγκα  τὰ  ἐόντα  εἶμεν  πάντα  ἢ 
περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ 
ἄπειρα·  ἄπειρα  δὲ  μόνον  οὐκ  ἀεί.  ἐπεὶ 
τοίνυν  φαίνεται  οὔτ'  ἐκ  περαινόντων 
πάντων  ἐόντα  οὔτ'  ἐξ  ἀπείρων  πάντων, 
δῆλον  τἆρα  ὅτι  ἐκ  περαινόντων  τε  καὶ 
ἀπείρων  ὅ  τε  κόσμος  καὶ  τὰ  ἐν  αὐτῶι 
συναρμόχθη.  δηλοῖ  δὲ  καὶ  τὰ  ἐν  τοῖς 
ἔργοις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκ περαινόντων 
περαίνοντι,  τὰ  δ'  ἐκ  περαινόντων  τε  καὶ 
ἀπείρων περαίνοντί τε καὶ οὐ περαίνοντι, 
τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀπείρων ἄπειρα φανέονται.
It is necessary that the things that are be all 
either  limiting,  or  unlimited,  or  both 
limiting and unlimited but not in every case 
unlimited  alone.  Well  then,  since  it  is 
manifest that they are neither from limiting 
things  alone,  nor  from  unlimited  things 
alone, it is clear then that the world-order 
and  the  things  in  it  were  fitted  together 
from  both  limiting  and  unlimited  things. 
Things in their actions also make this clear. 
For,  some  of  them  from  limiting 
(constituents)  limit,  others  from  both 
limiting  and unlimited  (constituents)  both 
limit  and  do  not  limit,  others  from 
unlimited (constituents) will be manifestly 
unlimited.
Philolaus, fr. B2 DK = Stob. 1.21.7a
Limited and unlimited material elements relate to one another harmoniously (ἁρμόχθη: 
fr. B1; συναρμόχθη: fr. B2) in the world-order as a whole (ὅλος <ὁ> κόσμος: fr. B1; ὅ τε 
κόσμος: fr. B2) and in the individual things in it (καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῶι πάντα: fr. B1; καὶ τὰ ἐν 
αὐτῶι: fr. B2).  In fact, harmony (ἁρμονία) is the engine that sets Philolaus' world-order 
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in order (like Anaxagorean mind):146 
TEXT (Huffman) TRANSLATION (Huffman)
περὶ  δὲ  φύσιος  καὶ  ἁρμονίας  ὧδε  ἔχει·  ἁ 
μὲν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀΐδιος ἔσσα καὶ 
αὐτὰ  μὰν  ἁ  φύσις  θείαν  τε  καὶ  οὐκ 
ἀνθρωπίνην ἐνδέχεται γνῶσιν πλάν γα ἢ 
ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἦν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἐόντων καὶ 
γιγνωσκομένων ὑφ' ἁμῶν γεγενῆσθαι μὴ 
ὑπαρχούσας τᾶς ἑστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξ 
ὧν  συνέστα  ὁ  κόσμος,  καὶ  τῶν 
περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ 
ἀρχαὶ ὑπᾶρχον οὐχ ὁμοῖαι οὐδ' ὁμόφυλοι 
ἔσσαι,  ἤδη  ἀδύνατον  ἦς  κα  αὐταῖς 
κοσμηθῆναι,  εἰ  μὴ  ἁρμονία  ἐπεγένετο 
ὡιτινιῶν  ἂν  τρόπωι  ἐγένετο.  τὰ  μὲν  ὦν 
ὁμοῖα  καὶ  ὁμόφυλα  ἁρμονίας  οὐδὲν 
ἐπεδέοντο,  τὰ  δὲ  ἀνόμοια  μηδὲ  ὁμόφυλα 
μηδὲ  † ἰσοταχῆ,  ἀνάγκα  τὰ  τοιαῦτα  ἁρ-
μονίαι  συγκεκλεῖσθαι,  εἰ  μέλλοντι  ἐν 
κόσμωι κατέχεσθαι.
Concerning  nature  and  harmony  the 
situation is this: the being of things, which 
is  eternal,  and  nature  in  itself  admit  of 
divine  and not  human  knowledge,  except 
that it was impossible for any of the things 
that are and are known by us to have come 
to be, if the being of the things from which 
the  world-order  came  together,  both  the 
limiting  things  and  the  unlimited  things, 
did not preexist. But since these beginnings 
preexisted and were neither alike nor even 
related, it would have been impossible for 
them to be ordered, if a harmony had not 
come upon them, in whatever way it came 
to be. Like things and related things did not 
in addition require any harmony, but things 
that are unlike and not even related nor of 
[? the same speed], it is necessary that such 
things be bonded together by harmony, if 
they are going to be held in an order. 
Philolaus, fr. B6 DK
Stob. 1.21.7d
Harmony comes upon (ἐπεγένετο) the physical elements (limiting and unlimited) in a 
way that escapes human apprehension (but not divine: θείαν τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνην 
ἐνδέχεται γνῶσιν), binding disparate things together (τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα μηδὲ 
† ἰσοταχῆ, ἀνάγκα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἁρμονίαι συγκεκλεῖσθαι) and forming the order (κόσμος) 
familiar to the Critical Tradition.  
146 See also the references to ἁρμονίη in Heraclitus (fr. 9 Marcovich: ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων 
[Hippol. Refut. 9.9.5]) and Empedocles (page 75 above).
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Like other authors in the Critical Tradition, Philolaus conceived that order as 
developing regularly from a beginning.  His story was one of origin and development:
TEXT (Huffman) TRANSLATION (Huffman)
τὸ πρᾶτον ἁρμοσθέν,  τὸ ἓν  ἐν τῶι  μέσωι 
τᾶς σφαίρας, ἑστία καλεῖται.
The first thing fitted together, the one in the 
center of the sphere, is called the hearth.
Philolaus, fr. B7 DK
Stob. 1.21.8
ὁ  κόσμος  εἷς  ἐστιν,  ἤρξατο  δὲ  γίγνεσθαι 
ἄχρι τοῦ μέσου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου εἰς τὸ 
ἄνω διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς κάτω, <καὶ> ἔστι 
τὰ ἄνω τοῦ μέσου ὑπεναντίως κείμενα τοῖς 
κάτω.  τοῖς  γὰρ κάτω τὸ κατωτάτω μέρος 
ἐστὶν  ὥσπερ  τὸ  ἀνωτάτω  καὶ  τὰ  ἄλλα 
ὡσαύτως.  πρὸς  γὰρ τὸ μέσον κατὰ ταὐτά 
ἐστιν ἑκάτερα, ὅσα μὴ μετενήνεκται.
The world-order is one. It began to come to 
be  right  up  at  the  middle  and  from  the 
middle <came to be> upwards in the same 
way  as  downwards  and  the  things  above 
the  middle  are  symmetrical  with  those 
below.  For,  in  the  lower  <regions>  the 
lowest part <for the upper regions> is like 
the highest and similarly with the rest. For 
both <the higher and the lower> have the 
same relationship to the middle, except that 
their positions are reversed.
Philolaus, fr. B17 DK
Stob. 1.15.7
Harmony first makes the central hearth (τὸ ἓν ἐν τῶι μέσωι … ἑστία καλεῖται: fr. B7), the 
point of origin for the rest of the κόσμος (ἤρξατο δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἄχρι τοῦ μέσου καὶ ἀπὸ 
τοῦ μέσου εἰς τὸ ἄνω διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς κάτω: fr. B17), which forms symmetrically 
(ἔστι τὰ ἄνω τοῦ μέσου ὑπεναντίως κείμενα τοῖς κάτω: fr. B17) in a sphere around it (ἐν 
τῶι μέσωι τᾶς σφαίρας: fr. B7; πρὸς γὰρ τὸ μέσον κατὰ ταὐτά ἐστιν ἑκάτερα, ὅσα μὴ 
μετενήνεκται: fr. B17).  
Thus begins the Philolaean account of the origin and development of the Greek 
97
κόσμος.147  Many details of this account as extant are astronomical148 and need not 
concern us here.  More interesting to this study are what remains of Philolaus' perspective 
on the constitution of biological life (which is not restricted to the familiar earth):149
TEXT (DK, Huffman)150 TRANSLATION (Huffman)
καὶ τέσσαρες ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ζώιου τοῦ λογικοῦ, 
ὥσπερ καὶ Φιλόλαος ἐν τῶι Περὶ φύσεως 
λέγει,  ἐγκέφαλος,  καρδία,  ὀμφαλός, 
αἰδοῖον.  «κεφαλὰ  μὲν  νόου,  καρδία  δὲ 
ψυχὰς καὶ αἰσθήσιος, ὀμφαλὸς δὲ ῥιζώσιος 
καὶ  ἀναφύσιος  τοῦ  πρώτου,  αἰδοῖον  δὲ 
σπέρματος δὲ <ἔχει> τὰν ἀνθρώπω ἀρχάν, 
καρδία  δὲ  τὰν  ζώου,  ὀμφαλὸς  δὲ  τὰν 
φυτοῦ,  αἰδοῖον  δὲ  τὰν  ξυν-απάντων. 
πάντα  γὰρ  ἀπὸ  σπέρματος  καὶ  θάλλοντι 
καὶ βλαστάνοντι.»
And there are four principles of the rational 
animal, just as Philolaus says in On Nature: 
brain,  heart,  navel,  genitals.  The  head [is 
the seat] of intellect,  the heart of life and 
sensation,  the  navel  of  rooting  and  first 
growth, the genitals of the sowing of seed 
and  generation.  The  brain  [contains]  the 
origin  of  man,  the  heart  the  origin  of 
animals, the navel the origin of plants, the 
genitals the origin of all (living things). For 
all  things  both  flourish  and  grow  from 
seed.
Philolaus, fr. B13 DK
Theol. Ar. 25.17
Φιλόλαος δὲ ὁ Κρ[ο]τωνιάτης συνεστάναι 
φησὶν  τὰ  ἡμέτερα  σώμ[ατα  ἐκ]  θερμοῦ. 
ἀμέτ<οχ>α  γὰρ  αὐτὰ  εἶναι  ψυχροῦ[, 
ὑπομι]μνήσκων  ἀπότινων  τοιούτων·  τὸ 
σπέρμ[α  εἶναι  θερ]μόν,  κατασκευαστικὸν 
δὲ τοῦτο τ[οῦ ζώιο]υ· καὶ ὁ τόπος δέ, εἰς ὃν 
ἡ  καταβολ[ή—μήτρα]  δὲ  αὕτη—ἐστὶν 
θερμοτέρα  καὶ  ἐοι[κυιᾶ  ἐκ]είνωι·  τὸ  δὲ 
ἐοικός τινι τἀτὸ δύναται, ὧι ἔοικεν· ἐπεὶ δὲ
Philolaus  says  that  our  bodies  are 
constituted out of hot. For he says that they 
have  no  share  of  cold  on  the  basis  of 
something  like  the  following  con-
siderations: Sperm is hot and this is what 
constitutes the animal. Also the place into 
which it is sown, the womb itself, is even 
hotter and like to the seed. But what is like 
something has the same power as that to  
147 See Naddaf (2005), 123; Huffman (1993), 202-288.  Apparently, this origin-and-development story 
included some provision for some regular destruction (either total or partial) of the earth nourishing the 
κόσμος as a whole, creating a cyclic reading of φύσις like others already examined; see fr. A18 DK and 
Huffman (1993), 261-265.  Numbers seem to have been important as well, with each integer from 1 to 
10 playing a special role in the constitution of the κόσμος; see frr. B20, A10 DK, Naddaf (2005), 123-
124, and Huffman (1993), 279-288, 334-340. 
148 The astronomical fragments are treated in depth by Huffman (1993), 231-288.
149 See frr. A17 (on the inhabitants of the counter-earth) and A20 DK (on the inhabitants of the moon). 
150 Note that I have not marked marginal insertions or doubtful letters in fr. A27 DK.
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τὸ κατασκευάζ[ον ἀμέ]τοχόν ἐστιν ψυχροῦ 
καὶ  ὁ  τόπος  δέ,  ἐν  ὧ[ι  ἡ  καταβολ]ή, 
ἀμέτοχός ἐστιν ψυχροῦ, δῆλον [ὅτι καὶ τὸ] 
κατασκευζόμενον  ζῶιον  τοιοῦτο[ν  γίνε]-
ται.
which it is like. Since that which constructs 
has no share of cold, and the place in which 
the sowing occurs has no share of the cold, 
it is clear that the animal that is constructed 
turns out to have the same character. 
Philolaus, fr. A27.1-10 DK
Meno, Anon. Lond. 18.8
 
Philolaus' discussion of the human body is reminiscent of Empedocles' story of corporal 
evolution.  Empedocles sees the human body as a late, composite creation of physical 
evolution, with  the first bodies being nothing but a few organs joined together and later 
ones showing more familiar differentiation (eventually becoming the modern species 
familiar to the Greeks).  All these bodies incorporate the same δαίμονες, a detail that 
confirms the Empedoclean (and Pythagorean) insight that all embodied life is related.151  
In fr. B13, Philolaus seems to take a similar perspective, with the familiar human body 
representing a composite of various organs, many of which exist elsewhere: (a) the 
αἰδοῖον, which creates seed that is the source of all life (πάντα ... ἀπὸ σπέρματος); (b) the 
ὀμφαλός, which makes plant life; (c) the καρδία, which makes animal life (and separates 
animals from plants); (d) the κεφαλά, which makes human life, separating humans from 
animals and plants as a separate expression of the energy contained in the αἰδοῖον.152  Fr. 
A27 construes the origin of the individual human being as analogous to the origin of the 
151 See pages 67-73 and 79 above.
152 Note that this reading of the κεφαλά is inherited by Philolaus from the work of Alcmaeon of Croton, 
who is thought to have written some time in the late sixth or early fifth century.  In the Ionian tradition, 
Alcmaeon and Diogenes of Apollonia divide biological life similarly to Philolaus (distinguishing 
humans from animals from plants and confirming that our source for fr. B13 DK does not simply 
conflate Philolaus with Aristotle); see Huffman (1993), 311. 
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κόσμος: as the latter comes into being in a central hearth (the ἑστία of fr. B7 above), so 
the former is born from warm seed (τὸ σπέρμ[α εἶναι θερ]μόν) placed in an even warmer 
womb (ὁ τόπος δέ, εἰς ὃν ἡ καταβολ[ή—μήτρα] δὲ αὕτη—ἐστὶν θερμοτέρα).153
(4) Ethics.  Fr. A27 goes on to make interesting points about human health, 
starting with (a) the function of respiration and moving on to consider (b) disease:
TEXT (DK, Huffman) TRANSLATION (Huffman)
(a)  εἰς  δὲ  τούτου  τὴν  κατασκ[ευὴν 
ὑ]πομνήσει  προσχρῆται  τοιαύτηι·  με[τὰ 
γὰρ]  τὴν  ἔκτεξιν  εὐθέως  [[το]]  τὸ  ζῶιον 
ἐπισπᾶται τὸ ἐκτὸς πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ὄν· εἶτα 
πάλιν καθαπερεὶ χρέος ἐκπέμπει αὐτό. διὰ 
τοῦτο δὴ καὶ ὄρεξις τοῦ ἐκτὸς πνεύματος, 
ἵνα  τῆ[ι]  ἐπ<ε>ισάκτωι  τοῦ  πνεύματος 
ὁλκῆι  θερμ[ό]τερα ὑπάρχοντα τὰ ἡμέτερα 
σώματα πρὸς αὐτοῦ καταψύχηται. καὶ τὴν 
μὲν σύστασιν τῶν ἡμετέρων σωμάτων ἐν 
τουτοῖς  φησίν.  (b)  λέγει  δὲ  γίνεσθαι  τὰς 
νόσους διά τε χολὴν καὶ αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα, 
ἀρχὴν δὲ γίνεσθαι τῶν νόσων ταῦτα· ἀπο-
τελεῖσθαι δέ φησιν τὸ μὲν αἷμα παχὺ μὲν 
ἔσω  παραθλιβομένης  τῆς  σαρκός,  λέπτον 
δὲ  γίνεσθαι  διαιρουμένων  τῶν  ἐν  σαρκὶ 
ἀγγείων·  τὸ  δὲ  φλέγμα  συνίστασθαι  ἀπὸ 
τῶν  ὄμβρων  φησίν.  λέγει  δὲ  τὴν  χολὴν 
ἰχῶρα  εἶναι  τῆς  σαρκός.  παράδοξόν  τε 
αὑτὸς  ἀνὴρ  ἐπὶ  τούτου  κεινεῖ·  λέγει  γὰρ 
μηδὲ  τετάχθα[ι]  ἐπὶ  τ[ῶι]  ἥπατι  χολήν, 
ἰχῶρα μέντοι τῆς σαρκὸς εἶναι τὴν χολήν. 
τό τ' αὖ φλέγμα τῶν πλείστων ψυχ<ρ>ὸν 
[[θερμον]]  εἶναι  λεγόντων  αὐτὸς  θερμὸν 
τῆι  φύσει  ὑπ[ο]τίθεται·  ἀπὸ  γὰρ  τοῦ 
φλέγειν  φλέγμα  εἰρῆσθαι·  ταύτηι  δὲ  καὶ 
φλεγμαίνον[τα]  μετοχῆι τοῦ  φλέγματος 
φλεγμ[α]ίνει. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ἀρχὰς τῶν 
(a) He also mentions the following sort of 
consideration regarding the construction of 
the  animal:  Immediately  after  birth  the 
animal breathes in the external air which is 
cold. Then it sends it out again like a debt. 
Indeed, it is for this reason that there is a 
desire for external air,  so that our bodies, 
which were too hot before, by the drawing 
in  of  breath  from  outside  are  cooled 
thereby. He says, then, that the constitution 
of our body depends upon these things. (b) 
He says that diseases arise through bile and 
blood and phlegm, and that  these are  the 
origin of diseases. He says that the blood is 
made  thick  when  the  flesh  is  squeezed 
inwards, but that it becomes thin when the 
vessels in the flesh are broken up. He says 
that phlegm is constituted from rains. Bile, 
he says,  is  a serum of the flesh.  And the 
same man stirs up a paradox on this topic. 
For he says that bile is not even assigned to 
the liver, but rather that bile is a serum of 
the flesh. And again, while most people say 
that phlegm is cold, he himself postulates 
that  it  is  hot  by  nature.  For  he  says  that 
'phlegm'  gets  its  name from  phlegein ('to 
burn').  In  this  way  also  things  that  are 
inflamed are inflamed by taking part in 
153 The likeness recognized here between Philolaean embryology (of the human) and cosmogony is 
already familiar to modern scholarship; see Naddaf (2005), 124; Huffman (1993), 293-297.  
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νό[σ]ων  ὑπ[ο]τίθεται,  [σ]υνεργὰ  δὲ  ὑπερ-
βολ[άς]  τε  θερμασίας,  τροφῆς,  κατα-
ψύ[ξ]εω[ς  καὶ  ἐ]νδείας <τούτων  ἢ>  τῶν 
τού[το]ι[ς παραπλησίων].
phlegm. It is these then that he postulates 
as  the  origins  of  diseases.  He  says  that 
excesses of heat, nutriment, and cooling as 
well as deficiencies of these or things like 
these also have a role.  
Philolaus, fr. A27.10-30 DK
Meno, Anon. Lond. 18.8
In the κόσμος imagined by Philolaus, (a) the respiratory cycle works thus: inspiration 
tempers the innate heat of the human being (an excessive heat) with external coolness 
(ἵνα τῆ[ι] ἐπ<ε>ισάκτωι τοῦ πνεύματος ὁλκῆι θερμ[ό]τερα ὑπάρχοντα τὰ ἡμέτερα 
σώματα πρὸς αὐτοῦ καταψύχηται), which exhalation promptly returns to the 
environment, as though paying back a debt (εἶτα πάλιν καθαπερεὶ χρέος ἐκπέμπει αὐτό).  
So Philolaean man exists as a physical equilibrium (or harmonization, combination: 
σύστασις) between inner heat and external cold.  The Philolaean account of (b) disease 
develops this portrait of man as a temporary balance between hot and cold.  Disease is a 
result of three internal bodily humors (γίνεσθαι τὰς νόσους διά τε χολὴν καὶ αἷμα καὶ 
φλέγμα), all of them hot: contemporary medical thought made χόλη and αἷμα hot,154 and 
Philolaus goes out of his way to claim heat for φλέγμα as well (αὐτὸς θερμὸν τῆι φύσει 
ὑπ[ο]τίθεται· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ φλέγειν φλέγμα εἰρῆσθαι).  Presumably, treatment consisted in 
tempering these internal sources of heat,  supplementing their lack (if the humors became 
154 See Huffman (1993), 297.  Note that the Hippocratic treatise Περὶ αρχαίης ἰητρικῆς (late fifth century 
BCE) “attacks a group of thinkers who attempted to systematize medicine by reducing it to the 
interaction of one or more of the opposites hot, cold, wet, and dry, factors which had played an 
important role in much of early Greek natural philosophy” (Schiefsky [2005], 1).  There is 
longstanding speculation that Philolaus represents one of the treatise's targets; see Huffman (1993), 
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too thin: λέπτον δὲ γίνεσθαι διαιρουμένων τῶν ἐν σαρκὶ ἀγγείων) with external heat and 
cooling their excess (if the humors became too thick: τὸ μὲν αἷμα παχὺ μὲν ἔσω παραθλι-
βομένης τῆς σαρκός) with some kind of external coolant.  This would explain the 
συνεργά of disease recognized by Philolaus: excess (ὑπερβολαί) and deficit (ἔνδειαι) in 
heat (θερμασία), cold (κατάψυξις), or nourishment (τροφή, which could be hot or cold).  
The role of the physician would then have been to recognize the precise nature of his 
patient's physical imbalance (i.e. whether the patient had too much or too little internal 
heat) and then apply sources of heat or cold as necessary to restore equilibrium.155
There are few strictly ethical fragments from Philolaus extant, and those few are 
terse.  Nevertheless, we have enough information to make some interesting suggestions, 
particularly in light of Philolaus' medical theories.  Witness the following:
TEXT (Huffman) TRANSLATION (Huffman)
Pythagoras  et  Philolaus  harmoniam 
[animam esse dixerunt].
Pythagoras and Philolaus [said that the soul 
was] a harmony.
Philolaus, fr. A23 DK
Macrob. in Somn. Scip. 1.14.19  
καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ 
αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτον 
τι  μάλιστα  ὑπολαμβάνομεν  τὴν  ψυχὴν 
εἶναι,  ὥσπερ  ἐντεταμένου  τοῦ  σώματος 
ἡμῶν  καὶ  συνεχομένου  ὑπὸ  θερμοῦ  καὶ 
ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων 
τινῶν,  κρᾶσιν  εἶναι  καὶ  ἁρμονίαν  αὐτῶν 
τούτων  τὴν  ψυχὴν  ἡμῶν,  ἐπειδὰν  ταῦτα 
καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῆι πρὸς ἄλληλα—
[Simmias speaking:] For I think, Socrates, 
that  you  have  realized  yourself  that  we 
believe the soul to be something much like 
this: our body is as it were tensioned and 
held together by hot and cold and dry and 
wet and other things of this sort,  and our 
soul is  a  blending and  harmonia of  these 
same things,  when they  have  been  finely 
and proportionately blended with one 
155 Of course the real scheme was likely more complicated (with the three separate humors being more 
than just heat), but a basic distinction between heat and cold appears to have been its foundation, 
relating it closely to the Philolaean cosmogony.
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εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία τις, 
δῆλον ὅτι,  ὅταν χαλασθῆι τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν 
ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῆι ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων 
κακῶν,  τὴν  μὲν  ψυχὴν  ἀνάγκη  εὐθὺς 
ὑπάρχει  ἀπολωλέναι,  καίπερ  οὐσαν 
θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἵ 
τ'  ἐν  τοῖς  φθόγγοις  καὶ  ἐν  τοῖς  τῶν 
δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι ...
another. So if the soul turns out to be some 
sort of  harmonia, it is clear that when our 
body is slackened  or tautened by diseases 
and other evils, it is inevitable that the soul 
must perish at once, most divine though it 
be, just like other  harmoniai, those in the 
notes  and  in  all  the  things  craftsmen 
make...
Plato, Phaedo 86b5
καὶ  ἄλλη  δέ  τις  δόξα  παραδέδοται  περὶ 
ψυχῆς,  πιθανὴ  μὲν  πολλοῖς  οὐδεμιᾶς 
ἧττον  τῶν  λεγομένων  ...  ἁρμονίαν  γάρ 
τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν 
κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι καὶ τὸ 
σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων.
Another view has also been handed down 
about  the  soul  which  many  find  as 
convincing as any view put forward … for 
they  say  that  the  soul  is  a  kind  of 
harmonia.  Indeed  [they  say]  also  that 
harmonia is a blending and combination of 
opposites  and  the  body  is  composed  of 
opposites.
Aristot. De anima 1.4.407b27
In fr. A23, Macrobius attributes a Pythagorean equation between soul (anima, ψυχή) and 
harmony (an equation familiar to Plato and Aristotle)156 to Philolaus.  As presented most 
clearly by Plato, this equation reduces soul to an emergent physical phenomenon which 
begins to disintegrate (εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι) when something disturbs the corporal 
equilibrium upon which it depends (ὅταν χαλασθῆι τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτ-ρως ἢ ἐπιταθῆι 
ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν).157  In other words, soul becomes another material 
expression of cosmic harmony analogous to (and to some extent dependent on) the 
somatic σύστασις in fr. A27.  This impression is confirmed by another very interesting 
156 For more references, see Huffman (1993), 324-326.
157 While other thinkers need not follow Simmias down this path, it is interesting to note that the 
Pythagorean Empedocles does not see δαίμονες as immortal: if his psychic harmony is more robust 
than that of Simmias, it is still not indissoluble.  See pages 73-76 above. 
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fragment:
TEXT (Huffman) TRANSLATION (Huffman)
ὥστε καὶ διάνοιαί τινες καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφ' 
ἡμῖν εἰσιν, ἢ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας 
διανοίας  καὶ  λογισμούς,  ἀλλ'  ὥσπερ 
Φιλόλαος  ἔφη  εἶναί  τινας  λόγους 
κρείττους ἡμῶν.
So that certain thoughts and affections are 
not in our control, nor are the actions which 
are  in  accord  with  such  thoughts  and 
calculations,  but  as  Philolaus  said,  some 
motives are stronger than we are.
Philolaus, fr. B16 DK
Aristot. Eth. Eud. 2.8.1225a30
Cosmic harmony produces the world-order, then bodies, then souls, none of which exists 
independently or absolutely: all are more or less determined by harmony.  Nevertheless, 
the recognition of certain λόγοι whose influence humans cannot resist presumes that 
there are others over which control can be exerted.  This raises a question: did Philolaus 
provide any kind of instruction to the moralist who might play physician to the soul (see 
page 102 above), attempting to restore psychic harmony by the addition or omission of 
certain behaviors whose influence was unbalancing?  It is impossible to say for certain, 
but what we have shows that he certainly could have.  There is no compelling reason to 
assume that Philolaus (or any of the early thinkers examined here) separated what we call 
ethics (or psychology) from what we call physics (or cosmology): for them, the κόσμος  
included all kinds of order; for Philolaus, everything is a result of cosmic ἁρμονία 
between limiting and unlimited material elements.
Conclusion: The Atomists' Problem
The foregoing creates a back-story for early Greek atomism comprised of two 
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principle elements: (1) Greece during the transition from the Archaic Age to the Classical, 
with most of our attention focused on Abdera as it existed from its foundation to the end 
of the fifth century; (2) the Critical Tradition, which we have explored by taking a brief 
survey of authors who predate the atomists in it (or, in the case of Philolaus, represent 
ideas significantly older than atomism).  The first element gives us a picture of the πόλις 
familiar to the atomists, a πόλις we also meet in the ethical fragments of Democritus.  
The second gives us a picture of the company the atomists joined when they published 
books like the Διάκοσμοι and the Τριτογένεια (manuals for understanding the world and 
our place in it as human beings), outlining the unique approach to φύσις developed by the 
Critical Tradition.
As we have seen, that approach typically constructs an origin-and-development 
narrative comprising four parts: (a) cosmogony; (b) zoogony; (c) anthropogony; (d) 
practical, ethical applications of the information provided in items (a)-(c), sometimes 
with the hint of a politogony (i.e. a history of the development of human institutions).  In 
no case did we find any clean break between items (a)-(c) and item (d).158  Anaximander 
158 The closest thing to such a break occurs in Xenophanes, who is extant only in brief fragments.  Even if 
we absolve him (and perhaps Parmenides) of creating a narrative that explicitly approaches ethics from 
a physiological perspective, we still find him (and Parmenides) making both physical and ethical 
pronouncements from an explicitly universal vantage point (a perspective that sees all phenomena).  
Thus, even where ethics and physics are least related in the Critical Tradition, they are still presumed to 
belong together somehow (with the details of their relationship obscured primarily by lack of data, 
secondarily by the difficulty of relating them to one another meaningfully).  This observation 
vindicates Plutarch's polemic against Colotes (see the Introduction above), a polemic that takes its 
strength from the assertion that early philosophers (including thinkers in the Critical Tradition) were 
advocates for proper moral behavior as something which they regarded as a vital concern (as vital as 
physics, with which they were also fundamentally concerned).  The ethics Critical thinkers discussed 
were not ethics for a world without physics, and their physics were not created for a world without 
ethics.  Rather, physics and ethics were integrated parts of the whole that they were investigating—a 
whole that we might call the human experience, a whole that did not admit the kind of absolute barrier 
that modern conventions draw between hard and soft sciences.
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speaks of natural justice and vengeance without separating these clearly from any 
unnatural counterparts (though he is only imperfectly extant).  The god of Xenophanes is 
both morally and physically perfect.  Heraclitus does not restrict war to ethics or fire to 
physics.  Parmenides sees Being everywhere; Empedocles love and strife (ethical realities 
before he expresses them as physical ones); Anaxagoras mind; and Philolaus harmony.  
An apt expression of the unifying, universal perspective evident throughout the Critical 
Tradition comes from Porphyry, summarizing Pythagoras: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι κατὰ 
περιόδους τινας τὰ γενόμενά ποτε πάλιν γίνεται, νέον δ' οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς ἔστι (Vita 
Pythagor. 19 = DK14A8).  From a human perspective, life is a series of repeating events 
(with no hard lines between ethical events and physical ones: all we know is that 
everything we see has been seen before and will be seen again).  Given the trend apparent 
here, we would not expect the atomists to separate ethics from physics a priori.
The atomists' problem is two-fold (like our presentation in this chapter).  (1) First, 
like their predecessors in the Critical tradition, they have to make sense of the ancient 
Greek world-order in its entirety.  (2) Second, they have to present their vision of that 
world-order in a compelling way, competing successfully with alternative explanations 
(such as those already offered) and accommodating the reality of new information (a 
reality which Parmenides confronted most directly when he put Being beyond the reach 
of definitive expression: one can only go as far as human μῆτις allows).  In what follows, 
we will examine their approach to this problem, showing how they inherited and 
improved upon earlier work in the Critical Tradition. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE EARLY ATOMISTS' ΔΙΑΚΟΣΜΟΣ  
Introduction: Democritus and Leucippus as Authors (2.1)  
Democritus is credited with many more books than any other author in the Critical 
Tradition: the Thrasyllan list (compiled sometime before 36 CE) gives seventy titles with 
claim to be genuine (Diog. 9.45-49 = Democritus, fr. cxv Luria).1  None of these works 
remains extant today, and tradition confirms what such a large corpus might lead us to 
suspect: Democritus was not above changing his mind, correcting (and contradicting) his 
expressed opinions.2  Nonetheless, the written account(s) of the Greek universe that he 
produced was (or were) complicated and coherent enough to support relatively extensive 
summaries in the ancient doxography (e.g. Diog. 9.44-45 and Hippol. Refut. 1.13; see 
items [c] and [d] below), summaries that are significantly consistent (internally with 
themselves and externally with one another).
Ancient tradition3 makes Leucippus the teacher of Democritus (who was born 
before 450 and died before 350)4 and the founder of atomism, though Epicurus denied his 
existence (Diog. 10.13 = fr. 2 Taylor).  Leucippus' reputation as an author rests on a 
single attribution, already disputed in antiquity: according to the Thrasyllan list (cited 
above), the disciples of Theophrastus traced the treatise Μέγας διάκοσμος to him, 
1 Of all the non-atomist authors examined thus far, Philolaus is the one on record with the most titles 
(five, a small number compared to seventy: see page 94 above in chapter 1).  In fairness, there is no 
knowing how many poems Xenophanes composed.  
2 See fr. lix Luria: αὐτός τε Ἀριστοτέλης Δημόκριτός τε καὶ Χρύσιππος ἔνια τῶν πρόσθεν αὐτοῖς 
ἀρεσκόντων ἀθορυβῶς καὶ ἀδήκτως καὶ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀφεῖσαν (Plut. De virt. mor. 7.448a); 
[Δημοκρίτου] Κρατυντήρια, ὅπερ ἔστιν ἐπικριτικὰ τῶν προειρημένων (Diog. 9.47). 
3 The earliest testimonia come from Aristotle: Metaph. 985b4-22, De gen. et corr. 324b35-326b6 (= frr. 
46a, 48a Taylor, and frr. 7, 16, 173, 241, 146 Luria).
4 For a discussion of the different chronologies proposed for Democritus, see Taylor (1999), 158, note 2.
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although the list itself assigns this title to Democritus and later tradition makes it 
Democritus' magnum opus (Diog. 9.39-40; Athen. 4.168b).5  In defense of Theophrastus' 
followers, they enter the historical record earlier than their rivals, and there is no reason  
the relatively extensive summaries of Leucippan thought extant in the doxography (e.g. 
Diog. 9.30-33 and Hippol. Refut. 1.12; see items [a] and [b] below) could not come from 
writing(s) originating with the first atomist (granting his existence).  But these summaries 
might just as easily derive from the writings of Democritus (playing Plato to Leucippus' 
Socrates).  We lack the information necessary for a definitive decision.
In light of the foregoing, I offer the following observations on authorship in early 
atomism: (1) Democritus is credited with writing more than anyone in the Critical 
Tradition, including his teacher Leucippus, who may or may not have written (as he may 
or may not have existed, though we have no good reason to side with Epicurus against  
Aristotle).6  (2) There is no compelling reason to separate Democritus and Leucippus, 
who were already so hard to distinguish in antiquity that an important book like the 
Μέγας διάκοσμος could be ascribed to either.  In keeping with this observation, this 
chapter examines Leucippan physics (as extant) alongside Democritean.  Thus the 
chapter is about the διάκοσμος of the atomists, rather than simply the διάκοσμος of 
Democritus (though he is still our principal witness, since he has more fragments extant).
5 Achilles Tatius (third century CE) also cites this book as a work of Democritus: τοὺς ἀστέρας δὲ ζῶια 
εἶναι οὔτε Ἀναξαγόραι οὔτε Δημοκρίτωι ἐν τῶι Μεγάλωι διακόσμωι δοκεῖ (Isag. 1.13 = Leucippus, fr. 
B1 DK; Democritus, fr. 392 Luria).  It is not inconceivable that both early atomists produced a Μέγας 
διάκοσμος, but this is more than the testimonia tell us. 
6 Chronological proximity favors Aristotle over Epicurus as a witness to Leucippus' historicity.
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Early Atomist Cosmogony (2.2)   
The atomists offer a story about the origin and development of the universe.  Like 
other such stories in the Critical Tradition, theirs begins with elemental physical material:
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
(a1) πρῶτός τε ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς ὑπεστήσατο 
...  τὸ  μὲν  πᾶν  ἄπειρόν  φησιν,  ὡς 
προείρηται· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν πλῆρες εἶναι, 
τὸ  δὲ  κενόν,  <ἃ>  καὶ  στοιχεῖά  φησι. 
κόσμους τε ἐκ τούτων ἀπείρους εἶναι καὶ 
διαλύεσθαι εἰς ταῦτα. (Marcovich [1999])
[Leucippus] was the first to put forward the 
atoms  as  principles  …  He  says  that  the 
universe is infinite, as has been said. Part 
of it is a plenum, and part void, which he 
says are the elements.  There are infinitely 
many  worlds  composed  of  this,  and  they 
are resolved into those elements.
Leucippus, fr. A1 DK
     = fr. 77a Taylor
     = frr. 289, 318, 355, 382, 389 Luria
Diog. 9.30-31
(b1) Λεύκιππος δὲ Ζήνωνος ἑταῖρος οὐ τὴν 
αὐτὴν  δόξαν  διετήρησεν,  ἀλλά  φησιν 
ἄπειρα εἶναι καὶ ἀεὶ κινούμενα καὶ γένεσιν 
καὶ μεταβολὴν συνεχῶς οὖσαν. στοιχεῖα δὲ 
λέγει τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενόν. (Luria)
Leucippus,  an  associate  of  Zeno,  did  not 
adhere to the same doctrine, but says things 
are infinitely many and always in motion, 
and  that  coming  to  be  and  change  are 
continuous. He says that the elements are 
the plenum and the void.
Leucippus, fr. A10 DK
     = fr. 78 Taylor
     = fr. 151 Luria
Hippol. Refut. 1.12
(c1) δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτῶι τάδε· ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν 
ὅλων ἀτόμους καὶ κενόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα 
νενομίσθαι [δοξάζεσθαι]. ἀπείρους τε εἶναι 
κόσμους  καὶ  γενητοὺς  καὶ  φθαρτούς. 
μηδέν τε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι μηδὲ εἰς 
τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι. καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους δὲ
[Democritus'] doctrines are as follows. The 
principles  of  everything  are  atoms  and 
void,  and everything else is  conventional. 
There  are  infinitely  many  worlds  which 
come into  being  and  pass  away.  Nothing 
comes  into  being  from  what  is  not,  or 
passes away into what is not. The atoms are 
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ἀπείρους εἶναι κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ πλῆθος ... 
(Marcovich [1999])
infinite in size and number … 
Democritus, fr. A1 DK
     = fr. 6 Taylor
     = frr. 93, 184, 215, 382 Luria 
Diog. 9.44
(d1)  λέγει  δὲ  ὁμοίως  Λευκίππωι  περὶ 
στοιχείων,  πλήρους  καὶ  κενοῦ,  τὸ  μὲν 
πλῆρες  λέγων  ὄν,  τὸ  δὲ  κενὸν  οὐκ  ὄν· 
ἔλεγε δὲ ὡς ἀεὶ κινουμένων τῶν ὄντων ἐν 
τῶι κενῶι … (Luria)
Like Leucippus, he says that the elements 
are  plenum and  void,  calling  the  plenum 
what is and the void what is not. He said 
that the things that there are are always in 
motion in the void ...
Democritus, fr. A40 DK
     = fr. 78 Taylor
     = fr. 349 Luria
Hippol. Refut. 1.13 
As witnessed by the most extensive summaries of atomist cosmogony in the doxography 
(to which this section will refer repeatedly), πλῆρες (ὄν) and κενόν (οὐκ ὄν)7 are the 
atomist equivalents to Anaximander's ἄπειρον, Xenophanes' γαῖα, Heraclitus' πῦρ, 
Parmenides' ἐόν, Empedocles' ῥιζώματα, Anaxagoras' πάντα χρήματα (ἄπειρα καὶ 
πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα: DK59B1), or the ἄπειρα καὶ περαίνοντα of Philolaus.  Unlike 
7 Judging from extant quotations, the atomists used various different words to refer to (i) atoms and (ii) 
void: (i) ἄτομα (fr. 55 Luria); δέν (frr. 156, 197 Luria); πλῆρες (fr. 197 Luria); ναστόν (fr. 197 Luria); 
ὄν (frr. 197, 349 Luria); ἰδέαι (fr. 198 Luria); (ii) κενόν (fr. 55 Luria); μηδέν (fr. 156 Luria); οὐκ ὄν (fr. 
349 Luria).  Among the doxographers with access to atomist texts, Aristotle refers to atoms and void as 
τὸ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πύκνον (Metaph. 1.4.985b4 = fr. 241 Luria), Cicero latinizes Leucippus' elements as 
plenum et inane (Acad. priora 2.37.118 = fr. 165 Luria), and both Aristotle (De gen. et corr. 1.1.314a21 
= fr. 240 Luria) and Theophrastus (De sensu 65 = fr. 496 Luria) refer to Democritus' atoms as σχήματα: 
this reception tends to support the authenticity of the terms πλῆρες, ναστός, κενόν, and ἰδέαι.  
Theodoret (c. 393-c. 457 CE) parses the historical development of atomist terminology thus (in Affect. 
4.57.9 = fr. 199 Luria): (1) τὸ κενὸν καὶ τὰ ναστά (Democritus); (2) κενὸν καὶ ἀδιαίρετα (Metrodorus 
of Chios); (3) (void and) ἄτομα (Epicurus).  The omission of Leucippus (see page 107 above) confirms 
that this account is probably Epicurean and therefore indecisive against the non-polemical account of 
Sextus (2nd cent. CE), who puts the word ἄτομα in Democritus' mouth (fr. 55 Luria) and claims 
familiarity with written works by Democritus (Περὶ ἰδεῶν, Κρατυντήρια: frr. 48-50, 55 Luria), 
including one title from the Thrasyllan list (Κρατυντήρια: fr. cxv Luria). 
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their predecessors, the atomists explicitly believe in nothingness (κενόν) as an element of 
physical reality (directly contradicting Parmenides' denial of nonbeing),8  an emptiness in 
which solid atoms (πλῆρες) move about eternally (ἀεὶ κινούμενα: [b1]; ἀεὶ κινουμένων 
τῶν ὄντων ἐν τῶι κενῶι: [d1]).  As infinite atoms (ἄπειρα εἶναι: [b1]; τὰς ἀτόμους δὲ 
ἀπείρους εἶναι [c1]) move through infinite emptiness (τὸ μὲν πᾶν ἄπειρόν φησιν: [a1]), 
they form infinite world-orders (κόσμους τε ἐκ τούτων ἀπείρους εἶναι: [a1]; ἀπείρους τε 
εἶναι κόσμους: [c1]).9   None of these orders is permanent (εἶναι κόσμους καὶ γενητοὺς 
καὶ φθαρτούς: [c1]); each one eventually dissolves into its component parts, solid 
particles and emptiness (κόσμους τε ἐκ τούτων [i.e. τοῦ πλήρους καὶ τοῦ κενοῦ] ἀπείρους 
εἶναι καὶ διαλύεσθαι εἰς ταῦτα: [a1]).  As these endless κόσμοι come and go, nothing ever 
comes from nothing or dissolves into nothing: everything is atoms going through endless 
permutations (καὶ γένεσιν καὶ μεταβολὴν συνεχῶς οὖσαν: [b1]) facilitated by inert void 
(μηδέν τε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι: [c1]).10  There is no 
enduring reality outside of atoms and void; anything that seems to be such is merely 
notional (ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους καὶ κενόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα νενομίσθαι: [c1]).  
8 Simplicius makes the explicit confrontation with Parmenides a contribution of Leucippus, whom 
tradition  remembers as an associate of Parmenides' pupil Zeno (Simpl. in Phys. 28.4 = DK67A8, fr. 
147).  This is accepted by von Fritz (1963), 14-18.
9 For earlier instances of cosmic infinity in the Critical Tradition, see pages 86-94 (Anaxagoras) and note 
24 (Anaximander) above in chapter 1.  Where earlier, pre-atomist ideas of cosmic infinity are harder to 
pin down precisely (owing to lack of evidence), it is clear that Leucippus and Democritus understood 
their infinite κόσμοι to exist simultaneously (as contemporary alternative universes) and sequentially 
(as recycled systems incorporating atoms and void from older universes): see frr. 344, 349-350 Luria, 
Kahn (1960, 33-35, 46-53) and KRS (frr. 111-114). 
10 For more on the role of void in allowing for movement (and the kind of real, non-illusory change that 
Parmenides denies, e.g. οὐ γὰρ ἀποτμήξει τὸ ἐὸν τοῦ ἐόντος ἔχεσθαι [fr. 6 Coxon]), see frr. 255-260 
Luria.  On the distinction between internal void (void enclosed by atoms) and external void (the 
endless outer space in which all atoms move), see frr. 268-270.
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As the only enduring material that exists, atoms recycle through endless κόσμοι without 
suffering any change to their structure as individual particles; all that changes is their 
position relative to one another.11
Void and perpetually moving atoms are not the only controlling factors in the 
atomist cosmogony, which proceeds as follows:
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
(a2) γίνεσθαι  δὲ  τοὺς  κόσμους  οὕτω· 
φέρεσθαι  κατὰ  ἀποτομὴν ἐκ  τῆς  ἀπείρου 
πολλὰ σώματα παντοῖα τοῖς σχήμασιν εἰς 
μέγα  κενόν,  ἅπερ  ἀθροισθέντα  δίνην 
ἀπεργάζεσθαι μίαν, καθ' ἣν προσκρούοντα 
<αλλήλοις>  καὶ  παντοδαπῶς  κυκλούμενα 
διακρίνεσθαι  χωρὶς  τὰ  ὅμοια  πρὸς  τὰ 
ὅμοια. ἰσορρόπων δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος μηκέτι 
δυναμένων  περιφέρεσθαι,  τὰ  μὲν  λεπτὰ 
χωρεῖν  εἰς  τὸ  ἔξω  κενόν,  ὥσπερ 
διαττώμενα·  τὰ  δὲ  λοιπὰ  συμμένειν  καὶ 
περιπλεκόμενα  συγκατατρέχειν  ἀλλήλοις 
καὶ ποιεῖν πρῶτόν τι σύστημα σφαιροειδές. 
τοῦτο  δὲ  οἷον  ὑμένα  ὑφίστασθαι,  περι-
έχοντα  ἐν  ἑαυτῶι  παντοῖα  σώματα·  ὧν 
κατὰ  τὴν  τοῦ  μεσοῦ  ἀντέρεισιν  περι-
δινουμένων  λεπτὸν  γενέσθαι  τὸν  πέριξ 
ὑμένα, συρρεόντων ἀεὶ τῶν συνεχῶν κατ' 
ἐπίψαυσιν  τῆν  δίνης.  καὶ  οὕτω  γενέσθαι 
τὴν  γῆν,  συμμενόντων  τῶν  ἐνεχθέντων 
ἐπὶ  τὸ  μέσον.  αὐτόν  τε  πάλιν  τὸν 
περιέχοντα οἷον ὑμένα αὔξεσθαι κατὰ τὴν
The worlds come into being in this way. A 
large  number  of  bodies  of  every  shape 
become separated from the infinite  into a 
great void, congregate together and form a 
single swirl, in which, as they collide and 
circle  in  all  sorts  of  ways,  they  are 
separated out, like to like. Because of their 
number  they  can  no  longer  rotate  in 
equilibrium,  but  the  small  ones  are  as  it 
were sifted out into the external void; the 
rest remain, and, becoming entangled with 
one another, move round together, making 
up  a  primary  spherical  structure.  There 
separates off from this a sort of membrane, 
containing  bodies  of  every  kind;  as  these 
swirl  round  the  surrounding  membrane 
becomes thin through the resistance of the 
central  mass,  as  the  bodies  on  its  inner 
surface are continually flowing off into the 
centre  because  of  the  contact  within  the 
swirl.  In  this  way  the  earth  comes  into 
being, as the bodies which have been 
11 The key witness to this principle (implicit in the cosmogonic narratives) is Aristotle (De gen. et corr. 1. 
1.314a21, Metaph. 1.4.985b4 and 7.2.1042b11 = frr. 240-242 Luria), who attributes to the atomists the 
idea that each individual atom has (1) a particular shape (compare the difference between the letters A 
and N), (2) a particular order in whatever compound it helps to form (compare the difference between 
AN and NA), and (3) a particular orientation (compare the letters Z and N, which have the same shape 
but are oriented differently on the page).  These three characteristics of individual atoms recur through-
out the received tradition, especially in Aristotelian commentators (see frr. 243-248 Luria), and the 
alphabetic analogy appears to originate with the atomists (see Lact. Inst. 3.17.22 = fr. 241 Luria).  See 
Taylor (1999), 171-172; Barnes (1982), 363-365; KRS frr. 555-557.   
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ἐπέκκρισιν τῶν ἔξωθεν σωμάτων· δίνηι τε 
φερόμενον αὐτόν, ὧν ἂν ἐπιψαύσηι, ταῦτα 
ἐπικτᾶσθαι. τούτων δέ τινα συμπλεκόμενα 
ποιεῖν σύστημα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κάθυγρον 
καὶ  πηλῶδες,  ξηρανθέντα  δὲ  καὶ 
περιφερόμενα σὺν τῆι τοῦ ὅλου δίνηι, εἶτ' 
ἐκπυρωθέντα  τὴν  τῶν  ἀστέρων  ἀπο-
τελέσαι φύσιν. (Marcovich [1999])
carried into  the  middle remain there;  and 
on  the  other  hand  the  surrounding 
membrane grows by separating off bodies 
from the outside, adding to itself any which 
it touches as it whirls round. Some of these 
fasten together into a structure which is at 
first moist and muddy, but which dries as it 
rotates  in  the  universal  swirl,  finally 
catching fire and constituting the nature of 
the stars.
Leucippus, fr. A1 DK
     = fr. 77a Taylor
     = frr. 289, 318, 382, 389 Luria
Diog. 9.31-32
(b2) κόσμους δὲ <ὧδε> γίνεσθαι λέγει· ὅταν 
εἰς  μέγα  κενὸν  ἐκ  τοῦ  περιέχοντος 
ἀθροισθῆι  πολλὰ  σώματα  καὶ  συρρυῆι, 
προσκρούοντα ἀλλήλοις συμπλέκεσθαι τὰ 
ὁμοιοσχήμονα  καὶ  παραπλήσια  τὰς 
μορφάς,  καὶ  *περιπλεχθέντων  εἰς  ἕτερα 
γίνεσθαι* 12 ... (Luria)
He says that worlds come into being in this 
way; when many bodies are collected out 
of the surroundings and flow together into 
a great void, in their collisions those of the 
same and similar shapes get entangled, and 
*after  being  entangled  they  turn  into 
different things* 13 ...
Leucippus, fr. A10 DK
     = fr. 78 Taylor
     = fr. 291 Luria
Hippol. Refut. 1.12
(c2) καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους ... φέρεσθαι δ' ἐν τῶι 
ὅλωι  δινουμένας.  καὶ  οὕτω  πάντα  τὰ 
συγκρίματα γεννᾶν, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν· 
εἶναι  γὰρ  καὶ  ταῦτα  ἐξ  ἀτόμων  τινῶν 
συστήματα·  ἅπερ  εἶναι  ἀπαθῆ  καὶ 
ἀναλλοίωτα  διὰ  τὴν  στερρότητα.  τόν  τε 
ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην ἐκ τοιούτων λείων 
The  atoms  …  are  carried  about  in  the 
whole  in  a  swirl,  and  in  that  way  they 
generate all the compounds, fire, water, air, 
earth. For these things too are complexes of 
atoms,  which  are  incapable  of  being 
affected  and  changeless  because  of  their 
solidity. The sun and moon are compound-
12 Here I follow the reading of the MSS over emendations proposed by Diels (περιπλεχθέντων ἄστρα 
γίνεσθαι) and Luria (περιπλεχθέντων εἰς ἕτερα μετακοσμηθῆναι καὶ ἕτερα γίνεσθαι), since I believe 
the original text offers fewer problems.  Starting with the Theognidea (162), we see the preposition εἰς 
used with the predicate of γίγνομαι (see LSJ s.v.).
13 Taylor's translation has been altered to suit my choice of text.  The original follows Diels' emendation.
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καὶ  περφερῶν  ὄγκων  συγκεκρίσθαι  ... 
(Marcovich [1999])
ed of smooth, round bodies of that kind ...
Democritus, fr. A1 DK
     = fr. 6 Taylor
     = frr. 93, 184, 215, 382 Luria 
Diog. 9.44
(d2) ἀπείρους δὲ εἶναι κόσμους καὶ μεγέθει 
διαφέροντας.  ἐν  τισὶ  δὲ  μὴ  εἶναι  ἥλιον 
μηδὲ σελήνην, ἐν τισὶ δὲ μείζω τῶν παρ' 
ἡμῖν  καὶ  ἐν  τισὶ  πλείω.  εἶναι  δὲ  τῶν 
κόσμων ἄνισα τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τῆι μὲν 
πλείους,  τῆι  δὲ  ἐλάττους  καὶ  τοὺς  μὲν 
αὔξεσθαι,  τοὺς  δὲ  ἀκμάζειν,  τοὺς  δὲ 
φθίνειν,  καὶ  τῆι  μὲν  γίνεσθαι,  τῆι  δὲ 
ἐκλείπειν.  φθείρεσθαι  δὲ  αὐτοὺς  ὑπ' 
ἀλλήλων  προσπίπτοντας.  εἶναι  δὲ  ἐνίους 
κόσμους  ἐρήμους  ζώιων  καὶ  φυτῶν  καὶ 
παντὸς  ὑγροῦ. τοῦ  δὲ  παρ'  ἡμῖν  κόσμου 
πρότερον  τὴν  γῆν  τῶν ἄστρων γενέσθαι, 
εἶναι δὲ τὴν μὲν σελήνην κάτω, ἔπειτα τὸν 
ἥλιον, εἶτα τοὺς ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας. τοὺς δὲ 
πλανήτας  οὐδ'  αὐτοὺς  ἔχειν  ἴσον  ὕψος. 
ἀκμάζειν  δὲ  κόσμον,  ἕως  ἂν  μηκέτι 
δύνηται ἔξωθέν τι προσλαμβάνειν. (Luria)
[He  says]  that  there  are  infinitely  many 
worlds differing in size, some with neither 
sun  nor  moon,  some with  sun and moon 
larger than ours and some with more. The 
distances between the worlds are unequal, 
and  there  are  more  in  some  parts  of  the 
universe  and  fewer  in  others;  some  are 
growing, some are at their peak, and some 
decaying,  and  in  some  parts  they  are 
coming into being and in others ceasing to 
be.  They  are  destroyed  by  collision  with 
one  another.  There  are  worlds  without 
animals or plants or any moisture.  In our 
world the earth came into being before the 
stars, and the moon is the lowest, then the 
sun,  then  the  fixed  stars.  Nor  are  the 
planets at equal heights either. A world is at 
its  peak  until  it  can  no  longer  assimilate 
material from the outside.
Democritus, fr. A40 DK
     = fr. 78 Taylor
     = frr. 349, 391 Luria
Hippol. Refut. 1.13 
These narratives are complicated and problematic (showing idiosyncratic divergence),14 
but several salient things emerge from reading them together.  First, the atomists appear 
to follow Empedocles and Anaxagoras15 in positing vortices as causative in creating 
14 E.g. the attempt to combine atomism with a theory of four elements in Diog. 9.44, which may or may 
not go back to Democritus.  My treatment of atomist physical doctrines aims to remain as general and 
uncontroversial as possible. 
15 For the δίνη of Empedocles, see note 90 above in chapter 1.  For the περιχώρησις of Anaxagoras, see 
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κόσμοι (ἅπερ ἀθροισθέντα δίνην ἀπεργάζεσθαι μίαν [a2]; καὶ τὰς ἀτόμους ... φέρεσθαι δ' 
ἐν τῶι ὅλωι δινουμένας [c2]).  An individual vortex comes into being when a particular 
crowd of atoms spontaneously flows together into a particular area of void (φέρεσθαι 
κατὰ ἀποτομὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου πολλὰ σώματα παντοῖα τοῖς σχήμασιν εἰς μέγα κενόν 
[a2]; ὅταν εἰς μέγα κενὸν ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀθροισθῆι πολλὰ σώματα καὶ συρρυῆι [b2]). 
Whirling together in the vortex, the atoms spontaneously sort themselves: like particles 
go with like (καὶ παντοδαπῶς κυκλούμενα διακρίνεσθαι χωρὶς τὰ ὅμοια πρὸς τὰ ὅμοια 
[a2]; προσκρούοντα ἀλλήλοις συμπλέκεσθαι τὰ ὁμοιοσχήμονα καὶ παραπλήσια τὰς 
μορφάς: [b2]),16 interlocking to form material compounds (τοῦτο δὲ οἷον ὑμένα 
ὑφίστασθαι … τούτων δέ τινα συμπλεκόμενα ποιεῖν σύστημα: [a2]; προσκρούοντα 
ἀλλήλοις συμπλέκεσθαι τὰ ὁμοιοσχήμονα καὶ ... εἰς ἕτερα γίνεσθαι: [b2]; φέρεσθαι δ' ἐν 
τῶι ὅλωι δινουμένας. καὶ οὕτω πάντα τὰ συγκρίματα γεννᾶν: [c2]), including the 
familiar physical phenomena (e.g. earth, water, fire, air, sun, moon, and stars) whose 
cyclical interaction constitutes the Greek world-order (συρρεόντων ἀεὶ τῶν συνεχῶν κατ' 
ἐπίψαυσιν τῆν δίνης. καὶ οὕτω γενέσθαι τὴν γῆν … ξηρανθέντα δὲ καὶ περιφερόμενα σὺν 
τῆι τοῦ ὅλου δίνηι, εἶτ' ἐκπυρωθέντα τὴν τῶν ἀστέρων ἀποτελέσαι φύσιν: [a2]; καὶ οὕτω 
πάντα τὰ συγκρίματα γεννᾶν, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν· εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐξ ἀτόμων 
τινῶν συστήματα … τόν τε ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην ἐκ τοιούτων λείων καὶ περφερῶν 
pages 84-86 above in chapter 1.  Notice that the atomists do not posit a single vortex (Anaxagoras as 
extant) or series of vortices succeeding one another forever (Empedocles): the atomists' vortices occur 
simultaneously throughout all existence, like the κόσμοι that they create—κόσμοι in which celestial 
bodies circle a central earth in time with its seasonal transformation (see Diog. 9.31-32 and Hippol. 
Refut. 1.13 above), a striking phenomenon that seems to have inspired the original idea of a creative 
cosmic vortex.
16 Democritus explicitly embraces this idea of homogeneity in fr. 316 Luria (see page 127 below).
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ὄγκων συγκεκρίσθαι: [c2]).  According to the summary of Democritean ideas preserved 
by Hippolytus, the individual κόσμος grows as long as its vortex continues drawing 
atoms from the outside: when it can no longer accept external atoms, it reaches maturity 
in the manner of a living being (ἀκμάζειν δὲ κόσμον, ἕως ἂν μηκέτι δύνηται ἔξωθέν τι 
προσλαμβάνειν: [d2]) and begins to decay (καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὔξεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἀκμάζειν, τοὺς 
δὲ φθίνειν, καὶ τῆι μὲν γίνεσθαι, τῆι δὲ ἐκλείπειν: [d2]).17  According to the same source, 
different κόσμοι contain different parts—more or less celestial bodies of variable size, 
different amounts of animal and plant life, different amounts of water (ἐν τισὶ δὲ μὴ εἶναι 
ἥλιον μηδὲ σελήνην, ἐν τισὶ δὲ μείζω τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τισὶ πλείω ... εἶναι δὲ ἐνίους 
κόσμους ἐρήμους ζώιων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ παντὸς ὑγροῦ: [d2])—perhaps in keeping with 
the particular atomic material extracted from the boundless extracosmic store by different 
vortices (φέρεσθαι κατὰ ἀποτομὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου πολλὰ σώματα παντοῖα τοῖς σχήμασιν: 
[a2]).18
The Concept of Necessity (ΑΝΑΓΚΗ) in Early Atomism (2.2.1)             
Thus far, the atomist κόσμος consists of three things: atoms, void, and a vortex 
(which mixes atoms and void to create worlds like the one familiar to the Critical 
Tradition, worlds in which a central earth is circled by celestial bodies).  This raises 
questions, e.g. what causes the individual vortex? why is it in one place rather than 
another, containing some atoms and not others?  The atomists had a simple answer for 
such questions, an answer that turns up in our cosmological testimonia (as elsewhere):
17 Remember that Anaximander may have likened the universe to a plant: see note 21 above in chapter 1.
18 For more on the early atomist cosmology (including insight into controversies not immediately relevant 
to this discussion), see Mugler (1959), 9-19; Taylor (1999), 160-188.
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TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
(a3)  καὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον ἐκλείπειν σπανίως, 
τὴν δὲ  σελήνην συνεχῶς,  διὰ  τὸ ἀνίσους 
εἶναι τοὺς κύκλους αὐτῶν. εἶναί τε ὥσπερ 
γενέσεις  κόσμου,  οὕτω  καὶ  αὐξήσεις  καὶ 
φθίσεις καὶ φθοράς, κατά τινα ἀνάγκην, ἣν 
ὁποία  ἐστὶν  <οὐ>19 διασαφεῖ. (Marcovich 
[1999])
The  sun  is  eclipsed  rarely,  the  moon 
frequently,  because  their  cycles  are 
unequal. Just like the coming into being of 
worlds,  so  do  their  growth,  decay,  and 
destruction  occur  according  to  a  certain 
necessity, the nature of which he does not 
explain.
Leucippus, fr. A1 DK
     = fr. 77a Taylor
     = fr. 382 Luria
Diog. 9.33
(b3) συμπλέκεσθαι  τὰ  ὁμοιοσχήμονα  καὶ 
παραπλήσια  τὰς  μορφάς ...  αὔξειν  δὲ  καὶ 
φθίνειν διὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην. (Luria)
Those [bodies,  i.e.  atomic compounds] of 
the same and similar shapes get entangled 
… and grow and decay through necessity.
Leucippus, fr. A10 DK
     = fr. 78 Taylor 
     = fr. 291 Luria
Hippol. Refut. 1.12
(c3)  πάντα τε κατ' ἀνάγκην γίνεσθαι,  τῆς 
δίνης αἰτίας οὔσης τῆς γενέσεως πάντων, 
ἣν ἀνάγκην λέγει. (Marcovich [1999])
Everything comes  to  be  by necessity,  the 
swirl,  which  he calls  necessity,  being  the 
cause of the coming to be of everything.
Democritus, fr. A1 DK
     = fr. 6 Taylor
     = frr. 93, 184, 215, 382 Luria 
Diog. 9.44
19 The negative particle (inserted by Stephanus, who is followed by Diels and Luria) comes from a 
parallel passage in Hippol., Refut. 1.12: Λεύκιππος ... τίς δ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀνάγκη, οὐ διώρισεν (fr. 16 Luria). 
It is justified by the widely attested lack of any clear atomist definition of ἀνάγκη that revealed 
precisely how it produces κόσμοι.  See page 122 below.    
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The ultimate reason for everything in the atomist multiverse (infinite void containing 
infinite κόσμοι at various stages of evolution) is necessity (πάντα τε κατ' ἀνάγκην 
γίνεσθαι), which can be identified with the vortex that creates all physical phenomena 
(τῆς δίνης αἰτίας οὔσης τῆς γενέσεως πάντων, ἣν ἀνάγκην λέγει: [c3]).  This puts 
necessity outside the realm of rational understanding: the word ἀνάγκη merely renames 
the vortex along with all aspects of it that escape easy explanation.  Why does something 
happen?  Because it is necessary.  What makes it necessary?  Necessity, in the form of a 
vortex, creates the conditions that call it forth.  This is circular reasoning.20  Thus the 
atomist ἀνάγκη (δίνη) is an absolute ordering principle that resists definitive reduction, 
similar to the cosmic mind of Anaxagoras, the cosmic love and strife of Empedocles, 
Parmenidean Being, or Heraclitean war.  When the atomists want to talk about what 
makes things happen everywhere, they invoke necessity the way their predecessors 
invoked these other things—as ambitious illustrations of reality rather than as definitive 
explanations of it.  
Other testimonia go beyond our cosmological sources in describing how 
Leucippus and Democritus imagined the world-ordering activity of ἀνάγκη.  Consider 
the following testimonia from the early atomist corpus:
20 See Drozdek (2007), 102-104, especially the following: “Necessity is an atomistic, nondivine divinity 
capable of bringing ordered and harmonious results out of disharmonious clouds of chaotically moving 
atoms. [Vortices appear of necessity as endless atoms move in the boundless void.] It is a blind force 
that produces what intelligible divinities of other philosophers brought into being, a force that is 
stripped of the divine status and yet by terminological fiat, brings results that only divinities were able 
to perform. And because the way it is accomplished is out of reach to the human mind, it is left 
unanalyzed, obscure, existing but unexplainable” (104).
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TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
Λεύκιππος  πάντα  κατ'  ἀνάγκην,  τὴν  δ' 
αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν εἱμαρμένην. λέγει γὰρ ἐν 
τῶι Περὶ νοῦ· οὐδὲν χρῆμα ματὴν γίνεται, 
ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης.
Leucippo sostiene che tutto è in virtù della 
Necessità, e che quest'ultima  è il destino. 
Infatti, nell'opera intitolata Sull'Intelligenza 
afferma:  «nulla  avviene  invano,  ma  tutto 
deriva  dalla  causa  e  dalla  necessita». 
(Luria, Krivushina)
Leucippus, fr. B2 DK
     = fr. L1 Taylor
     = fr. 22 Luria
Aet. 1.25.4; Stob. 1.4.7c
Δημόκριτος δὲ  τὸ  οὗ ἕνεκα ἀφεὶς  λέγειν, 
πάντα  ἀνάγει  εἰς  ἀνάγκην  οἷς  χρῆται  ἡ 
φύσις. 
Democritus  neglects  the  final  cause, 
reducing  all  the  operations  of  nature  to 
necessity. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A66 DK
     = fr. 74a Taylor
     = fr. 23 Luria
Aristot. De gen. animal. 5.8.789b2
Δημόκριτος  [ἔφη  οὐσίαν  ἀνάγκης  εἶναι] 
τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν καὶ φορὰν καὶ πληγὴν τῆς 
ὕλης.
Democritus  says  that  it  [necessity]  is 
impact  and motion and a  blow of matter. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A66 DK
     = fr. 74e Taylor
     = fr. 25 Luria
Aet. [Plut.] 1.26.2 (Dox. 321:  περὶ οὐσίας 
ἀνάγκης)
Confirming what we have already noticed, Leucippus (πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' 
ἀνάγκης: fr. B2 DK) and Democritus (πάντα ἀνάγει εἰς ἀνάγκην: fr. 23 Luria) both 
explain everything as a result of necessity.  Confirming the portrait of atomic behavior in 
the cosmological fragments (see [a1]-[d1], [a2]-[c2] above), pseudo-Plutarch identifies 
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Democritean necessity with atomic motion (φορά), including the impact (ἀντιτυπία, 
πληγή) that occurs when moving atoms collide (fr. 25 Luria).21  (Note that from the 
doxographers, especially Aristotle,22 it appears that the early atomists offered no causal 
explanation for eternal atomic motion: like atomic shape, order, and orientation, it was 
just assumed as a constant factor in the eternal flux of the atomist multiverse.  So perhaps 
we should think of atomist necessity as what happens when infinite atomic shapes, 
orders, orientations, and movements come together in infinite void, i.e. infinite vortices 
constituting infinite and infinitely varied κόσμοι.)  The most problematic new 
information here comes from Leucippus, who seems to say that nothing happens without 
reason (οὐδὲν χρῆμα ματὴν γίνεται), that all things are determined by a necessity that is 
in some sense logical (ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης: fr. B2 DK).  How does 
this agree with the (irrational) nature of ἀνάγκη as an unconstructed illustration of 
ultimate reality (see page 118 above)?
With this question we come upon a fundamental human problem: how do we 
speak about causality?  What are the limits of reason as a tool for illustrating and 
exploring reality?  The atomists provide no definitive response to these questions, though 
there is good evidence that they were concerned with them.  Democritus in particular is 
remembered as an authority on αἰτίαι,23 with the most famous etiological testimonium 
21 As the cosmological fragments state, infinite atoms of every shape move about eternally, crashing and 
coalescing (as shape, order, and orientation allow: see note 11 above) to form compounds making up 
observable physical phenomena.  Necessity somehow determines the results of this process. 
22 See frr. 288, 300, 304, 305 Luria = Phys. 2.4.196a26, 8.1.250b11; De caelo 3.2.300b8, b31.  Motion 
thus joins shape, order, and orientation (see note 11 above) as a permanent attribute of individual 
atoms.  Like order and orientation, it can be changed with circumstances (e.g. atoms collide), unlike 
shape (which does not change).  For more testimonia, see frr. 288-313 Luria.  
23 The Thrasyllan list attributes eight books on physical causes to him: 1. Αἰτίαι οὐράνιαι. 2. Αἰτίαι ἀέριοι. 
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being a Democritean saying preserved by Dionysius of Alexandria (3rd cent. CE) and cited 
by Eusebius of Caesarea: 
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
Δημόκριτος  γοῦν  αὐτός,  ὥς  φασιν,  ἔλεγε 
βούλεσθαι  μᾶλλον  μίαν  εὑρεῖν  αἰτιο-
λογίαν  ἢ  τὴν  Περσῶν  οἱ  βασιλείαν 
γενέσθαι. 
Democritus himself, so they say, said that 
he  would  rather  discover  a  single 
explanation  than  acquire  the  kingdom  of 
the Persians. 
Democritus, fr. B118 DK
     = fr. lviii, 29 Luria 
Euseb. Praep. Evang. 14.27.4
 
In light of the Leucippan quotation that joins ἀνάγκη with λόγος (DK67B2), it is 
tempting to read this Democritean saying (and all other approaches to etiology extant in 
the atomist corpus)24 as the expression of a rigid determinist who believed that every 
event in the atomic multiverse is minutely predetermined by an endless chain of atomic 
movements (conveniently referred to as ἀνάγκη).  If by some miracle the atomist could 
see all atoms everywhere at any given moment in time—noting their shape, order, 
orientation, and movement—then he would seemingly be able to foretell every event 
resulting from their ongoing mutual interaction.  This rigid determinist perspective—we 
3. Αἰτίαι ἐπίπεδοι. 4. Αἰτίαι περὶ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν πυρί. 5. Αἰτίαι περὶ φωνῶν. 6. Αἰτίαι περὶ σπερμάτων 
καὶ φυτῶν καὶ καρπῶν. 7. Αἰτίαι περὶ ζώιων α β γ. 8. Αἰτίαι σύμμικτοι (Diog. 9.47 = fr. cxv Luria).  
While discussing sexual shyness among humans and animals, Aelian refers to him in passing as 
providing explanations for inexplicable natural phenomena: ταῦτα Δημοκρίτωι τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις 
καταλείπωμεν ἐλέγχειν τε καὶ τὰς αἰτίας οἴεσθαι λέγειν ἱκανοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀτεκμάρτων τε καὶ οὐ 
συμβλητῶν (N. a. 6.60 = fr. 560 Luria).  The reputation attested in these sources is born out by several 
anecdotes in the atomist doxography which preserve Democritean explanations of natural phenomena, 
e.g. the sweetness of a fig (Plut. Quaest. conv. 1.10.2, p. 628c = fr. xxxvii Luria), the budding of milk 
teeth in infants (Aristot. De gen. animal. 5.8.788b9 = fr. 517 Luria), the existence of horns and antlers 
(Ael. N. a. 12.18-20 = fr. 541-543 Luria), the occurrence of multiple births (Ael. N. a. 12.16 = fr. 545 
Luria), and the birth of monsters with multiple limbs (Aristot. De gen. animal. 4.4.769b30, Philopon. 
185.33 = fr. 546 Luria).  
24 See note 23 above.
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might call it rigid determinism—appears consonant with certain atomist fragments (e.g. 
fr. 32 Luria, where Democritus makes τύχη an illusion) and it is certainly assumed by 
Epicurus when he introduces the unpredictable atomic swerve to account for spontaneity 
in human thought and action.25  But it would be a mistake to attribute it to the early 
atomists without serious reservation.26
The confounding variable here is the fact that ancient students of early atomism 
found no meaningful distinction drawn between atomist necessity (ἀνάγκη) and sheer 
happenstance (τύχη).  This problem appears as early as Aristotle (whose precise theory of 
causation attempts to correct Critical laxness in this regard),27 and continues throughout 
the doxography28—including Eusebius ad locum supra citatum (where Democritus is 
mocked for explaining things by denying any definitive explanation: καὶ ταῦτα μάτην καὶ 
ἀναιτίως αἰτιολογῶν).29  This is the familiar opacity of atomist necessity, which causes 
everything somehow without being itself reducible to any easily recognizable rule (see 
page 118 above).  Here we might simply mark this problem (the identity of atomist 
necessity and its relationship to luck) as insoluble, lamenting the early atomists' lack of 
25 See frr. 36a, 38, 39 Luria (= Epicur. Περὶ φύσεως, pap. 1056 ed. Gomperz col. 25; Cic. De nat. deor. 
1.25.69, De fato 10.23; Diog. Oenoand. fr. 32 col. 1 [p. 56 Chilton]) and Lucret. 2.216-293.
26 Sedley recognizes this in Macchiaroli (1983, 32-34), where he suggests that Epicurus was arguing 
more with Democriteans (e.g. Metrodorus of Chios, Anaxarchus, Nausiphanes) than with Democritus.
27 See e.g. Aristot. De caelo 3.2.300b8; Metaph. 11.6.1071b26; Phys. 2.4.195b36, 196a24 (= frr. 16, 17, 
18, 24 Luria).
28 See e.g. frr. 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 27, 31 Luria, and the discussion in Taylor (1999), 190-191.
29 This criticism opens the remainder of fr. 29 Luria: καὶ ταῦτα μάτην καὶ ἀναιτίως αἰτιολογῶν ὡς ἀπὸ 
κενῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ὑποθέσεως πλανωμένης ὁρμώμενος καὶ τὴν ῥίζαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἀνάγκην τῆς τῶν 
ὄντων φύσεως οὐκ ὁρῶν, σοφίαν δὲ μεγίστην ἡγούμενος τὴν τῶν ἀσόφως καὶ ἠλιθίως συμβαινόντων 
κατανόησιν, καὶ τὴν τύχην τῶν μὲν καθόλου καὶ τῶν θείων δέσποιναν ἐφιστὰς καὶ βασιλίδα, καὶ 
πάντα γενέσθαι κατ' αὐτὴν ἀποφαινόμενος, τοῦ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων αὐτὴν ἀποκηρύττων βίου καὶ τοὺς 
πρεσβεύοντας αὐτὴν ἐλέγχων ἀγνώμονας (Euseb. Praep. Evang. 14.27.4).
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clarity (which we might then blame on lack of extant texts, lack of sympathetic ancient 
readers, and/or simple incompetence on the part of Leucippus and Democritus).  This 
would be premature, however, since it would require us to ignore important clues that we 
do have about the atomists' understanding of their own worldview.  First of these clues is 
the description of τύχη that Dionysius (Eusebius' source) and Stobaeus place in the 
mouth of Democritus:
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
τῶν  γοῦν  Ὑποθηκῶν  ἀρχόμενος  λέγει· 
«ἄνθρωποι  τύχης  εἴδωλον  ἐπλάσαντο 
πρόφασιν ἰδίης ἀνοίης». φύσει γὰρ γνώμηι 
τύχη  μάχεται·  καὶ  τὴν  ἐχθίστην  τῆι 
φρονήσει  ταύτην  αὐτὴν  ἔφασαν  κρατεῖν· 
μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ταύτην ἄρδην ἀναιροῦντες 
καὶ  ἀφανίζοντες  ἐκείνην  ἀντικαθιστᾶσιν 
αὐτῆς·  οὐ γὰρ εὐτυχῆ τὴν φρόνησιν, ἀλλ' 
ἐμφρονεστάτην ὑμνοῦσι τὴν τύχην.
En tout cas, au début de ses  Proverbes, it 
dit:  «Les  hommes  se  sont  façonné  une 
image  de  la  fortune  pour  couvrir  leur 
propre folie»; car il y a une lutte naturelle 
de la fortune contre la raison; et c'est cette 
ennemie  jurée  de  l'intelligence  qu'ils  en 
font triompher, ou plutôt, en supprimant, en 
anéantissant radicalement l'une, ils mettent 
l'autre à sa place: ils ne célèbrent pas, en 
effet,  la  fortune  de  l'intelligence,  mais 
l'extrême  intelligence  de  la  fortune (des  
Places)
Democritus, fr. B119 DK
     = fr. D29 Taylor
     = fr. 32 Luria
Euseb. Praep. Evang. 14.27.5
ἄνθρωποι  τύχης  εἴδωλον  ἐπλάσαντο 
πρόφασιν  ἰδίης  ἀβουλίης.  βαιὰ  γὰρ 
φρονήσει τύχη μάχεται,  τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ἐν 
βίωι εὐξύνετος ὀξυδερκείη κατιθύνει.
People fashioned an image of fortune as an 
excuse  for  their  own folly.  For  in  a  few 
cases fortune conflicts  with prudence,  but 
most  things  in  life  intelligent  clear-
sightedness keeps straight. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B119 DK
     = fr. D29 Taylor
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     = fr. 32 Luria
Stob. 2.8.16
 
According to both sources, Democritus treats τύχη as an image (εἴδωλον) that humans 
created (ἐπλάσαντο) to cover their lack of understanding (ἀνοίη, ἀβουλίη), i.e. a 
convenient word for that which we do not understand.  Since ἀνάγκη too escapes 
understanding (as we have seen), this does not differentiate it decisively from τύχη: both 
words refer to what is unknown to man (an indefinite variable, e.g. x or y in modern 
algebraic notation).  That said, there is a significant difference in the way these two words 
appear in the early atomists' writing (as extant).  Briefly, Democritus uses τύχη (here in 
fr. 32 Luria as elsewhere) to indicate the chaotic, irregular process whereby something 
unexpected happens to people who are naïve, unsuspecting, and uncomprehending (x).30  
In contrast, ἀνάγκη designates the more or less regular physical process that generates all 
things, a process about which we are not necessarily entirely naïve: we can know more or 
less about it even if we cannot understand it perfectly (y).31  As used by the early atomists, 
then, τύχη designates an unknown quantity that is fundamentally unknowable (x), since it 
varies wildly with individual experience and opinion, while ἀνάγκη refers to an unknown 
quantity that we can know something about through thoughtful investigation (y), because 
30 See frr. 32 Luria (quoted above on page 123), 33a Luria (τύχη μεγαλόδωρος, ἀλλ' ἀβέβαιος, φύσις δὲ 
αὐτάρκης· διόπερ νικᾶι τῶι ἥσσονι καὶ βεβαίωι τὸ μεῖζον τῆς ἐλπίδος: Stob. 2.9.5), 33b Luria (τόλμα 
πρήξιος ἀρχή, τύχη δὲ τέλεος κυρίη: Stob. 4.10.28), and 737 Luria (τὸν εὐθυμεῖσθαι μέλλοντα χρὴ … 
μηδὲ ... ὑπέρ τε δύναμιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν ἑωτοῦ καὶ φύσιν· ἀλλὰ τοσαύτην ἔχειν φυλακήν, ὥστε καὶ τῆς 
τύχης ἐπιβαλ-λούσης καὶ ἐς τὸ πλέον ὑπηγεομένης τῶι δοκεῖν, κατατίθεσθαι, καὶ μὴ πλέω 
προσάπτεσθαι τῶν δυνατῶν: Stob. 4.39.25).  
31 The atomists demand a stance like this when they assert that all things happen by necessity and then try 
to offer an account (or accounts) of how this comes about.  If necessity were entirely intractable to 
theoretical examination, it would be pointless to compose theory about it. 
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it has λόγος (πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης: DK67B2).  At issue here is precisely 
how regular the unknown (y) imagined as ἀνάγκη is relative to the unknown (x) imagined 
as τύχη.  Is it fair for Aristotle and others to reduce the atomists' necessity to mere luck (x 
= y)?
There are several testimonia which suggest that a meaningful distinction between 
ἀνάγκη and τύχη did exist in early atomist (or at least Democritean) thought, even if that 
distinction is ultimately not as strong as Aristotle (or others with a taste for deductive 
logical precision) would like.  Consider the following:
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
λέγω τάδε περὶ τῶν ξυμπάντων· ἄνθρωπός 
ἐστιν ὃ πάντες ἴδμεν
This I say about everything: man is  what 
we all know. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B165 DK
     = frr. D4-5 Taylor
     = frr. 9, 58, 65, 102 Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 7.265; Pyrrh. Hypot. 2.23; 
Aristot.  De part.  anim. 1.1.640b29;  Phys.  
2.1.193a3;  Mich.  Ephes.  5.35;  Cic.  Acad.  
priora 2.23.73 
Δημόκριτος  ὁ  Ἀβδηρίτης  ...  διαιρεῖ  δὲ  τὰ 
ὄντα εἰς  τὸ  εἶναι  ἢ ἐξ  ἀνάγκης εἶναι,  ὡς 
«τὸν ἄνθρωπον ζῶιον εἶναι». ὃ γὰρ παντί 
τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει, τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν 
[ὁμοίως  ἀναγκαῖον  καὶ  τὸ  τὸν  θεὸν 
ἄφθαρτον  εἶναι].  τὰ  δὲ  ἐνδεχομένως,  καὶ 
τούτων τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὰ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 
πλεῖστον,  ὡς  τὸ  τὸν  ἄνθρωπον  πεντα-
δάκτυλον εἶναι  καὶ  γηράσκοντα πολιοῦσ-
θαι,  τὰ  δὲ  ἐπ'  ἔλαττον,  ὡς  τὰ  τούτοις 
ἀντικείμενα,  τὸ  τὸν  ἄνθρωπον  τετρα-
δάκτυλον ἢ ἑξαδάκτυλον εἶναι (ἔστι γὰρ ἐν 
τούτοις οὕτως καὶ ταῦτα) ἢ τὸ μὴ πολιοῦ-
Democrito  di  Abdera …  divide  tutto 
l'esistente in ciò che  «esiste» e in ciò che 
«esiste in forza della necessità», come, per 
esempio, «l'uomo, che è un essere vivente». 
In fatti, tutto ciò che esiste sempre e in tutti 
i  casi  esiste  in  forza  della  necessità  (è 
analogamente necessario anche il fato che 
Dio sia immortale). Le altre cose esistono 
come probabili;  e,  tra  queste,  ve ne  sono 
alcune che  si  danno  nel  maggior  numero 
dei  casi,  come,  per  esempio,  il  fatto  che 
l'uomo possiede cinque dita o che diventa 
canuto man mano che invecchia; mentre le 
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σθαι  γηρῶντα  τὸν  ἄνθρωπον,  <τὰ  δὲ  ἐπ' 
ἴσης ὡς τὸ πολιτευέσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον> ἢ 
μή, ἀποδημεῖν <ἢ μ>ή, λούεσθαι ἢ μή.
altre  si  danno  nella  minoranza  dei  casi, 
come,  per  esempio,  le  cose contrarie  alle 
precedenti, come l'avere quattro o sei ditta 
(in  questi  casi  sussistono  tutte  e  due  le 
possibilità), oppure il non diventare canuti 
man  mano che  si  invecchia.  Ancora  altre 
(possono esserci  e  non esserci)  in  eguale 
misura,  come,  per  esempio,  il  fatto  che 
l'uomo  si  occupi  degli  affari  pubblici 
oppure  no,  si  trasferisca  in  un'altra  città 
oppure  no,  si  lavi  oppure  no. (Luria,  
Krivushina) 
Democritus, fr. 103 Luria
Suda,  s.v.  ἀναγκαῖον,  suppl.  uncis 
angulatis ap. Alex. in Top. 177.19
 
These fragments are difficult to interpret.  But following the persuasive insight of 
Mourelatos (2003), both appear to approach phenomena with the intent of separating the 
general from the particular: the word ἄνθρωπος refers to what is common to all men (ὃ 
πάντες ἴδμεν [fr. B165 DK]; τὸν ἄνθρωπον ζῶιον εἶναι [fr. 103 Luria]), a shared 
standard to which individual ἄνθρωποι add some variation (e.g. not every man has five 
fingers per hand or goes gray with age, even though most do [fr. 103 Luria]).  Thus our 
working concept of the general (e.g. Democritus' ἄνθρωπος) remains unclear and 
unfixed, since it is liable to change every time we make a particular observation: if we 
failed to meet any men with eight or twelve fingers (ἔστι γὰρ ἐν τούτοις οὕτως καὶ ταῦτα: 
fr. 103 Luria), then we might assume that having ten fingers is a general rule defining 
Democritus' ἄνθρωπος, when in fact this trait is merely a common variation.32 The 
32 A more thorough discussion of the Democritean distinction between general and particular is given by 
Mourelatos (2003), who cites additional fragments that parse the relationship between generic 
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distinction between general and particular in Democritean thought creates a new 
perspective on early atomist ἀνάγκη.  Consider the following famous fragment:
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
παλαιὰ  ...  δόξα  περὶ  τοῦ  τὰ  ὅμοια  τῶν 
ὁμοίων  εἶναι  γνωριστικά  …  ἀλλ'  ὁ  μὲν 
Δημόκριτος  ἐπί  τε  τῶν  ἐμψύχων  καὶ 
ἀψύχων ἵστησι τὸν λόγον. «καὶ γὰρ ζῶια, 
φησίν, ὁμογενέσι ζώιοις συναγελάζεται ὡς 
περιστεραὶ  περιστεραῖς  καὶ  γέρανοι 
γεράνοις  καὶ  ἐπὶ  τῶν  ἄλλων  ἀλόγων 
ὡσαύτως.  <ὡσαύτως>  δὲ  καὶ  ἐπὶ  τῶν 
ἀψύχων,  καθάπερ  ὁρᾶν  πάρεστιν  ἐπί  τε 
τῶν  κοσκινευομένων  σπερμάτων  καὶ  ἐπὶ 
τῶν παρὰ ταῖς κυματωγαῖς ψηφίδων· ὅπου 
μὲν  γὰρ  κατὰ  τὸν  τοῦ  κοσκίνου  δῖνον 
διακριτικῶς φακοὶ μετὰ φακῶν τάσσονται 
καὶ  κριθαὶ  μετὰ  κριθῶν  καὶ  πυροὶ  μετὰ 
πυρῶν,  ὅπου  δὲ  κατὰ  τὴν  τοῦ  κύματος 
κίνησιν αἱ μὲν ἐπιμήκεις ψηφῖδες εἰς τὸν 
αὐτὸν τόπον ταῖς ἐπιμήκεσιν ὠθοῦνται, αἱ 
δὲ  περιφερεῖς  ταῖς  περιφερέσιν  ὡς  ἂν 
συναγωγόν τι ἐχούσης τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς 
ἐν τούτοις ὁμοιότητος».
There is an ancient opinion that like things 
are recognized by like. Democritus seemed 
to  have  devised  some  considerations  in 
support  of  this  opinion  …  he  based  his 
argument  on  the  behaviour  of  living  and 
non-living  things.  For  “Animals  flock 
together,”  he  says,  “with  animals  of  the 
same  kind,  doves  with  doves  and  cranes 
with  cranes  and  similarly  with  the  other 
irrational creatures, and so with non-living 
things  too,  as  one can  see in  the  case of 
seeds in a sieve and pebbles on a beach. In 
the one lentils are sorted out by the swirl of 
the sieve to lie together with lentils, barley 
with barley, and wheat with wheat, and in 
the other oblong pebbles are pushed by the 
motion of the waves into the same place as 
oblong and round into  the  same place  of 
round, as if that sort of similarity in things 
had a kind of attractive force.”
Democritus, fr. B164 DK
humanity and individual human beings: ἐκκρίνεται τὸ σπέρμα ὥσπερ Πλάτων φησὶ καὶ Διοκλῆς, ἀπὸ 
ἐγκεφάλου καὶ νωτιαίου· Πραξαγόρας δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος ἔτι τε Ἱπποκράτης ἐξ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος, ὁ 
μὲν Δημόκριτος λέγων «ἄνθρωποι εἷς ἔσται καὶ ἄνθρωπος παντός» (Galen. De defin. med. 439 = fr. 
B124 DK, 525 Luria); ξυνουσίη ἀποπληξίη σμικρή· ἐξέσσυται γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου καὶ 
ἀποσπᾶται πληγῆι τινι μεριζόμενος (Clem. Paed. 1.94, Hippol. Refut. 8.14, Galen. in Hippocrat. 3.1, 
Galen. De defin. med. 439, [Galen.] An animal sit id quod in utero est 19.176, Plin. N. h. 28.58, Gell. 
Noct. Att. 19.2, Stob. 3.6.28, Plut. Quaest. conv. 3.6.1 = fr. B32 DK, 527 Luria). Mourelatos ultimately 
concludes that for Democritus, “knowledge of man (type) [generic ἄνθρωπος] is complete, 
unrestricted, and public; knowledge of men (tokens) [individual ἄνθρωποι] is inevitably incomplete, 
restricted, and parochial” (53). While the thrust of this conclusion (recognizing a more or less regular 
generic type that is larger than its individual instances) is undoubtedly correct, it seems a little too 
positive regarding our knowledge of the general: since this depends necessarily on knowledge of the 
particular, it is hard to justify its being complete (thus Mourelatos) or perfect when the knowledge that 
it depends on is necessarily incomplete (imperfect).  See frr. 79-80 Luria, where the imperfect 
knowledge of the senses (which deal in particulars) limit the power of the mind (which deals with what 
is generally true, generalizing from particulars).
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     = fr. D6 Taylor
     = fr. 316 Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 7.116
According to this fragment, many different phenomena (herds of animals, seeds in a 
sieve, rocks on a beach) are results of a natural sorting process.  This sorting process 
regularly places like with like, putting animals, seeds, and stones together in groups 
defined by mutual resemblance.  The existence of general likeness among animals, seeds, 
and stones does not preclude infinite idiosyncrasies in particular instances (not just of the 
individual but also of the group: the animals and plants in one country differ from those 
in another, and different beaches are strewn with different rocks).33  Because we cannot 
see every particular instance where this sorting process plays out, we cannot define it 
absolutely (just as we cannot define Democritus' ἄνθρωπος).  The most we can do is 
offer a tentative description that illustrates the regularity we observe without closing our 
minds to the likelihood that some of it is not absolute.  In other words, we have to remain 
open to the possibility of men with more or less than five fingers per hand. 
What are we to call the sorting process that mysteriously places like with like? 
From the perspective of the early atomists, this question can only be answered in context. 
If we are thinking about reality that we have observed and pondered carefully, noting 
where it is more predictable and where it is less, we call the sorting process ἀνάγκη (or 
vortex, e.g. δῖνος in fr. 316 Luria).34  If we are thinking about reality that we have not 
33 Living in an age of geographic exploration and increasing cultural interchange, the atomists would 
have been acutely aware of these kind of differences: see chapter 1.3 above.
34 It is difficult to tell precisely what word(s) other than ἀνάγκη Democritus (let alone the barely extant 
Leucippus) used to refer to the vortex: frr. DK68B164 and B167 (= frr. 316, 288 Luria) put the word 
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observed or pondered, we call the sorting process τύχη.35  In either case, what changes is 
not what happens, but how we orient ourselves as active observers.  In one case, we are 
playing Russian roulette with a gun that we have examined carefully and maybe even 
doctored beforehand.  In the other, someone else pulls the trigger before we notice that 
the game is on and we are in play.  Assuming that Democritus is reliable translator, the 
deontic λόγος of Leucippus (DK67B2) thus appears to have more in common with the 
universal λόγος of Heraclitus (fr. 1, 23a Marcovich, quoted on pages 47-48 in chapter 1) 
than with the syllogistic logic of Aristotle.  It is a tool for thinking inductively rather than 
deductively, and the necessity (ἀνάγκη, δῖνος) that it construes is an unclear, generic 
principle that cannot be precisely defined by any limited set of particulars (since the set 
of particulars that it deals with, namely all things, is infinite).36  This explains why 
Aristotle and others who think deductively find it unsettling and complain that there is no 
categorical distinction between necessity and happenstance (see page 122 above).  They 
want the atomists to be more explicit and definitive about the relationship between the 
general and the particular than the atomists themselves (as far as we can tell) appear to 
have been (possibly with good reason).  They want axioms and proofs when all the 
atomists have are observations and more or less plausible explanations. 
Where does this leave early atomist understanding of causality?  The early 
δῖνος in Democritus' mouth, and doxographers close to Democritean texts use the Ionian word δίνη 
(e.g. Aristot. Phys. 2.4.196a26, Sext. Adv. math. 9.113 = frr. 288, 290 Luria).  Both words (δῖνος, δίνη) 
were extant in the fifth century with the meaning vortex, eddy, whirl, rotation (see LSJ s.v.).  I have 
tentatively decided to accept the attribution of δῖνος to Democritus.
35 See note 30 above, where all extant early atomist usages of the word are gathered. 
36 While I am not prepared to follow Luria (1970, 1012-1014) in making Democritus the founder of 
inductive logic, I agree that he represents an instance of it that predates Aristotle.
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atomists appear to accept the human intuition that cause and effect exist, sharing a 
relationship in which the one is in some sense prior to the other.  However, they do not 
pretend to understand that relationship minutely or precisely (as far as we can tell).  In 
light of fr. 316 Luria, the principle of homogeneity by which atomist necessity operates37 
does not seem to allow the degree of precision demanded by rigid determinism (as 
discussed above on page 121): we have no reason to suppose that Democritus thought 
that knowing the general truth that similar animals, seeds, and stones gather together 
would allow him to predict precisely where particular animals, seeds, or stones of a kind 
would stand relative to one another in a specific situation (e.g. in a particular instance of 
the general phenomenon that he calls ἀνάγκη or δῖνος).  Like pebbles (or atoms) will 
always group with like as a general rule, but the particular pebble patterns on an 
individual beach (like the particular atomic structures that exist and interact at any given 
moment in an individual κόσμος) are not minutely predictable.  Every pebble-strewn 
beach constitutes a particular (and to some extent random) variation on the general and 
universal rule, just as every κόσμος does.  
Remember the different atomist κόσμοι mentioned in [d2] above (see pages 114 
and 116): as imagined by Democritus (assuming Hippolytus to be a reliable witness), 
these show considerable and indefinite variation (1) in the number of celestial bodies, (2) 
in the amount of animal life, and (3) in the amount of water present.  Thus, experience 
37 Note that this principle appears throughout the atomist corpus—e.g. frr. 315, 318, 319, 320, 321 Luria, 
in which atoms come together and influence one another by likeness (separating from one another by 
unlikeness, which makes it difficult for them to associate or interact at length).  Fr. 316 provides the 
most explicit explanation of how the atomists envisaged this principle working. 
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with the particular (individual human beings, individual pebble-strewn beaches, the 
Greek world-order) provides atomists with insight into the general (Democritean man, the 
generic beach, the generic world), insight which has to be flexible enough to cope with 
unexpected (and fundamentally unpredictable) instances of the particular (men who lack 
or add fingers, beaches with different pebble patterns, worlds with different celestial and 
terrestrial phenomena).  Some things appear less random than others (e.g. most men have 
ten fingers), but rigid determinism seems impossible, since individual instances of the 
particular escape minute, precise prediction.
 The foregoing does not mean that the early atomists were not determinists, only 
that their determinism was not necessarily as strict or absolute as a cursory reading of 
Aristotelian or Epicurean criticism of it might suggest.38  Read on their own terms, 
Leucippus and Democritus seem to have believed (1) that cause and effect are real,39 (2) 
that they occur at a dimension too small to be perceived easily (i.e. at the level of 
individually imperceptible atoms), and thus (3) that it is hard to see how causation really 
38 Aristotle (see note 27 above) has the atomists reducing everything to sheer happenstance (his reading 
of τύχη), while Epicurus (see note 25 above) has them reducing everything to rigid determinism (his 
reading of ἀνάγκη without the formal addition of a random atomic swerve).  I think the truth lies 
between these reductionist polemics, with Epicurus formalizing (in the swerve) an idea of randomness 
already nascent in Democritus (certainly) and Leucippus (arguably: see Taylor [1999], 189-190). 
39 See frr. 22-31 Luria, esp. fr. 22 (= Aet. 1.25.4; Stob. 1.4.7c), where the meaning of οὐδὲν χρῆμα ματὴν 
γίνεται seems to be that no event occurs without proximate cause (and ensuing effect): this does not 
mean that every event is minutely predictable (supposing an observer with the insight of Anaxagoras' 
cosmic mind), since the principle of like-with-like does not demand this.  That principle tells you only 
that shaking different seeds in a sieve will sort like with like (fr. 316 Luria), not what precise patterns 
each group will make during the process: chances are, if you repeatedly mix and sort the same 
collection of different seeds, you will get slightly different patterns each time (particular variations on 
the general rule that like always goes with like).  See also the discussion of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason in Taylor (1999): “No event occurs, or state of affairs obtains, unless there is a sufficient reason 
for its occurrence or obtaining” (162).  Taylor finds this idea implicit in early atomism (e.g. in frr. 45, 
80c, 80d Taylor).
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works (i.e. precisely how eternal atomic movement creates cascading chains of accretion 
and disjunction).  Every cause and effect exist as a complex interaction between multiple 
moving parts (atoms and groups of atoms) whose generic guiding principle (like-with-
like, ἀνάγκη, δῖνος) allows considerable leeway in particular instances to what we might 
fairly call luck or chance (τύχη)—even if Democritus ultimately sees the determinative 
role of randomness as less than many of his contemporaries thought.40  Thus Democritus 
likens discovering a single true etiology to being the Great King (fr. B118 DK, quoted 
above on page 121): it is humanly possible, but rare.  And when the atomist talks about 
reality, he puts it outside easy reach of the human mind, in the infinite void where 
imperceptible particles move together and apart for reasons that we cannot fathom 
perfectly in particular instances (even if we can use repeated instances of the particular to 
draw broad inferences with general validity):
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
«ἐτεῆι  δὲ  οὐδὲν  ἴδμεν·  ἐν  βυθῶι  γὰρ  ἡ 
ἀλήθεια».
In reality we know nothing; for truth is in 
the depths.
Democritus, fr. B117 DK; 51 Luria
     = frr. D15, 179b Taylor
Diog.  9.72;  Cic.  Acad.  priora 2.10.32; 
Lact.  Epit. div. inst.  40,  Inst.  3.28.13,  Inst.  
3.30.6; Honor. Augustodun. (PL 172: 235); 
Isidor.  Hisp. Etym. 8.6.12 (= Raban. Maur. 
De universo 15.1, PL 111: 414). 
40 βαιὰ γὰρ φρονήσει τύχη μάχεται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ἐν βίωι εὐξύνετος ὀξυδερκείη κατιθύνει (Stob. 2.8.16 
= fr. 32 Luria, quoted above on page 123).
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The only things that exist absolutely are atoms (material) and void (non-material whose 
emptiness allows the material to move):
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
Δημόκριτος ...  «νόμωι» γάρ φησι «γλυκύ, 
[καὶ] νόμωι πικρόν, νόμωι θερμόν, νόμωι 
ψυχρόν, νόμωι χροιή, ἐτεῆι δὲ ἄτομα καὶ 
κενόν»  (ὅπερ  <ἔστι>·  νομίζεται  μὲν  εἶναι 
καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' 
ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ 
τὸ κενόν).
For he says, “By convention sweet and by 
convention  bitter,  by  convention  hot,  by 
convention cold, by convention colour; but 
in reality atoms and void.” That is to say, 
the  sensible  qualities  are  conventionally 
considered  and  thought  to  exist,  but  in 
reality  they  do  not  exist,  but  only  atoms 
and void.
Democritus, fr. B9 DK
     = fr. 179a Taylor
     = fr. 55 Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 7.135
Δημόκριτος ... «νόμωι χροίη, νόμωι γλυκύ, 
νόμωι πικρόν», εἰπών, «ἐτεῆι δὲ ἄτομα καὶ 
κενόν» ...
“By  convention  colour,  by  convention 
sweet,  by convention bitter,  but  in  reality 
atoms and void” ...
Democritus, fr. B125 DK
     = fr. 179c Taylor
     = fr. 79 Luria
Galen. De medica exper. 1259.8 
«νόμωι  γὰρ  χροίη,  νόμωι  γλυκύ,  νόμωι 
πικρόν,  ἐτεῆι  δ'  ἄτομα  καὶ  κενόν»  ὁ 
Δημόκριτος φησιν ...
“For by convention colour, by convention 
sweet,  by convention bitter,  but  in  reality 
atoms and void,” says Democritus …
Democritus, fr. A49 DK
     = fr. 179d Taylor
     = fr. 90 Luria
Galen. De elem. sec. Hipp. 1.2
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Δημόκριτος  δὲ  τὰς  ποιότητας  ἐκβάλλων, 
ἵνα  φησὶ  «νόμωι  θερμόν,  νόμωι  ψυχρόν, 
ἐτεῆι δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν» ...
Democritus, getting rid of qualities, where 
he says, “By convention hot, by convention 
cold, but in reality atoms and void” …
Democritus, fr. B117 DK
     = frr. D15, 179b Taylor
     = fr. 51 Luria
Diog. 9.72 
δοκεῖ  δὲ  αὐτῶι  (sc. Δημοκρίτωι) τάδε· 
ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους καὶ κενόν, 
τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα νενομίσθαι.
His doctrines are as follows. The principles 
of  everything  are  atoms  and  void,  and 
everything else is conventional.
Democritus, fr. A1 DK
     = fr. 6 Taylor
     = fr. 93, 382 Luria
Diog. 9.4441
From repeated experience with particular instances of material and non-material (atoms 
and void), people generalize to create material qualities like color, taste (bitter and sweet), 
and temperature (hot and cold).  The most general qualities of all are those characterizing 
the entire data set defined by infinite atoms and void.  Depending on where the atomist 
stands relative to the totality of atoms and void, he might qualify this totality generally as 
regular or irregular: either way, the regularity must admit some randomness (since he 
cannot predict particular instances of atomic behavior), and the irregularity must show 
some order (since causation is real for him, and he sees like going with like in every 
particular instance of atomic behavior of which he is aware).  In the final analysis, then, 
Aristotle's criticism that the early atomists confused necessity and luck (see page 122 
above) rings true to some degree, since the atomists do not use words like ἀνάγκη and 
41 In addition to these sources, see frr. 92, 94, 95 Luria.
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τύχη as absolute definitions: they are merely artificial conventions (see fr. 563 Luria on 
the arbitrary nature of words) naming artificial conventions (the imagined quality or 
qualities that characterize all atoms and void individually and collectively in the atomist 
multiverse).  As open-ended descriptions, they are vulnerable to one another (and to the 
external material reality that both refer to): ἀνάγκη cannot exclude all randomness 
without missing the six-fingered man (vel sim.), and τύχη cannot exclude all order 
without denying causation and the principle of like with like.  Thus atomic necessity is 
orderly (like with like, causation) but in some sense random (since certain aspects of 
particular experiences are irreducibly unpredictable), and atomic happenstance is random 
(since it is unexpected), but in some sense orderly (since it occurs in a situation where 
causation obtains and like goes with like).  
The clearest early atomist differentiation between necessity and luck is rhetorical: 
the early atomists talk of necessity (ἀνάγκη) or vortex (δῖνος) when discussing all 
phenomena (the whole),42 of luck (τύχη) when discussing human orientation toward 
phenomena (part of the whole).43  Judging from extant testimonia, the most promising 
point of cleavage here is the distinction between general and particular, with necessity 
being a general characteristic of atoms and void and luck a particular one.  After many 
particular experiences with luck, one begins to notice that it is not generally as random as 
at first it appears: this leads eventually to a general idea of probability that one can use to 
inform one's understanding of the particular, e.g. observations (a) that like goes with like 
42 See page 118 above.
43 See note 30 above.
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or (b) that most men have five fingers on each hand.  Weighing probabilities intelligently 
shifts the boundaries of randomness significantly (see page 129 above), but it does not 
erase them or make understanding causation a simple matter of calculation.44 
The foregoing section (2.2.1) can be summarized as follows.  Early atomists 
believed that all reality is reducible to atoms and void, which interact to produce all 
phenomena.  Interaction between atoms and void is assumed to be regular in some way 
(e.g. like seeks like),45 and that regularity is called necessity (ἀνάγκη) or vortex (δῖνος).  
Doxographers disagree on the nature of atomist necessity: some, like Aristotle, take it to 
be the same thing as luck (i.e. wholly random); others, like Epicurus, identify it with fate 
(the precise opposite of random).  An exhaustive reading of all extant testimonia suggests 
that the truth lies between these extremes: early atomist necessity was generally regular 
(validating Epicurus) without being particularly or definably so (validating Aristotle).  In 
other words, the early atomists use the word ἀνάγκη to refer generally to whatever it is 
that produces monotonous regularity in some particular phenomena (e.g. the movement 
of the fixed stars, the sorting of like with like) and occasional irregularity in others (e.g. 
the number of fingers on a human hand, the particular position that like things take 
44 Thus in Stob. 2.8.16 (= fr. 32 Luria, quoted on page 123 above), τύχη retains some indelible influence 
in human affairs in spite of the (greater) power of ὀξυδερκείη. 
45 The inquiry in Taylor (1999, 193-195), more minute than our purpose requires, finds multiple regular 
expressions (e.g. like seeks like) emerging from interaction between atoms and void: “We have, then, 
some evidence that Democritus' dynamics postulated three fundamental forces, a repulsive force [fr. 
44a Taylor] which plays the role of impact in a conventional corpuscular theory and two kinds of 
attractive force, one which draws together atoms of the same shape [frr. D6, 45, 77a, 78, 124, 103, 160 
Taylor] and another which holds together atoms of different shapes in an atomic aggregate [frr. 44a, 
113 Taylor]. There is also some rather vague evidence to suggest that atoms may have been conceived 
as having an internal source of mobility [frr. 44a, 67b, 113, 178c Taylor].  It is plausible that 
Democritus applied the term 'necessity' to all these forces, regarding them alike as irresistible” (194-
195).  
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relative to one another in any given instance).  This whatever-it-is is presumably an 
emergent characteristic46 of atoms and void (the only objective realities recognized by the 
early atomists), i.e. something arising from their mutual interaction.  Its contours are not 
precisely knowable in the particular, since new instances of the particular are constantly 
occurring (given that atoms and void are infinite), but rough sketches of it (subject to 
revision) can be drawn from multiple particular instances.  (We can have a generally 
accurate idea of man, even if we fail to observe that certain traits are not as universal 
among men as they might seem, e.g. having ten fingers.)  
We might call this compromising reconstruction of early atomist necessity supple 
determinism, since it has material reality being determined (by the properties that emerge 
when atoms and void interact, i.e. necessity) but does not construe that determination to 
exclude randomness entirely (since particular instances of atomic necessity demonstrate 
spontaneous variation that can be observed but not minutely predicted or explained in 
terms of linear causation, e.g. the variation in human beings, in different piles of pebbles 
or seeds, and in the various worlds imagined as existing parallel to the Ionian).47
Defending Supple Determinism (2.2.2)   
Lack of clear, unequivocal testimony about the nature of early atomist necessity is 
the greatest obstacle to our understanding, and thus the greatest cause to be skeptical of 
46 Or series of characteristics: see note 45 above.
47 This understanding of early atomist necessity (and causality) agrees with Morel (1996), e.g. «l' 
étiologie de Démocrite n'est donc pas une branche déséquilibrée de la physique, mais son 
prolongement naturel, vers les phénomènes réguliers ou exceptionnels, par opposition aux principes et 
aux phénomènes en droit possibles» (462); «Démocrite … n'est pas totalement réductionniste» (463); 
«Démocrite adopte à la fois une théorie de type réductionniste et une conception complexe de la 
causalité. Il tient des positions sceptiques tout en promettant de parler de toutes choses» (470).
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any overly explicit reconstruction of that necessity (such as supple determinism might 
appear to be).  Different fragments offer different perspectives on necessity, perspectives 
that are necessarily disintegrated (owing to the fragmentary nature of our evidence) even 
if they are compatible.  The following section addresses some of the discontinuities 
apparent in the fragments and clarifies the view of them taken by this study, showing how 
supple determinism offers a viable interpretation of our admittedly imperfect evidence.  
(a) One problematic datum is fr. 103 Luria (quoted on page 125 above), which 
figures prominently in the case offered for supple determinism above in section 2.2.1.  
This fragment seems to complicate the construction of early atomist necessity in a way 
that we do not find explicit elsewhere (see e.g. frr. 22, 23, 291, 382 Luria, quoted above 
on pages 117 and 119).  Whereas many testimonia make necessity the unconstructed 
reason for everything,48 fr. 103 Luria separates everything that happens into (1) things 
that happen by necessity (ὃ γὰρ παντί τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει, τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν), and 
(2) things whose occurrence is a matter of probability (τὰ δὲ ἐνδεχομένως: Suda, s.v. 
ἀναγκαῖον).  When we consider that this odd parsing of phenomena (which might seem 
to demote necessity from its well-attested role as universal cause) comes from the Suda 
(10th cent. CE), it is tempting to see it as tainted (at least potentially) by later discussions 
of fate and free will (ideas important to Stoics and Epicureans, among others).49  Still, 
though it is impossible to prove that fr. 103 Luria does not incorporate later thought, there 
48 See note 133 above, which quotes Hippol., Refut. 1.12: Λεύκιππος ... τίς δ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀνάγκη, οὐ 
διώρισεν (fr. 16 Luria).
49 Though the fragment lacks any obvious smoking gun connecting it with non-atomist philosophy.  The 
only anomaly is a pious sentence that Luria (1970) brackets as a Late Antique interpolation (1008): 
ὁμοίως ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ τὸν θεὸν ἄφθαρτον εἶναι (fr. 103 Luria). 
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are good reasons not to dismiss it entirely as a window into genuine Democritean ideas.
In the first place, fr. 103 Luria is not the only early atomist fragment that 
problematizes an entirely unconstructed reading of early atomist necessity: it is merely 
one of several witnesses suggesting that the early atomists tried to break into the black 
box (see page 118 above) out of which their multiverse emerges.50  Among testimonia 
already examined, fr. 382 Luria (quoted above on page 117) identifies Democritean 
necessity with vortex, and fr. 316 Luria (quoted above on pages 127-131) illustrates what 
occurs in vortice: like material goes with like (ὡς ἂν συναγωγόν τι ἐχούσης τῶν 
πραγμάτων τῆς ἐν τούτοις ὁμοιότητος: Sext. Adv. math. 7.116).  Other fragments confirm 
this principle,51 and show it producing infinite κόσμοι that vary indefinitely among 
themselves (e.g. DK68A40, quoted above on page 114 and discussed on pages 116 and 
130).  This is consistent with the portrait of human beings in fr. 103 Luria, which is one 
of several witnesses that Democritus imagined individual human beings as particular 
instances of a universal type (e.g. frr. B32, B124, and B165 DK = frr. 527, 525, 9, 58, 65, 
and 102 Luria), i.e. as recurring products of vortex that are as likely to show variation as 
different κόσμοι (which are also produced by vortex).52  In other words, even if we did 
50 See notes 11, 22, and 45 above for more fragments which document early atomist attempts to identify 
principles (e.g. the existence of fundamental characteristics of the individual atom: shape, order, and 
orientation) and rules (e.g. like seeks like) that apply generally and particularly (integrating a more or 
less coherent idea of material necessity).
51 See frr. 45, 77a, 78, 124, 103, and 160 Taylor.
52 See note 32 above.  Note also the tradition that Democritus called the human being a μικρὸς κόσμος 
(frr. 9-12a Luria).  Some dismiss this as a late interpolation, e.g. Finkelburg (1998, 120-121), but 
Aristotle mentions the idea that the animal (ζῶιον) is a μικρὸς κόσμος (without attribution: Phys. 
8.2.252b24), and Galen attributes it to unnamed ἄνδρες παλαιοὶ περὶ φύσιν ἱκανοί, which certainly 
might include Democritus (De usu part. 3.10 = fr. 10 Luria).  If the tradition is genuinely Democritean, 
then the likeness between men and κόσμοι that this study discovers in early atomist thought is even 
more telling as an indication that early atomist necessity is best understood as supple determinism.
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not have fr. 103 Luria, we could still infer that Democritus held beliefs like those 
represented in it.  It confirms and further illustrates what we already know from a variety 
of sources about Democritus' interest in identifying general rules (e.g. like goes with like) 
by which vortex produces particular phenomena.  
Under these circumstances, it seems wise to admit fr. 103 Luria as evidence and to 
allow the possibility that its discussion of regularity in human beings might go back to 
Democritus: at the very least, this discussion proceeds along the lines we would expect, 
given our other evidence for Democritus' interest in human beings and in the problem of 
the general and the particular.
(b) Another problematic datum, addressed already in passing (on pages 122 and 
136 above),53 is the critique of Democritus adopted by Epicurus (341-270), a critique 
which presumes that the early atomists denied randomness (thus providing an excuse to 
introduce the Epicurean atomic swerve).  While there is no disputing that the early 
atomists were more focused on order than on randomness,54 i.e. that they tended toward 
determinism rather than away from it (a trait which they share with the Ionian tradition at 
large, which generalizes from particulars to create regular maps of cosmic phenomena), 
this does not automatically mean that they denied variation, or that they thought all 
variation was reducible to linear causation explainable by rule.  Remember how difficult 
it is for Democritus to discover a real cause (DK68B118, quoted on page 121 and 
discussed on page 132), and how he has τύχη retaining some indelible influence in 
53 See note 25 above for sources.
54 See e.g. the comparison of Democritean and Epicurean necessity in Silvestre (1985), 123-155.
140
determining human affairs (fr. 32 Luria, quoted above on page 124).  From data like these 
(not to mention Democritus' interest in the distinction between general and particular: see 
pages 125-131 and 135 above), it seems that the difference(s) between Democritus and 
Epicurus may have been less obvious and oppositional than is often assumed.55  Perhaps 
the latter merely formalized (in the swerve) a conception of randomness that the former 
accommodated by having an indefinite idea of necessity (a fuzzy idea that went out of 
fashion as succeeding generations of students demanded more rhetorical clarity and 
consistency from their teachers, and/or teachers sought to distance themselves from 
problematic understandings accruing to received ideas).  On this reading of the evidence, 
Epicurus is best understood as updating an old idea that seemed (to him and others) to 
have outlived its usefulness, and the strictly deterministic Democritus against whom he 
polemicizes (see page 121) becomes a straw man.56
(c) Another factor to consider are the so-called indifference arguments which 
several testimonia attribute to the early atomists. Makin (1993) parses these arguments 
into three categories, two of which are pertinent to our discussion of necessity: (1) 
indifference and indivisibility, and (2) indifference and variety (49-65).  (c1) Arguments in 
the first category combat the position of Parmenides (and his successors Zeno and 
55 I am not the only scholar to raise this possibility: see note 26 above.
56 Vindicating the judgment that Cicero puts in the mouth of Cotta: Quid est in physicis Epicuri non a 
Democrito? nam etsi quaedam commutavit, ut quod paulo ante de inclinatione atomorum dixi, tamen 
pleraque dicit eadem, atomos, inane, imagines, infinitatem locorum innumerabilitatemque mundorum, 
eorum ortus interitus, omnia fere quibus naturae ratio continetur (De nat. deor. 1.26.73 = fr. xcix 
Luria, fr. 233 Usener).  Note that the ratio offered by Epicurus is that of Democritus, with a few 
changes that the speaker regards as relatively insignificant.  Would this even be arguable if the swerve 
were a drastic departure from the original physics posited by the early atomists?  See also Cic. De fin. 
1.6.17-21: Democritea dicit (Epicurus) perpauca mutans, sed ita, ut ea, quae corrigere vult, mihi 
quidem depravare videatur (Democritus, fr. c Luria; Epicurus, fr. 234 Usener).
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Melissus, both contemporaries of Democritus), that Being is unitary and fundamentally 
irreducible (see pages 58-64 above in chapter 1).  This position came to the atomists 
fortified with an indifference argument: τί δ' ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν 
τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον φῦν; οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστιν ἢ οὐκί (Parmenides, 
fr. 8.9-11 Coxon, quoted in context on page 61 above in chapter 1).57  In other words, 
since there is no compelling reason to divide Being from itself here but not there, there is 
no compelling reason to divide Being anywhere, and things that imply an alteration in 
Being (like birth and death) are purely illusions.58  Positing void allowed the atomists to 
divide Being in theory, but to beat this indifference argument they still needed a way to 
divide it that was not arbitrary.59  Here Democritus appears to have created his own 
indifference argument.  Judging from Aristotle (De gen. et corr. 1.2.316a 13 = fr. 105 
Luria), it seems to have run thus: (i) Being and non-Being are real; (ii) since non-Being is 
real, Being is separated from itself somewhere; (iii) if this separation could occur simply 
anywhere, then the entire physical mass of every κόσμος would disintegrate, and reality 
could not exist as we experience it (i.e. as a somewhat regular cycle rather than an utterly 
irregular chaos); (iv) reality as we experience it exists, therefore Being is not arbitrarily 
57 See Makin (1993), 28-33.
58 Melissus provides a catalogue of these illusions (DK30B8 = Simpl. 558.19): the illusion of  warmth 
and cold (confounded when one inexplicably becomes the other); the illusion that iron is hard 
(shattered when a man wears it down with his fingers); the illusion that animals are alive (shattered 
when they die, and when they are born from inanimate physical material); the illusion that rocks are 
solid (shattered when they come into being through the agency of water).  His conclusion: εἰ γὰρ ἦν 
πολλά, τοιαῦτα χρὴ αὐτὰ εἶναι, οἷόν περ ἐγώ φημι τὸ ἓν εἶναι … ὥστε συμβαίνει μήτε ὁρᾶν μήτε τὰ 
ὄντα γινώσκειν. οὐ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογεῖ. φαμένοις γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀίδια καὶ εἴδη τε 
καὶ ἰσχὺν ἔχοντα, πάντα ἑτεροιοῦσθαι ἡμῖν δοκεῖ καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἐκ τοῦ ἑκάστοτε ὁρωμένου. δῆλον 
τοίνυν, ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἑωρῶμεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πολλὰ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ εἶναι.
59 Like the division into four elements proposed by Empedocles.  See Melissus' critique in note 58 above, 
which deconstructs the idea that individual elements are really different substances (since water creates 
rock, to give the most pointed example).
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divisible: ἀνάγκη εἶναι σώματα ἀδιαίρετα (fr. 105 Luria).  From our perspective, the 
salient virtue of Democritus' argument is its refusal to be too specific.60  In order to marry 
the ancient Ionian idea that divisions in matter exist with the Eleatic contention that they 
cannot be arbitrary, the Democritean argument of necessity tends toward a concept of the 
individual atom that is indefinite, as Makin (1993) ultimately points out (59).   
(c2) Early atomist arguments in the second category continue this trend toward a 
deliberately indefinite concept of particular phenomena (like the individual atom):
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
Λεύκιππος ... ὑπέθετο ... τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς [sc. 
ἐν  τοῖς  στοιχείοις]  σχημάτων  ἄπειρον  τὸ 
πλῆθος  διὰ  τὸ  μηδὲν  μᾶλλον τοιοῦτον ἢ 
τοιοῦτον  εἶναι  ...  [Λεύκιππος  καὶ 
Δημόκριτος]  τῶν  ἐν  ταῖς  ἀτόμοις 
σχημάτων ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθός φασι διὰ τὸ 
μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοιοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον εἶναι. 
ταύτην  γὰρ  αὐτοὶ  τῆς  ἀπειρίας  αἰτίαν 
ἀποδιδόασι.
Leucippus … held … that  the number of 
shapes in the elements was infinite because 
nothing  is  rather  thus  than  thus  … 
[Leucippus  and  Democritus]  say  that  the 
number of shapes in the atoms is  infinite 
because  nothing  is  rather  thus  than  thus. 
They  offer  this  as  a  reason  for  infinity. 
(Makin,augmented)
Leucippus, fr. A8 DK
Democritus, fr. A38 DK
     = fr. 2 Luria
Simpl.  in  Phys. 28.4  (=  Theophr.  Phys.  
opin. fr. 8; Dox. 483)
60 For a more technical treatment of the argument in question in light of other passages from the early 
atomist corpus, see Makin (1993, 49-62), who confirms that the ultimate portrait of atoms emergent 
from this passage (and others) is one in which there is deliberate uncertainty about the attributes of 
matter in specific instances.  Witness Makin's proposed understanding of Democritean atoms: “(vii) if a 
particular atom contains parts, it contains a finite though indefinite number of parts” (59).
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ἔνθεν γὰρ καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος ἀπείρους εἶναι 
κόσμους  ὑπετίθετο,  ὑποτιθέμενος  κενὸν 
εἶναι ἄπειρον· τίς γὰρ ἡ ἀποκλήρωσις τόδε 
μὲν  τὸ  τοῦ  κενοῦ  μέρος  ὑπὸ  κόσμου 
πληρωθῆναι,  ἄλλα δὲ μή;  ὥστε εἰ ἔν τινι 
μέρει τοῦ κενοῦ κόσμος ἐστί, καὶ ἐν παντὶ 
ἄρα  τῶι  κενῶι.  ἀπείρου  οὖν  ὄντος  τοῦ 
κενοῦ, ἄπειροι ἔσονται καὶ οἱ κόσμοι.
For hence it was that Democritus proposed 
an unlimited number of universes, propos-
ing that there is an unlimited void. For by 
what dispensation is some particular part of 
the void to  be filled by the universe,  but 
others not? So that if a universe is in any 
part of the void, therefore [this is true] also 
in  the  whole  void.  Since,  therefore,  the 
void is unlimited, the universes will also be 
unlimited [in number]. (Edwards) 
Democritus, fr. 1 Luria
Philopon. in Phys. 405.23
     
According to the argument in fr. 2 Luria, we have no reason to understand an individual 
atom to be one shape rather than another.  According to fr. 1 Luria, we have no reason to 
think that cosmic matter is extant in one area of void and utterly absent in another, so 
infinite void must be full of infinite κόσμοι.  Both arguments require something like 
supple determinism in order to make sense, presuming a degree of uncertainty about 
particulars (e.g. the individual atom, which might be any shape, or the individual κόσμος, 
which might be anywhere) that is nonetheless compatible with an ability to make 
intelligent generalizations.61  The fact that Leucippus and Democritus felt comfortable 
61 Makin (1993) explains: “Indifference arguments for an infinite variety of shapes and sizes in the atoms 
[left out of our discussion to avoid irrelevant disputes] apply also to worlds, and give the conclusion 
that worlds will come in as many various shapes and sizes as are consistent with other principles of the 
atomic theory.  There will be reasons why there are no worlds shaped like snakes, concerning the 
behavior of atoms in the whirl in which worlds are formed. But if atoms, due to the action of the whirl, 
form tambourine-shaped worlds, then there is no reason why the variety of these worlds should be 
limited to those of one radius rather than another. Given such an infinite array of worlds, there seems  
no reason why there should be just one like this rather than more than one.  Democritus draws that 
conclusion: there will be other worlds just like this one (Cic. Acad. priora 2.17.55, 2.40.125; [Hippocr.] 
Epist. 10 = fr. 6 Luria)” (64).  Compare the discussion on page 130 above.  Makin vindicates our 
reading of the generic atomist κόσμος as a universal type of which many particular instances exist 
(including some very like ours and others very different).
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advancing such arguments vindicates us in offering supple determinism as a reasonable 
appraisal of early atomist necessity.
Early Atomist Zoogony and Anthropogony (2.3)
At this point, a summary of early atomist cosmology is in order.  Atoms and void 
are the only things that exist permanently.  Atoms move constantly relative to one 
another, forming impermanent alliances constrained by the shape of individual atoms in 
particular situations (atoms which adhere or fail to adhere to one another as they are more 
or less like one another, following the principle of homogeneity).62  When a certain 
number of these alliances occur in a particular location (as is necessary), the resulting 
vortex gives birth to a κόσμος like the one in which the Greeks happened to live.  The 
vortex grows the κόσμος up to a certain point, adding new atoms from the outside and 
sorting the inner atoms (by the principle of homogeneity). When a κόσμος cannot 
assimilate any more extracosmic atoms, it achieves the ἀκμή of its integration and starts 
to disintegrate, eventually dissolving entirely (and releasing all of its atoms and void to 
be taken up by alien vortices building other emerging κόσμοι).63  The whole of this 
endlessly iterative process may be called necessity (ἀνάγκη).
It would be strange for the early atomists to develop this carefully detailed 
account of cosmic evolution without including a story about the origin and development 
of biological life (such as their predecessors in the Critical Tradition offered, as we have 
already seen in chapter 1).  It comes as no great surprise, therefore, that the doxography 
62 See fr. 316 Luria, quoted and discussed on page 127 and following and note 37 above.
63 See DK68A40, quoted and discussed on pages 114-115 above.  Compare frr. 288-313 Luria; Mugler 
(1959), 9-19; Taylor (1999), 188-195.
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remembers such a story (at least for Democritus):
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
Δημόκριτος  [λέγει]  γεγενημένα  εἶναι  τὰ 
ζῶια συστάσει εἴδε<ι> ἐν<δεε>-στ<έ>ρ<ω>ν 
(?) πρῶτον τοῦ ὑγροῦ ζωιογονοῦντος.
Democritus  said that  animals64 first  come 
into  being  through  condensation  of 
generative moisture.
Democritus, fr. A139 DK
     = fr. 154a Taylor
     = fr. 514 Luria
Aet. 5.19.6 = [Galen.] Hist. philos. 123
Democrito vero Abderitae ex aqua limoque  
primum visum esse homines procreatos.
Democritus of Abdera thought that human 
beings were first  brought into being from 
water and mud. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A139 DK
     = fr. 154b Taylor
     = fr. 514 Luria
Censor. 4.9
erravit  ergo  Democritus,  qui   [homines] 
vermiculorum modo putavit effusos esse de  
terra nullo auctore nullaque ratione.
Democritus was wrong to think that human 
beings were generated from the earth like 
worms, without any design or any creator. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A139 DK
     = fr. 154c Taylor
     = fr. 514 Luria
Lact. Inst. div. 7.7.9
According to the hints here, the early atomist account of life's origins agreed broadly with 
other stories in the Critical Tradition, e.g. Xenophanean and Anaxagorean accounts that 
derive biological life from earth and water.65  As the vortex that incorporates the Greek 
64 The doxography records that Democritus' disciples identified plants as animals fixed in the earth: 
ζῶιον γὰρ ἔγγειον τὸ φυτὸν εἶναι, οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Δημόκριτον οἴονται (Plut. 
Quaest. nat. 1.1.1.911d = fr. 556 Luria).
65 For Xenophanes, see DK21B29 and B33, quoted and discussed on page 39 above in chapter 1.  For 
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κόσμος turns, placing like things with like, one result is the creation and proliferation of 
various life-forms.  If we want to know more about how the atomists imagined this 
happening, there are other testimonia we can refer to:
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
φερομένας δὲ [τὰς ἀτόμους] ἐμπίπτειν καὶ 
περιπλέκεσθαι  περιπλοκὴν  τοιαύτην,  ἣ 
συμψαύειν μὲν αὐτὰ καὶ πλησίον ἀλλήλων 
εἶναι ποιεῖ, φύσιν μέντοι μίαν ἐξ ἐκείνων 
κατ'  ἀλήθειαν  οὐδ'  ἡντιναοῦν  γεννᾶι· 
κομιδῆι  γὰρ  εὔηθες  εἶναι  τὸ  δύο  ἢ  τὰ 
πλείονα  γενέσθαι  ἄν  ποτε  ἕν.  τοῦ  δὲ 
συμμένειν τὰς οὐσίας μετ' ἀλλήλων μέχρι 
τινὸς  αἰτιᾶται  τὰς  ἐπαλλαγὰς  καὶ  τὰς 
ἀντιλήψεις  τῶν  σωμάτων·  τὰ  μὲν  γὰρ 
αὐτῶν εἶναι  σκαληνά,  τὰ δὲ  ἀγκιστρώδη, 
τὰ  δὲ  κοῖλα,  τὰ  δὲ  κυρτά,  τὰ  δὲ  ἄλλας 
ἀναρίθμους ἔχοντα διαφοράς· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 
οὖν  χρόνον  σφῶν  αὐτῶν  ἀντέχεσθαι 
νομίζει καὶ συμμένειν, ἕως ἰσχυροτέρα τις 
ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀνάγκη παραγενομένη 
διασείσηι καὶ χωρὶς αὐτὰς διασπείρηι.
As they [sc.  the atoms] move they collide 
and become entangled in such a way as to 
cling in  close contact  to  one another,  but 
not so as to form one substance of them in 
reality of any kind whatever; for it is very 
simple-minded to suppose that two or more 
could  ever  become  one.  The  reason  he 
gives for atoms staying together for a while 
is the intertwining and mutual hold of the 
primary  bodies;  for  some  of  them  are 
angular, some hooked, some concave, some 
convex,  and  indeed  with  countless  other 
differences; so he thinks they cling to each 
other and stay together until such time as 
some  stronger  necessity  comes  from  the 
surrounding and shakes and scatters them 
apart. (KRS)
Democritus, fr. A37 DK
     = fr. 583 KRS
     = fr. 44a Taylor
     = fr. 293 Luria
Aristot. Περὶ Δημοκρίτου ap. Simpl. in De 
caelo 295.11
Anaxagoras, see DK59A1, quoted on page 88 above in chapter 1. 
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ταύτας  δὲ  τὰς  ἀτόμους  ἐν  ἀπείρωι  τῶι 
κενῶι  κεχωρισμένας  ἀλλήλων  καὶ 
διαφερούσας σχήμασί τε καὶ μεγέθεσι καὶ 
θέσει καὶ τάξει φέρεσθαι ἐν τῶι κενῶι καὶ 
ἐπικαταλαμβανούσας  ἀλλήλας  συγκρού-
εσθαι καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀποπάλλεσθαι, ὅπηι ἂν 
τύχωσιν,  τὰς  δὲ  περιπλέκεσθαι  ἀλλήλαις 
κατὰ τὴν τῶν σχημάτων καὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ 
θέσεων  καὶ  τάξεων  συμμετρίαν  καὶ 
συμμένειν  καὶ  οὕτως  τὴν  τῶν  συνθέτων 
γένεσιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι. 
These  atoms  move  in  the  infinite  void, 
separate one from the other and differing in 
shapes,  sizes,  position  and  arrangement; 
overtaking  each  other  they  collide,  and 
some  are  shaken  away  in  any  chance 
direction,  while  others,  becoming 
intertwined one with another according to 
the  congruity  of  their  shapes,  sizes, 
positions,  and arrangements,  stay together 
and  so  effect  the  coming  into  being  of 
compound bodies. (KRS)
Democritus, fr. A14 DK
     = fr. 584 KRS
     = fr. 57 Taylor
     = fr. 295 Luria
Simpl. in De caelo 242.21
In the infinite void, infinite atoms of infinite shape (τὰ δὲ ἄλλας ἀναρίθμους ἔχοντα 
διαφοράς [DK68A37])66 move endlessly relative to each another.  In vortice, a certain 
number of these are sorted (like with like, κατὰ τὴν τῶν σχημάτων καὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ 
θέσεων καὶ τάξεων συμμετρίαν [DK68A14]): during this process, susceptible atoms (τὰ 
μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν εἶναι σκαληνά, τὰ δὲ ἀγκιστρώδη, τὰ δὲ κοῖλα, τὰ δὲ κυρτά [DK68A37]) 
interlock to form compounds ([τὰς ἀτόμους] ἐμπίπτειν καὶ περιπλέκεσθαι περιπλοκὴν 
τοιαύτην, ἣ συμψαύειν μὲν αὐτὰ καὶ πλησίον ἀλλήλων εἶναι [DK68A37]; φέρεσθαι ἐν 
τῶι κενῶι καὶ ἐπικαταλαμβανούσας ἀλλήλας συγκρούεσθαι καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀποπάλλεσθαι, 
ὅπηι ἂν τύχωσιν, τὰς δὲ περιπλέκεσθαι ἀλλήλαις [DK68A14]) that endure until some 
greater outside pressure intervenes to force them apart (ἕως ἰσχυροτέρα τις ἐκ τοῦ 
περιέχοντος ἀνάγκη παραγενομένη διασείσηι καὶ χωρὶς αὐτὰς διασπείρηι [DK68A37]).  
66 See also DK67A8, quoted above on page 143.
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Among the number of these temporary compounds are the material bodies of plants, 
animals, and human beings (as well as every other sensible phenomenon in the Greek 
κόσμος).  But what animates some of these bodies, causing them to live while others 
remain corpses?
The early atomists had an answer for this question: 
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
(ἡ  ψυχὴ)  ἔδοξέ  τισι  πῦρ  εἶναι·  καὶ  γὰρ 
τοῦτο  λεπτομερέστατόν  τε  καὶ  μάλιστα 
τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον, ἔτι δὲ κινεῖταί τε 
καὶ κινεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πρώτως. Δημόκριτος δὲ 
καὶ  γλαφυρωτέρως  εἴρηκεν  ἀποφηνά-
μενος, διὰ τί τούτων ἑκάτερον. ψυχὴν μὲν 
γὰρ  εἶναι  ταὐτὸ καὶ  νοῦν.  τοῦτο  δ'  εἶναι 
τῶν  πρώτων  καὶ  ἀδιαιρέτων  σωμάτων, 
κινητικὸν  δὲ  διὰ  μικρομέρειαν  καὶ  τὸ 
σχῆμα· τῶν δὲ σχημάτων εὐκινητότατον τὸ 
σφαιροειδὲς λέγει· τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τόν τε 
νοῦν καὶ τὸ πῦρ.
That has led some to regard it [the soul] as 
fire, for fire is the subtlest of the elements 
and nearest to the incorporeality; further, in 
the primary sense, fire both is moved and 
originates  movement  in  all  the  others. 
Democritus  has  expressed  himself  more 
ingeniously than the rest on the grounds for 
ascribing  each of  these  two characters  to 
soul; soul and thought are, he says, one and 
the same thing, and this thing must be one 
of the primary and indivisible bodies, and 
its power of originating movement must be 
due to its fineness of grain and the shape of 
its atoms; he says that of all the shapes the 
spherical is the most mobile, and that this is 
the shape of the particles of both fire and 
thought. (Smith in Barnes [1984])
Democritus, fr. A101 DK
     = fr. 107b Taylor
     = fr. 444 Luria
Aristot. De anima 1.2.405a5-a13
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ἔνιοι  δὲ  καὶ  κινεῖν  φασι  τὴν  ψυχὴν  τὸ 
σῶμα ἐν ὧι ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτὴ κινεῖται, οἷον 
Δημόκριτος παραπλησίως λέγων Φιλίππωι 
τῶι  κωμωιδοδιδασκάλωι.  φησὶ  γὰρ  τὸν 
Δαίδαλον κινουμένην ποιῆσαι τὴν ξυλίνην 
Ἀφροδίτην  ἐγχέαντ'  ἄργυρον  χυτόν· 
ὁμοίως  δὲ  καὶ  Δημόκριτος  λέγει· 
κινουμένας  γάρ  φησι  τὰς  ἀδιαιρέτους 
σφαίρας,  διὰ  τὸ  πεφυκέναι  μηδέποτε 
μένειν,  συνεφέλκειν  καὶ  κινεῖν  τὸ  σῶμα 
πᾶν.
Some say that the soul moves the body in 
which it is in the same way as it is itself 
moved,  e.g.,  Democritus,  who says  much 
the same as the comic dramatist Philippus. 
He  describes  Daedalus  as  making  the 
wooden  statue  of  Aphrodite  move  by 
pouring in quicksilver. Democritus' view is 
similar; he says that the indivisible spheres 
are in motion because their nature is such 
that they are never still, and they move the 
whole  body  by  dragging  it  along  with 
them. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A104 DK
     = fr. 108 Taylor 
     = fr. 445 Luria
Aristot. De anima 1.2.406b15
Democritum enim,  magnum illum quidem 
virum, sed levibus et rotundis corpusculis  
efficientem  animum  concursu  quodam 
fortuito,  omittamus.  Nihil  est  enim  apud  
istos, quod non atomorum turba conficiat.
Non ci soffermiamo ora su Democrito, che 
è sicuramente un uomo illustre, ma che  fa 
derivare l'anima da un effluvio casuale di 
corpusculi  lisci  e  rotondi. Secondo  loro, 
non  esiste  realtà che  non  possa  essere 
generata da un ammasso caotico di atomi. 
(Luria, Krivushina)
Democritus, fr. 449 Luria
Cic. Tusc. disp. 11.22
    
The live body—whether animal, vegetable, or mineral67—contains inside it a number of 
smooth, spherical atoms (τῶν δὲ σχημάτων ... τὸ σφαιροειδὲς λέγει [fr. 444 Luria]; 
67 Several testimonia witness that the early atomists understood plants, animals, humans, and even 
minerals as animate and (to varying degrees) intelligent.  See fr. 448 Luria, especially Aetius 4.4.7: ὁ δὲ 
Δημόκριτος πάντα μετέχειν φησὶ ψυχῆς ποιᾶς.  This idea is not unprecedented in the Critical Tradition: 
recall (1) Heraclitus' idea that everything in the Greek universe is an expression of intelligent fire (see 
pages 45 and 50 above in chapter 1), as well as (2) Empedocles' teaching that the same δαίμονες 
occupy all kinds of animate bodies (see page 73 above in chapter 1), and (3) Anaxagoras' idea that all 
things contain elements of everything disposed by a universal cosmic intelligence (see pages 84-86 
above in chapter 1). 
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levibus et rotundis corpusculis [fr. 449 Luria]).  Moving constantly in contact with one 
another and the grosser material body surrounding them, these atoms constitute the mind 
and breath of a living organism (ψυχὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν: fr. 444 Luria), and 
cause its movement (τὰς ἀδιαιρέτους σφαίρας, διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι μηδέποτε μένειν, 
συνεφέλκειν καὶ κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα πᾶν: fr. 445 Luria).  Of course these soul atoms—
routinely identified as the principal components of fire as well (ἔδοξέ τισι πῦρ εἶναι … 
τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τόν τε νοῦν καὶ τὸ πῦρ: fr. 444 Luria)68—are not permanently trapped; 
some of them escape the body regularly.  Witness the following discussions of human 
sleep and respiration: 
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
Λεύκιππος [λέγει] ὕπνον σώματος γίνεσθαι 
ἐκκρίσει  τοῦ  λεπτομεροῦς  πλείονι  τῆς 
εἰσκρίσεως τοῦ ψυχικοῦ θερμοῦ· <ἧς> τὸν 
πλεονασμὸν αἴτιον θανάτου·
Leucippo  ritiene  che  il  sonno  riguardi  il 
corpo  e  si  origini  quando  la  fuoriuscita 
delle  particelle  più sottili  è  superiore 
all'ingresso del calore psichico, fuoriuscita 
che,  allorché  sia  eccessiva,  è  causa  di 
morte. (Luria, Krivushina)
Leucippus, fr. A34 DK
Democritus, fr. 466 Luria
Aet. 5.25.3
68 Leucippus also identified the animating principle of the living body with fire: Λεύκιππος [λέγει] ἐκ 
πυρὸς εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν (Aet. 4.3.7 = DK67A28; Democritus, fr. 447 Luria).  The early atomist soul of 
fire atoms recalls the fiery soul imagined by Heraclitus: see page 49 above in chapter 1.
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Δημόκριτος  δ'  ὅτι  μὲν  ἐκ  τῆς  ἀναπνοῆς 
συμβαίνει  τι  τοῖς  ἀναπνέουσι  λέγει, 
φάσκων κωλύειν ἐκθλίβεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν· 
οὐ μέντοι ὡς τούτου γ'  ἕνεκα ποιήσασαν 
τοῦτο τὴν φύσιν οὐθὲν εἴρηκεν· ὅλως γὰρ 
ὥσπερ  καὶ  οἱ  ἄλλοι  φυσικοί,  καὶ  οὗτος 
οὐθὲν ἅπτεται τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας. λέγει δ' 
ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ταὐτόν, τὰ πρῶτα 
σχήματα τῶν σφαιροειδῶν. ἐκκρινομένων 
οὐν  αὐτῶν  ὑπὸ  τοῦ  περιέχοντος  ἐκθλί-
βοντος,  βοήθειαν γίνεσθαι  τὴν ἀναπνοήν 
φησιν. ἐν γὰρ τῶι ἀέρι πολὺνἀριθμὸν εἶναι 
τῶν  τοιούτων  ἃ  καλεῖ  ἐκεῖνος  νοῦν  καὶ 
ψυχήν. ἀναπνέοντος οὖν καὶ εἰσιόντος τοῦ 
ἀέρος  συνεισιόντα  ταῦτα  καὶ  ἀνείργοντα 
τὴν θλίψιν κωλύειν τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τοῖς 
ζώιοις διιέναι ψυχήν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῶι 
ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἐκπνεῖν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ 
ἀποθνήισκειν.  ὅταν  γὰρ  κρατῆι  τὸ  περι-
έχον συνθλῖβον καὶ μηκέτι θύραθεν εἰσιὸν 
δύνηται  ἀνείργειν,  μὴ  δυναμένου  ἀνα-
πνεῖν,  τότε  συμβαίνειν  τὸν  θάνατον  τοῖς 
ζώιοις·  εἶναι  γὰρ  τὸν  θάνατον  τὴν  τῶν 
τοιούτων  σχημάτων  ἐκ  τοῦ  σώματος 
ἔξοδον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐκθλίψεως. 
Democritus, however, does teach that in the 
breathing animals  there is  a  certain result 
produced by respiration; he asserts  that it 
prevents the soul from being extruded by 
the  body.  Nevertheless,  he  by  no  means 
asserts that it is for this purpose that nature 
so contrives it, for he, like the other natural 
scientists,  altogether  fails  to  attain to  any 
such explanation. His statement is that the 
soul  and  the  hot  element  are  identical, 
being  the  primary  forms  among  the 
spherical particles. Hence, when these are 
being  separated  out  by  the  surrounding 
atmosphere thrusting them out, respiration, 
according  to  his  account,  comes  in  to 
succour them. For in the air there are many 
of those particles which he calls mind and 
soul. Hence, when we breathe and the air 
enters,  these  enter  along  with  it,  and  by 
their  action  cancel  the  pressure,  thus 
preventing the expulsion of the soul which 
resides  in  the  animal.  This  explains  why 
life and death are bound up with the taking 
in and letting out of the breath; for death 
occurs  when  the  compression  by  the 
surrounding air gains the upper hand, and, 
the animal being unable to respire, the air 
from  outside  can  no  longer  enter  and 
counteract  the  compression.  Death  is  the 
departure  of  those  forms  owing  to  the 
expulsive  pressure  exerted  by  the 
surrounding air. (Ross in Barnes [1984])
Democritus, fr. A106 DK
     = fr. 106c Taylor
     = frr. 445, 463 Luria
Aristot. De resp. 4.471b30   
 
These fragments suppose a continuous exchange of soul atoms between the individual 
organism and the environment, which contains a great number of such atoms wandering 
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free in the air (ἐν γὰρ τῶι ἀέρι πολὺν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων ἃ καλεῖ ἐκεῖνος νοῦν 
καὶ ψυχήν: DK68A106).  Respiration controls the exchange rate, restraining the body's 
tendency to yield to external pressure and squeeze out all of the soul atoms inside it (ἐκ 
τῆς ἀναπνοῆς συμβαίνει τι τοῖς ἀναπνέουσι λέγει, φάσκων κωλύειν ἐκθλίβεσθαι τὴν 
ψυχήν: DK68A106).  Sleep occurs when the body exhales more soul atoms than it 
inhales (ὕπνον σώματος γίνεσθαι ἐκκρίσει τοῦ λεπτομεροῦς πλείονι τῆς εἰσκρίσεως τοῦ 
ψυχικοῦ θερμοῦ: fr. 466 Luria), causing it to lose consciousness.  When it loses a critical 
number of soul atoms, the result is death (<ἧς> τὸν πλεονασμὸν αἴτιον θανάτου [fr. 466 
Luria]; ὅταν γὰρ κρατῆι τὸ περιέχον συνθλῖβον καὶ μηκέτι θύραθεν εἰσιὸν δύνηται 
ἀνείργειν, μὴ δυναμένου ἀναπνεῖν, τότε συμβαίνειν τὸν θάνατον τοῖς ζώιοις 
[DK68A106]), a permanent loss of consciousness.69  Biological life thus becomes an 
accidental byproduct of interaction between smooth and rough atoms, not the calculated 
result of a telic plan70 (οὐ μέντοι ὡς τούτου γ' ἕνεκα ποιήσασαν τοῦτο τὴν φύσιν οὐθὲν 
εἴρηκεν· ὅλως γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φυσικοί, καὶ οὗτος οὐθὲν ἅπτεται τῆς τοιαύτης 
αἰτίας: DK68A106).  Smooth, spherical atoms enter and enliven grosser compounds 
because they are relatively more mobile (τῶν δὲ σχημάτων εὐκινητότατον τὸ σφαιρο-
ειδὲς λέγει: fr. 444 Luria), not because of any preordained cosmic purpose or plan 
deliberately calibrated to foster life.  Likewise, the different shapes that life-forms take 
69 Note that death does not require the complete absence of soul atoms in the body: an abiding residue of 
these atoms explains some of the odd properties of corpses, e.g. their ability to continue growing nails 
and hair.  See frr. 448, 586 Luria.
70 Such as Socrates wants Anaxagoras' cosmic Mind to provide in Phaedo 98b-c.  Socrates' chief problem 
is the identity between breath (ψυχή) and thought (νοῦς) assumed by Anaxagoras (and by Democritus, 
e.g. in DK68A106 quoted on page 152 above).
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over time are not planned.  Each emerges spontaneously from natural necessity: like 
atoms inevitably go with like, and certain atoms inevitably adhere together better than 
others, creating different containers where soul atoms from the external environment can 
be lodged.  Some of these containers then go on to become reproductively viable,71 
creating species of life that persist through time.72   
As the vivifying element in every living organism, the early atomist soul unites in 
itself the faculties of thought and sensory perception (e.g. sight, hearing, and touch in 
71 The atomists had a developed theory of sexual reproduction.  According to Democritus, every adult 
contributes a reproductive seed to its embryo that contains tiny, imperceptible versions of the adult's 
larger organs (frr. 525, 526, 527 Luria: note that the seeds contain atoms from every part of the 
contributing adult).  The final physical characteristics of the embryo are determined by a struggle 
between the paternal and maternal seeds, which occurs when these meet in the womb (fr. 530 Luria).  
Whichever seed contributes more atoms to a particular organ in the embryo ultimately controls how 
that organ develops (frr. 531, 532, 533 Luria).  The embryo's atoms are arranged in the womb on the 
principle of homogeneity, with the mother's body providing a kind of blueprint for that of the offspring 
(ἐν ταῖς ὑστέραις μένει τὸ ζῶιον ... ὡς Δημόκριτός φησιν, ἵνα διαπλάττηται τὰ μόρια κατὰ τὰ μόρια τῆς 
ἐχούσης: fr. 535 Luria = Aristot. De gen. animal. 2.4.740a33).  The link between the first life-forms, 
which originate in water and mud (see pages 146-148 above), and the later ones, which reproduce 
sexually, is not made explicit in any of the early atomist testimonia available to us.  Likewise, early 
atomist distinctions between plants and animals are unclear, with extant testimonia seeming to refer to 
animals (especially human beings).
72 Note that Aristotle refers to multiple sources (e.g. οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες in Phys. 2.8.198b23 = fr. 516 
Luria) as advocating an atelic evolution of biological life-forms like that proposed by Empedocles (see 
pages 70-72 above in chapter 1).  Created by accident, the original atelic life-forms persist and evolve 
only insofar as their accidental structure happens to allow: some of them are made such that they 
cannot survive long (e.g. Empedocles' βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωιρα, which Aristotle offers here as an explicit 
example); others become the enduring plant and animal species familiar to us (including our own).  It is 
likely that the early atomists subscribed to a similar theory of biological evolution.  One indication that 
Democritus at least viewed biological life from this perspective is fr. 561 Luria, in which the atomist 
discusses the mule: ἡμιόνους δὲ λέγει μὴ τίκτειν ... μὴ γὰρ εἶναι φύσεως ποίημα τὴν ἡμίονον, ἀλλὰ 
ἐπινοίας ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τόλμης ὡς ἂν εἴποις μοιχιδίου ἐπιτέχνημα τοῦτο καὶ κλέμμα. δοκεῖ δέ μοι, ἦ 
δὲ ὅς, ὄνου ἵππον βιασαμένου κατὰ τύχην κυῆσαι, μαθητὰς δὲ ἀνθρώπους τῆς βίας ταύτης γεγενη-
μένους εἶτα μέντοι προελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς γονῆς αὐτῶν συνήθειαν (Ael. N. a. 12.16).  The 
Democritean mule is not a creature of nature, but of accidental rape; if man did not intervene, it would 
not exist as a species.  The model of speciation here is one in which life-forms exist and reproduce as 
they are accidentally able; the viable survive (as legitimate offspring of nature), and the rest die out (as 
unfortunate aberrations whose life necessity cannot extend beyond a comparatively short-lived 
individual).  This is the same model assumed in the story of biological evolution attributed to 
Empedocles (and unnamed others).  
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human beings), which exist as changes in its material composition or mixture (κρῆσις).73  
This is best illustrated by a summary overlook of key atomist testimonia describing how 
(a) thought and (b) perception occur:
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
(a1) περὶ  δὲ  τοῦ  φρονεῖν  ἐπὶ  τοσοῦτον 
εἴρηκεν  ὅτι  γίνεται  συμμέτρως  ἐχούσης 
τῆς  ψυχῆς  κατὰ  τὴν  κρῆσιν·  ἐὰν  δὲ 
περίθερμός  τις  ἢ  περίψυχρος  γένηται, 
μεταλλάττειν  φησί.  δι'  ὅ  τι  καὶ  τοὺς 
παλαιοὺς καλῶς τοῦθ' ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶν 
ἀλλοφρονεῖν.  ὥστε  φανερόν,  ὅτι  τῆι 
κράσει τοῦ σώματος ποιεῖ τὸ φρονεῖν, ὅπερ 
ἴσως  αὐτῶι  καὶ  κατὰ  λόγον  ἐστί,  σῶμα 
ποιοῦντι τὴν ψυχήν. (Luria)  
Concerning  thought,  Democritus  says 
merely  that  “it  arises  when  the  soul's 
composition is  duly proportioned.”  But  if 
one  becomes  excessively  hot  or  cold,  he 
says,  thinking  is  transformed;  and  it  was 
for  some  such  reason,  the  ancients  well 
believed, that the mind became “deranged.” 
Thus it is clear that he explains thought by 
the  composition  of  the  body  —  a  view 
perhaps  not  unreasonable  in  one  who 
regards  the  soul  itself  as  corporeal. 
(Stratton)
Democritus, fr. A135 DK
     = fr. 113 Taylor
     = fr. 460 Luria
Theophr. De Sensu 58  
(a2)  Quem (deligam)? Democritum? Tune  
putes … si nunc, aut si  etiam dormientes  
aliquid  animo  videre  videamur,  imagines  
extrinsecus  in  animos  nostros  per  corpus  
irrompere?  (Luria) 
Who would be best? Democritus perhaps? 
Do you really think … that if we now (or 
when we're asleep) seem to 'see' something 
in our mind, images are bursting into our 
minds through our bodies from the outside? 
(Brittain, adapted)
Democritus, fr. 470 Luria
Cic. Acad. priora 2.40.12574
73 In addition to fr. 460 Luria (quoted on this page), see also fr. 436 Luria (Λεύκιππος, Δημόκριτος τὰς 
αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς νοήσεις ἑτεροιώσεις εἶναι τοῦ σώματος: Aet. 4.8.5; Stob. 1.50.4, 12).
74 Cicero makes several other references to atomist psychology, even incorporating some Greek 
terminology: Fit enim nescio qui, ut quasi coram adesse videare, cum scribo aliquid ad te, neque id 
κατ' εἰδώλων φαντασίας, ut dicunt tui amici novi qui putant etiam διανοητικὰς φαντασίας spectris 
Catianis excitari—nam, ne te fugiat, Catius Insuber Epicurius, qui nuper est mortuus, quae ille 
Gargettius et iam ante Democritus εἴδωλα, hic «spectra» nominat—his autem spectris etiamsi oculi 
155
(b1)  ὁρᾶν  μὲν  οὖν  ποιεῖ  τῆι  ἐμφάσει· 
ταύτην  δὲ  ἰδίως  λέγει·  τὴν  γὰρ  ἔμφασιν 
οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐν τῆι κόρηι γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν 
ἀέρα  τὸν  μεταξὺ  τῆς  ὄψεως  καὶ  τοῦ 
ὁρωμένου τυποῦσθαι  συστελλόμενον ὑπὸ 
τοῦ  ὁρωμένου  καὶ  τοῦ  ὁρῶντος·  ἅπαντος 
γὰρ αἰεὶ γίνεσθαί τινα ἀπορροήν· (Luria) 
He  makes  sight  occur  by  means  of  the 
image; his account of this is original, for he 
says  that  the  image  is  not  immediately 
produced in the eyeball, but the air between 
the sight and the thing seen is compacted 
by  the  seer  and  the  thing  seen  and  an 
impression75 is made on it, as everything is 
always giving off an effluence.76 (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A135 DK
     = fr. 113 Taylor
     = fr. 478 Luria
Theophr. De sensu 50 
possint feriri, quod velis <nolis> ipsa incurrunt, animus qui possit, ego non video: doceas tu me 
oportebit, cum salvus veneris, in meane potestate [ut] sit spectrum tuum, ut similac mihi conlibitum sit 
de te cogitare, illud occurrat, neque solum de te, qui mihi haeres in medullis, sed si insulam 
Britanniam coepero cogitare, eius εἴδωλον mihi advolabit ad pectus (Cic. Epist. ad fam. 15.16.1 = fr. 
470 Luria); Fac [deos] imagines esse quibus pulsentur animi: species dumtaxat obicitur quaedam; 
num etiam cur ea beata sit, cur aeterna? quae autem istae imagines vestrae aut unde? a Democrito 
omnino haec licentia; sed et ille reprehensus a multis est (Cic. De nat. deor. 1.38.107 = fr. 470 Luria); 
Imagines, quae idola nominant (sc. Epicurei), quorum incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam 
cogitemus (Democriti sunt) (Cic. De fin. 1.6.21 = fr. 470 Luria). 
75 According to the simile credited to Democritus further on in this passage, this impression is like a mark 
left in wax: τοιαύτην εἶναι τὴν ἐντύπωσιν οἷον εἰ ἐκμάξειας εἰς κηρόν (De sensu 51).
76 Theophrastus goes on to enumerate other physical factors that Democritus finds optimal for sight.  The 
eye itself should be moist (since moisture receives impressions from the external environment) and free 
from oily discharge, while the channels connecting it with the inner body should be dry, straight, and 
unobstructed, such that “they match the shape of impressions” (trans. Taylor): ἔπειτα τοῦτον στερεὸν 
ὄντα καὶ ἀλλόχρων ἐμφαίνεσθαι τοῖς ὄμμασιν ὑγροῖς· καὶ τὸ μὲν πυκνὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι τὸ δ´ ὑγρὸν 
διἱέναι. διὸ καὶ τοῦς ὑγροὺς τῶν σκληρῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀμείνους εἶναι πρὸς τὸ ὁρᾶν, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἔξω χιτὼν 
ὡς λεπτότατος καὶ πυκνότατος εἴη, τὰ δ' ἔντος <τῆς> πυκνῆς καὶ ἰσχυρᾶς σαρκὸς ὡς μάλιστα σομφὰ 
καὶ κενά, ἔστι δὲ ἰκμάδος παχείας τε καὶ λιπαρᾶς, καὶ αἱ φλέβες <αἱ> κατὰ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εὐθεῖαι καὶ 
ἄνικμοι καὶ ὁμοσχημονεῖν <οἷαί τε> τοῖς ἀποτυπουμένοις· τὰ γὰρ ὁμόφυλα μάλιστα ἕκαστον γνωρίζειν 
(De sensu 50).  Notice the concluding reference to the principle of homogeneity: “For everything most 
readily recognizes things of the same kind as itself” (trans. Taylor).
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(b2)  τὴν δ' ἀκοὴν παραπλησίως ποιεῖ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις.  εἰς  γὰρ  τὸ  κενὸν ἐμπίπτοντα τὸν 
ἀέρα κίνησιν ἐμποιεῖν, πλὴν ὅτι κατὰ πᾶν 
μὲν ὁμοίως τὸ σῶμα εἰσιέναι, μάλιστα δὲ 
καὶ  πλεῖστον  διὰ  τῶν  ὤτων,  ὅτι  διὰ 
πλείστου  τε  κενοῦ  διέρχεται  καὶ  ἥκιστα 
διαμίμνει. διὸ καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα 
οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ταύτηι δὲ μόνον. ὅταν δὲ 
ἐντὸς  γένηται,  σκίδνασθαι  διὰ  τὸ  τάχος· 
τὴν  γὰρ  φωνὴν  εἶναι  πυκνουμένου  τοῦ 
ἀέρος καὶ μετὰ βίας εἰσιόντος. ὥσπερ οὖν 
ἐκτὸς  ποιεῖ  τῆι  ἁφῆι  τὴν αἴσθησιν,  οὕτω 
καὶ ἐντός. (Luria)  
His account of hearing is similar to that of 
the  others;  air  entering  a  void  creates 
motion, except that it comes in all over the 
body, but especially and most of all through 
the  ears,  because  there  it  travels  through 
the most void and has the least delay. That 
is why one does not perceive [sound] with 
the whole body, but only there. And when it 
gets inside, its speed causes it to disperse; 
sound occurs when the air is condensed and 
penetrates  with  force.77 Just  as  he  makes 
external perception come about by contact, 
so with internal.78 (Taylor, augmented) 
Democritus, fr. A135 DK     
     = fr. 113 Taylor
     = fr. 488 Luria
Theophr. De sensu 55
77 Aetius makes the likeness between vision and hearing more explicit, invoking the principle of 
homogeneity, which he illustrates with a Homeric allusion and a summary of the same analogies 
provided by Sextus in fr. 316 Luria (see page 127 above): Δημόκριτος καὶ τὸν ἀέρα φησὶν εἰς ὁμοιο-
σχήμονα θρύπτεσθαι σώματα καὶ συγκαλινδεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς θραύσμασι. «κολοιὸς» γὰρ 
«παρὰ κολοιὸν ἱζάνει» καὶ «ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον».  (Od. 18.218). καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς 
αἰγιαλοῖς αἱ ὅμοιαι ψῆφοι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόπους ὁρῶνται κατ' ἄλλο μὲν αἱ σφαιροειδεῖς, κατ' ἄλλο 
δὲ αἱ ἐπιμήκεις· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κοσκινευόντων δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συναλίζεται τὰ ὁμοιοσχήμονα, ὥστε χωρὶς 
εἶναι τοὺς κυάμους καὶ ἐρεβίνθους (Aet. 4.19.13).  Air takes aural impressions from the surrounding 
environment and carries them into the human ear, which transmits them as sound to the mind or soul 
(insofar as the likeness between the atoms making the ear and the mind and the atoms making the 
impressions allows them to interact: see note 78 below).  The impressions that carry sound are 
particular configurations of air atoms.
78 Theophrastus goes on to enumerate other physical factors that Democritus finds optimal for hearing 
(De sensu 56).  Ducts throughout the body (but especially the auditory canals) should be dry and 
empty.  Bones should be dense, and the brain well constituted (or well mixed: εὔκρατος) so that the 
flesh around it is dry: “in those circumstances the sound is concentrated and comes in through the large 
amount of void, which is free from moisture and well-bored, and is dispersed swiftly and regularly 
through the body and does not escape” (ἀθρόον γὰρ ἂν οὕτως εἰσιέναι τὴν φωνὴν ἅτε διὰ πολλοῦ 
κενοῦ καὶ ἀνίκμου καὶ εὐτρήτου εἰσιοῦσαν, καὶ ταχὺ σκίδνασθαι καὶ ὁμαλῶς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὐ 
διεκπίπτειν ἔξω, trans. Taylor). 
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(b3) περὶ δὲ ὁσμῆς προσαφορίζειν παρῆκεν 
πλὴν  τοσοῦτον,  ὅτι  τὸ  λεπτὸν  ἀπορρέον 
ἀπὸ τῶν βαρέων ποιεῖ τὴν ὁδμήν·  (Luria) 
He omitted any discussion of smell, except 
to  say  that  a  fine  effluence  from  heavy 
things produces odour … (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A135 DK
     = fr. 113 Taylor
     = fr. 502 Luria
Theophr. De sensu 82
(b4) τῶν δὲ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν οὐδενὸς εἶναι 
φύσιν,  ἀλλὰ  πάντα  πάθη  τῆς  αἰσθήσεως 
ἀλλοιουμένης,  ἐξ  ἧς  γίνεσθαι  τὴν 
φαντασίαν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ 
θερμοῦ  φύσιν  ὑπάρχειν,  ἀλλὰ  τὸ  σχῆμα 
'μεταπῖπτον' ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν 
ἀλλοίωσιν·  ὅ  τι  γὰρ  ἂν  ἄθρουν  ἦι,  τοῦτ' 
ἐνισχύειν  ἑκάστωι,  τὸ  δὲ  ἐς  μακρὰ  δια-
νενημένον ἀναίσθητον εἶναι. (Diels)
As for other sensory objects, he holds that 
none has an objective reality, but that one 
and all are effects in our sensuous faculty 
as  it  undergoes  alteration,  and  that  from 
this  faculty  arises  the  inner  presentation. 
For not even of heat or cold is there for him 
an  objective  reality;  but  configuration,  in 
“undergoing a change,” effects a qualitative 
alteration in us also; since what is massed 
together in anything prevails in it, and what 
is  widely  diffused  is  imperceptible. 
(Stratton)
Democritus, fr. A135 DK
     = fr. 113 Taylor
     = fr. 441 Luria
Theophr. De Sensu 63
These testimonia construe thinking and perception as interactions between three groups 
of atoms: (1) the atoms that form compounds in the external world-order; (2) the atoms 
that move about in the atmosphere between compounds; and (3) the soul atoms that 
animate the body of a living organism.  (1) Every compound in the atomist world-order 
emits atoms in continuous waves (ἅπαντος γὰρ αἰεὶ γίνεσθαί τινα ἀπορροήν [b1]; τὸ 
λεπτὸν ἀπορρέον ἀπὸ τῶν βαρέων ποιεῖ τὴν ὁδμήν [b3]),79 which Democritus refers to 
79 Note the summary of Aetius: Λεύκιππος, Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν 
γίνεσθαι εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προσιόντων (Aet. 4.13.1 = fr. 469 Luria). 
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as images (εἴδωλα: Cic. Epist. ad fam. 15.16.1 = fr. 470 Luria, quoted above in note 
74).80  (2) These images are constantly entering the surrounding environment, which takes 
atomic impressions of them (τὸν ἀέρα τὸν μεταξὺ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρωμένου 
τυποῦσθαι συστελλόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁρωμένου καὶ τοῦ ὁρῶντος: [b1]; τὴν γὰρ φωνὴν 
εἶναι πυκνουμένου τοῦ ἀέρος [b2]; Δημόκριτος καὶ τὸν ἀέρα φησὶν εἰς ὁμοιοσχήμονα 
θρύπτεσθαι σώματα καὶ συγκαλινδεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς θραύσμασι [Aet. 4.19.13, 
quoted above in note 77]) and broadcasts these impressions to living organisms (gross 
material bodies animated by soul atoms).  (3) Receiving image impressions transmitted 
through its sensory orifices (which naturally incorporate void, as in the case of the ear 
(κατὰ πᾶν μὲν ὁμοίως τὸ σῶμα εἰσιέναι, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τῶν ὤτων, ὅτι διὰ 
πλείστου τε κενοῦ διέρχεται καὶ ἥκιστα διαμίμνει [b2]), the gross material body of the 
living organism eventually brings them into contact with the soul atoms inside it.  Struck 
by invading impressions (and/or by various atomic structures in the body that receive the 
impressions, e.g. the visual and auditory cortices described in some detail by 
Theophrastus in De sensu 50, 56 [see notes 76 and 78 above]), soul atoms move into new 
configurations relative to one another, a material displacement or alteration (ἀλλοίωσις 
[b4]) which the organism experiences either as different kinds of perception (e.g. vision 
[b1], hearing [b2], smell [b3], or touch [b4]) or as thought (a1, a2), depending on the 
80 The Etymologicum Genuinum remembers that he also used the word δείκελον to refer these atomic 
effluvia emitted by all objects, glossing that word thus: παρὰ δὲ Δημοκρίτωι κατ' εἶδος ὁμοία τοῖς 
πράγμασιν ἀπόρροια (Etym. Gen. s.v. δείκελον = fr. 828 Luria).  The invention of atomic effluvia is 
treated by Clement of Alexandria as a Democritean improvement on Leucippus (Protr. 5.19 = fr. 191 
Luria), but the concept of corpuscular emanations as a source of animal perception goes back at least to 
Empedocles (frr. 17, 88 Inwood): see pages 77-79 in chapter 1 above, and note 102 below. 
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particular nature of the atoms that an individual process engages (as a particular external 
stimulus leads to a particular internal apprehension).  
For example, if atomic impressions enter the body through the eye and manage to 
engage the visual apparatus (being the right size and shape to make contact with it), they 
become optical visions.  If they enter through the ear and manage to engage the hearing 
apparatus (which broadcasts them eventually through the entire body: see note 78 above), 
they become sound.  Some impressions bypass all gross sensory cortices and enter the 
mind directly, becoming thoughts or dreams (si nunc, aut si etiam dormientes aliquid 
animo videre videamur, imagines extrinsecus in animos nostros per corpus irrompere 
[a2]): it is easy to imagine that these impressions might be made of soul atoms (discussed 
above on pages 149-159), which would be uniquely small and mobile, allowing them to 
slip through the body and engage the mind without mediation.  While the details of this 
theory of thought and perception remain vague (and disputed),81 the basics are clear: the 
environment mediates (and distorts) atomic impressions created by individual objects, 
impressions which the living organism happens to perceive and respond to more or less 
intelligently, owing to the soul atoms that enliven it (enabling corporal movement82 and 
81 Sassi (1978, 39) disagrees with the interpretation of frr. 109-110 Taylor (= frr. 83, 117, 448, 453, 455, 
586 Luria) defended most recently in Taylor (1999, 201-204).  Both authorities agree that Democritus 
separated thought and perception (e.g. in Sext. Adv. math. 7.135-140 = fr. 48, 55, 83 Luria).  Sassi 
thinks the atomist followed Alcmaeon in distinguishing the rational mind (in the head) from the 
irrational soul (scattered throughout the body), citing testimonia like frr. 455 (Aet. 4.4.6, 4.5.1; 
Theodoret. Affect. 5.22), 457 (Philopon. in De gen. animal. 100.27), and 458 Luria (Tertull. De anima 
15); Taylor disputes this with testimonia that scatter the early atomist soul throughout the body without 
differentiating it, e.g. frr. 454 (Lucret. 3.370) and 456 Luria (Sext. Adv. math. 7.349).  For our purposes, 
all that matters is that Democritus discussed perception and thought as functions of the soul, which he 
imagined as an infusion of spherical atoms animating the cloud of atoms that coheres to form the body 
of an organism. 
82 See fr. 445 Luria, quoted on page 154-152 above.
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respiration83 in addition to perception and thought).  It is important to notice that the early 
atomist soul is not a purely passive recipient of external impressions: it moves constantly 
on its own (influencing bodily movement and participating in respiration), and its shifting 
internal composition has a determining effect on perception and thought.84  
This insight is supported by critical testimonia which reveal Democritus' concern 
with idiosyncrasies in the perception and thought of an individual organism:
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
ὁμοίως  δὲ  καὶ  ἡ  περὶ  τὰ  φαινόμενα 
ἀλήθεια ἐνίοις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλήλυθεν. 
«τὸ  μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς  οὐ πλήθει  κρίνεσθαι 
οἴονται  προσήκειν  οὐδ'  ὀλιγότητι»,  τὸ  δ' 
αὐτὸ  τοῖς  μὲν  γλυκὺ  γευομένοις  δοκεῖν 
εἶναι,  τοῖς  δὲ  πικρόν·  ὥστ'  εἰ  πάντες 
ἔκαμνον ἢ πάντες παρεφρόνουν, δύο δ' ἢ 
τρεῖς  ὑγίαινον  ἢ  νοῦν  εἶχον,  δοκεῖν  ἂν 
τούτους κάμνειν καὶ παραφρονεῖν, τοὺς δ' 
ἄλλους οὔ· ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἄλλων 
ζώιων  ὑγιαίνουσι  τἀναντία  περὶ  τῶν 
αὐτῶν φαίνεσθαι  καὶ  ἡμῖν,  καὶ  αὐτῶι  δὲ 
ἑκάστωι  πρὸς  αὑτὸν  οὐ  ταὐτὰ  κατὰ  τὴν 
αἴθησιν  ἀεὶ  δοκεῖν.  ποῖα  οὖν  τούτων 
ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ, ἄδηλον· οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον 
τάδε  ἢ  τάδε  ἀληθῆ,  ἀλλ'  ὁμοίως.  διὸ 
Δημόκριτός  γέ  φησιν  ἤτοι  οὐθὲν  εἶναι 
ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ' ἄδηλον. ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ 
ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, 
ταύτην δ' εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον 
κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς 
And similarly some have inferred from the 
sensible world the truth of appearances. For 
they  think  that  the  truth  should  not  be 
determined by the large or small number of 
those who hold a belief, and that the same 
thing is thought sweet by some who taste it, 
and bitter by others, so that if all were ill or 
all were mad, and only two or three were 
well or sane, these would be thought ill and 
mad, and not the others. And again, many 
of  the  other  animals  receive  impressions 
contrary to ours; and even to the senses of 
each individual, things do not always seem 
the  same.  Which,  then,  of  these  im-
pressions are true and which are false is not 
obvious;  for  the  one  set  is  no  more  true 
than the other, but both are alike. And this 
is  why Democritus,  at  any rate,  says that 
either there is no truth or to us at least it is 
not  evident.  And in  general  it  is  because 
these thinkers suppose knowledge to be 
83 See frr. 445, 463, and 466 Luria, quoted on pages 151-155 above.
84 Thus perception only takes place when impressions engage soul atoms via sensory cortices (which 
cloud perception when impeded: see notes 21 and 78 above), and rational thought only occurs when the 
soul itself is properly mixed (περὶ δὲ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἴρηκεν ὅτι γίνεται συμμέτρως ἐχούσης 
τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν κρῆσιν [a1]).
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εἶναί φασιν. (Luria) sensation,  and  this  to  be  a  physical 
alteration,  that  they  say  what  happens  to 
our senses must be true.85 (Ross in Barnes  
[1984])
 
Democritus, fr. A112 DK
     = fr. 177 Taylor
     = frr. 77, 79-80 Luria
Aristot. Metaph. 3.5.1009b1-17
σημεῖον δ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει τὸ μὴ ταὐτα 
πᾶσι  φαίνεσθαι  τοῖς  ζώιοις  ἀλλ'  ὃ  ἡμῖν 
γλυκύ, τοῦτ' ἄλλοις πικρὸν καὶ ἑτέροις ὀξὺ 
καὶ ἄλλοις δριμὺ τοῖς δὲ στρυφνὸν καὶ τὰ 
ἄλλα  δ'  ὡσαύτως.  ἔτι  δ'  αὐτοὺς  μετα-
βάλλειν τῆι κρήσει κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς 
ἡλικίας·  ἧι  καὶ  φανερὸν  ὡς  ἡ  διάθεσις 
αἰτία τῆς φαντασίας. (Diels)
Proof that <these sensory qualities> are not 
objectively  real  is  found  in  the  fact  that 
they  do  not  appear  the  same  to  all 
creatures:  what  is  sweet  to us is  bitter  to 
others,  and  still  to  others  it  is  sour  or 
pungent or astringent; and similarly of the 
other  <sensory  qualities>.  Moreover 
Democritus  holds  that  'men  vary  in  their 
composition'  according  to  their  condition 
and age; whence it is evident that a man's 
physical  state  accounts  for  his  inner 
presentation.86 (Stratton)
Democritus, fr. A135 DK
     = fr. 113 Taylor
     = fr. 441 Luria
Theophr. De sens. 63-64 
Up to this point in our study, the early atomist theory of biology has been presented in 
general terms, outlining a universal portrait of the live organism.  As a generic type, the 
85 Inasmuch as Theophrastus (fr. 441 Luria) explicitly attributes to Democritus the same ideas that 
Aristotle (DK68A112) treats as generally common to his predecessors in the Critical Tradition, I feel 
justified in using Aristotle's summary here (supported by Theophrastus) as a source of insight into 
Democritus' position.
86 Theophrastus mentions this theory elsewhere, too: ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἄτοπον, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, εἰ τὸ 
ἡμῖν κακῶδες καὶ ἄοσμον ἐκείνοις εὔοσμον γίγνεται. τάχα δ' οὐκ ἄτοπον. ὁρῶμεν δ' οὖν τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' 
ἑτέροις συμβαῖνον οἷον ἐν αὐταῖς εὐθὺ ταῖς τροφαῖς, ὧν μάλιστ' ἄν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τὰς κράσεις 
ἀνωμαλεῖς γε οὔσας. ἐπεὶ τά γε σχήματα Δημοκρίτου, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη, τεταγμένας ἔχοντα τὰς μορφὰς 
τεταγμένα καὶ τὰ πάθη καίτοι γε οὐκ ἐχρῆν ποιεῖν (De caus. plant. 6.17.11 = fr. 91 Luria).
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live organism is a temporarily coherent cloud of atoms infused with spherical soul atoms 
that enable movement, perception, and (in at least some cases) thought.  These testimonia 
show that this generic theory explicitly embraced the particular,87 acknowledging and 
attempting to account for idiosyncrasies apparent in individual organisms (as unique 
instances of the generic type).  Thus, Democritus notices that different living organisms 
perceive the same phenomena differently (σημεῖον δ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει τὸ μὴ ταὐτα πᾶσι 
φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ζώιοις [fr. 441 Luria]), with idiosyncratic fluctuations in the inner 
condition of a particular organism (e.g. sickness, age) affecting its perception and thought 
(τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ γευομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ πικρόν· ὥστ' εἰ πάντες 
ἔκαμνον ἢ πάντες παρεφρόνουν, δύο δ' ἢ τρεῖς ὑγίαινον ἢ νοῦν εἶχον, δοκεῖν ἂν τούτους 
κάμνειν καὶ παραφρονεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους οὔ [DK68A112]; ἀλλ' ὃ ἡμῖν γλυκύ, τοῦτ' 
ἄλλοις πικρὸν καὶ ἑτέροις ὀξὺ καὶ ἄλλοις δριμὺ τοῖς δὲ στρυφνὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δ' 
ὡσαύτως [fr. 441 Luria]).  Notice that the same organism does not always experience the 
same phenomena the same way: its changing condition alters its experience (ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς 
μεταβάλλειν τῆι κρήσει κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἡλικίας· ἧι καὶ φανερὸν ἡ διάθεσις αἰτία 
τῆς φαντασίας [fr. 441 Luria]), so that neither the senses nor the thinking soul88 can be 
trusted to reveal clear, objective truth about material phenomena (διὸ Δημόκριτός γέ 
φησιν ἤτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ' ἄδηλον: [DK68A112]).  Nevertheless, 
organisms necessarily rely on perception and thought as tools for getting at truth (ὅλως δὲ 
87 Here as elsewhere: see pages 125-135 above.
88 See frr. 79-80 Luria, quoted below on page 165.  Without the body (and its sensory interface with the 
soul), thought would not exist: the soul atoms that enable it would scatter (as they do upon death).
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διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ' εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ 
φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί φασιν [DK68A112]): they are 
the only such tools that nature (or in early atomist terms, ἀνάγκη) has provided.
This leads us to consider early atomist attempts to distinguish between perception 
and thought (already mentioned on page 159).  While some testimonia appear to value 
thought as more certain than sensation (c), others complicate this picture (d):
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
(c) ἐν  δὲ  τοῖς  Κανόσι  δύο  φησὶν  εἶναι 
γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὴν 
δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ  τῆς 
διανοίας   γνησίην   καλεῖ  προσμαρτυρῶν 
αὐτῆι τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ 
διὰ  τῶν  αἰσθήσεων  σκοτίην  ὀνομάζει, 
ἀφαιρούμενος  αὐτῆς  τὸ  πρὸς  διάγνωσιν 
τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπλανές. λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν· 
«γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, 
ἡ  δὲ  σκοτίη·  καὶ  σκοτίης  μὲν  τάδε 
σύμπαντα, ὄψις ἀκοή ὀδμή γεῦσις ψαῦσις· 
ἡ  δὲ  γνησίη,  ἀποκεκριμένη  δὲ  ταύτης». 
εἶτα προκρίνων τῆς  σκοτίης  τὴν γνησίην 
ἐπιφέρει  λέγων·  «ὅταν  ἡ  σκοτίη  μηκέτι 
δύνηται  μήτε  ὁρῆν  ἐπ'  ἔλαττον  μήτε 
ἀκούειν  μήτε  ὀδμᾶσθαι  μήτε  γεύεσθαι 
μήτε ἐν τῆι ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ 
λεπτότερον  <....>89.» οὐκοῦν  καὶ  κατὰ 
τοῦτον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ κριτήριον, ὃν γνησίην 
γνώμην καλεῖ. (Mutschmann)
But  in  Rules  he  says  that  there  are  two 
forms  of  knowledge,  one  through  the 
senses  and the  other  through  thought.  Of 
these  he  calls  the  one  through  thought 
'legitimate,'  testifying  to  its  reliability  for 
the judgment of truth, while he names the 
one  through  the  senses  'bastard,'  not 
allowing  it  to  be  unerring  in  the 
discernment of what is true. He says in so 
many  words:  'There  are  two  forms  of 
judgment, one legitimate, the other bastard. 
And all these are of the bastard kind: sight, 
hearing, smell, taste, touch. The other one 
is legitimate and separated from this.' Then, 
ranking  the  legitimate  kind  before  the 
bastard one, he goes on to say: 'When the 
bastard one can no longer see any smaller 
or  hear  or  smell  or  taste  or  perceive  by 
touch,  but  <...>  more  finely,  <...>.'  So, 
according  to  this  man,  too,  reason  is  the 
criterion,  which  he  calls  legitimate 
judgment. (Bett)
Democritus, fr. B11 DK
     = frr. D22, 179a Taylor 
     = fr. 83 Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 7.138
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(d1) ὃς  γὰρ  οὐδ'  ἄρξασθαι  δύναται  τῆς 
ἐναργείας  χωρίς,  πῶς ἂν οὗτος [ὁ λόγος] 
πιστὸς εἴη, παρ' ἧς ἔλαβε τὰς ἀρχάς, κατὰ 
ταύτης  θρασυνόμενος·  τοῦτο  καὶ 
Δημόκριτος  εἰδώς,  ὁπότε  τὰ  φαινόμενα 
διέβαλε,  «νόμωι  χροιή,  νόμωι  γλυκύ, 
νόμωι πικρόν», εἰπών, «ἐτεῆι δ' ἄτομα καὶ 
κενόν»,  ἐποίησε  τὰς  αἰσθήσεις  λεγούσας 
πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως· «τάλαινα φρήν, 
παρ'  ἡμέων  λαβοῦσα  τὰς  πίστεις  ἡμέας 
καταβάλλεις;  πτῶμά  τοι  τὸ  κατάβλημα». 
(Luria)
For how could a reasoning, which cannot 
even get off to a start without evidence, be 
trustworthy, if it rails against the evidence 
from which it took its starting points? This 
is  what  Democritus  knew,  too,  when  he 
maligned the phenomena. Having said 'by 
convention there is  colour,  by convention 
sweetness,  by  convention  bitterness;  in 
truth there are just atoms and void,' he lets 
the senses  speak to the mind in this  way 
'wretched mind, taking your evidence from 
us  you  overthrow  us?  Our  overthrow  is 
your downfall.' (Frede)
Democritus, fr. B125 DK
     = frr. 79-80 Luria
Galen.  De medica exper. fr. ed. H. Schöne 
(Berl. Sitz. Ber. 1901, 1259, 8)
(d2)  φησὶ  γάρ·  «ἡμεῖς  δὲ  τῶι  μὲν  ἐόντι 
οὐδὲν  ἀτρεκὲς  συνίεμεν,  μεταπῖπτον  δὲ 
κατά  τε  σώματος  διαθήκην  καὶ  τῶν 
ἐπεισιόντων  καὶ  τῶν  ἀντιστηριζόντων». 
(Luria)
For he says, “In fact we understand nothing 
precise, but what changes according to the 
condition of the body and of the things that 
enter  it  and  that  offer  resistance  to  it.” 
(Bett)
Democritus, fr. B9 DK
     = fr. D17, 179a Taylor
     = fr. 55 Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 7.135
89 Mutschmann's text follows the manuscript tradition, which is corrupt here.  DK supplements <δέηι 
ζητεῖν, τότε ἐπιγίνεται ἡ γνησίη ἅτε ὄργανον ἔχουσα τοῦ νῶσαι λεπτότερον>, and Luria <τι δέηι 
καταφεύγειν, τότε ἐπιγίνεται ἡ γνησίη>.  Bett (2005) merely observes that “clearly there are some 
words missing here” (30).
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(d3)  καὶ πάλιν· «δηλοῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ 
λόγος, ὅτι ἐτεῆι οὐδὲν ἴδμεν περὶ οὐδενός, 
ἀλλ'  ἐπιρυσμίη  ἑκάστοισιν  ἡ  δόξις». 
(Luria)
And again: 'This reasoning too shows that 
in verity we know nothing about anything, 
but  opinion  is  for  everyone  a  reshaping.' 
(Bett)
Democritus, fr. B7 DK
     = fr. D20, 179a Taylor
     = fr. 49 Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 7.137
The precise relationship between thought and perception in early atomist thought is 
uncertain,90 possibly because the early atomists were not sure what this relationship was.91 
Fragments (d2) and (d3) confirm the notion (already discussed on pages 160-171) that 
thought was conceived as analogous to perception, i.e. as the soul's reception of atomic 
projections emanating from the external environment (οὐδὲν ἀτρεκὲς συνίεμεν, 
μεταπῖπτον δὲ κατά τε σώματος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστη-
ριζόντων [d2]; ἐπιρυσμίη ἑκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις [d3]).  Fragments (c) and (d1) take things 
further, providing evidence for an early atomist distinction between thought and 
perception.  Fragment (c) seems to make thought a source of genuine knowledge, 
whereas the gross senses produce bastard knowledge (γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν 
γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης μὲν τάδε σύμπαντα, ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὀδμή, γεῦσις, ψαῦσις. ἡ 
δὲ γνησίη, ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ ταύτης).  Fragment (d1), on the other hand, conceives a 
90 See note 81 above, on the undecided question whether Democritus separated the thinking mind from 
the perceiving soul in the body.
91 We have already discussed thought as the result of incoming soul atoms impacting the soul (see page 
160 above), but it is likewise involved somehow in the reception and interpretation of impressions in 
the soul that occur through the sensory cortices.  At the very least, gross perceptions (e.g. sight, 
hearing, touch) create disturbances in the structure of the soul that influence how it receives incoming 
streams of soul atoms: see fr. (d1) on the preceding page.  
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nexus between them such that thought is dependent on grosser material perception, a 
dependence that would seem to vitiate any claim that genuine knowledge comes from 
thought (τάλαινα φρήν, παρ' ἡμέων λαβοῦσα τὰς πίστεις ἡμέας καταβάλλεις; πτῶμά τοι 
τὸ κατάβλημα).  It is certainly possible that these two fragments represent an unresolved 
problem in Democritean theory.  But careful reading suggests that it would be premature 
to conclude that they are hopelessly at odds with one another.  There is a better way to 
understand them, a way that sees them contributing to a single, coherent perspective on 
thought and perception.
The key for a unitary reading of these fragments is fragment (c), which does not 
actually say that thought provides uncomplicated access to genuine knowledge, only that 
such knowledge is different from what the gross bodily senses provide (σκοτίης μὲν τάδε 
σύμπαντα, ὄψις, ἀκοή, ὀδμή, γεῦσις, ψαῦσις. ἡ δὲ γνησίη, ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ <τὰ> ταύτης). 
The fragment then appears to invoke a perceptive faculty that picks up slighter things, a 
faculty to which we resort when dealing with things too subtle for our gross material 
senses (ὅταν ἡ σκοτίη μηκέτι δύνηται μήτε ὁρῆν ἐπ' ἔλαττον μήτε ἀκούειν μήτε ὀδμᾶσ-
θαι μήτε γεύεσθαι μήτε ἐν τῆι ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ λεπτότερον).  There is still 
no promise here (or anywhere in the early atomist corpus as extant) that this subtle 
faculty offers unobstructed access to genuine knowledge.  Since Democritus never claims 
uncomplicated access to genuine knowledge, he might merely be saying here that thought 
is pragmatically more reliable than the senses (as anyone who has experienced any kind 
of sensual illusion would agree: walking into a desert mirage and failing to find water 
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teaches you to doubt your eyes).92  This allows assertions like those in fragments (d1)-(d3), 
wherein thought, like sensual perception (to which it is intrinsically related according to 
[d1]), is vulnerable to illusion.  In other words, all that Democritus offers here is an echo 
of the epistemological position taken by Xenophanes in DK21B34.93  Objective reality 
exists (in the form of atoms and void), and some of our subjective impressions of it may 
be nearer the truth than others (e.g. impressions which involve more and smaller particles 
whose shape is less deformed by interaction with atoms from the external environment),94 
but we have no foolproof way of separating true insight completely from false.  All 
knowledge is provisional, subject to revision in light of ongoing experience, and the 
experience of the individual is inevitably colored by his unique physical constitution 
92 Discussing the concept of perceptual illusion current among οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον, Philoponus illustrates 
with several examples: (1) the changing colors of a dove's neck in the sun; (2) the misperception of 
geometric shapes at a distance; (3) the fact that honey tastes bitter to sick people; (4) the fact that the 
same collection of lines can constitute a different Greek letter based on its orientation (in De gen. et 
corr. 23.2 = fr. 434 Luria).  Example (4) appears to derive directly from the early atomists (though the 
particular letters invoked are different: see Aristot. Metaph. 1.4.985b4 and Lact. Div. inst. 3.17.23 = fr. 
241 Luria, discussed above in note 11), and the others may as well: Lucretius uses (1) and (2) without 
any attribution (in 2.801 and 4.353, respectively).  Here it is worth observing that Aetius credits 
Democritus with positing the existence of more sensations than things sensed: πλείους μὲν εἶναι τὰς 
αἰσθήσεις τῶν αἰσθητῶν (4.10.5 = fr. 437 Luria).  Accepting this attribution, the role of thought 
becomes correlation, with the mind (i.e. the thinking aspect of the soul, which is either scattered 
through the body or localized in the brain; see note 81 above) comparing sensory impressions that may 
conflict, reading the initial appearance of something against the full array of impressions it emits.  
Interacting with all the other senses (and with its own impressions too fine to be picked up elsewhere), 
it perceives that the dove's neck is a dove's neck no matter what color it appears, that squares are really 
square (for all that they may appear round at a distance), and that honey is still honey when sick people 
find it bitter.  What it comes up with ultimately is not perfect knowledge of things as they are (ἡ γνησίη 
γνώμη), but a physical reconfiguration (ἐπιρυσμίη) that occurs as the soul reacts to many incoming 
data streams—a reaction never entirely free from the taint of the bastard knowledge that informs it.  
93 καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται / εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· 
/ εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών, / αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται 
(Sext. Adv. math. 7.49.110).  This fragment is quoted (with a translation) and discussed on page 41 in 
chapter 1.  Compare DK68A112, quoted in full on page 162 above: Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἤτοι οὐθὲν 
εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ' ἄδηλον.
94 These concessions to objectivity are what separates Democritus and Leucippus from the thorough-
going relativism of Protagoras.  See note 3 in the Introduction.
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(διάθεσις [fr. 441 Luria, quoted above on page 198]; κρῆσις [fr. 460 Luria = a1 above]; 
διαθήκη [fr. 55 Luria = d2 above]),95 an atomic construct which changes with time and 
circumstance.  Genuine knowledge exists in practical form merely as an unclear 
counterpart to bastard knowledge, which latter is all we can ever be really sure that we 
have.  Thus our fragment (c) does not necessarily have to be read as contradicting the rest 
of the Democritean corpus, which insists repeatedly on human inability to achieve perfect 
understanding.96  
It is time to summarize our understanding of early atomist zoology.  After creating 
a world-order (κόσμος), the individual vortex sorts the atoms within that order so that like 
always goes with like, creating atomic compounds that constitute material objects.  Some 
objects accidentally happen to entrap soul atoms from the cosmic environment—fiery, 
mobile atoms that cause these objects to live (i.e. move, perceive, and respond to 
perception with movement).  An important consequence of living is that animate objects 
create other animate objects sharing their form: together with their parents, these objects 
form individual instances of various animal species analogous to the individual instances 
of κόσμοι created by particular vortices.97  (Notice that here again, like goes with like: a 
horse will not mate with or give birth to a lion, or vice versa.98)  Perception exists as the  
ability of the individual animal to receive and respond to atomic impressions from its 
95 Here it is perhaps significant to notice that the Thrasyllan list credits an ethical book Περὶ τῆς τοῦ 
σοφοῦ διαθέσεως to Democritus (Diog. 9.46 = fr. cxv Luria). 
96 To fragments (d1)-(d3), add the saying remembered by Diogenes Laertius (9.72), Cicero (Acad. priora 
2.10.32), et al: ἐτεῆι δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῶι γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια (fr. 51 Luria).  The argument offered here 
for reconciling fragments (c) and (d) agrees substantially with Taylor (1999), 204-206.
97 See the discussion of general and particular on pages 126-130 above.
98 See fr. 561 Luria, quoted in note 72 above.
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environment.  All forms of perception involve atomic collisions with soul atoms trapped 
inside the animal's body, collisions in which the soul takes some kind of impression from 
atoms bumping into it.  The keenest form of perception facilitated by soul atoms (as far as 
we know) is thought, which occurs when the soul takes impressions of incoming atomic 
effluvia that are too subtle to be picked up by the atomic structures that enable the gross 
material senses (e.g. sight, smell, touch, taste, hearing).  All perception is determined by 
the constitution of the animal perceiving: it can only construe the world as its faculties 
permit.  Since these faculties are inevitably limited99 and mutate—changing with time and 
unforeseeable circumstances (such as sudden illness)—its perception is necessarily 
limited and subjective.  From this perspective, it is plausible to imagine atoms too large 
or too small to be perceived,100 and to say (as Democritus does) that the only objective 
reality is atoms and void, with everything else existing only conventionally.101  Another 
important observation is that every perception is an instance of like going with like: 
animals perceive other objects only insofar as these objects emit atomic effluvia capable 
of interacting with the atoms that make up the animal.102  This confirms the principle of 
99 Unlike Xenophanes' god (see pages 38-39 in chapter 1 above), living organisms in the atomic universe 
cannot perceive equally with their entire bodies, and they cannot perceive everything.
100 Atoms too small to perceive individually are normal to the early atomist worldview; see frr. 204-206 
Luria.  Thought can perceive subtly enough to recognize that these imperceptible atoms exist, but even 
it cannot distinguish them individually; see fr. 209 Luria: Δημόκριτος, ὧι μετὰ πλεῖστον Ἐπίκουρος 
ἠκολούθησεν, ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων σώματα ἄτομα, λόγωι δὲ θεωρητά (Euseb. Praep. Evang. 14.14).  The 
doxography also records Democritus positing the existence of enormous atoms (including some as 
large as entire κόσμοι), whose size puts them beyond our capacity to perceive directly; see fr. 207 
Luria, with the commentary of Mugler (1959, 14-16) and Makin (1993, 62-84).  For our purposes, the 
important thing to notice here is the consistent assertion that objective reality is something that living 
things cannot perceive clearly.  All that any living being perceives are more or less distorted reflections 
of objective reality, reflections that exist as transitory impressions in its soul, which is a moving 
collection of small, spherical atoms animating the body. 
101 See frr. 51, 55, 79, 90, and 93 Luria, quoted above on pages 133-134.
102 Aetius attests that this insight was common to other thinkers in the Critical Tradition: Παρμενίδης, 
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homogeneity as a crucially important part of the material necessity responsible for all 
phenomena in the atomic multiverse.  Like particles going with like is a generalized 
expression of what happens in every particular episode of atomic interaction, whether we 
are talking about the evolution of an entire world-order or that of an individual complex 
object (such as a living organism, e.g. a human being).103
Conclusion: Early Atomist Ethics (2.4)  
So far, this chapter has revealed the early atomists as typical thinkers in the 
Critical Tradition.  Like their fellows discussed in chapter 1, Leucippus and Democritus 
construct a universal narrative discussing and relating all things known and knowable to 
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, Ἀναξαγόρας, Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος, Ἡρακλείδης παρὰ τὰς συμμετρίας τῶν πόρων τὰς 
κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεις γίνεσθαι τοῦ οἰκείου τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑκάστου ἑκάστηι ἐναρμόττοντος (Aet. 4.9.6 
= fr. 437 Luria).  Sassi (1978, 51-52) confirms a striking likeness between Democritean (fr. 476 Luria; 
see also notes 76, 77, and 78 above) and Empedoclean sensory cortices (πόροι in fr. 88 Inwood; see 
note 111 in chapter 1). Turning to the early atomists specifically, remember the summary of 
Theophrastus (quoted with context in note 21 above): τὰ γὰρ ὁμόφυλα μάλιστα ἕκαστον γνωρίζειν (De 
sensu 50).  See also fr. 472 Luria, wherein Aristotle concludes a discussion of Democritean εἴδωλα 
with the following observation to explain why we dream about familiar people: τὸ δέ τινας 
εὐθυονείρους εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοὺς γνωρίμους περὶ τῶν γνωρίμων μάλιστα προορᾶν συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ 
μάλιστα τοὺς γνωρίμους ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων φροντίζειν· ὥσπερ γὰρ πόρρω ὄντων τάχιστα γνωρίζουσι καὶ 
αἰσθάνονται, οὕτω καὶ τῶν κινήσεων· αἱ γὰρ τῶν γνωρίμων γνωριμώτεραι κινήσεις (De divinat. in 
somn. 2.464a). The common thread here is that all forms of perception (including thought) rely on the 
principle of homogeneity (see fr. 316 Luria, quoted and discussed on pages 127-138 above): according 
to the atomists, we perceive (and think about) things (1) that happen to be in our personal environment 
and (2) that have atomic structures enough like ours that we can interact with them.
103 The likeness between organism and world in early atomist thought is very striking.  Each is an orderly 
arrangement of atoms, a κόσμος that evolves over time and produces (man by sexual reproduction, 
world by dissolution into the ἄπειρον where atoms and void create vortices) repeating iterations of 
itself—endless particular variations on a general theme.  (Note fr. 527 Luria: ἄνθρωπος ἐξέσσυται ἐξ 
ἀνθρώπου παντός [Galen. De defin. med. 439].)  In light of this, it may be significant that Democritus 
is supposed to have referred to the individual human being as a small world: ἐν τῶι ἀνθρώπωι μικρῶι 
κόσμωι ὄντι κατὰ τὸν Δημόκριτον (David, Proleg. 38.14 = fr. 10 Luria).  I prefer Luria's validation of 
this attribution (pp. 969, 983-984) to the skepticism of Finkelberg (1998, 120-122), though I do not 
dispute Finkelberg's point that in fifth-century usage the word κόσμος means order without necessarily 
meaning world (i.e. the particular order comprised by the earth, biological life, and celestial bodies).  
From an early atomist perspective, the distinction Finkelberg argues for appears immaterial, a debate 
about conventions, since the early atomist world like every subordinate order in it, is merely a 
collection of atomic clouds moving in a more or less regular fashion (i.e. following a natural order 
where like necessarily goes with like, etc.).  
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man (both the individual human being and collective mankind).  Like other Critical 
narratives, the early atomist one includes a cosmogony (section 2.1 above).  This atomist 
cosmogony is dependent on necessity (section 2.2 above), which sorts matter in vortices 
to create endless particular variations on common generic themes across an infinite 
multiverse of atoms and void.  The nature of atoms and void as imagined by the early 
atomists is such that generic events necessarily recur over and over (e.g. as like particles 
go constantly with like), even as specific instances of necessary events show some 
irregular variation (e.g. when oblong pebbles are sorted into piles of different shape on 
different beaches; see pages 128-131 above).  Besides creating infinite κόσμοι, the 
endless recurrence of necessary events facilitates the evolution of complex atomic forms 
that interact with one another within κόσμοι—e.g. living organisms, including human 
beings (section 2.3 above).  Thus, like other Critical narratives, the early atomist one 
includes a zoogony and an anthropogony.  As in the constitution of the early atomist 
κόσμος, so in the constitution of organic life necessity plays an important role: once 
more, generic events recur (e.g. when like animals herd and mate with like to produce 
conspecific offspring), but again they show idiosyncratic variation in particular instances 
(e.g. when donkeys and horses mate to produce mules, or when the offspring of two 
normal human beings has more or less than the usual five digits on each hand).104  
In light of chapter 1, we expect the early atomists to have an ethical perspective 
that complements and coheres with this physical theory.105  In light of this chapter, we 
104 See frr. 561 (quoted in note 72 above) and 103 Luria (quoted on pages 125-137 above).
105 See note 158 in chapter 1.
172
expect that ethical perspective to involve material necessity (ἀνάγκη), which is 
omnipresent in atomist physics and biology.106  As matters stand, the early atomist corpus 
contains several fragments confirming (1) that Democritus (at least) built an ethical 
outlook upon the physical and biological foundation that we have set forth in this chapter, 
and (2) that this outlook depended on necessity.  Consider the following smoking guns:
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
Δημόκριτος  μὲν  τοίνυν,  ἀνὴρ  οὐ 
φυσιολογώτατος  μόνον  τῶν  ἀρχαίων, 
ἀλλὰ  καὶ  τῶν  ἱστορουμένων  οὐδενὸς 
ἧττον  πολυπράγμων,  μουσικήν  φησι 
νεωτέραν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδίδωσι 
λέγων μὴ ἀποκρῖναι τἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ ἐκ 
τοῦ περιεῦντος ἤδη γενέσθαι.
Democritus, a man who was not only the 
most  learned  about  nature  of  all  the 
ancients  but  no  less  industrious  than  any 
other  inquirer,  says  that  music  is  more 
recent, and identifies its cause, saying that 
it  was  not  singled  out  by  necessity,  but 
arose as a result of plenty. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B144 DK
     = fr. 213 Taylor
     = fr. 568 Luria
Philod. De musica 4.31
γινώσκειν  χρεὼν  ἀνθρωπίνην  βιοτὴν 
ἀφαυρήν  τε  ἐοῦσαν  καὶ  ὀλιγοχρόνιον 
πολλῆισίν  τε  κηρσὶ  συμπεφυρμένην  καὶ 
ἀμηχανίηισιν,  ὅκως  ἄν  τις  μετρίης  τε 
κτήσιος  ἐπιμέληται  καὶ  μετρῆται  ἐπὶ  τοῖς 
ἀναγκαίοις ἡ ταλαιπωρίη.
Bisogna  prendere  consapevolezza  della 
fragilità  e  della  brevità  della  vita  umana, 
che si rivela anche intessuta di molteplici 
sciagure e bisogni,  in modo da curarsi  di 
avere  beni  di  proprietà  misurati  e  da 
commisurare le tribolazioni inevitabili alle 
necessità vitali. (Luria, Krivushina)
Democritus, fr. B285 DK
     = fr. D150 Taylor
     = fr. 646 Luria
Stob. 4.34.65
106 Remember the saying of Leucippus quoted on page 119 and discussed on pages 119-141 above:  οὐδὲν 
χρῆμα ματὴν γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης (DK67B2).
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φησὶν ἐκεῖνος (ὁ Δημόκριτος)  ἐξιέναι  (sc. 
τὰ  εἴδωλα)  τοὺς  φθονοῦντας,  οὔτ' 
αἰσθήσεως ἄμοιρα παντάπασιν οὔθ' ὁρμῆς, 
ἀνάπλεά  τε  τῆς  ἀπὸ  τῶν  προϊεμένων 
μοχθηρίας  καὶ  βασκανίας,  μεθ'  ἧς 
ἐμπλασσόμενα  καὶ  παραμένοντα  καὶ 
συνοικοῦντα  τοῖς  βασκαινομένοις  ἐπιτα-
ράττειν καὶ κακοῦν αὐτῶν τό τε σῶμα καὶ 
τὴν διάνοιαν· 
Ce philosophe affirme que  les  simulacres 
émis  par  les  êtres  méchants  ne  sont  pas 
essentiellement  exempts  de  sentiment  ni 
d'intention,  et  qu'ils  sont  au  contraire 
chargés  de  toute  la  malignité  et  de  toute 
l'envie de celui dont ils émanent; c'est avec 
elles  qu'ils  s'impriment,  demeurent  et 
s'installent  dans  la  victime,  dont  ils 
troublent  et  corrompent  ainsi  le  corps  en 
même temps que l'esprit. (Fuhrmann)
Democritus, fr. A77 DK
     = fr. 133b Taylor
     = fr. 579 Luria
Plut. Quaest. conv. 5.7.6, p. 682f
Δημόκριτος  δὲ  εἴδωλά  τινά  φησιν 
ἐμπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τούτων τὰ 
μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ τὰ δὲ κακοποιά. ἔνθεν 
καὶ  εὔχετο  εὐλόγχων  τυχεῖν  εἰδώλων. 
εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερφυῆ καὶ 
δύσφθαρτα  μέν,  οὐκ  ἄφθαρτα  δέ,  προ-
σημαίνειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 
θεωρούμενα καὶ φωνὰς ἀφιέντα.
Democritus  says  that  some  eidôla  en-
counter  people,  and  of  these  some  are 
beneficial  and  some  harmful;  hence  he 
prayed to find propitious  eidôla.  These are 
huge and gigantic and difficult to destroy, 
but  not  indestructible,  and  they  foretell 
future  events  to  people  by  appearing  to 
them and speaking. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B166 DK
     = fr. 175b Taylor
     = fr. 472a Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 9.19
Fragments B144 and B285 DK attest that Democritus saw human culture developing as a 
response to necessary conditions, with some arts arising early (to meet essential needs, 
like the need for food and shelter) and others later (to meet superfluous needs, like the 
appetite for entertainment filled by music—an appetite that could not exist if essential 
needs were not already met).  This generalizing perspective appears complemented by a 
particular one in fragments A77 and B166 DK, where Democritus sees the ethical 
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character of the individual ἄνθρωπος being shaped or influenced to some degree by 
atomic effluvia that leave impressions upon his soul.  This chapter has already shown 
how necessity creates conditions that enable both of these events (the generic evolution 
of human culture, and the particular evolution of an individual human being).  From this, 
it appears that ethics and physics are not unrelated concerns in early atomist thought, 
contrary to what some modern scholars have concluded.107  At the very least, the atomist 
appears to be employing familiar ideas when he makes the transition from physics to 
ethics: there is no hard line apparent between the ethical necessity of these fragments and 
the physical necessity discussed above in sections 2.2-3.
This is particularly evident if we remember fr. 103 Luria (quoted and discussed on 
pages 125-126 above), wherein Democritean necessity produces some things that must be 
the way they are (things that occur ἐξ ἀνάγκης), and other things whose state is more 
mutable (things that occur ἐνδεχομένως).  In that fragment, man is necessarily a living 
animal (a generic truth that necessity guarantees absolutely), but the particular state of his 
life in individual instances admits a great deal of variation (particular truths that necessity 
enables without minutely predetermining).  Compare fr. B144 DK (quoted above), which 
recognizes and distinguishes (1) arts that are absolutely necessary (presumably those that 
provide mankind with essential amenities like food and shelter), and (2) arts that are 
inessential (music): in the language of fr. 103, arts of the first class exist ἐξ ἀνάγκης, 
while those of the second exist ἐνδεχομένως.  The identity of physical and ethical 
107 E.g. Barnes (1982): “[P]hysics and ethics were so successfully compartmentalized in Democritus' 
capacious mind that he never attended to the larger issues which their cohabitation produces” (535).
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necessity here is not specious: necessity constructs the body such that it absolutely needs 
food to maintain its physical integrity, while its ability to produce music (an ability 
created by the same necessity) serves no absolute physical need (and so comes about late, 
as a kind of accidental cosmic afterthought).  
Even better, if we look for a moral perspective that treats the individual human 
being as a unique unit (as in fragments A77 and B166), fr. 103 Luria has Democritus 
listing personal ethical choices, e.g. the decision to travel or settle in a particular city, as 
occurring ἐνδεχομένως (just like instances of humans born with more or less than the 
normal five digits on each hand).  Thus Democritean ethics, whether collective or 
individual, seems to exist in the realm of supple determinism, the same realm where 
physical variation lives.  It is a realm shaped but not minutely predetermined by the 
universal governing principle of material necessity (as discussed in sections 2.2-3).  It is a 
realm where general realities exist, necessarily, and admit particular variations.
At this point, we have seen enough evidence to conclude that Democritus follows 
the Critical Tradition in crafting a universal perspective,108 one that encompasses both 
physics and ethics.  Democritean physics create a world-order (διάκοσμος) that explicitly 
includes and enables human behavior, as the following chapters will illustrate.  
108 Compare atomist necessity (and its all-encompassing reach) with Anaximander's justice (δίκη) and 
retribution (τίσις: pages 32-42 in chapter 1), Heraclitus' reason (λόγος) and war (πόλεμος: pages 47-
58), Parmenides' Being (τὸ ὄν: pages 61-70), Empedocles' love (φιλότης) and strife (νεῖκος: pages 69-
77), Anaxagoras' mind (νοῦς: pages 84-93), and Philolaus' harmony (ἁρμονία: page 96).  Though 
Xenophanes' place in this company is less secure, his μέγιστος θεός might unite ethics with physics, 
since the divine should be accorded due ethical reverence (χρὴ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑμνεῖν εὔφρονας 
ἄνδρας εὐφήμοις μύθοις καὶ καθαροῖσι λόγοις· σπείσαντας δὲ καὶ εὐξαμένους τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι 
πρήσσειν … θεῶν <δὲ> προμηθείην αἰὲν ἔχειν ἄγαθον [DK21B1.15-16, 24]), and the greatest god has 
the capacity to exert universal physical influence (ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει 
[DK21B25]).   
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CHAPTER 3. COSMIC ΡΥΣΜΟΙ: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
DEMOCRITEAN ETHICAL THEORY
Putting Democritean Ethics in Context (3.1)
The foregoing chapters have given us a contextualized picture of the διάκοσμος 
that Plutarch finds typical of philosophers in the Critical Tradition (Adv. Colot. 1114b-c).1 
As we have seen, the Critical διάκοσμος offers a verbal model of the universe, a master 
narrative aspiring to contain and relate everything known and knowable to early Ionians.  
In telling the story of the origin and development of the Ionian world-order (κόσμος), the 
Critical διάκοσμος naturally includes stories about the origin and development of human 
beings (as biological and social animals).  Some of these stories survive at least partially 
intact in the historical record, as we have already noticed.2  This chapter will consider 
these stories historically as forerunners and/or parallels to the Democritean story of 
humanity—an early atomist narrative of human origins and development that provides 
contextual information important for interpreting the ethical sayings attributed to 
Democritus (as we will see). 
Not all Critical philosophers are on record thinking historically about the origin 
and development of human ethics.  As extant, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Philolaus seem 
more interested in timeless reality than in historical development (which for them is an 
endless recurring cycle of fluctuations in fire, Being, or harmony).  In the material extant 
for us to read, these thinkers are concerned primarily with continuity (how things stay the 
1 See pages 16-27 above in the Introduction.
2 See the discussions of anthropogony in chapters 1 and 2.
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same over time), rather than with discontinuity (how things change in a way that does not 
relate neatly to what came before).3  An early instance of discontinuity in the Critical 
Tradition comes from Anaximander's account of human evolution (discussed briefly in 
chapter 1, pages 31-32).  As the first of several discontinuous narratives explaining 
human origins (anthropogony) and development (ethical evolution that culminates in the 
creation of cities, i.e. politogony) from a Critical perspective, it warrants attention:
TEXT (DK) TRANSLATION (KRS)
(a) Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐν ὑγρῶι γεννηθῆναι τὰ 
πρῶτα ζῶια φλοιοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀκανθώ-
δεσι, προβαινούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀποβαί-
νειν  ἐπὶ  τὸ  ξηρότερον  καὶ  περιρρηγνυ-
μένου  τοῦ  φλοιοῦ  ἐπ'  ὀλίγον  χρόνον 
μεταβιῶναι.
Anaximander  said  that  the  first  living 
creatures were born in moisture,  enclosed 
in  thorny  barks;  and  that  as  their  age 
increased they came forth on to  the drier 
part  and,  when  the  bark  had  broken  off, 
they lived a different kind of life for a short 
time.
Anaximander, fr. A30 DK
     = fr. 133 KRS
Aet. 5.19.4
(b) ἔτι φησίν, ὅτι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐξ ἀλλοειδῶν 
ζώιων  ὁ  ἄνθρωπος  ἐγεννήθη,  ἐκ  τοῦ  τὰ 
μὲν ἄλλα δι' ἑαυτῶν ταχὺ νέμεσθαι, μόνον 
δὲ  τὸν  ἄνθρωπον  πολυχρονίου  δεῖσθαι 
τιθηνήσεως·  διὸ  καὶ  κατ'  ἀρχὰς  οὐκ  ἄν 
ποτε τοιοῦτον ὄντα διασωθῆναι.
Further he says that in the beginning man 
was born from creatures of a different kind; 
because  other  creatures  are  soon  self-
supporting, but man alone needs prolonged 
nursing.  For this reason he would not have 
survived if this had been his original form.
Anaximander, fr. A10 DK
     = fr. 134 KRS
[Plut.] Strom. 2
3 Here I am not claiming that Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Philolaus fail to incorporate any idea of 
discontinuity into their διάκοσμοι.  I am merely noting that what survives of their work seems more 
focused on continuity than discontinuity (which appears more prominently elsewhere in the Critical 
Tradition, perhaps accidentally, in authors whom I am about to examine).
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(c) Anaximander  Milesius  videri  sibi  ex  
aqua terraque calefactis exortos esse sive  
pisces seu piscibus simillima animalia; in  
his homines concrevisse fetusque ad puber-
tatem  intus  retentos;  tunc  demum  ruptis  
illis  viros  mulieresque  qui  iam  se  alere  
possent processisse.
Anaximander  of  Miletus  conceived  that 
there  arose  from  heated  water  and  earth 
either  fish  or  creatures  very  like  fish;  in 
these  man  grew,  in  the  form of  embryos 
retained within  until  puberty;  then  at  last 
the  fish-like  creatures  burst  and men and 
women who were already able to nourish 
themselves stepped forth.
Anaximander, fr. A30 DK
     = fr. 135 KRS
Censor. 4.7
(d) τὰ  δὲ  ζῶια  γίνεσθαι  <ἐξ  ὑγροῦ> 
ἐξατμιζομένου  ὑπὸ  τοῦ  ἡλίου.  τὸν  δὲ 
ἄνθρωπον  ἑτέρωι  ζώιωι  γεγονέναι, 
τουτέστι ἰχθύι, παραπλήσιον κατ' ἀρχάς.
Living  creatures  came  into  being  from 
moisture evaporated by the sun.  Man was 
originally similar to another creature – that 
is, to a fish.
Anaximander, fr. A11 DK
     = fr. 136 KRS
Hippol. Refut. 1.6.6
(e) διὸ καὶ σέβονται  (sc.  Σύροι) τὸν ἰχθῦν 
ὡς  ὁμογενῆ  καὶ  σύντροφον,  ἐπιεικέσ-
τερον  Ἀναξιμάνδρου  φιλοσοφοῦντες·  οὐ 
γὰρ  ἐν  τοῖς  αὐτοῖς  ἐκεῖνος  ἰχθῦς  καὶ 
ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλ' ἐν ἰχθύσιν ἐγγενέσθαι τὸ 
πρῶτον  ἀνθρώπους  ἀποφαίνεται  καὶ 
τραφέντας,  ὥσπερ  οἱ  γαλεοί,  καὶ  γενομέ-
νους  ἱκανοὺς  ἑαυτοῖς  βοηθεῖν  ἐκβῆναι 
τηνικαῦτα καὶ γῆς λαβέσθαι.
Therefore they [the Syrians] actually revere 
the  fish  as  being  of  similar  race  and 
nurturing.  In this they philosophize more 
suitably than Anaximander; for he declares, 
not  that  fishes  and  men  came into  being 
from the same parents, but that originally 
men came into being inside fishes, and that 
having been nurtured there – like sharks – 
and having become adequate to look after 
themselves, they then came forth and took 
to the land.
Anaximander, fr. A30 DK
     = fr. 137 KRS
Plut. Symp. 8.8.4, p. 730e
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For our purposes, there are two important things to notice in Anaximander's theory of 
human evolution.  First is the idea that human life changes over time, moving from a 
primitive state, in which ancestral humans resembled fish or were born from fish-like 
creatures, to a more modern one on dry land (ἐν ὑγρῶι γεννηθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα ζῶια ... 
προβαινούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀποβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον … ἐπ' ὀλίγον χρόνον μετα-
βιῶναι [a]; κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐξ ἀλλοειδῶν ζώιων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεννήθη [b]; ex aqua terraque 
calefactis exortos esse sive pisces seu piscibus simillima animalia; in his homines con-
crevisse … tunc demum ruptis illis viros mulieresque ... processisse [c]; τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον 
ἑτέρωι ζώιωι γεγονέναι, τουτέστι ἰχθύι, παραπλήσιον κατ' ἀρχάς [d]; ἀλλ' ἐν ἰχθύσιν 
ἐγγενέσθαι τὸ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπους … ἐκβῆναι τηνικαῦτα καὶ γῆς λαβέσθαι [e]).  Second 
is the recognition that human beings require nourishment: the first generation of mankind 
takes this from its fishy ancestors (μόνον δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πολυχρονίου δεῖσθαι τιθηνή-
σεως· διὸ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοιοῦτον ὄντα διασωθῆναι [b]; in his homines 
concrevisse fetusque ad pubertatem intus retentos [c]; ἀλλ' ἐν ἰχθύσιν ἐγγενέσθαι τὸ 
πρῶτον ἀνθρώπους ἀποφαίνεται καὶ τραφέντας [e]); eventually, mankind becomes self-
sufficient (tunc demum ruptis illis viros mulieresque qui iam se alere possent processisse 
[c]; καὶ γενομένους ἱκανοὺς ἑαυτοῖς βοηθεῖν ἐκβῆναι τηνικαῦτα καὶ γῆς λαβέσθαι [e]).  
What matters here are not the details of human evolution as imagined by 
Anaximander (details which are rather hazy), but the stark outlines: (i) human life is not 
categorically separate from other animal life; (ii) life was not always as it is now; (iii) 
nourishment is a persistent part of life, a need which is serviced by different means over 
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time (as life changes).  These insights constitute important evidence for the kind of 
historical thinking that some Critical thinkers engage in when they come to consider 
human biology and ethics.
From the evidence we have, Xenophanes, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras appear to 
work from the same basic playbook as Anaximander in this area (human biology and 
ethics).  For Xenophanes, (i) humans are not categorically different from animals, which 
would make gods in their own image if they could;4 (ii) life is a historical process marked 
by change, as people discover better over time;5 and (iii) allocating nourishment (σῖτα and 
associated prizes) is a central ethical concern (a concern which the poet proposes to serve 
better with σοφίη than predecessors and contemporaries have with ῥώμη: note that his 
desire to change custom points directly toward its mutability).6  Similarly, in the world of 
Empedocles, (i) humans and animals are fundamentally the same, sharing δαίμονες;7 (ii) 
life is a historical process marked by change, as love puts things together more or less
4 καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν / τοιαῦθ' οἷόνπερ καὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ἕκαστοι (DK21B15 = Clem. Strom. 5.110).  
See pages 40-50 above in chapter 1.
5 ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον (DK21B18 = Stob. 1.8.2).  See page 43 above in 
chapter 1.
6 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ταχυτῆτι ποδῶν νίκην τις ἄροιτο / … ἀστοῖσίν κ' εἴη κυδρότερος προσορᾶν, / καί κε 
προεδρίην φανερὴν ἐν ἀγῶσιν ἄροιτο, / καί κεν σῖτ' εἴη δημοσίων κτεάνων / ἐκ πόλιος καὶ δῶρον ὅ 
οἱ κειμήλιον εἴη· … / οὐκ ἐὼν ἄξιος ὥσπερ ἐγώ· ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων ἀνδρῶν ἠδ' ἵππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη· 
… / σμικρὸν δ' ἄν τι πόλει χάρμα γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῶι, / εἴ τις ἀεθλεύων νικῶι Πίσαο παρ' ὄχθας· / οὐ γὰρ 
πιαίνει ταῦτα μυχοὺς πόλιος (DK21B2.1, 6-9, 17-22 = Athen. 10.413f).  The crucial point here is not 
that Xenophanes created an explicit account of the origin and development of ethics (if he did, it is 
lost), but that he could have: his fragments contain the foundation of such a story, just like the 
doxographical summaries of Anaximander's biology.  Together, they represent a kind of early Critical 
perspective which later thinkers developed into more detailed narratives. 
7 ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε / θάμνος τ' οἰωνός (fr. 111 Inwood = Hippol. Refut.1.3.1).  μορφὴν δ' 
ἀλλάξαντα πατὴρ φίλον υἱὸν ἀείρας / σφάζει ἐπευχόμενος μέγα νήπιος (fr. 128.1-2 Inwood = Sext. 
Adv. math. 9.129).  For more on fr. 111, see note 103 above in chapter 1; for more on fr. 128, see page 
73 above in chapter 1.
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at random8 and strife pulls them apart,9 creating all kinds of impermanent beings whose 
existence only vaguely resembles that of their ancestors or descendants;10, 11 and (iii) 
human nourishment changes over time, with primitive men offering Aphrodite bloodless 
sacrifices unlike their modern descendants, who kill and eat animals in honor of deity.12  
Empedocles urges his audience to alter this practice,13 presuming (like Xenophanes) the 
mutability of human ethics.  In the διάκοσμος of Anaxagoras, (i) humans are animals, 
defined (like other animals) by their possession of ψυχή;14 (ii) life is discontinuous, with 
8 See fr. 65.3 Inwood: ταῦτά τε συμπίπτεσκον, ὅπηι συνέκυρσεν ἕκαστα (Simpl. in Cael. 586.7).
9 See fr. 38.1-7 Inwood: τοῦτο μὲν ἀμ' βροτέων μελέων ἀριδείκετον ὄγκον· / ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι 
συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα / γυῖα, τὰ σῶμα λέλογχε, βίου θαλέθοντος ἐν ἀκμῆι· / ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε 
κακῆισι διατμηθέντ' ἐρίδεσσι / πλάζεται ἄνδιχ' ἕκαστα περὶ ῥηγμῖνι βίοιο. / ὡσαύτως θάμνοισι καὶ 
ἰχθύσιν ὑδρομελάθροις / θηρσί τ' ὀρειλεχέεσσιν ἰδὲ πτεροβάμοσι κύμβαις (Simpl. in Phys. 1124.7).  
Notice the parity between animals and men here (not to mention plants): all are the results of love and 
strife mingling and separating wandering limbs.  As different combinations of the same raw materials 
acting under the same cosmic influences, they are fundamentally similar. 
10 E.g. πολλὰ μὲν ἀμφιπρόσωπα καὶ ἀμφίστερνα φύεσθαι, / βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωιρα, τὰ δ' ἔμπαλιν 
ἐξανατέλλειν / ἀνδροφυῆ βούκρανα (fr. 66 Inwood = Ael. N. a. 16.299).  See also fr. 67 Inwood: 
ἐννυχίους ὅρπηκας ἀνήγαγε κρινόμενον πῦρ, / οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον, / 
ἀμφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδεος αἶσαν ἔχοντες· / τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἱκέσθαι, / 
οὔτε τί πω μελέων ἐρατὸν δέμας ἐμφαίνοντας, / οὔτ' ἐνοπὴν οὔτ' αὖ ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι γυῖον (Simpl. 
in Phys. 381.29).  As with the human-headed oxen and the ox-headed men in fr. 66, the life 
experienced by these primitive human shoots cannot be the life familiar to the Ionians, a life which 
presupposes anatomically modern humans.  For more about the evolution of different life-forms 
(including humans) in the world-order imagined by Empedocles, see pages 70-80 above in chapter 1, 
and frr. 61, 64-65, 71-72 Inwood.  
11 Like Xenophanes (DK21B18), Empedocles also explicitly recognizes the adaptive ability to learn as an 
important human attribute.  See e.g. frr. 25.14 Inwood (μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει [Simpl. in Phys. 
157.25]) and 15 Inwood (παύσεις δ' ἀκαμάτων ἀνέμων μένος ... / ἄξεις δ' ἐξ Ἀίδαο καταφθιμένου 
μένος ἀνδρός [Diog. 8.59]).  The experience of Empedocles' student alters his nature discontinuously, 
giving him special power over natural phenomena, power that he cannot possess until his mind is 
enlarged as a result of studying with the poet-philosopher.  
12 τὴν οἵ γ' εὐσεβέεσσιν ἀγάλμασιν ἱλάσκοντο / … σμύρνης τ' ἀκρήτου θυσίαις λιβάνου τε θυώδους  … 
ἀλλὰ μύσος τοῦτ' ἔσκεν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστον, / θυμὸν ἀπορραίσαντας ἐέδμεναι ἠέα γυῖα (fr. 
122.4-10 Inwood = Porphyr. De abst. 2.20, 27).  See also frr. 126, 128 Inwood, which are quoted in full 
and discussed briefly on pages 85-79 above in chapter 1. 
13 οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιο δυσηχέος; (fr. 126 Inwood = Sext. Adv. math. 9.119).
14 καὶ ἀνθρώπους τε συμπαγῆναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶια ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει (DK59B4a = Simpl. in Phys. 34.18-
20, 27).  See also DK59B12: καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω, πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ 
(Simpl. in Phys. 156.13).  The rest of B12 is quoted and discussed on pages 84-94 above in chapter 1.
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the world-creating περιχώρησις starting small and growing indefinitely larger,15 creating 
multiplicity from an original material unity16 at a rate of speed that varies over time;17 and 
(iii) humans distinguish themselves by their application of intelligence in gathering 
nourishment.18
The Origin and Development of Ethics according to Democritus (3.2)
Democritus' predecessors in the Critical Tradition constructed διάκοσμοι around 
narratives of origin and development (sketched briefly in chapter 1): we have seen that 
Democritus followed suit (with the cosmological narrative outlined in chapter 2).  As 
extant in the historical record, certain Critical narratives of origin and development talk 
historically about the origin and development of humanity, treating human beings (i) as 
animals whose circumstances (ii) change over time and (iii) require adaptive approaches 
to nourishment if mankind is to survive and/or thrive.  Here too, if we judge from the 
fragments extant, Democritus followed suit, starting with a core narrative essentially 
15 καὶ πρῶτον ἀπό του σμικροῦ ἤρξατο περιχωρεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ πλέον περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχώρησει ἐπὶ πλέον 
(DK59B4a = Simpl. in Phys. 34.18-20, 27).
16 πρὶν δὲ ἀποκριθῆναι [ταῦτα] πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲ χροιὴ ἔνδηλος ἦν οὐδεμία· ἀπεκώλυε γὰρ ἡ 
σύμμιξις πάντων χρημάτων (DK59B4b = Simpl. in Phys. 34.20-27).
17 See DK59B9: οὕτω τούτων περιχωρούντων τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένων ὑπὸ βίης τε καὶ ταχυτῆτος (βίην δὲ 
ἡ ταχυτὴς ποιεῖ), ἡ δὲ ταχυτὴς αὐτῶν οὐδενὶ ἔοικε χρήματι τὴν ταχυτῆτα τῶν νῦν ἐόντων χρημάτων 
ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ πάντως πολλαπλασίως ταχύ ἐστι (Simpl. in Phys. 35.15).  For confirmation of the 
temporal evolution of Anaxagoras' universe, remember that the doxography credits him with a theory 
of animal (and human) evolution similar to that of Anaximander; see DK59A1 (Diog. 2.9) and A42 
(Hippol. Refut. 1.8.1), quoted and discussed on page 88 in chapter 1.
18 See DK59B4a and B21b (= A102, Plut. De fort. 3.98f), quoted on pages 87 and 90 in chapter 1, and 
discussed in the same chapter on pages 90-100.  Lacking explicit confirmation that Anaxagoras created 
a politogony, we are left with hints: cosmic νοῦς orders infinite matter into holding patterns that 
develop historically in rational sequence (the περιχώρησις); human νοῦς orders finite matter into 
households and cities (holding patterns that might also develop historically in rational sequence).  At 
the very least, where there is a diachronic narrative of the workings of cosmic νοῦς, nothing prohibits a 
diachronic narrative of human νοῦς (which the larger Anaxagorean narrative would have contained): 
Xenophanes' insight in DK21B18 (see note 5 above) is not out of place in the Anaxagorean διάκοσμος, 
which does not presume a static vision of humanity or human behavior. 
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identical to the one just recognized in the fragments of Anaximander, Xenophanes, 
Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, and developing it to fit his concept of ἀνάγκη.19
Humans as Animals in Democritus (3.2.1)
We have already examined the Democritean story of human and animal origins 
(extant in the doxographical fragments quoted on page 146 above in chapter 2), a story 
that shows clear affinity with similar stories credited to Anaximander,20 Xenophanes,21 
and Anaxagoras.22  All of these stories locate the origins of human and animal life in the 
water.  The more developed stories (e.g. those credited to Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and  
Democritus) have ancestral life-forms emerging from the water before diversifying to 
produce modern, ground-dwelling animal species, including humans.23  If humanity 
derives from primitive animal life thus, as these Critical stories say, then it stands to 
reason that human and animal behavior should be related somehow (as parallel instances 
of biological derivation from a common source, at the very least).  Like other Critical 
thinkers (e.g. Xenophanes in DK21B15),24 Democritus has ideas about the behavioral 
19 Where other thinkers structure their narratives around different core principles, e.g. the struggle 
between φιλότης and νεῖκος in Empedocles or the interaction between material and νοῦς in 
Anaxagoras.  Anaximander tells a story about boundless material (ἄπειρον), and Xenophanes talks 
about everything coming from and dissolving into the earth (γῆ, γαῖα).
20 See DK12A10 ([Plut.] Strom. 2), A11 (Hippol. Refut. 1.6.6), and A30 (Aet. 5.19.4; Censor. 4.7; Plut. 
Symp. 8.8.4, p. 730e), discussed above on pages 178-188.
21 See DK21B33 (Sext. Adv. math. 10.314) and A42 (Aet. 2.30.8), discussed in chapter 1 on page 39.
22 See DK59A1 (Diog. 2.9) and A42 (Hippol. Refut. 1.8.1), discussed in chapter 1 on page 88.
23 Plato inverts this order of development in the Timaeus (92a-c), having the demiurge create aquatic 
animals from the terrestrial ancestors distinguished by their senselessness (which renders them 
unworthy to breath undiluted air).
24 See also DK68A112 (= frr. 77, 79-80 Luria, Aristot. Metaph. 3.5.1009b1-17), quoted on page 162 
above in chapter 2, wherein Aristotle credits multiple philosophers (unnamed, though Democritus is 
quoted explicitly as one exemplar) with the idea that the perceptive experience of other animals proves 
the subjectivity of human perception (ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζώιων ὑγιαίνουσι τἀναντία περὶ 
τῶν αὐτῶν φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν).  Comparing human and animal behavior is certainly not unique to 
Democritus or the Critical Tradition: outside that tradition, it occurs routinely in Homeric epic and 
Archaic lyric poetry.
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likeness between humans and animals, ideas that have left their mark in the historical 
record.  Consider the following series of quotations from Democritus:
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
κατὰ  δὲ  ζώιων  ἔστιν  ὧν  φόνου  καὶ  μὴ 
φόνου ὧδε ἔχει· τὰ ἀδικέοντα καὶ θέλοντα 
ἀδικεῖν  ἀθῶιος  ὁ  κτείνων,  καὶ  πρὸς 
εὐεστοῦν  τοῦτο  ἔρδειν  μᾶλλον  ἢ  μή. 
(Luria)
Concerning the  killing  or  not  killing  of 
some living things it  stands thus: he who 
kills those which do or attempt to do wrong 
is  free  of  punishment,  and  doing  this 
contributes  more  to  well-being  than  not. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. 257 DK 
     = fr. D121 Taylor
     = fr. 620 Luria
Stob. 4.2.15
κτείνειν  χρὴ  τὰ  πημαίνοντα  παρὰ  δίκην 
πάντα  περὶ  παντὸς·  καὶ  ταῦτα  ὁ  ποιῶν 
εὐθυμίης  καὶ  δίκης  καὶ  θάρσεος  καὶ 
κτήσεως25 ἐν  παντὶ  κόσμωι  μέζω  μοῖραν 
μεθέξει.  (DK)
Si  devono  uccidere,  costi  quel  che  costi, 
tutti  coloro  che  fanno  danno  contro 
giustizia; chi farà questo parteciperà di una 
sorte migliore in ogni tipo di regime, una 
sorte di tranquillità dell'anima, di giustizia 
dinanzi  alla  legge,  di  sicurezza  e  di 
[proprietà].  (Luria, Krivushina, emended)
Democritus, fr. 258 DK
     = fr. D122 Taylor
     = fr. 621 Luria
Stob. 4.2.16
25 The MSS have κτάσεως, which DK emend to κτήσεως (as above) and Luria to ἐκτάσεως.  The 
emendation of DK resonates better with other fragments in the corpus (e.g. frr. 646, 721 Luria, which 
attest Democritean usage of κτῆσις) than Luria's ἔκτασις (which would be a hapax legomenon in the 
Democritean corpus, as far as I can tell). 
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ὅκωσπερ  περὶ  κιναδέων τε  καὶ  ἑρπετέων 
γεγράφαται τῶν πολεμίων, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ 
ἀνθρώπων  δοκεῖ  μοι  χρεὼν  εἶναι  ποιεῖν· 
κατὰ  νόμους  τοὺς  πατρίους  κτείνειν 
πολέμιον ἐν παντὶ κόσμωι, ἐν ὧι μὴ νόμος 
ἀπείργει·  ἀπείργει  δὲ  ἱερὰ  ἑκάστοισι 
ἐπιχώρια καὶ σπονδαὶ καὶ ὅρκοι. (Luria)
As it has  been written  concerning hostile 
beasts and reptiles, so it seems to me one 
should do in the case of men.  According to 
the ancestral laws one may kill an enemy in 
every form of community, provided that the 
law  does  not  prohibit  it;  prohibitions  are 
made by the religious enactments of each 
state, by treaties, and by oaths.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B259 DK
     = fr. D123 Taylor
     = fr. 622 Luria
Stob. 4.2.17
κιξάλλην καὶ  ληιστὴν πάντα κτείνων τις 
ἀθῶιος ἂν εἴη καὶ αὐτοχειρίηι καὶ κελεύων 
καὶ ψήφωι. (Luria)
Anyone who kills  any highway robber or 
pirate, whether by his own hand or by his 
order  or  by  his  vote,  should  be  free  of 
punishment.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B260 DK
     = fr. D124 Taylor
     = fr. 623 Luria
Stob. 4.2.18
  
This series is part of a larger collection of contiguous Democritean fragments preserved 
by Stobaeus (4.2.13-18).  The fragments quoted here are all covered under the same 
attribution, meaning that they probably derive from the same source—either another 
florilegium or some lost work of Democritus.26  If they are from a florilegium, then the 
fragments likely represent a collation of several statements Democritus delivered 
regarding the death penalty.27  In any event, the fragments offer a consistent ethical 
message: certain criminals should be killed with impunity.  Fr. 620 Luria identifies these 
26 The longer quotations in Stobaeus (e.g. DK68B172, B173-175, B179, B181-182, B191, B223, B228, 
B234-235, B248, B252-253, B255, B257-259, B262, B264-266, B276-279) indicate that he may have 
had access to more than just brief quotations (such as we find in florilegia).  See Gerlach (2008), 63.
27 For more discussion of Stobaeus as a source for Democritean fragments, see Gerlach (2008), 62-71.
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criminals as “those which do or attempt to do wrong” (τὰ ἀδικέοντα καὶ θέλοντα 
ἀδικεῖν); fr. 621 Luria similarly as “coloro che fanno danno contro giustizia” (τὰ 
πημαίνοντα παρὰ δίκην).  Both fragments refer to the criminals using neuter forms (τὰ 
ἀδικέοντα, τὰ πημαίνοντα), a neutrality that fr. 620 explains as including animals (κατὰ 
δὲ ζώιων ἔστιν ὧν φόνου καὶ μὴ φόνου ὧδε ἔχει);28 and both fragments state that the 
criminals have transgressed δίκη, making δίκη something that applies to humans and 
animals alike.29  Fr. 622 Luria makes the moral likeness between humans and animals 
explicit: just as hostile animals may be killed with impunity, so human enemies may be.  
Reading the last fragment (623 Luria) in light of this one, it seems that Democritus found 
no hard, categorical distinction between a human pirate and a dangerous animal.  
According to the δίκη that applies to humans and animals alike in fr. 621 Luria, both are 
28 τὰ ἀδικέοντα are τὰ ζῶια ἀδικέοντα.
29 This position is prefigured by Archilochus, who has Zeus minding the δίκη of animals: ὦ Ζεῦ, πάτερ 
Ζεῦ, σὸν μὲν οὐρανοῦ κράτος, / σὺ δ' ἔργ' ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ὁρᾶις / λεωργὰ καὶ θεμιστά, σοὶ δὲ θηρίων / 
ὕβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει (fr. 177 West = Stob. 1.3.34).  Contrast this with Hesiod, who gives animals no 
δίκη: τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων, / ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς / 
ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτοῖς (Opera et dies 276-278).  The quote from Hesiod is 
especially interesting in light of the discussion of Democritus that follows, since Democritus also has 
humanity acquiring νόμος as something extra (and unique): the difference is that Democritus sees 
νόμος as addition to (and a check on) animal δίκη, while Hesiod presents animals as lacking any δίκη.  
In the Critical Tradition, Democritus' position presupposes a position like the one taken by Heraclitus, 
who makes δίκη something universal rather than simply human: τῶι μὲν θεῶι καλὰ πάντα καὶ δίκαια 
(fr. 91 Marcovich, quoted in full on page 51 in chapter 1).  Another passage worth looking at in this 
context comes from Homer: ὡς οὐκ ἔστι λέουσι καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὅρκια πιστά, / οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες 
ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν, / ἀλλὰ κακὰ φρονέουσι διαμπερὲς ἀλλήλοισιν (Il. 22.262-264).  While δίκη 
is not explicitly mentioned, the Homeric animals' lack of ὅρκια recalls Democritus' position in fr. 622 
Luria that ὅρκοι constitute a human check on the ancestral custom of killing enemies (κατὰ νόμους 
τοὺς πατρίους κτείνειν πολέμιον) that is congruent with animal δίκη in frr. 620-621 Luria.  Looking at 
these passages together, we see that Homer, Archilochus, and Democritus represent animals as 
practicing moral behavior comparable to humans; Archilochus and Democritus think that animals can 
practice justice, with Democritus making them exemplars of the punitive justice that Homeric Achilles 
wants from Hector (and illustrates with an epic simile comparing himself to animals).  Hesiod denies 
the existence of animal justice, declining to describe behavior like that of Achilles with the word δίκη.  
See page 18 above, discussing fr. 559 Luria (also quoted below on page 199).     
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equally guilty and should be killed without mercy (κτείνειν χρὴ τὰ πημαίνοντα παρὰ 
δίκην πάντα περὶ παντὸς).  But in fr. 622 Luria, humanity has interposed something 
between this ruthless δίκη and the criminal: ancestral laws countermand it in certain 
circumstances (ἀπείργει δὲ ἱερὰ ἑκάστοισι ἐπιχώρια καὶ σπονδαὶ καὶ ὅρκοι).  Humanity 
improves upon the δίκη that it shares with animals (κτείνειν πολέμιον),30 adding its own 
νόμος (μὴ νόμος ἀπείργει).  Humans share certain behaviors with other animals (e.g. 
killing enemies), behaviors that they constrain with their own innovative customs (e.g. 
various rights of sanctuary or immunity).
Another fragment illustrating this phenomenon in Democritean ethics concerns 
the getting and rearing of children:         
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
ἀνθρώποισι  τῶν  ἀναγκαίων  δοκεῖ  εἶναι 
παῖδας  κτήσασθαι  ἀπὸ  φύσιος  καὶ 
καταστάσιός  τινος  ἀρχαίης.  δῆλον  δὲ  καὶ 
τοῖς  ἄλλοις  ζώιοισι·  πάντα  γὰρ  ἔκγονα 
κτᾶται  κατὰ  φύσιν  ἐπωφελείης  γε 
οὐδεμιᾶς εἵνεκα· ἀλλ' ὅταν γένηται, ταλαι-
πωρεῖ καὶ τρέφει ἕκαστον ὡς δύναται καὶ 
ὑπερδέδοικε,  μέχρι  σμικρὰ  ἦι,  καὶ  ἤν  τι 
πάθηι,  ἀνιᾶται.  ἡ  μὲν  φύσις  τοιαύτη 
πάντων ἐστὶν ὅσσα ψυχὴν ἔχει· τῶι δὲ δὴ 
ἀνθρώπωι  νομίζον  ἤδη  πεποίηται,  ὥστε 
καὶ  ἐπαύρεσίν  τινα  γίγνεσθαι  ἀπὸ  τοῦ 
ἐκγόνου.
People  think  of  having  children  as 
necessary because of their nature and their 
long-established constitution. This is clear 
from the other  animals too;  they all  have 
young in accordance with their nature, but 
not for any benefit. But when they are born 
each one takes trouble to rear them as best 
it  can  and  fears  for  them when  they  are 
little  and  grieves  if  anything  happens  to 
them.  The nature of all living things is like 
that. But as far as mankind are concerned 
the opinion has grown up that there is some 
advantage  to  be  derived  from  one's 
offspring.
Democritus, fr. 278 DK 
     = fr. D142 Taylor
30 Note that this justice is practical (answering the real historical problem of piracy with brutal 
efficiency), as recognized by Procopé (1989), 312.
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     = fr. 562 Luria
Stob. 4.24.33
All animals bear offspring and care for them when they are small (ἡ μὲν φύσις τοιαύτη 
πάντων ἐστὶν ὅσσα ψυχὴν ἔχει), but humans are unique in expecting that children will 
prove beneficial to their parents (τῶι δὲ δὴ ἀνθρώπωι νομίζον ἤδη πεποίηται, ὥστε καὶ 
ἐπαύρεσίν τινα γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκγόνου).  That expectation persists because of a 
certain ancient arrangement (καταστάσιός τινος ἀρχαίης).  Once again, human beings 
have improved animal life (getting and rearing offspring) with custom (offspring assist 
their parents).  Here the custom is an informal opinion (νομίζον), where earlier it was 
more formal (e.g. σπονδαὶ καὶ ὅρκοι in fr. 622 Luria above).31  At this point, we begin to 
wonder whether Democritus expressed any ideas about the origins of these customs.  Did 
the atomist provide an origin-and-development narrative explaining how primitive 
humanity differentiated from the animals, taking ancient bestial habits (like killing 
enemies and begetting children) and embellishing these with the abundance of different 
human customs (formal and informal)32 known to the ancient Greeks?33
31 On the increasingly commonplace distinction between formal and informal law or custom in 
Democritus' day, see Cole (1967), 113-115.
32 Archaic and Classical Greeks were very aware that different human societies have different customs: 
see e.g. Homer, Il. 4.433-438; Od. 9.105-115; Herodot. 3.38.  This awareness appears reflected in the 
Critical Tradition, e.g. in Xenophanes (DK21B3, B16).
33 Our initial response should be affirmative.  Reading fr. B278 DK (quoted above on page 188), Cole 
(1967) emphasizes the implication of historical development: “The phrase ἤδη πεποίηται indicates that 
there was in Democritus' view a time when the particular nomizon with which he is dealing did not 
exist” (115).  Cole then compares this phrase with ἐκ τοῦ περιεῦντος ἤδη from fr. B144 DK (quoted on 
page 191 below): “It is only now (ἤδη = nunc demum), not at all periods in man's history, that a 
nomizon governing child rearing is operative; it was when a condition of superfluity obtained, and only 
then (tunc demum), that certain arts became possible” (115).  Section 3.2.2 validates this insight. 
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Democritean Kulturgeschichte (3.2.2)  
While few fragments shed direct light on Democritus' ideas about human cultural 
evolution, those that do preserve very interesting information, confirming some of what 
we have already guessed above and paving the way for deeper inquiry:
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
γελοῖοι δ' ἴσως ἐσμὲν ἐπὶ τῶι μανθάνειν τὰ 
ζῶια  σεμνύνοντες,  ὧν  ὁ  Δημόκριτος 
ἀποφαίνει  μαθητὰς  ἐν  τοῖς  μεγίστοις 
γεγονότας ἡμᾶς· ἀράχνης ἐν ὑφαντικῆι καὶ 
ἀκεστικῆι,  χελιδόνος  ἐν  οἰκοδομίαι,  καὶ 
τῶν  λιγυρῶν,  κύκνου  καὶ  ἀηδόνος,  ἐν 
ὠιδῆι κατὰ μίμησιν.
Perhaps we are ridiculous to make a fuss 
about  animals  who  can  learn,  when 
Democritus  shows  that  in  the  most 
important  things  we  have  learned  from 
them,  spinning  and  mending  from  the 
spider,  housebuilding  from  the  swallow, 
and  singing  by  imitation  from songbirds, 
the swan and the nightingale.
Democritus, fr. B154 DK
     = fr. 187a Taylor
     = fr. 559 Luria
Plut. De sollert. animal. 20 p. 974a
ἡμιόνους δὲ λέγει μὴ τίκτειν· μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν 
ὁμοίας  μήτρας  τοῖς  ἄλλοις  ζώιοις, 
ἑτερομόρφους δέ, ἥκιστα δυναμένας γονὴν 
δέξασθαι· μὴ γὰρ εἶναι φύσεως ποίημα τὴν 
ἡμίονον,  ἀλλὰ  ἐπινοίας  ἀνθρωπίνης  καὶ 
τόλμης ὡς ἂν εἴποις μοιχιδίου ἐπιτέχνημα 
τοῦτο  καὶ  κλέμμα.  δοκεῖ  δέ  μοι,  ἦ  δ'  ὅς, 
ὄνου  ἵππον  βιασαμένου  κατὰ  τύχην 
κυῆσαι,  μαθητὰς  δὲ  ἀνθρώπους  τῆς  βίας 
ταύτης  γεγενημένους  εἶτα  μέντοι 
προελθεῖν  ἐπὶ  τὴν  τῆς  γονῆς  αὐτῶν 
συνήθειαν.
He also says that mules do not breed, for 
their  wombs  are  not  like  those  of  other 
animals,  but  of  a  different  form,  hardly 
capable  of  containing  offspring.  For  the 
mule is not a product of nature, but a crafty 
contrivance  of  human  ingenuity  and,  one 
might  almost  say,  of  sexual  violence.  It 
seems  to  me,  he  says,  that  a  mare  once 
happened  to  give  birth  after  having  been 
raped by an ass, and men, getting the idea 
from this violent act,  went on to  develop 
this kind of breeding.
Democritus, fr. A151 DK
     = fr. 145 Taylor
     = fr. 561 Luria
Ael. N. a. 12.16
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Δημόκριτος  μὲν  τοίνυν,  ἀνὴρ  οὐ 
φυσιολογώτατος  μόνον  τῶν  ἀρχαίων, 
ἀλλὰ  καὶ  τῶν  ἱστορουμένων  οὐδενὸς 
ἧττον  πολυπράγμων,  μουσικήν  φησι 
νεωτέραν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδίδωσι 
λέγων μὴ ἀποκρῖναι τἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ ἐκ 
τοῦ περιεῦντος ἤδη γενέσθαι.
Democritus,  who  was  not  only  the  most 
learned about nature of all the ancients but 
no less industrious than any other inquirer, 
says  that  music  is  more  recent,  and 
identifies its cause,  saying that it  was not 
singled  out  by  necessity,  but  arose  as  a 
result of plenty.
Democritus, fr. B144 DK
     = fr. 213 Taylor
     = fr. 568 Luria
Philod.  De musica 4.31, p. 108.29 Kemke; 
Herculaneum pap. 1497, col. 36.29-39
     
We have already observed an implicit link between human and animal morality in section 
3.2.1 (where people and animals appear to share the same basic δίκη, augmented in the 
case of humans by additional νόμοι).  Fr. 559 Luria goes further than this, positing an 
explicit historical connection that makes ancestral humans students (μαθηταί) of the 
animals in the most important arts (μαθητὰς ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις γεγονότας ἡμᾶς).  Fr. 561 
Luria improves on this revelation by showing clearly how Democritus imagined humans 
learning from animals as students (μαθηταί again): confronted with the chance rape of a 
mare by an ass and its natural consequence, he says34 that our ancestors learned how to 
breed mules (ὄνου ἵππον βιασαμένου κατὰ τύχην κυῆσαι, μαθητὰς δὲ ἀνθρώπους τῆς 
βίας ταύτης γεγενημένους εἶτα μέντοι προελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς γονῆς αὐτῶν συνήθειαν).  
Finally, fr. 568 Luria indicates that Democritus used some kind of historical timetable, 
according to which certain cultural arts (those answering material necessity, τἀναγκαῖον) 
developed naturally before others (which exist as a result of abundance).  Thus, fr. 559 
34 δοκεῖ δέ μοι, ἦ δ' ὅς: notice that Aelian makes this a direct quote.
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tells us that Democritus thought important human habits (there is no reason not to think 
of these as νόμοι)35 were learned from animals; fr. 561 gives us one mechanism through 
which Democritus imagined this occurring (human observation of chance occurrences in 
nature); and fr. 568 indicates that he had a historical narrative worked out, a Kultur-
geschichte explaining which νόμοι developed first and why.  While we lack any way of 
determining conclusively the precise content of this narrative that Democritus created, we 
can make a number of reasonable inferences by reading his fragments against other data 
that survive outside the early atomist corpus.
The external data of interest here are ancient narratives of human ethical evolution 
that (i) imagine human beings acquiring culture for themselves (especially through the 
accidental observation of nature) and (ii) show some historical connection to Democritus. 
Of the many examples of ancient Kulturgeschichte that survive,36 the following serve our 
needs best: (1) Archelaus, fr. A4 DK; (2) Plato, Protagoras 320d-322e; (3) Plato, Leges 
3.676a-683a; (4) Polybius, Historiae 6.5.1-6.10.12; (5) Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca 
historica 1.7-8; (6) Lucretius, De rerum natura 5.925-1457.  Reviewing these exempla in 
chronological order allows us to see how Critical thinkers approach Kulturgeschichte
in the time of Democritus (whose contemporaries in the tradition include Archelaus, 
Protagoras, and Plato),37 and how later treatments near the atomist's ideological position 
35 Democritus himself certainly thought of them this way.  See the sources quoted on pages 133-143 
above in chapter 2, summarized effectively by Diog. 9.44: ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους καὶ κενόν, 
τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα νενομίσθαι (frr. 93, 382 Luria).  Like taste, color, and temperature, human habit  
(whether formal law or informal custom) is just another convention (νόμος) defined by temporary 
atomic configurations (i.e. the evolving physical constitutions of certain individual people as they 
relate to one another and the surrounding environment over time).   
36 For a thorough survey of the ancient Kulturgeschichte extant, see Cole (1967), 1-10. 
37 See discussions (1), (2), and (3) below.
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change in his wake.  While it cannot tell us precisely what new material Democritus 
added to the debate, this exercise will permit us to estimate more intelligently, giving us a 
reasonable idea of Democritus' Kulturgeschichte—an idea whose validity can be verified 
against the fragments that survive from the atomist's work.
(1) Archelaus, fr. A4 DK.  Doxographers remember Archelaus as an Ionian 
φυσικός contemporary with Democritus (fifth century), an associate of Anaxagoras and 
Socrates (DK60A1-3).  As part of a typical Critical cosmogony (in which everything 
results from primal elements heating and cooling),38 he is said to have composed an 
account of animal and human life that incorporated a Kulturgeschichte.   Hippolytus' 
summary of this account casts light on the Critical conversation Democritus was entering 
when he wrote his own lost Kulturgeschichte:
TEXT (DK) TRANSLATION (KRS)
περὶ  δὲ  ζώιων  φησίν,  ὅτι  θερμαινομένης 
τῆς γῆς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῶι κάτω μέρει, ὅπου 
τὸ  θερμὸν  καὶ  το  ψυχρὸν  ἐμίσγετο, 
ἀνεφαίνετο τά τε ἄλλα ζῶια πολλὰ καὶ οἱ 
ἄνθρωποι,  ἅπαντα  τὴν  αὐτὴν  δίαιταν 
ἔχοντα  ἐκ  τῆς  ἰλύος  τρεφόμενα  (ἦν  δὲ 
ὀλιγοχρόνια),  ὕστερον  δὲ  αὐτοῖς  ἡ  ἐξ 
ἀλλήλων  γένεσις  συνέστη.  καὶ  διεκρί-
θησαν  ἄνθρωποι  ἀπὸ  τῶν  ἄλλων  καὶ 
ἡγεμόνας  καὶ  νόμους  καὶ  τέχνας  καὶ 
πόλεις  καὶ  τὰ ἄλλα συνέστησαν.  νοῦν δὲ 
λέγει πᾶσιν ἐμφύεσθαι ζώιοις ὁμοίως. 
On the  subject  of  animals,  he  holds  that 
when the earth was originally getting warm 
in the lower region, where the hot and the 
cold were mingled, many animals began to 
appear,  including  men,  all  with  the  same 
manner  of  life  and  all  deriving  their 
nourishment  from  the  slime.  These  were 
short-lived; but later they began to be born 
from one another. Men were distinguished 
from animals, and established rulers, laws, 
crafts, cities, and so on.  Mind, he says, is 
inborn in all animals alike; for each one of 
38 See DK60A4-18.  The precise nature of Archelaus' cosmogony is clouded by the vagueness of our 
testimonia, but he is clearly supposed to have come up with a narrative similar to those examined 
already in chapter 1.  In his narrative, the world-order results from certain primal elements (here the 
doxographers differ) combining and dissociating regularly as they heat and cool (temperature appears 
as a crucial causative force in frr. A4, A8, and A14 DK); some sources have Archelaus positing an 
Anaxagorean νοῦς with some kind of control as well (e.g. frr. A12 and A18 DK).  For a more complete 
interpretation, see frr. 512-515 KRS and the accompanying discussion.   
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χρῆσθαι  γὰρ ἕκαστον καὶ  τῶν ζώιων τῶι 
νῶι, τὸ μὲν βραδυτέρως, τὸ δὲ ταχυτέρως.
the animals, as well as man, makes use of 
Mind,  though  some  more  rapidly  than 
others.  
Archelaus, fr. A4 DK
     = fr. 515 KRS
 
Hippol. Refut. 1.9.5-6
Unlike earlier fragments of Critical Kulturgeschichte extant—e.g. Xenophanes (DK21B4, 
B18),39 Empedocles (frr. 122, 123 Inwood),40 and Anaxagoras (DK59B4a, B21b)41—this 
one provides an historical narrative of human cultural development that is both explicit 
and intact (though only in summary form).  Following the line of thought represented by 
Xenophanes, Archelaus explains human cultural progress by human activity rather than 
appeal to divine intervention: ἄνθρωποι ... καὶ ἡγεμόνας καὶ νόμους καὶ τέχνας καὶ 
πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνέστησαν.  Like Anaxagoras, he makes mind a universal attribute: 
humans differ from other animals not in possessing it, but in how they possess it (χρῆσθαι 
γὰρ ἕκαστον καὶ τῶν ζώιων τῶι νῶι, τὸ μὲν βραδυτέρως, τὸ δὲ ταχυτέρως).  In both of 
these choices—eschewing any appeal to divine intervention42 and construing man as 
another animal43—Archelaus thinks much like his contemporary Democritus.44  Thus, 
39 See page 42 above in chapter 1.
40 See page 82 above in chapter 1.
41 See pages 87 and 90 above in chapter 1.
42 For Democritus' reluctance to ascribe human ethical innovation to gods, see fr. 593 Luria: ὑγιείην 
εὐχῆισι παρὰ θεῶν αἰτέονται ἄνθρωποι, τὴν δὲ ταύτης δύναμιν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχοντες οὐκ ἴσασιν· 
ἀκρασίηι δὲ τἀναντία πρήσσοντες αὐτοὶ προδόται τῆς ὑγείης τῆισιν ἐπιθυμίηισιν γίνονται (Stob. 
3.18.30).  See also fr. 580 Luria: τῶν λογίων ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγοι ἀνατείναντες τὰς χεῖρας ἐνταῦθα, ὃν 
νῦν ἠέρα καλέομεν οἱ Ἕλληνες· «πάντα, <εἶπαν>, Ζεὺς μυθέεται καὶ πάνθ' οὗτος οἶδε καὶ διδοῖ καὶ 
ἀφαιρέεται καὶ βασιλεὺς οὗτος τῶν πάντων» (Clem. Protr. 68, Strom. 5.103; Euseb. Praep. Evang. 
13.13.27).
43 See section 3.2.1 above.
44 Xenophanes anticipates Democritus in playing down human connections with divinity (DK21B14, 
B16, B18, B23) and embracing our likeness to beasts (DK21B15).  This does not make the atomist a 
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what remains of his world-ordering account at once confirms that Kulturgeschichte was 
part of the Critical cosmogonic narrative in Democritus' day, and provides an instance of 
the genre that agrees substantially with what we know of the atomist (who also derives 
men and other animals from slime and then has men develop their own unique culture 
sometime later).45  Archelaus shows us that in composing his atomist Kulturgeschichte 
(wherein humans share physical ancestry with other animals and learn culture from 
interaction with them), Democritus was not doing anything extremely or suspiciously 
unusual: the generic outlines of his project appear entirely congruent with contemporary 
practice in the Critical Tradition—contemporary practice that seems to descend naturally 
from earlier (as far as we can tell: Xenophanes and Archelaus might appear less similar to 
one another and/or to Democritus if we knew more of their work, though it is hard to 
imagine any divergence between them that would invalidate the basic resemblance 
recognized here).
(2) Plato, Protagoras 320d-322e.  The Athenian philosopher Plato is another 
contemporary of Democritus who shares in (or at least interacts extensively with) the 
Critical Tradition: the argument offered by the titular character in the Timaeus is clearly a 
Critical διάκοσμος (whatever the author's intent in proposing it).46  In the Protagoras, 
Plato puts a Kulturgeschichte in the mouth of Protagoras, an Abderite from the generation 
immediately preceding Democritus (who would certainly have been at least somewhat 
direct or conscious heir of the philosopher-poet.
45 For the origin of animal life in mud, see page 146 above in chapter 2.  The beginning of this section 
(3.2.2) cites what remains of his ideas on the origins of human culture.
46 Like the Critical thinkers discussed in chapter 1.3 above, Plato's Timaeus provides a cosmogony that 
embraces zoogony (91a-92c), anthropogony (69c-92c), and some reflection on human ethics (passim).  
For an interpretation of the Timaeus that coheres well with my approach, see Campbell (2000). 
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familiar with the work of a fellow townsman).47  While Plato's impression of Protagoras' 
understanding of human prehistory is too long to quote in full here, we can summarize it 
and extract the text most important for the task at hand.
Readers familiar with the Platonic dialogue will remember that Protagoras' 
Kulturgeschichte is offered as part of a larger monologue: it is the μῦθος that the sophist 
offers as a prelude to his λόγος explaining that justice (δικαιοσύνη, πολιτικὴ ἀρετή) is 
teachable (323a-328d).  The story begins as the gods mix fire and earth underground to 
form animals: they then assign Prometheus and Epimetheus to distribute capabilities 
(δυνάμεις) among the various different species (including humans).  After begging the 
distribution for himself, Epimetheus forgets to give humanity anything, making all useful 
physical qualities (strength, speed, claws and teeth, small or large size, thick hair, tough 
skins, hooves, reproductive prowess) over to other animals and leaving the first people 
naked and helpless.  Prometheus corrects this fatal mistake by stealing technical skill 
(ἔντεχνος σοφία) from Hephaestus and Athena along with fire.  Equipped with fire and 
the ability to make shrewd use of it, mankind survives and begins to create culture:
47 Doxographical tradition connects them as master and pupil, inverting the chronological relationship 
(see frr. lxix-lxxiii, lxxxi-lxxxii Luria).  While it is not inconceivable that they overlapped 
chronologically and even shared one another's company (Eusebius calls Protagoras the ἑταῖρος of 
Democritus in Praep. Evang. 14.3.7 = fr. lxxii Luria), this appears unlikely since the work of Ferguson 
(1967).  At the moment, consensus is that Democritus was at least aware of the earlier Protagoras (see 
e.g. SEP s.v. “The Sophists”), whom he is supposed to have joined Plato in contradicting: καθὼς ὅ τε 
Δημόκριτος καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἀντιλέγοντες τῶι Πρωταγόραι ἐδίδασκον (Sext. Adv. Math 7.389, p. 275b = 
fr. lxxiii Luria; see also Plut. Adv. Colot. 1108f, discussed above on page 3 in the Introduction).  I see 
no reason to dispute this consensus, and accordingly I assume that the historical Protagoras represents 
positions at once prior to Democritus and familiar to him.
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TEXT (Denyer) TRANSLATION (Taylor [1991])
ἐπειδὴ  δὲ  ὁ  ἄνθρωπος  θείας  μετέσχε 
μοίρας,  πρῶτον  μὲν  διὰ  τὴν  τοῦ  θεοῦ 
συγγένειαν ζώιων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν, 
καὶ  ἐπεχείρει  βωμούς  τε  ἱδρύεσθαι  καὶ 
ἀγάλματα  θεῶν·  ἔπειτα  φωνὴν  καὶ 
ὀνόματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῆι τέχνηι, καὶ 
οἰκήσεις  καὶ  ἐσθῆτας  καὶ  ὑποδέσεις  καὶ 
στρωμνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ηὕρετο. 
οὕτω  δὴ  παρεσκευασμένοι  κατ'  ἀρχὰς 
ἄνθρωποι ὤικουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ 
ἦσαν· ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ 
τὸ πανταχῆι αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ 
ἡ  δημιουργικὴ  τέχνη  αὐτοῖς  πρὸς  μὲν 
τροφὴν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν 
θηρίων  πόλεμον  ἐνδεής—πολιτικὴν  γὰρ 
τέχνην οὔπω εἶχον,  ἧς  μέρος πολεμική—
ἐζήτουν  δὴ  ἀθροίζεσθαι  καὶ  σώιζεσθαι 
κτίζοντες  πόλεις·  ὅτ'  οὖν  ἁθροισθεῖεν, 
ἠδίκουν  ἀλλήλους  ἅτε  οὐκ  ἔχοντες  τὴν 
πολιτικὴν τέχνην,  ὥστε  πάλιν σκεδαννύ-
μενοι διεφθείροντο.
Since man shared a divine gift, first of all 
through his kinship with the gods he was 
the only creature to worship them, and he 
began  to  erect  altars  and  images  of  the 
gods.  Then he soon developed the use of 
articulate  speech  and  of  words,  and 
discovered how to make houses and clothes 
and shoes and bedding and how to till the 
soil.  Thus  equipped,  men  lived  at  the 
beginning in scattered units, and there were 
no cities; so they began to be destroyed by 
wild  beasts,  since  they  were  altogether 
weaker. Their practical art was sufficient to 
provide  food,  but  insufficient  for  fighting 
against  the  beasts—for  they  did  not  yet 
possess the art of running a city, of which 
the  art  of  warfare  is  part—and  so  they 
sought  to  come  together  and  save 
themselves by founding cities. Now when 
they came together, they treated each other 
with  injustice,  not  possessing  the  art  of 
running a city, so they scattered and began 
to be destroyed once again. 
Plato. Protag. 322a-c
In the end, Zeus rescues mankind by having Hermes give them respect (αἰδώς) and 
justice (δίκη), the essential qualities they need to found successful cities (322c).  The king 
of the gods tells his messenger to distribute these qualities generally to all people, rather 
than selectively to individuals.  If a citizen is unable to partake of these essential virtues 
for some reason, the punishment is execution.48  In the speech (λόγος) that follows this 
story, Protagoras explains how the laws and customs of a city nurture and improve the 
48 καὶ νόμον γε θὲς παρ' ἐμοῦ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως 
(Protag. 322d).  Notice the similarity between this harsh assessment and the judgment of Democritus: 
κτείνειν χρὴ τὰ πημαίνοντα παρὰ δίκην πάντα περὶ παντὸς (Stob. 4.2.16 = fr. 621 Luria).
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individual endowment of respect and justice in each one of its citizens, offering an 
explanation of human ethics that resonates significantly with the Democritean ethical 
corpus.49
There are several interesting things to notice here.  In the first place, Protagoras' 
μῦθος comes out of the Critical tradition.  In the beginning, all we have are primal 
elements: fire, earth, and traditional Olympians taking the place of other thinkers' 
ordering principle(s), e.g. Democritean ἀνάγκη.  Here as elsewhere (see the previous 
chapters), these elements combine to create animal life (zoogony) that includes the 
human experience (anthropogony culminating in a politogony that in this case remains 
fully intact in the record).  If this story does not originate with the historical Protagoras, it 
certainly could have.  It has all the hallmarks of a genuine Critical διάκοσμος.  
The second thing to notice is the world that Protagoras' primitive men inhabit.  It 
is a savage world in which animals fight among themselves for survival.  Having only 
fire and mental acuity (which they put to good use inventing religion, language, shelter, 
clothing, and basic agriculture),50 ancestral humanity is ill-equipped for this war (πρὸς δὲ 
τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής).  Gathering together for protection, they found the first 
cities, which save them from the other animals but not from one another (ἠδίκουν 
49 Ferguson (1967) found the similarity so striking that he concluded Plato was putting Democritean ideas 
in the mouth of Protagoras.  I am not prepared to go this far, preferring to say that the two Abderites 
show a remarkably similar approach to ethics and the world-order generally: Democritus is less of a 
relativist than Protagoras, but he is still ultimately a relativist, since objective truth remains hidden in 
the abyss (ἐτεῆι δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῶι γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια: Diog. 9.72 = fr. 51 Luria) and men are 
separated from reality (γινώσκειν τε χρή, φησίν, ἄνθρωπον τῶιδε τῶι κανόνι, ὅτι ἐτεῆς ἀπήλλακται: 
Sext. Adv. math. 7.137 = fr. 48 Luria).  The similarities between Protagorean and Democritean ethics 
will be brought up later as they become relevant.
50 Notice that none of these skills is itself the gift of a god: Protagoras' early men, like Xenophanes' (in 
DK21B18, quoted in note 5 above), must discover things for themselves.
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ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην).  Civic virtues are acquired late as an 
amendment to the savage nature that man shares with other animals (similar to the 
situation that we observed already on pages 185-189, where we interpreted Democritus, 
frr. 620-623 and 562 Luria).51     
The most important difference between Archelaus' Kulturgeschichte and that of 
Protagoras, as extant, is that the latter puts explicit selective pressure on early mankind.  
Archelaus' primitive humans develop culture for reasons that remain unexamined, though 
there is some hint that mankind is different from other animals and that that difference 
manifests itself in the human mind.  While the rudimentary development of human 
culture remains similarly opaque in the myth of Protagoras, with the development of 
basic crafts following the gift of Prometheus in no particular order, its culmination in the 
creation of cities involves deliberate struggle—first the war with other animals, then civil 
strife between men (a new form of war: this myth may owe something to Heraclitus).52  
Whether the myth goes back to Protagoras or Plato, it shows that Democritus was not 
doing something entirely unexpected or unusual when he created a Kulturgeschichte 
driven by human interaction with necessity (the selective pressure in early atomism).53  
Critical philosophers close to him were thinking along similar lines, looking for 
51 In the speech that follows our story, Plato's Protagoras strengthens the likeness between himself and 
Democritus when he recognizes a kind of savage justice in animals, who retaliate against those who 
wrong them (with no thought of teaching anyone anything or influencing future behavior): οὐδεὶς γὰρ 
κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τούτωι τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ 
θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται (324a-b).  This looks much like the δίκη that humans and animals share 
in Democritus, frr. 620-623 Luria.
52 See Heraclitus, frr. 28-29 Marcovich, quoted and discussed on page 50 in chapter 1.
53 See fr. 568 Luria, quoted above on pages 173 and 191, in which music develops later than arts that 
serve needs more immediate.  A central role for necessity in Democritean Kulturgeschichte is not 
unexpected, since necessity is responsible for everything in early atomism: see chapter 2, especially 
2.2.  
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something more than just divine intervention or incomprehensible accident to drive their 
narrative accounts of human cultural development.
(3) Plato, Leges 3.676a-683a.  Plato puts a more complex Kulturgeschichte in the 
mouth of the Athenian stranger in this passage.  Like the Platonic Protagoras, the 
Athenian stranger offers his narrative as background to a practical discussion of ethics: 
Protagoras believes that justice is teachable, and the Athenian stranger believes that an 
ideal city can be created (if lawgivers conceive human nature correctly and use this 
conception to come up with laws).54  Once again, the complete narrative is too long to be 
reproduced, obliging us to resort to summary and selective quotation.
The Athenian stranger's story begins with the familiar observation that infinite 
time brings changes55—among these, the foundation of human cities and their maturation 
in virtue and vice.  He then lays out an ancient theory of catastrophism in which human 
beings repeatedly create civilization (i.e. cities and the complex cultural skills needed to 
sustain these), suffer an incredible calamity that destroys everything they have made, and 
then rebuild it from scratch (with no memory of what it was).56  According to this theory, 
54 Like the ethical outlook taken by Plato's Protagoras (see note 49 above), the Athenian stranger's 
practical ethical platform also resonates significantly with the Democritean ethical corpus (as extant).  
Points of coincidence between his ethics and early atomism will be noted as they become relevant. 
55 This is the first point the stranger makes: ΑΘ. πολιτείας δὲ ἀρχὴν τίνα ποτὲ φῶμεν γεγονέναι; μῶν οὐκ 
ἐνθένδε τις ἂν αὐτὴν ῥᾶιστά τε καὶ κάλλιστα κατίδοι;  ΚΛ. Πόθεν; ... ΑΘ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους 
τε καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῶι τοιούτωι (Leg. 676a-b).  Later, he restates it thus: ΑΘ. 
Οὐκοῦν προϊόντος μὲν τοῦ χρόνου, πληθύοντος δ' ἡμῶν τοῦ γένους, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν καθεστηκότα 
προελήλυθεν πάντα;  ΚΛ. Ὀρθότατα (Leg. 678b).  Compare Porphyry's summary of Pythagoras on 
page 106 above in chapter 1.  This kind of thinking is characteristic of the Critical tradition. 
56 ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ λέγωμεν ἔχειν τότε, ὅτ’ ἐγένετο ἡ φθορά, τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράγματα, 
μυρίαν μέν τινα φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν, γῆς δ’ ἀφθόνου πλῆθος πάμπολυ, ζῴων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρρόντων, 
βουκόλι’ ἄττα, καὶ εἴ τί που αἰγῶν περιλειφθὲν ἐτύγχανεν γένος, σπάνια καὶ ταῦτα νέμουσιν εἶναι ζῆν 
τότε κατ' ἀρχάς;  ΚΛ. Τί μήν;  ΑΘ. Πόλεως δὲ καὶ πολιτείας πέρι καὶ νομοθεσίας, ὧν νῦν γέγονεν ἡμῖν 
σύμπαντα, πόλεις τε καὶ πολιτεῖαι καὶ τέχναι καὶ νόμοι, καὶ πολλὴ μὲν πονηρία, πολλὴ δὲ ἀρετή;  ΚΛ. 
Οὐδαμῶς (Leg. 678a).  This cyclic understanding of history recalls the διάκοσμος of Heraclitus 
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every kind of social arrangement that anyone can think of has already been tried many 
times in the past, meaning that human ethics are predictable (i.e. they evolve naturally in 
response to recurring stimuli).57  There follows a lengthy discussion defining the cycle of 
civilization more precisely: primitive men survive world-ending calamities (the stranger 
posits a deluge) in isolated mountainous areas (Leg. 677b), from which they emerge to 
found small settlements in the foothills (Leg. 681a), which become the eventual parents 
of cities in the plains (Leg. 682a-c)—cities whose subsequent destruction restarts the 
cycle.  The mountain folk lack technology and society (all tools and technical knowledge 
having perished as a result of the latest catastrophe); the city folk are technically adept 
and socially complex; and the hill folk occupy a middle ground, figuratively as well as 
literally.  In telling this story, the Athenian stranger stresses an early version of the myth 
of the noble savage, positing that the less technically and socially developed people are 
inherently morally superior to their more civilized descendants (whose arts include not 
only helpful trades but also tricks for harming other city-dwellers, e.g. the art of lying, 
which is supposedly unknown to naïve primitives).58
(chapter 1.3.3) or (especially) Empedocles (1.3.5), in which the κόσμος evolves in a regular cycle 
(which in the case of Empedocles include regular fluctuations in the way people treat each other, i.e. 
regular ethical revolutions to match the physical revolution of the four elements).  
57 ΑΘ. Μῶν οὖν οὐ μυρίαι μὲν ἐπὶ μυρίαις ἡμῖν γεγόνασι πόλεις ἐν τούτωι τῶι χρόνωι, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν 
δὲ τοῦ πλήθους λόγον οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐφθαρμέναι; πεπολιτευμέναι δ' αὖ πάσας πολιτείας πολλάκις 
ἑκασταχοῦ; ... ΚΛ. Ἀναγκαῖον.  ΑΘ. Ταύτης δὴ πέρι λάβωμεν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, τῆς μεταβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν· 
τάχα γὰρ ἂν ἴσως δείξειεν ἡμῖν τὴν πρώτην τῶν πολιτειῶν γένεσιν καὶ μετάβασιν (Leg. 676b-c).  
Notice the focus on finding the αἰτία for human ethical behavior (like the creation and implementation 
of a πολιτεία).  Αἰτιολογία is important for the Athenian stranger as for Democritus (see page 121 
above in chapter 2, especially note 23). 
58 See Leg. 677b, 679a-e.
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Like the stories already examined, the Athenian stranger's Kulturgeschichte 
presumes significant human involvement in the invention of culture (which primitive 
people repeatedly discover and develop for themselves).59  Like the myth of Protagoras, it 
introduces αἰτίαι—impersonal motivating forces that guide human invention the way 
πόλεμος and ἀδικία do in Protagoras' myth.  The initial αἰτία is a disaster (φθορά, νόσος, 
κατακλυσμός: Leg. 677a; φθορά: Leg. 682c) that destroys urban civilization, sparing only 
a few human survivors, mountain-dwellers whose existence is defined by solitude 
(ἐρημία: Leg. 678e).  While these survivors and their immediate descendants retain 
resources and technical abilities sufficient to live, they desire human company, which the 
recent disaster has made scarce.  The Athenian stranger is careful to make satisfying this 
desire a matter of preference rather than strict necessity60 (as in Protagoras' myth, where 
the πόλεμος among the animals demands that men create cities or perish):  
59 Discussing how catastrophe destroys all vestiges of civilized life at the beginning of a new cultural 
cycle, the stranger sounds much like Xenophanes (DK21B18, quoted above in note 5): ΑΘ. Οὐκοῦν 
ὄργανά τε πάντα ἀπόλλυσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι τέχνης ἦν ἐχόμενον σπουδαίως ηὑρημένον ἢ πολιτικῆς ἢ καὶ 
σοφίας τινὸς ἑτέρας, πάντα ἔρρειν ταῦτα ἐν τῶι τότε χρόνωι φήσομεν; πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ ἄριστε, εἴ γε 
ἔμενεν τάδε οὕτω τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὡς νῦν διακεκόσμηται, καινὸν ἀνηυρίσκετό ποτε καὶ ὁτιοῦν; 
(Leg. 677c).  (Notice the verb διακεκόσμηται, whose appearance in this context suggests that 
Democritus would not be the only Critical thinker to think that a discussion of the διάκοσμος includes 
ethics.)  Unlike Plato's Protagoras, the Athenian stranger does not make gods directly responsible for 
human ethics.  The stranger's primitives discover civic virtues for themselves, the same way Protagoras' 
primitives discover how to use the gifts of Prometheus.  
60 This insistence may indicate that the Athenian stranger is arguing against alternative Kulturgeschichte 
in which mankind is much needier, i.e. Kulturgeschichte more like the myth of Protagoras.  This is 
argued well by Cole (1967), 102-104.  Note that the Athenian stranger's hill-dwellers do build walls 
eventually, as a protection against wild animals even (Leg. 680e-681a, quoted below on page 206), but 
this is not stressed as a matter of survival (which in the Athenian stranger's story depends more on 
human fear and forgetfulness than our ability to out-fight other animals). 
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TEXT (Burnet) TRANSLATION (A. Taylor in Hamilton [1961])
ΑΘ.  Πρῶτον  μὲν  ἠγάπων  καὶ  ἐφιλο-
φρονοῦντο  ἀλλήλους  δι'  ἐρημίαν,  ἔπειτα 
οὐ περιμάχητος ἦν αὐτοῖς ἡ τροφή.  νομῆς 
γὰρ οὐκ ἦν σπάνις, εἰ μή τισιν κατ' ἀρχὰς 
ἴσως, ἧι δὴ τὸ πλεῖστον διέζων ἐν τῶι τότε 
χρόνωι· γάλακτος γὰρ καὶ κρεῶν οὐδαμῶς 
ἐνδεεῖς ἦσαν, ἔτι δὲ θηρεύοντες οὐ φαύλην 
οὐδ'  ὀλίγην  τροφὴν παρείχοντο.  καὶ  μὴν 
ἀμπεχόνης γε καὶ στρωμνῆς καὶ οἰκήσεων 
καὶ  σκευῶν  ἐμπύρων  τε  καὶ  ἀπύρων 
ηὐπόρουν·  αἱ  πλαστικαὶ  γὰρ  καὶ  ὅσαι 
πλεκτικαὶ  τῶν  τεχνῶν  οὐδὲ  ἓν  προσ-
δέονται σιδήρου, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα τούτω τὼ 
τέχνα θεὸς ἔδωκε πορίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, 
ἵν'  ὁπότε  εἰς  τὴν  τοιαύτην  ἀπορίαν 
ἔλθοιεν, ἔχοι βλάστην καὶ ἐπίδοσιν τὸ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων γένος.
ATHENIAN:  For  one  thing,  men's 
loneliness  made  them  sociable  and 
friendly;  for  another,  there  could  be  no 
quarreling over  the means of  subsistence. 
Except  perhaps  in  some  instances  at  the 
very first, they were not stinted for flocks 
and herds, the principle support of life in 
that age; in fact, there was no shortage of 
milk  or  meat,  and  besides,  they  could 
supply themselves with plenty of excellent 
viands by hunting. Again, they were quite 
well  off  for  clothes,  bedding,  shelter,  or 
vessels,  culinary  and  other.  Iron,  as  you 
know, is wholly superfluous for the arts of 
the  potter  or  the  weaver,  and  these  two 
crafts  have,  by  divine  appointment,  been 
empowered  to  supply  all  our  wants,  that 
our  species  may  still  be  enabled  to 
germinate  and increase  when  it  falls  into 
such straits.
Plato. Leg. 678e-679b
With permanent access to pottery and weaving (gifts of the gods, like Protagorean αἰδώς 
and δίκη), mankind never really risks extinction (a significant difference between the 
story of the Athenian stranger and Protagoras' myth).  Coming together to relieve the 
tedium of their solitude, primitive men nevertheless retain a dread (φόβος) of the plain 
(Leg. 678c) and the sea (Leg. 682b), the site of their ancestors' ruin, until forgetfulness 
(λήθη: Leg. 682b) lets them found a city and prepare the cycle for another repetition.  The 
entire story can be summarized as an interaction between external, environmental αἰτίαι 
(the initial disaster, solitude) and internal, human αἰτίαι (knowledge of the two essential 
τέχναι, desire for company, fear, forgetfulness).  Even more than Protagoras' myth, this 
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story relies on impersonal αἰτίαι, with the gods' only explicit contribution being to make 
pottery and weaving sufficient to satisfy all essential human needs.61
On the way down from the mountains to the plain, the site for their doomed city, 
the Athenian stranger's primitives develop increasingly sophisticated νόμοι to cope with 
their evolving community (which grows from a small, isolated clan into a large πόλις  
connected to a thriving trade network).  The mountain-folk at the very beginning of the 
cycle live with informal family tradition rather than formal law, and they are explicitly 
likened to animals (among other things62):
TEXT (Burnet) TRANSLATION (A. Taylor in Hamilton [1961])
ΑΘ.  Ἆρ'  οὖν  ἐκεῖνοι  μὲν  οὔτ'  ἐδέοντο 
νομοθετῶν οὔτε πω ἐφίλει  κατὰ τούτους 
τοὺς χρόνους γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον; οὐδὲ 
γὰρ γράμματα ἔστι πω τοῖς ἐν τούτωι τῶι 
μέρει  τῆς περιόδου γεγονόσιν,  ἀλλ'  ἔθεσι 
καὶ  τοῖς  λεγομένοις  πατρίοις  νόμοις 
ἑπόμενοι ζῶσιν.
ATHENIAN:  May  we  not  perhaps  say, 
then, that in that age men were in no need 
of a lawgiver, and that such a thing as a law 
was as  yet  unusual? In fact,  those whose 
lives fall in that part of the cycle do not as 
yet  so  much  as  possess  an  alphabet,  but 
regulate their lives by custom and what is 
called traditionary law [sic].
Plato. Leg. 680a
61 If we conceive the gods as engineering the whole situation, they are still much less hands-on than the 
Protagorean gods (in the myth as told by Plato).  They set the κόσμος up and then let it cycle naturally, 
refraining from tampering with the narrative (unlike Prometheus and Zeus in the Protagorean myth). 
62 The Athenian stranger also compares them with the Homeric Cyclopes (Leg. 680b, citing Od. 9.112-
115 thus: τοῖσιν δ' οὔτ' ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες, / ἀλλ' οἵ γ' ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι 
κάρηνα / ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος / παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων 
ἀλέγουσιν [ed. Burnet]).  According to the Athenian stranger, the Cyclopes represent a poetic reflection 
of recurring reality in the history of mankind (cf. Leg. 682a).
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ΑΘ. Δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες τὴν ἐν τούτωι τῶι 
χρόνωι  πολιτείαν  δυναστείαν  καλεῖν,  ἣ 
καὶ νῦν ἔτι πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ 
κατὰ βαρβάρους ἐστίν  … μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ 
τούτων τῶν κατὰ  μίαν  οἴκησιν  καὶ  κατὰ 
γένος  διεσπαρμένων  ὑπὸ  ἀπορίας  τῆς  ἐν 
ταῖς φθοραῖς, ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει 
διὰ  τὸ  τὴν  ἀρχὴν  αὐτοῖς  ἐκ  πατρὸς  καὶ 
μητρὸς  γεγονέναι,  οἷς  ἑπόμενοι  καθάπερ 
ὄρνιθες  ἀγέλην  μίαν  ποιήσουσιν,  πατρο-
νομούμενοι  καὶ  βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιο-
τάτην βασιλευόμενοι;
ATHENIAN: The form of polity in that age 
was,  I  believe,  what  is  universally  called 
dynasty, a form still to be found in many 
places  among  Greeks,  as  well  as  among 
non-Greeks … That  is,  they [instances of 
this form of polity] are found among such 
men as we are speaking of, who have been 
dispersed in single homesteads and families 
as a result of the distress caused by these 
disasters? In such societies do we not find 
that the oldest members rule, because their 
authority  has  come  down  to  them  from 
father or mother? The rest follow them, and 
form one flock, like so many birds, and are 
thus  under  patriarchal  control,  the  most 
justifiable of all types of royalty. 
Plato. Leg. 680b-e
 
Gathering together naturally like a flock of birds (think of Democritus, fr. 316 Luria),63 
the most primitive men live with uncodified family traditions (remember the δίκη that 
humans and animals share in Democritus, frr. 620-623 Luria)64 that make the eldest living 
member the ultimate authority.  From the perspective of the Athenian stranger, which 
exalts the primitive ethic at the expense of the more civilized, this arrangement is the 
most just one (βασιλεία δικαιοτάτη).
As the primitive community grows larger, absorbing and incorporating multiple 
family groups, its customs change:
63 «καὶ γὰρ ζῶια, φησίν, ὁμογενέσι ζώιοις συναγελάζεται ὡς περιστεραὶ περιστεραῖς καὶ γέρανοι 
γεράνοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλόγων ὡσαύτως» (Sext. Adv. math. 7.116).  The entire fragment is 
quoted above in chapter 2, on page 127.
64 These fragments are quoted and discussed above in section 3.2.1.
205
TEXT (Burnet) TRANSLATION (A. Taylor in Hamilton [1961])
ΑΘ. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά γε εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μείζους 
ποιοῦντες πόλεις πλείους συνέρχονται, καὶ 
ἐπὶ  γεωργίας  τὰς  ἐν  ταῖς  ὑπωρείαις 
τρέπονται  πρώτας,  περιβόλους  τε  αἱμασι-
ώδεις  τινὰς  τειχῶν  ἐρύματα τῶν  θηρίων 
ἕνεκα  ποιοῦνται,  μίαν  οἰκίαν  αὖ  κοινὴν 
καὶ μεγάλην ἀποτελοῦντες.
ΚΛ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκὸς ταῦθ' οὕτως γίγνεσθαι.
ΑΘ. Τί δέ; τόδε ἆρα οὐκ εἰκός;
ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον;
ΑΘ.  Τῶν  οἰκήσεων  τούτων  μειζόνων 
αὐξανομένων  ἐκ  τῶν  ἐλαττόνων  καὶ 
πρώτων,  ἑκάστην  τῶν  σμικρῶν  παρεῖναι 
κατὰ  γένος  ἔχουσαν  τόν  τε  πρεσβύτατον 
ἄρχοντα  καὶ  αὑτῆς  ἔθη  ἄττα  ἴδια  διὰ  τὸ 
χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν,  ἕτερα ἀφ' ἑτέρων 
ὄντων τῶν γεννητόρων τε καὶ θρεψάντων, 
ἃ  εἰθίσθησαν  περὶ  θεούς  τε  καὶ  ἑαυτούς, 
κοσμιωτέρων  μὲν  κοσμιώτερα  καὶ  ἀνδ-
ρικῶν  ἀνδρικώτερα,  καὶ  κατὰ  τρόπον 
οὕτως ἑκάστους τὰς αὑτῶν ἂν αἱρέσεις εἰς 
τοὺς  παῖδας  ἀποτυπουμένους καὶ  παίδων 
παῖδας,  ὃ  λέγομεν,  ἥκειν  ἔχοντας  ἰδίους 
νόμους εἰς τὴν μείζονα συνοικίαν.
ATHENIAN:  The  next  step  is  to  come 
together  in  larger  numbers,  which  will 
increase the size of the communities,  and 
turn  to  agriculture.  This  will  be  at  first 
practiced in the skirts of the hill  country; 
dry fences of a kind will  be contrived as 
walls for defense against savage beasts, and 
a  new  and  larger  single  homestead  thus 
erected for the community.
CLINIAS:  At  least  that  is  the  probable 
succession of events.
ATHENIAN:  Well,  and  is  there  not 
something else which is no less probable?
CLINIAS: And what may that be?
ATHENIAN:  As  these  larger  homesteads 
are in process of growth from the smaller 
and  most  primitive,  each  of  the  smaller 
groups  will  bring  along  with  it  its 
patriarchal  ruler  and  certain  private 
customs  of  its  own—private,  I  mean, 
because the groups are isolated from each 
other,  and  the  several  groups  have  been 
trained  by  their  different  progenitors  and 
fosterers  in  different  habits  of  conduct 
toward  gods  and  fellow  men,  in  more 
orderly  habits  where  the  ancestors  have 
been more orderly, in more valiant where 
they  have  been  valiant.  Thus  each  group 
comes accordingly, as I say, into the larger 
settlement with special laws of its own, and 
prepared  to  imprint  its  own  preferences 
upon its  children,  and their  children after 
them.
Plato. Leg. 680e-681b
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The larger communities come down from the mountains, where their ancestors kept herds 
and hunted (see page 203 above), to the hills, where they take up farming.  By this time 
they comprise multiple families, each with its own dynast and ethical traditions.  (Notice 
the language used to describe how these dynasts hand down traditions in their respective 
families.  Literally, they leave an impression on their children and grandchildren: οὕτως 
ἑκάστους τὰς αὑτῶν ἂν αἱρέσεις εἰς τοὺς παῖδας ἀποτυπουμένους καὶ παίδων παῖδας.  
This reminds us of the Democritean theory of perception and thought, in which every 
sensation and thought are the result of a soul receiving and transmitting substantial, 
material impressions from its environment.65)    
The hillside farmers choose legislators to collate the various dynastic traditions 
extant in their growing community, create the first formal legal code(s), and pave the way 
for the eventual incorporation of a proper πόλις—a society that follows leaders with more 
explicit authority than nature's dynasts and exhibits every form and experience that is part 
of human life (Leg. 681c-682d).  In choosing one tradition over another as law for this 
evolving community, legislators consult their own preferences, surveying the entire field 
of custom (τὰ πάντων νόμιμα) and recommending to rulers those that please them best 
(τά σφισιν ἀρέσκοντα αὐτῶν μάλιστα εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τοῖς ἡγεμόσι ... φανερὰ δείξαντες 
ἑλέσθαι τε δόντες: Leg. 681c-d).  In this way, hill folk produce small cities like Homeric 
Dardania, located on the slopes of Mount Ida (Leg. 681e), which give rise ultimately to 
mature city-states like Homeric Ilium, situated in the plain that remains deadly even after 
65 See pages 154-177 above in chapter 2.3, as well as the ethical effect of atomic εἴδωλα in frr. 579 Luria 
and B166 DK (quoted on page 174 above in chapter 2.4).
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it has ceased to strike men with terror (Leg. 682b-c).  Once  the sack of Ilium is invoked 
(Leg. 682d), the dialogue ceases to discuss human evolution in terms of probability 
(εἰκός: Leg. 678b),66 and the Kulturgeschichte is over.
The Athenian stranger crafts his narrative with some familiar elements.  Like 
Archelaus and Protagoras, he follows Xenophanes in making culture something that 
requires human initiative.  Like the Platonic Protagoras, he imagines human cultural 
evolution taking place in an environment determined by divinity (e.g. the unnamed θεός 
in Leg. 670b)67 and impersonal αἰτίαι (cataclysmic disasters, human solitude, human fear, 
human technical knowledge, human desire for company, human forgetfulness).68  Unlike 
the Protagorean gods, however, his are not invoked to explain human ethical evolution 
(from primitive to modern).  Instead of gods, he offers probability (εἰκός): surely, given 
the likely natural environment he posits and the vast amount of time he allows, societies 
will inevitably evolve along the general lines he draws.  Primitives will always flock to 
dynasts like birds of a feather, until numbers reach critical mass and they begin to 
recognize explicit laws for towns that turn insensibly into cities.  The naturalism here (in 
the relative abeyance of deity) and the gradualism (in the slow accumulation of mutually 
interacting factors that lead to increasingly complex societies) show that by Democritus' 
day, the Critical Tradition had acquired the concepts and critical awareness necessary for 
crafting a sophisticated narrative explaining and illustrating the dictum of Xenophanes: 
66 Note that this probability (εἰκός) is an indefinite likelihood that exists in narrative without being 
minutely calculable.  As far as I can tell, none of the ancient sources examined in this chapter affects 
the mathematical precision that characterizes the outlook of modern statisticians.  See page 135 above.  
67 Compare the role(s) played by Epimetheus, Prometheus, and Zeus in the myth of Protagoras.
68 Compare the role(s) played by interspecific war and intraspecific injustice in the myth of Protagoras.
208
οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξαν, / ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν 
ἄμεινον (DK21B18).69  The more we investigate how the Athenian's Kulturgeschichte 
resonates with the Democritean corpus, the more reason we have to suspect that these 
developments in the Tradition did not escape Democritus. From the work we have 
already done, two important facts are already apparent: (1) Democritus imagined material 
necessity (ἀνάγκη) as the engine creating every species of order that exists, has existed, 
or will exist anywhere;70 (2) Democritus crafted some sort of narrative (or narratives) 
explaining various kinds of order in human society—as the result(s) of human learning 
(frr. 559, 561 Luria) and necessity (fr. 568 Luria).71  What did that Democritean narrative 
(or narratives) look like?  While we cannot say for certain, lacking definitive evidence, 
the Athenian stranger allows us to begin making educated guesses.  Not only does his 
account constitute an extensive, intact instance of Critical Kulturgeschichte contemporary 
with Democritus, it also shows some significant resonance with what remains of the 
Democritean corpus.  We have already noted some of this resonance in passing; it is time 
to look at it more closely, exploring its contribution to our understanding of Democritean 
69 See page 43 above.  While there is enough evidence to suggest that the Critical Tradition already told 
relatively developed stories about human evolution well before the fourth century (see chapter 1), the 
Athenian stranger provides one of the earliest clear instances of such a narrative in the historical 
record.
70 See chapter 2.
71 See pages 190-200 above.  Other fragments confirm that Democritus saw social order coming and 
going, waxing and waning with time (just like other kinds of order created by necessity). Remember 
that the νομίζον in fr. 562 Luria (quoted on page 188) comes into being over time, indicating that 
Democritus imagined a time when it did not exist (see note 33 above in this chapter).  Here we should 
also notice fr. 613 Luria (= Stob. 4.5.48), which discusses how it is impossible for magistrates in a city 
to avoid doing wrong and/or being wronged: the fragment refers to the urban political environment that 
creates this problem as existing τῶι νῦν καθεστῶτι ῥυθμῶι, a deliberately explicit phrase showing that 
the atomist recognized the existence of other social ῥυθμοί in space and time.  What do these ῥυθμοί 
look like?  How are they related?  These are the questions we are grappling with here. 
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Kulturgeschichte in greater depth.
The resonance that demands attention is the likeness between the Athenian 
stranger's αἰτίαι and early atomist ἀνάγκη.  Both αἰτίαι and ἀνάγκη exist to describe 
generic similarity in particular incidents of repetitive reality.  What keeps the Athenian 
stranger's cycle intact over countless iterations is not the one-time work of unique 
individual agents (human or divine), but the fact that αἰτίαι remain constant: the same 
generic stimuli continually produce the same generic series of human responses, with 
particular deviations possible.72  The ἀνάγκη of the early atomists is responsible for 
particular instances of generic patterns in the same way, with individual humans and 
worlds providing so many different examples of the Democritean universals ἄνθρωπος 
and κόσμος over time.73  So both the Athenian stranger and Democritus tell stories in 
which generic elements remain the same as particulars vary over time: the Athenian 
parses these generic elements as separate things (different factors in the environment that 
remain constant), where Democritus combines them all under the rubric of material 
necessity.  The Athenian shows us that this kind of story-telling can be used to create a 
Kulturgeschichte, with probability (εἰκός) mediating between the storyteller's ignorance 
of particulars in any individual historical instance and his need to tell a generically true 
and complete tale.  This is essentially the same technique that Democritus is on record 
72 See e.g. Leg. 677a, where the initial disaster happens to be a flood, and 677d, where the stranger names 
the most recent inventors of recurrent human arts (which others presumably invented before, perhaps 
quicker or better, and others yet will invent again as the cycle repeats itself).
73 See chapter 2.2-3 above, esp. pages 130-141.  The nature of atoms and void is such that they inevitably 
come together in patterns that produce humanity (groups of animate beings sharing some fundamental, 
generic characteristics to which each individual adds unique, particular variations whose existence 
depends on that individual's unique placement in history).
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using in fr. 561 Luria (quoted on page 190 above), where chance (τύχη) impregnates a 
mare by an ass, teaching men who happen to be observing how to breed mules.  Material 
necessity determines the generic facts of this situation: fertile matings between asses and 
mares occur, resulting in mules; and human beings exist, with the ability to observe and 
learn from their observations.  The coincidence of these generic, necessary facts in a 
particular historical moment in time, however, is a matter of probability, occurring only 
κατὰ τύχην (fr. 561 Luria).74  Given this fragment and its coherence with the rest of the 
early atomist corpus, it is likely that the narrative(s) of cultural development composed 
by Democritus utilized this kind of reasoning, which the Athenian stranger demonstrates 
to have been current in the Critical Tradition contemporary with the atomist.
The correctness of this interpretation is confirmed when we compare the historical 
effects of the Athenian's αἰτίαι with what is known about the biological consequences of 
early atomist ἀνάγκη.  In the Athenian's account, divine providence and other αἰτίαι 
cause primitive human beings to gather like flocks of birds (Leg. 680b-e) and establish 
dynasties—natural societies whose members live by unstudied, unwritten habits that 
ruling elders imprint on the rising generation.75  We have already seen how Democritean 
ἀνάγκη similarly causes conspecific animals to herd together spontaneously76 and makes 
the individual animal perceive and react to its environment by receiving atomic 
74 See the discussion of necessity in chapter 2.2 above, especially the discussion of fr. 103 Luria (quoted 
on pages 125-135).
75 The Athenian refers to these primitive habits as πατρίοι νόμοι (Leg. 680a, quoted on page 204 above).
76 See fr. 316 Luria (quoted above on page 127), which makes explicit reference to flocks of birds as 
instances of early atomist necessity.
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impressions from it.77  Knowing that Democritus imagined humans sharing morality with 
other animals78 and adding their own traditions to this shared morality over time,79 it is 
not much of a stretch to conclude that he had his own version(s) of the story told by the 
Athenian stranger.  Mirroring the path taken by the Athenian, this version (or versions) 
would have articulated the primordial state of man in atomist terms, invoking ἀνάγκη 
rather than the Athenian's αἰτίαι to explain how the first humans established a natural 
order or orders culminating in the modern πόλις.  The atomist narrative(s) would rely on 
probabilistic reasoning like that invoked by the Athenian, arguing that the nature of atoms 
is such that they invariably fall into certain generic patterns in the void (patterns like 
those indicated by the words κόσμος and ἄνθρωπος).  The particular variations in 
individual instances of these patterns would not be important to the atomist, who would 
be trying to account for human culture as something generic and re-inventable rather than 
as the unique, one-off discovery of a single historical person or persons.80  Foundational 
77 See chapter 2.3-4 above, esp. frr. 579 Luria and B166 DK (quoted on page 174).
78 See section 3.2.1 above.
79 See Cole's (1967) interpretation of fr. 562 Luria offered above in note 33.  In that fragment, Democritus 
has humans and animals sharing the habit of getting offspring; to this habit, humans eventually add (for 
reasons unspecified) a custom that the parent expects benefit from the offspring.
80 Notice that Democritus finds the animal morality discussed in fr. 621 Luria valid in every world (ἐν 
παντὶ κόσμωι: see page 185 for the full quote).  This morality is generic rather than particular: it 
appears in the history of every individual world as something constant.  This does not mean that it 
looks exactly the same in every world, only that its idiosyncrasies in any particular instance do not 
render it unrecognizable as one more example of its generic class.  This is clear when we consider the 
example attributed to Democritus in frr. B165 DK and 103 Luria (quoted on pages 129-125): people 
may look very different in individual instances, but we are all recognizably members of the same 
generic animal species.  Whatever our differences, we all answer to the descriptor ἄνθρωπος.  
Assuming that Democritus approached human νόμος from a similar position (as fr. 621 suggests he 
did), he would understand it to encompass at once everything that people do in any world and that 
which a particular person happens to be doing in a particular world.  A history of human νόμος written 
by Democritus would thus be a generic history (striving to accommodate all instances of human νόμος 
conceivable in an infinite atomist multiverse).
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events in this atomist Kulturgeschichte would be coincidences likely to occur and recur,81 
coincidences like the one Democritus imagines being responsible for mankind's 
discovery of the mule in fr. 579 Luria (or the world-altering catastrophes posited by the 
Athenian stranger).82  
For now, this is as close as the Athenian stranger can bring us to Democritean 
Kulturgeschichte.83  While we find a generic resemblance between his αἰτίαι and atomist 
ἀνάγκη (both create narrative worlds in which human societies arise as expressions of 
natural order), the Athenian and Democritus diverge significantly when we consider the 
particulars of their respective accounts of human culture: for the Athenian, culture is 
fundamentally a product of human lawgivers, whether the uncritical dynast of the 
mountain clan or the self-conscious legislator of the growing city; for Democritus, on the 
other hand, culture begins with non-human animals84 and reaches us only via chance 
81 Who knows how many times the mule was invented in the history of the atomists' particular κόσμος?  
Presumably, it might have been discovered more than once, by different people.  Democritus is 
interested in the possibility that someone or ones did discover it at some time, not in pinpointing a 
precise historical identity for the successful inventor(s). 
82 Here as elsewhere, the Critical Tradition conceives order as plural and repetitive, an emergent property 
of continuous processes whose general outcome is knowable even if it cannot be minutely predicted in 
particular instances.  The accent on probability and repetition in the Athenian stranger's story and in 
what remains of Democritus appears consonant with the eternal cosmic cycles invoked by earlier 
thinkers in the Critical Tradition like Heraclitus (fr. 51 Marcovich, quoted on page 44) and Empedocles 
(fr. 21 Inwood, quoted on page 68), and with the multiple κόσμοι invoked by Anaxagoras (fr. B4a DK, 
quoted on page 87).  Considering how the Athenian stranger's cycle recalls these cycles in its attempt to 
create a general story of order covering all specific instances of it, the question naturally arises: could 
the Heraclitean, Empedoclean, and Anaxagorean cosmogonies be some of the παλαιοὶ λόγοι that the 
Athenian stranger refers to as sources for his story (Leg. 677a)?  While it is impossible to answer this 
question definitively, a positive answer appears at least plausible.
83 The present discussion does not by any means exhaust the resonance between the Democritean corpus 
and Plato's Athenian stranger, who says many things in the Leges that converge with words and ideas 
attributed to the atomist.  Some important convergences in book 3 that have not yet been treated in this 
study include (a) the approach to traditional poetry and (b) the role of pleasure in determining νόμοι.  
Both will be discussed later as they become relevant.
84 See fr. 559 Luria, quoted on page 190.  Where the Athenian merely compares primitive men to animals, 
Democritus makes them learn directly from animals.
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discoveries exploited by lucky inventors.85  In the world-order of Democritus, then, 
culture is not necessarily human (at least not in origin), and its transmission does not 
depend fundamentally on the mediation of authoritative lawgivers.  Thus, while the 
Athenian provides us insight into the form that Democritus' Kulturgeschichte likely took
—with atomist ἀνάγκη and τύχη standing in the same relation to one another as αἰτίαι 
and εἰκός in the story of the Athenian—it cannot tell us much about how Democritus 
developed that form.  It tells us nothing about how a Critical thinker like the atomist 
might have imagined animals teaching humans, and it offers no explicit theory of cultural 
development predicated on accident.86  For insight into these elements as they appear in 
the fragments of Democritus, we have to bring in other accounts of cultural evolution.
(4) Polybius, Historiae 6.5.1-6.10.12.  Unlike the Kulturgeschichte already 
considered, this one definitely postdates Democritus: Polybius lived near the turn of the 
third century BCE, several generations after the early atomists.  His relevance to our 
discussion arises from the similarity evident between his narrative and those that we have 
already seen (especially the story of the Athenian stranger).  Before we examine that 
similarity more closely, it is interesting to note that Polybius himself recognized that his 
account was derivative, a digest concocted from earlier sources:
85 See fr. 561 Luria, quoted on page 190.
86 Though it does seem to presuppose the existence of such theories, e.g. when the Athenian assumes that 
primitive people will inevitably (re)discover the art of mining, given sufficient time (Leg. 678c-e).  
Presumably the Athenian could have offered some idea of how this (re)discovery would occur, a 
generic story tracing the origin of mining to a probable accident, even though he does not.  The only 
accident he assumes explicitly is the recurring world-altering disaster that resets his cycle.
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TEXT (Buettner-Wobst) TRANSLATION (Paton)
ἀκριβέστερον μὲν οὖν ἴσως ὁ περὶ τῆς κατὰ 
φύσιν  μεταβολῆς  τῶν  πολιτειῶν  εἰς 
ἀλλήλας  διευκρινεῖται  λόγος  παρὰ 
Πλάτωνι καί τισιν ἑτέροις τῶν φιλοσόφων· 
ποικίλος  δ'  ὢν  καὶ  διὰ  πλειόνων  λεγό-
μενος ὀλίγοις  ἐφικτός ἐστιν.  διόπερ ὅσον 
ἀνήκειν  ὑπολαμβάνομεν  αὐτοῦ  πρὸς  τὴν 
πραγματικὴν  ἱστορίαν  καὶ  τὴν  κοινὴν 
ἐπίνοιαν,  τοῦτο  πειρασόμεθα  κεφαλαι-
ωδῶς  διελθεῖν·  καὶ  γὰρ  ἂν  ἐλλείπειν  τι 
δόξηι διὰ τῆς καθολικῆς ἐμφάσεως, ὁ κατὰ 
μέρος  λόγος  τῶν  ἑξῆς  ῥηθησομένων 
ἱκανὴν  ἀνταπόδοσιν  ποιήσει  τῶν  νῦν 
ἐπαπορηθέντων.
Perhaps  this  theory  of  the  natural 
transformations  into  each  other  of  the 
different  forms  of  government  is  more 
elaborately  set  forth  by  Plato  and certain 
other  philosophers;  but  as  the  arguments 
are  subtle  and  are  stated  at  great  length, 
they are beyond the reach of all but a few. I 
therefore  will  attempt  to  give  a  short 
summary of the theory, as far as I consider 
it to apply to the actual history of facts and 
to  appeal  to  the  common  intelligence  of 
mankind. For if there appear to be certain 
omissions  in  my general  exposition  of  it, 
the detailed discussion which follows will 
afford the reader  ample compensation for 
any difficulties now left unsolved. 
Polyb. 6.5.1-3 
Polybius presents his story frankly as a summary of earlier work (τοῦτο πειρασόμεθα 
κεφαλαιωδῶς διελθεῖν), tracing the lineage of his Kulturgeschichte back to Plato and 
other, unnamed philosophers (παρὰ Πλάτωνι καί τισιν ἑτέροις τῶν φιλοσόφων) who 
wrote more subtly and at greater length than he.87  It is quite possible that Democritus was 
one of Polybius' anonymous sources: we know that the atomist wrote a great deal,88 and 
that his output included Kulturgeschichte whose remnants appear remarkably like what 
we find in Polybius (whose work here certainly belongs in the Critical Tradition).89  
87 Plato (Resp. 8) and Aristotle (Polit. 3) preserve traces of historical narratives like the one Polybius 
gives intact, narratives in which healthy polities exist in different shapes that alter in regular ways when 
they become diseased.  Democritus is thus not alone in speaking of human societies as plastic shapes 
that mutate over time: his contribution is to discuss those shapes from a Critical atomist perspective. 
88 See fr. cxv Luria and chapter 2.1 above.
89 For a detailed argument supporting Democritus as a source for Polybius, see Cole (1967), 107-130.  In 
this study, I am more interested in hermeneutics than in Quellenforschung: while the possibility that 
Democritus may have been a source for Polybius is noteworthy (and I find Cole's thesis convincing), 
my own argument does not require that it be decided one way or the other.
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Whatever one makes of the possibility that the historian drew directly from the atomist, 
which remains unproven,90 the convergence evident between Polybius, Plato's Athenian 
stranger, and the atomist is definitely worth attention.    
Immediately after the above statement, Polybius launches into a cyclical account 
of human cultural evolution that follows the narrative of the Athenian stranger closely 
and improves upon it significantly, sometimes in ways that remind us of Democritus. 
Like the Athenian, he begins by positing the occurrence and recurrence of world-altering 
disasters (6.5.4-6).  In the wake of these disasters, mankind is reduced to a familiar state 
of nature, without customs (ἐπιτηδεύματα) or arts (τέχναι: 6.5.6).  Just like the mountain-
folk in the Athenian's narrative, Polybius' primitives initially herd together like animals 
(καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώιων … καὶ τούτους εἰς τὸ ὁμόφυλον συναγελάζεσθαι: 
6.5.7).91  After its formation, this natural community goes through a familiar three-stage 
evolution: in the beginning, it is ruled by a primitive monarch (6.5.4-6.7.5);92 he is 
succeeded eventually by an aristocracy (6.7.6-6.8.7),93 which in time turns inevitably into 
a democracy (6.9).94  Unlike the Athenian stranger, Polybius resets his cycle not with the 
90 Cole (1967) is ultimately obliged to offer his thesis as no more than an interesting suggestion, since 
there is no blatant smoking gun identifying Democritus as a source for Polybius.  Our ignorance of 
other accounts available, particularly when much of the extant work in the Critical Tradition looks so 
similar,  makes it hard to assign attribution without uncontestable proof.  Polybius might just as easily 
be drawing on Plato, Archelaus, Anaxagoras, or some other thinker as (or in addition to) Democritus. 
91 Notice that Polybius' verb συναγελάζεσθαι is the very same verb that Democritus uses to talk about the 
spontaneous herding of animals in fr. 319 Luria: «καὶ γὰρ ζῶια, φησίν, ὁμογενέσι ζώιοις συναγελά-
ζεται ὡς περιστεραὶ περιστεραῖς καὶ γέρανοι γεράνοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλόγων ὡσαύτως» (Sext. 
Adv. math. 7.116).  Like Democritus in this fragment, Polybius stresses the homogeneity of animals in 
a herd (τούτους εἰς τὸ ὁμόφυλον συναγελάζεσθαι): like goes with like.
92 Compare the elderly dynast that rules the isolated mountain clan in the story of the Athenian stranger.
93 Compare what happens when multiple dynasts unite their clans in the story of the Athenian stranger.
94 Compare the climax community in the story of the Athenian stranger, a city-state in which every form 
and experience of human life exists: τρίτον τοίνυν εἴπωμεν ἔτι πολιτείας σχῆμα γιγνόμενον, ἐν ὧι δὴ 
πάντα εἴδη καὶ παθήματα πολιτειῶν καὶ ἅμα πόλεων συμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι (Leg. 681d).  In the 
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recurrence of a physical disaster (though he explicitly notes that these do recur in 6.5.6), 
but with the natural moral degeneration of democracy, which brings about an inevitable 
resurgence of the primitive monarch (6.9.7).95
Like Protagoras and the Athenian stranger, Polybius constructs human cultural 
evolution as a series of responses to recurring impersonal αἰτίαι—a series that can be 
predicted by appeals to probability (εἰκός: 6.5.7 et passim).96  As in the Kulturgeschichte 
of Protagoras and the Athenian stranger, so in that of Polybius the various impersonal 
αἰτίαι invoked are of two sorts: external environmental factors impinging on humanity 
regularly over time; and generic human character (which reacts predictably to recurring 
constants in its environment).97  Unlike the Athenian stranger, Polybius parses his αἰτίαι 
carefully, explaining in detail how they drive his cycle inevitably from one stage to the 
next in a continuous natural progression.  Three Polybian αἰτίαι worth examining with 
particular attention here are (i) the human ἀσθένεια that forms the first human society and 
Republic, Plato's Socrates describes democracy as the polity which contains all other polities (i.e. every 
form and experience of human life): κινδυνεύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι: ὥσπερ 
ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη 
ἂν φαίνοιτο ... ὅτι πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ κινδυνεύει τῶι βουλομένωι πόλιν 
κατασκευάζειν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς δημοκρατουμένην ἐλθόντι πόλιν, ὃς ἂν 
αὐτὸν ἀρέσκηι τρόπος, τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι, ὥσπερ εἰς παντοπώλιον ἀφικομένωι πολιτειῶν, καὶ 
ἐκλεξαμένωι οὕτω κατοικίζειν (Rep. 557c-d).  No close reader of Plato is surprised by the place of 
democracy in Polybius' narrative.   
95 This discrepancy seems to support Polybius' admission in 6.5.1-3 that his account harmonizes more 
than one source.  As it stands, his narrative offers two ways for the cycle to restart: (1) a terrible 
cataclysm destroys civilization; (2) civilization implodes naturally after undergoing a natural cycle of 
growth, acme, and decay.  Polybius does not explicitly address the relationship between these two plot-
lines.  Another confirmation that Polybius is weaving multiple sources together is the fact that he 
makes no effort to discuss the rediscovery of the τέχναι that disappear in 6.5.6. 
96 Polybius goes out of his way to emphasize this aspect of his narrative: ταῦτά τις σαφῶς ἐπεγνωκὼς 
χρόνοις μὲν ἴσως διαμαρτήσεται λέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος περὶ πολιτείας, τὸ δὲ ποῦ τῆς αὐξήσεως 
ἕκαστόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς φθορᾶς ἢ ποῦ μεταστήσεται σπανίως ἂν διασφάλλοιτο, χωρὶς ὀργῆς ἢ φθόνου 
ποιούμενος τὴν ἀπόφασιν (6.9.11).  Unlike his predecessors, he makes no mention whatsoever of gods.
97 See page 208 above.
217
keeps it intact (resetting the cycle when democracy becomes cheirocracy and collapses 
into civil war); (ii) the inevitable circumstances that create an idea of δικαιοσύνη and 
spread it throughout the community; and (iii) the περιουσία that brings about the collapse 
of each civilized form of government (kingship, aristocracy, democracy).  The historian 
presents these αἰτίαι in ways strikingly reminiscent of what we find in the Democritean 
corpus: more than just one more instance of a developed Critical Kulturgeschichte, 
Polybius' work provides unique insight into how Democritus might have gone about 
constructing an atomist narrative (or narratives) in that genre. 
(i) Consider how primitive monarchy (the natural prelude to civilized kingship) 
arises at the very beginning of Polybius' cycle:
TEXT (Buettner-Wobst) TRANSLATION (Paton)
ποίας  οὖν  ἀρχὰς  λέγω  καὶ  πόθεν  φημὶ 
φύεσθαι τὰς πολιτείας πρῶτον; ὅταν ἢ διὰ 
κατακλυσμοὺς ἢ διὰ λοιμικὰς περιστάσεις 
ἢ  διὰ  ἀφορίας  καρπῶν  ἢ  δι'  ἄλλας 
τοιαύτας  αἰτίας  φθορὰ  γένηται  τοῦ  τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων  γένους,  οἵας  ἤδη  γεγονέναι 
παρειλήφαμεν καὶ πάλιν πολλάκις ἔσεσθ' 
ὁ  λόγος  αἱρεῖ,  τότε  δὴ  συμθφειρομένων 
πάντων  τῶν  ἐπιτηδευμάτων  καὶ τεχνῶν, 
ὅταν  ἐκ  τῶν  περιλειφθέντων  οἷον   εἰ 
σπερμάτων   αὖθις   αὐξηθῆι  σὺν  χρόνωι 
ἀνθρώπων, τότε δήπου, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ζώιων, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων συναθροιζο-
μένων—ὅπερ  εἰκός,  καὶ  τούτους  εἰς  τὸ 
ὁμόφυλον  συναγελάζεσθαι  διὰ  τὴν  τῆς 
φύσεως  ἀσθένειαν—ἀνάγκη  τὸν  τῆι 
σωματικῆι  ῥώμηι  καὶ  ψυχικῆι  τόλμηι 
διαφέροντα, τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν, 
καθάπερ  καὶ  ἐπὶ  τῶν  ἄλλων  γενῶν 
ἀδοξοποιήτων ζώιων θεωρούμενον τοῦτο 
What  then  are  the  beginnings  I  speak  of 
and  what  is  the  first  origin  of  political 
societies? When, owing to floods, plagues, 
failure of crops or other such causes there 
occurs such a destruction of the human race 
as  tradition  tells  us  has  more  than  once 
happened, and as we must believe all often 
happen again, all arts and crafts perishing 
at the same time, when springing from the 
survivors  as  from  seeds  men  have  again 
increased  in  numbers  and  just  like  other 
animals  form herds—it  being  a  matter  of 
course that  they  too should herd  together 
with  those  of  their  kind  owing  to  their 
natural  weakness—it  is  a  necessary 
consequence  that  the  man  who  excels  in 
bodily strength and courage will lead and 
rule over the rest. We observe and should 
regard  as  a  most  genuine  work of  nature 
this very phenomenon in the case of other 
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χρὴ φύσεως ἔργον ἀληθινώτατον νομίζειν, 
παρ'  οἷς  ὁμολογουμένως  τοὺς  ἰσχυρο-
τάτους  ὁρῶμεν  ἡγουμένους,  λέγω  δὲ 
ταύρους,  κάπρους,  ἀλεκτρυόνας,  τὰ  τού-
τοις παραπλήσια. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς εἰκός 
τοιούτους  εἶναι  καὶ  τοὺς  τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
βίους, ζωιηδὸν συναθροιζομένων καὶ τοῖς 
ἀλκιμωτάτοις  καὶ  δυναμικωτάτοις  ἑπο-
μένων· οἷς ὅρος μέν ἐστι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἰσχύς, 
ὄνομα δ' ἂν εἴποι τις μοναρχίαν. 
animals  which  act  purely  by  instinct  and 
among  whom  the  strongest  are  always 
indisputably the masters—I speak of bulls, 
boars,  cocks,  and  the  like.  It  is  probable 
then that at the beginning men lived thus, 
herding together like animals and following 
the  lead of  the  strongest  and bravest,  the 
ruler's strength being here the criterion of 
his  real  power  and  the  name  we  should 
give this being monarchy.
Polyb. 6.5.4-9
The narrative of causation evident here follows Protagoras98 rather than the Athenian 
stranger.99  Where the Athenian stranger's primitive humans gather together because they 
do not want to be lonely, Protagoras and Polybius' aborigines socialize on account of their 
weakness (εἰς τὸ ὁμόφυλον συναγελάζεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀσθένειαν).  In the 
myth of Protagoras, this weakness is discussed in detail: people lack the ability to 
compete with other animal species (armed with various physical characteristics like fur, 
fangs, and claws) individually in the war to decide who survives.  The external threat of 
savage beasts with superior natural attributes puts pressure on humanity to change the 
way it expresses its moral character, making collectivism a necessity for survival.  While 
98 See page 198, which discusses Plato, Protag. 322a-c (quoted on page 197 above), especially the 
following sentence: ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῆι αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ 
δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον 
ἐνδεής (Protag. 322a-b).
99 Note the following passages: ἆρ' οὐχ ἅσμενοι μὲν ἑαυτοὺς ἑώρων δι' ὀλιγότητα ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκεῖνον 
τὸν χρόνον, πορεῖα δέ, ὥστ' ἐπ' ἀλλήλους τότε πορεύεσθαι κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν, σὺν ταῖς 
τέχναις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντα σχεδὸν ἀπωλώλει; συμμίσγειν οὖν ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ἦν οἶμαι σφόδρα 
δυνατόν (Leg. 678c).  πρῶτον μὲν ἠγάπων καὶ ἐφιλοφρονοῦντο ἀλλήλους δι' ἐρημίαν, ἔπειτα οὐ 
περιμάχητος ἦν αὐτοῖς ἡ τροφή (Leg. 678e).  Though the Athenian stranger does mention defenses 
erected against marauding animals at one point, these are not introduced to explain society's existence: 
see note 60 above.  Overall, the appearance of primitive humanity in the reckoning of the Athenian 
stranger is utopian (reminding one of Hesiod's golden race): his primitive man enjoys plenty of food 
and a morality that includes the happiness of civilization without any civilized vices (Leg. 678e-679d).  
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Polybius is not as explicit as Protagoras (as preserved by Plato), his later account 
definitely presumes a world similarly hard for the human individual to handle: human 
ἀσθένεια is the foundation he offers for society, the one permanent reason why we live 
together rather than apart.  This rather dour outlook on the place of humanity and human 
society in the world finds significant resonance in the fragments of Democritus: 
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
γινώσκειν  χρεὼν  ἀνθρωπίνην  βιοτὴν 
ἀφαυρήν  τε  ἐοῦσαν  καὶ  ὀλιγοχρόνιον 
πολλῆισίν  τε  κηρσὶ  συμπεφυρμένην  καὶ 
ἀμηχανίηισιν,  ὅκως  ἄν  τις  μετρίης  τε 
κτήσιος  ἐπιμέληται  καὶ  μετρῆται  ἐπὶ  τοῖς 
ἀναγκαίοις ἡ ταλαιπωρίη. (Luria)
Bisogna  prendere  consapevolezza  della 
fragilità e  della  brevità della  vita  umana, 
che si rivela anche intessuta di molteplici 
sciagure e bisogni,  in modo da curarsi  di 
avere  beni  di  proprietà  misurati  e  da 
commisurare le tribolazioni inevitabili alle 
necessità vitali. (Luria, Krivushina)
Democritus, fr. B285 DK
     = fr. D150 Taylor
     = fr. 646 Luria
Stob. 4.34.65
τὰ  κατὰ  τὴν  πόλιν  χρεὼν100 τῶν  λοιπῶν 
μέγιστα  ἡγεῖσθαι,  ὅκως  ἄξεται  εὖ,  μήτε 
φιλονικέοντα παρὰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς μήτε ἰσχὺν 
ἑαυτῶι περιτιθέμενον παρὰ τὸ χρηστὸν τὸ 
τοῦ ξυνοῦ. πόλις γὰρ εὖ ἀγομένη μεγίστη 
ὄρθωσίς ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τούτωι πάντα ἔνι, καὶ 
τούτου  σωιζομένου  πάντα  σώιζεται  καὶ 
τούτου  διαφθειρομένου  τὰ  πάντα  δια-
φθείρεται.  (DK)
One should attach the greatest importance 
of all to the city's being well run, and not 
indulge in inappropriate rivalry or increase 
one's  own power  to  the  detriment  of  the 
community. For the city's being well run is 
the greatest good; everything is contained 
in  that:  if  that  is  preserved,  everything is 
preserved; if that is destroyed everything is 
destroyed. (Taylor, adapted)
Democritus, fr. B252 DK
     = fr. D116 Taylor
     = fr. 595 Luria
Stob. 4.1.43
100 Luria (1970) deletes this word, apparently on the grounds that it is a later interpolation interrupting a 
Democritean adaptation of an ancient proverb since lost (though he finds another trace of the alleged 
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Like the aboriginal humans imagined by Protagoras and Polybius, Democritean man 
possesses a life that is inherently brief and fragile, fraught with disasters that he can never 
perfectly remedy (fr. 646 Luria).  Like his Protagorean and Polybian counterparts, he 
must rely on community as his best hope for preserving and enjoying this tenuous life: if 
the community is lost, then all is lost (fr. B252 DK).101  Humans band together because 
we must: in atomist terms, the same material necessity that makes the world makes us 
such that we only survive in company.
In Polybius' account, the same weakness that drives people together also pushes 
the strongest individual forward as the community's natural leader (ἀνάγκη τὸν τῆι 
σωματικῆι ῥώμηι καὶ ψυχικῆι τόλμηι διαφέροντα, τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν: 6.5.7).  
This recalls one of the ethical sayings attributed to Democritus: 
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
φύσει τὸ ἄρχειν οἰκήϊον τῶι κρέσσονι. Rule belongs by nature to the superior.
Democritus, fr. B267 DK
     = fr. D131 Taylor
     = fr. 688 Luria
Stob. 4.6.19
proverb in Sophocl. Antigone 189-190: see his commentary to fr. 595 on pages 891 and 1288).  This is 
not enough to convince me that χρεών must be rejected here as a non-Democritean interpolation.
101 The importance of community is a recurring theme in the Democritean ethical corpus.  The atomist 
condemns those who take pleasure in the misfortunes of those around them in fr. 678 Luria, and he 
denounces envy (φιλονικίη, φθόνος) as a threat to the community in frr. 679 and 679a Luria.  On the 
positive side, fr. 633 Luria shows him praising the rich who act voluntarily to strengthen the 
community by helping those less fortunate than they are.
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This fragment is sometimes cited as evidence that Democritus supported oligarchy or 
aristocracy on some level,102 with the nature of the atomist's endorsement complicated by 
the fact that he explicitly prefers democracy to δυνάσται in fr. 596 Luria.  Comparing 
Polybius with Democritus offers us an interesting new perspective: instead of endorsing 
aristocracy simply in the present, fr. 688 might present the fundamental δίκη that 
Democritean man shares with the animals as that δίκη exists historically before the 
introduction of uniquely human νόμοι (like the prohibition on killing enemies in certain 
situations, or the custom of parents expecting benefit from their children).103  Perhaps 
necessity gives Democritean man a natural inclination toward brutal aristocracy that can 
evolve over time to prefer more humane government (such as democracy)—government 
which becomes possible as human nature evolves past the initial stage(s) of development 
where animal ἰσχύς is the governing quality (what Polybius refers to as the ὅρος τῆς 
ἀρχῆς in 6.5.3) in human society.104  
In this context there are three more quotes from Democritus worth considering:  
102 E.g. Procopé (1989), 314; Taylor (1999), 230.
103 See section 3.2.1 above.
104 If this is the Democritean position, it seems remarkably close to the thesis that Plato gives Callicles in 
the Gorgias: ἡ δέ γε οἶμαι φύσις αὐτὴ ἀποφαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος 
πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν 
τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώιοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον 
κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν (483c-d).  For a thorough discussion of this 
thesis, see SEP, s.v. “Callicles and Thrasymachus.”  Unlike the atomist, Callicles expresses no 
preference for democracy and offers no Kulturgeschichte, appearing more interested in exploiting 
natural aristocracy than in understanding its history or evolving beyond it.  While we are discussing 
him, it is interesting to note that Callicles ends up proposing an ethics that makes pleasure an absolute 
value and prefers certain pleasures over others (Gorg. 490c-495e); compare Democritus, frr. 615, 678, 
695, 732, 734, 748, 750, 751, 753, 755, 756, 757, 759a, 771, 776, 788 Luria.  At the very least,  
Callicles confirms that Democritus was not the only person of his era interested in natural aristocracy 
and the ethics of pleasure.   
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TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor, amended)
κρείσσων ἐπ'  ἀρετὴν  φανεῖται  προτροπῆι 
χρώμενος καὶ λόγου πειθοῖ ἤπερ νόμωι καὶ 
ἀνάγκηι.  λάθρηι μὲν γὰρ ἁμαρτέειν εἰκὸς 
τὸν εἰργμένον ἀδικίης ὑπὸ νόμου, τὸν δὲ 
ἐς τὸ δέον ἠγμένον πειθοῖ οὐκ εἰκὸς οὔτε 
λάθρηι οὔτε φανερῶς ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές. 
διόπερ  συνέσει  τε  καὶ  ἐπιστήμηι  ὀρθο-
πραγέων τις ἀνδρεῖος ἄμα καὶ εὐθύγνωμος 
γίγνεται.
One will  appear  to promote virture better 
by using encouragement and persuasion of 
speech rather than law and necessity.  For it 
is  likely  that  he  who  is  held  back  from 
wrongdoing by law will  err in secret,  but 
that he who is urged to what must be done 
by persuasion will do nothing wrong either 
in secret or openly.  Therefore the man who 
acts  uprightly  from  understanding  and 
knowledge  becomes  at  once  courageous 
and right-minded.
Democritus, fr. B181 DK
     = fr. D46 Taylor, fr. 607 Luria
Stob. 2.31.59  
ἡ  φύσις  καὶ  ἡ  διδαχὴ  παραπλήσιόν  ἐστι. 
καὶ  γὰρ  ἡ  διδαχὴ  μεταρυσμοῖ  τὸν  ἄν-
θρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ
Nature  and  teaching  are  similar,  for 
teaching  reshapes  the  man,  and  in  re-
shaping makes his nature.
Democritus, fr. B33 DK
     = fr. D28 Taylor, fr. 682 Luria
Clem. Strom. 4.151; Stob. 2.31.65; 
Theodoret. 4.1, p. 100 Räder
οὐδεμία  μηχανὴ  τῶι  νῦν  καθεστῶτι 
ῥυθμῶι μὴ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἢν 
καὶ πάνυ ἀγαθοὶ ἔωσιν. οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλωι 
ἔοικεν  ἢ  ἑωυτῶι  τὸν  <***>  αὐτὸν  ἐφ' 
ἑτέροισι γίγνεσθαι·105 δεῖ δέ κως οὕτω καὶ 
ταῦτα κοσμηθῆναι, ὅκως ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικέων, 
ἢν  καὶ  πάνυ  ἐτάζηι  τοὺς  ἀδικέοντας,  μὴ 
There is no way in the present organization 
of society not to do wrong to rulers, even if 
they  are  exceptionally  good.  For  to  none 
other than himself … he is himself subject 
to others [text corrupt]. But things should 
somehow be arranged so that someone who 
does  no  wrong,  even  if  he  vigorously 
105 Luria proposes an idiosyncratic restoration for this damaged line: οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλωι ἔοικεν ἢ τῶι 
αἰετὸν ἐφ' ἑρπετοῖσι γίγνεσθαι.  Here I follow the more cautious approach taken by DK (and Taylor), 
who leave the line unrestored.  Even though the fragment is textually corrupt, it is generally agreed to 
discuss problems arising from the official scrutiny (εὔθυνα) that magistates in the contemporary Greek 
city-state underwent upon completing their term of service.  A good magistrate might make enemies by 
pursuing criminals  relentlessly, incurring a really tough scrutiny and perhaps even legal penalties that 
he did not justly deserve.  Democritus contemplates altering the shape of the contemporary Greek 
πόλις to remove this possibility that the righteous public servant might end up suffering for doing 
justice.  See Procopé (1989), 316-317.
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ὑπ' ἐκείνους γενήσεται, ἀλλά τις ἢ θεσμὸς 
ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀμυνεῖ τῶι δίκαια ποιεῦντι.
prosecutes  wrongdoers,  does  not  become 
subject  to  them,  but  some  law  or  other 
device  will  protect  the  person  who  does 
right.
Democritus, fr. B266 DK
     = fr. Taylor, fr. 613 Luria
Stob. 4.5.48
In fr. 607 Luria, the atomist identifies exhortation (προτροπή) and verbal persuasion 
(λόγου πείθω) as more effective means of influencing human behavior than law (νόμος) 
and necessity (ἀνάγκη). In frr. 682 and 613, he discusses the malleability of human 
nature as it exists in the individual (fr. 682, where instruction remakes the shape of the 
human being) and in the collective (fr. 613, where Democritus contemplates altering the 
shape of the fifth-century Greek πόλις).  Together, these three statements show that the 
atomist recognized both that human nature is malleable (in the individual and the 
collective) and that the human environment offers different tools for shaping it: the one 
that comes to hand first (when primitive man reacts instinctively to the harsh reality of 
necessity confronted in fr. 646 Luria) is not always the most effective.  This leads 
naturally to our next consideration: the origin(s) of moral values in Polybius' account.   
(ii) After becoming a primitive monarchy, Polybius' society generates the moral 
values (conveniently summarized as δικαιοσύνη) necessary for the other three types of 
government (kingship, aristocracy, democracy) via a probabilistic evolutionary process 
whose careful articulation reminds us again of Democritus:
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TEXT (Buettner-Wobst) TRANSLATION (Paton)
ὁ δὲ  τρόπος τῆς  ἀρχῆς  καὶ  τῆς  γενέσεως 
τῶν  εἰρημένων  [τοῦ  καλοῦ  καὶ  δικαίου 
τοῖς  ἀνθρώποις,  ὁμοίως  δὲ  καὶ  τῶν 
ἐναντίων  τούτοις]  τοιόσδε.   πάντων  γὰρ 
πρὸς τὰς συνουσίας ὁρμώντων κατὰ φύσιν, 
ἐκ δὲ τούτων παιδοποιίας ἀποτελουμένης, 
ὁπότε  τις  τῶν  ἐκτραφέντων  εἰς  ἡλικίαν 
ἱκόμενος  μὴ  νέμοι  χάριν  μηδ'  ἀμύνοι 
τούτοις οἷς ἐκτρέφοιτ', ἀλλά που τἀναντία 
κακῶς  λέγειν  ἢ  δρᾶν  τούτους  ἐγχειροίη, 
δῆλον  ὡς  δυσαρεστεῖν  καὶ  προσκόπτειν 
εἰκὸς  τοὺς  συνόντας  καὶ  συνίδοντας  τὴν 
γεγενημένην  ἐκ  τῶν  γεννησάντων  ἐπι-
μέλειαν  καὶ  κακοπάθειαν  περὶ  τὰ  τέκνα 
καὶ τὴν τούτων θεραπείαν καὶ τροφήν. τοῦ 
γὰρ  γένους  τῶν  ἀνθρώπων  ταύτηι  δια-
φέροντος  τῶν  ἄλλων  ζώιων,  ἧι  μόνοις 
αὐτοῖς μέτεστι νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ, φανερὸν
ὡς  οὐκ  εἰκὸς  παρατρέχειν  αὐτοὺς  τὴν 
προειρημένην διαφοράν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων  ζώιων,  ἀλλ'  ἐπισημαίνεσθαι  τὸ 
γινόμενον  καὶ  δυσαρεστεῖσθαι  τοῖς  παρ-
οῦσι,  προορωμένους  τὸ  μέλλον  καὶ  συλ-
λογιζομένους ὅτι τὸ παραπλήσιον ἑκάστοις 
αὐτῶν  συγκυρήσει.  καὶ  μὴν  ὅταν  που 
πάλιν  ἅτερος  ὑπὸ  θατέρου  τυχὼν  ἐπι-
κουρίας  ἢ  βοηθείας  ἐν  τοῖς  δεινοῖς  μὴ 
νέμηι  τῶι  σώσαντι  χάριν,  ἀλλά ποτε  καὶ 
βλάπτειν  ἐγχειρῆι  τοῦτον,  φανερὸν  ὡς 
εἰκὸς  τῶι  τοιούτωι  δυσαρετεῖσθαι  καὶ 
προσκόπτειν  τοὺς  εἰδότας,  συναγανακ-
τοῦντας μὲν τῶι πέλας, ἀναφέροντας δ' ἐφ 
αὑτοὺς τὸ παραπλήσιον. ἐξ ὧν ὑπογίνεταί 
τις  ἔννοια  παρ'  ἑκάστωι  τῆς  τοῦ  καθ-
ήκοντος δυνάμεως καὶ θεωρίας· ὅπερ ἐστὶν 
ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος δικαιοσύνης.
The  manner in  which  these  notions  [of 
goodness,  justice,  and  their  opposites 
among men] come into being is as follows. 
Men being all naturally inclined to sexual 
intercourse,  and  the  consequence  of  this 
being the birth of children, whenever one 
of those who have been reared does not on 
growing  up  show gratitude  to  those  who 
reared  him  or  defend  them,  but  on  the 
contrary takes to speaking ill of them or ill 
treating  them,  it  is  evident  that  he  will 
displease and offend those who have been 
familiar  with  his  parents  and  have 
witnessed the care and pains they spent on 
attending to and feeding their children. For 
seeing that men are distinguished from the 
other animals by possessing the faculty of 
reason, it is obviously improbable that such 
a  difference  of  conduct  should  escape 
them, as it escapes other animals: they will 
notice the thing and be displeased at what 
is  going  on,  looking  to  the  future  and 
reflecting that they may all meet with the 
same treatment.   Again when a man who 
has  been  helped  or  succored  when  in 
danger by another does not show gratitude 
to his preserver, but even goes to the length 
of attempting to do him injury,  it  is clear 
that  those  who  become  aware  of  it  will 
naturally  be  displeased  and  offended  by 
such  conduct,  sharing  the  resentment  of 
their  injured  neighbor  and  imagining 
themselves in the same situation.  From all 
this there arises in everyone a notion of the 
meaning and theory of the power of duty, 
which is the beginning and end of justice.
Polyb. 6.6.1-7  
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This passage recalls Democritus' discussion of the unique benefits that human parents 
expect from their children: like all animals, humans naturally participate in coitus and get 
children; unlike other animals, we have developed a long-standing tradition (referred to 
as a κατάστασις τις ἀρχαίη and a νομίζον)106 by which the offspring are supposed to be an 
asset to their parents.  How did we get this tradition, according to Democritus?  While 
there is no simple, conclusive answer to this question, owing to lack of evidence, the 
early atomist corpus does provide enough information to let us make some very good 
guesses about what Democritus would have said about the origins of filial obligation (and 
other ethical values recognized in contemporary Greek society).  As we will see, the 
evidence we have shows Democritus adopting a position on the evolution of human 
moral behavior very close to the one taken by Polybius, perhaps even identical with it.  
Fr. 682 Luria provides our clearest abstract formulation of Democritus' conception 
of how humans acquire moral character: nature (φύσις) and instruction (διδαχή) mould 
the human individual (ὁ ἄνθρωπος), giving him shape (ῥυσμός).107  Other testimonia 
show that Democritus imagined the process of individual ἄνθρωποι perceiving and 
106 See fr. 562 Luria, quoted above on page 188.
107 In the Critical Tradition, φύσις is both agent (na) and product (np): the word designates both the 
result(s) of natural processes (np) and the underlying reality controlling those processes (na).  From the 
Democritean perspective developed in chapter 2, φύσις (np) is the result of material necessity (ἀνάγκη), 
which is the underlying reality—i.e. φύσις (na)—responsible for all phenomena in the atomist universe. 
Necessity shapes human character by constituting man as a physical being whose existence is 
fundamentally restricted in certain ways (e.g. he must breathe) but otherwise open to development and 
alteration (e.g. the rate of his breathing may change, and there are any number of very different places 
where he can find air).  Instruction shapes human character within the constraints set by material 
necessity, giving man better (or at least different) ways of conforming to the absolute demands of that 
necessity (na).  In this way, the living nature (np) that material necessity provides to human beings is not 
morally neutral (i.e. certain moral aptitudes and tendencies appear hard-wired in mankind of necessity), 
and it can be altered through training (where necessity is flexible, e.g. when it comes to deciding 
whether to live in one city or another: see fr. 103 Luria, quoted on pages 125-137 above).
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responding to external stimuli (whether accidents arising from untutored φύσις or lessons 
cultivated as part of deliberate διδαχή) much the same as Polybius does (in 6.6.1-7):
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
(a) ὁ  δὲ  Φαβωρῖνος  ...  λόγον  τινὰ  τοῦ 
Δημοκρίτου  παλαιὸν  ὥσπερ  ἐκ  καπνοῦ 
καθελὼν  ἠμαυρωμένον  οἷος  ἦν  ἐκ-
καθαίρειν καὶ διαλαμπρύνειν, ὑποθέμενος 
τοῦτο δὴ τοὐπιδήμιον ὅ φησι Δημόκριτος 
«ἐγκαταβυσσοῦσθαι  τὰ  εἴδωλα  διὰ  τῶν 
πόρων εἰς τὰ σώματα καὶ ποιεῖν τὰς κατὰ 
ὕπνον  ὄψεις  ἐπαναφερόμενα·  φοιτᾶν  δὲ 
ταῦτα πανταχόθεν ἀπιόντα καὶ σκευῶν καὶ 
ἱματίων καὶ φυτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ ζώιων ὑπὸ 
σάλου  πολλοῦ  καὶ  θερμότητος  οὐ  μόνον 
ἔχοντα  μορφοειδεῖς  τοῦ  σώματος  ἐκμε-
μαγμένας  ὁμοιότητας»  (ὡς  Ἐπίκουρος 
οἴεται  μέχρι  τούτου  Δημοκρίτωι  συν-
επόμενος,  ἐνταῦθα  δὲ  προλιπὼν  τὸν 
λόγον),  «ἀλλὰ  καὶ  τῶν  κατὰ  ψυχὴν 
κινημάτων καὶ βουλευμάτων ἑκάστωι καὶ 
ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν ἐμφάσεις ἀναλαμβάνοντα 
συνεφέλκεσθαι  καὶ  προσπίπτοντα  μετὰ 
τούτων  ὥσπερ  ἔμψυχα  φράζειν  καὶ 
διαγγέλλειν  τοῖς  ὑποδεχομένοις  τὰς  τῶν 
μεθιέντων  αὐτὰ  δόξας  καὶ  διαλογισμοὺς 
καὶ ὁρμάς, ὅταν ἐνάρθρους καὶ ἀσυγχύτους 
φυλάττοντα προσμίξηι τὰς εἰκόνας».     
Favorinus … advanced an old argument of 
Democritus.  Taking it down all blackened 
with  smoke,  as  it  were,  he  set  about 
cleaning  and  polishing  it.  He  used  as 
foundation  the  familiar  commonplace 
found  in  Democritus  that  spectral  films 
penetrate  the  body through the pores  and 
that when they rise they make us see things 
in our sleep. These films that come to us 
emanate  from  everything—from  utensils, 
clothing,  plants,  and  especially  from 
animals,  because of  their  restlessness  and 
their warmth.  The films have not only the 
impressed physical  likeness  in  contour  of 
an  animal—so  far  Epicurus  agrees  with 
Democritus, though he drops the subject at 
this  stage—but they catch up and convey 
by attraction spectral copies of each man's 
mental  impulses,  designs,  moral  qualities, 
and  emotions.  When  they  strike  the 
recipient thus accompanied,  they speak to 
him, as if they were alive, and report to him 
the  thoughts,  reasoning,  and  impulses  of 
those  from whom they  escape,  whenever 
the  copies  are  still  preserved  whole  and 
undistorted till contact is made. (Minar)
Democritus, fr. A77 DK
     = fr. 133a Taylor
     = fr. 476 Luria
 
Plut. Quaest. Conv. 8.10.2 p. 734f-735a  
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(b) φησὶν ἐκεῖνος  (ὁ  Δημόκριτος)  ἐξιέναι 
(sc. τὰ  εἴδωλα)  τοὺς  φθονοῦντας,  οὔτ' 
αἰσθήσεως ἄμοιρα παντάπασιν οὔθ' ὁρμῆς, 
ἀνάπλεά  τε  τῆς  ἀπὸ  τῶν  προϊεμένων 
μοχθηρίας  καὶ  βασκανίας,  μεθ'  ἧς 
ἐμπλασσόμενα καὶ  παραμένοντα καὶ  συν-
οικοῦντα  τοῖς  βασκαινομένοις  ἐπιτα-
ράττειν καὶ κακοῦν αὐτῶν τό τε σῶμα καὶ 
τὴν διάνοιαν· 
Ce philosophe affirme que  les  simulacres 
émis  par  les  êtres  méchants  ne  sont  pas 
essentiellement  exempts  de  sentiment  ni 
d'intention,  et  qu'ils  sont  au  contraire 
chargés  de  toute  la  malignité  et  de  toute 
l'envie de celui dont ils émanent; c'est avec 
elles  qu'ils  s'impriment,  demeurent  et 
s'installent  dans  la  victime,  dont  ils 
troublent  et  corrompent  ainsi  le  corps  en 
même temps que l'esprit. (Fuhrmann)
Democritus, fr. A77 DK
     = fr. 133b Taylor
     = fr. 579 Luria
Plut. Quaest. conv. 5.7.6, p. 682f
(c) Δημόκριτος  μὲν  γὰρ  εὔχεσθαι  φησι 
δεῖν,  ὅπως  εὐλόγχων  εἰδώλων  τυγ-
χάνωμεν, καὶ  τὰ σύμφυλα καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ 
μᾶλλον  ἡμῖν  ἐκ  τοῦ  περιέχοντος  ἢ  τὰ 
φαῦλα καὶ τὰ σκαιὰ συμφέρηται.
Democritus  says  we  must  pray  that  we 
meet  with propitious  images  and that  our 
environment brings us congenial and good 
images rather than mean and harmful ones. 
(my translation)
Democritus, fr. 472a Luria
Plut. Aem. 1.1.4
(d) Δημόκριτος  δὲ  εἴδωλά  τινά  φησιν 
ἐμπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τούτων τὰ 
μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ τὰ δὲ κακοποιά. ἔνθεν 
καὶ εὔχετο εὐλόγχων τυχεῖν εἰδώλων. 
Democritus  says  that  some  eidôla  en-
counter  people,  and  of  these  some  are 
beneficial  and  some  harmful;  hence  he 
prayed to find propitious eidôla. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B166 DK
     = fr. 175b Taylor
     = fr. 472a Luria
Sext. Adv. Math. 9.19
228
(e)  καὶ πάλιν·  «δηλοῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ 
λόγος, ὅτι ἐτεῆι οὐδὲν ἴδμεν περὶ οὐδενός, 
ἀλλ'  ἐπιρυσμίη  ἑκάστοισιν  ἡ  δόξις». 
(Luria)
And again: 'This reasoning too shows that 
in verity we know nothing about anything, 
but  opinion  is  for  everyone  a  reshaping.' 
(Bett)
Democritus, fr. B7 DK
     = fr. D20, 179a Taylor
     = fr. 49 Luria
Sext. Adv. Math. 7.137
(f) δοκεῖ δέ μοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὄνου ἵππον βιασα-
μένου  κατὰ  τύχην  κυῆσαι,  μαθητὰς  δὲ 
ἀνθρώπους τῆς βίας ταύτης γεγενημένους 
εἶτα  μέντοι  προελθεῖν  ἐπὶ  τὴν  τῆς  γονῆς 
αὐτῶν συνήθειαν.
It  seems to me, [Democritus] says,  that a 
mare  once  happened  to  give  birth  after 
having  been  raped  by  an  ass,  and  men, 
getting the idea from this violent act, went 
on  to  develop  this  kind  of  breeding. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A151 DK
     = fr. 145 Taylor
     = fr. 561 Luria
Ael. N. a. 12.16 
   
These fragments offer an early atomist perspective on humanity that is already familiar 
from chapter 2: human beings exist as temporary clouds of atoms carried about in an 
environment saturated with other atomic clouds—including an infinite multitude of thin 
atomic films (εἴδωλα) that emanate continually from every discrete cloud.  The live 
person exists in this environment as a discrete cloud of soul atoms enclosed by grosser 
atoms that make up the physical body.  As long as he lives, he engages in three basic 
functions: (1) breathing (when incoming soul atoms replace those expelled by natural 
pressure); (2) perception (when films from another atomic cloud register in some sensory 
cortex as vision, sound, or thought); and (3) movement (when the reaction of the sensory 
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cortex to vision, sound, or thought moves soul atoms that move the grosser body).  
Because of their importance in determining perception and movement (laxly rather than 
absolutely),108 atomic εἴδωλα acquire the moral significance that appears explicit in frr. 
472a, 476, and 579 Luria.  In these fragments, Democritus asserts that images from the 
surrounding environment affect the individual for good or ill.109 
As the individual human soul comes into proximity with images—the atomic 
ε δωλαἴ  that happen to coincide with it at particular moments in time and space—the 
entire person experiences an evolution of moral character: certain images (e.g. those 
emanating from a person eaten up with φθόνος [b]) cause it harm, presumably because 
they engage its perceptive and motor capabilities in ways that are destructive.  Others are 
beneficial (τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιά [d]), presumably because they do the opposite.  Every 
person hopes to meet with εἴδωλα ἀγαθοποιά and avoid the κακοποιά (c, d) so that his 
moral character improves (or remains good) rather than degenerating.  The opinions that 
we carry around are unique and temporary reactions to εἴδωλα that we have met (e).  
These reactions give us information about our environment, information that we can use 
to modify our ethical behavior in significant ways (f).  
From the foregoing, it appears that Democritus would have described the genesis 
of human moral traditions (like the ancient νομίζον that children benefit their parents) in 
108 See chapter 2.2.1-2 above.
109 τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν κινημάτων καὶ βουλευμάτων ἑκάστωι καὶ ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν ἐμφάσεις ἀναλαμ-
βάνοντα συνεφέλκεσθαι ... φράζειν καὶ διαγγέλλειν τοῖς ὑποδεχομένοις τὰς τῶν μεθιέντων αὐτὰ 
δόξας καὶ διαλογισμοὺς καὶ ὁρμάς [a].  ἐμπλασσόμενα καὶ παραμένοντα καὶ συνοικοῦντα τοῖς 
βασκαινομένοις ἐπιταράττειν καὶ κακοῦν αὐτῶν τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν [b].  Δημόκριτος μὲν 
γὰρ εὔχεσθαι φησι δεῖν, ὅπως... τὰ σύμφυλα καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἢ τὰ 
φαῦλα καὶ τὰ σκαιὰ συμφέρηται [c]. τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ τὰ δὲ κακοποιά [d].
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terms very similar to those used by Polybius to explain the origins of filial piety and 
justice in 6.6.1-7.  Polybius' primitives discover moral virtue as a natural reaction to their 
observation of circumstances in the immediate environment: they perceive a specific 
instance of children treating their parents badly or some benefactor being misused by the 
object of his kindness, and they naturally fear that similar misfortune will befall them 
when they too become parents or benefactors.  As a result of this perceptual experience,  
i.e. perceiving something in their environment and reflecting on it, they conceive an idea 
(ἔννοια) of justice (δικαιοσύνη)—an idea that can be shared with other people through 
words and behavior and so become entrenched in the community.  Similarly, Democritus 
imagines men discovering the mule when someone witnesses the accidental coupling of a 
horse and an ass.  A perceptual experience (observing an accident and its consequence) 
leads to a moral habit (as people systematically breed mules, expecting the replication of 
results that become more familiar and important to the individual and the community110 as 
they are repeatedly reported and witnessed firsthand).  In both authors, the environment 
naturally presents circumstances (parents and benefactors being abused, horses being 
raped by asses) that people inevitably perceive and turn into novel moral habits (treating 
parents and benefactors with unfailing deference, mating horse and asses on purpose to 
110 From an early atomist perspective, it makes sense that the shape of an individual society be plastic like 
the shape of an individual human being.  In early atomist thought, each is the momentary coagulation 
of a discrete cloud of moving atoms: the society differs from the individual only in being a larger and 
more diffuse cloud (with larger and more diffuse perceptive and motive capabilities commensurate 
with its containing more than one embodied human soul).  Each exists in an evolving environment to 
which it responds naturally and necessarily, in a laxly determined way: some things occur arbitrarily 
while others are invariable.  Thus for the early atomist the history of an individual community, like the 
history of an individual human being, becomes a series of developments that are necessary to survival 
(the way breathing is necessary for the human individual) and accidental to it (the way having a certain 
number of fingers or living in a particular geographical area is for the human individual).
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breed mules).  Human morality is not a simple gift from the gods in either case (in 
contrast with the myth of Protagoras), but a result of people reacting to circumstances 
that occur and recur naturally in keeping with probability (εἰκός in Polybius 6.6.4 et 
passim, κατὰ τύχην in fr. 561 Luria).111      
(iii)  A final feature of Polybius' Kulturgeschichte with strong Democritean 
resonance is the material excess that invariably leads to political upheaval (overthrowing 
one regime and creating the conditions that give birth to the next one in the cycle):
TEXT (Buettner-Wobst) TRANSLATION (Paton)
(a) ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ διαδοχῆς καὶ κατὰ γένος τὰς 
ἀρχὰς παραλαμβάνοντες ἕτοιμα μὲν εἶχον 
ἤδη τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, ἕτοιμα δὲ καὶ 
πλείω  τῶν  ἱκανῶν  τὰ  πρὸς  τὴν  τροφήν, 
τότε δὴ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἑπόμενοι διὰ τὴν 
περιουσίαν  ἐξάλλους  μὲν  ἐσθῆτας 
ὑπέλαβον δεῖν ἔχειν τοὺς ἡγουμένους τῶν 
ὑποταττομένων, ἐξάλλους δὲ καὶ ποικίλας 
τὰς  περὶ  τὴν  τροφὴν  ἀπολαύσεις  καὶ 
παρασκευάς,  ἀναντιρρήτους  δὲ  καὶ  παρὰ 
τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων 
χρείας καὶ συνουσίας.  ἐφ' οἷς μὲν φθόνου 
γενομένου  καὶ  προσκοπῆς,  ἐφ'  οἷς  δὲ 
μίσους ἐκκαιομένου καὶ δυσμενικῆς ὀργῆς, 
ἐγένετο  μὲν  ἐκ  τῆς  βασιλείας  τυρρανίς, 
ἀρχὴ  δὲ  καταλύσεως  ἐγεννᾶτο  καὶ 
σύστασις ἐπιβουλῆς τοῖς ἡγουμένοις· 
But  when  they  [the  children  of  the  first 
kings]  received  the  office  by  hereditary 
succession  and  found  their  safety  now 
provided  for,  and  more  than  sufficient 
provision of food, they gave way to their 
appetites  owing  to  this  superabundance, 
and came to think that the rulers must be 
distinguished  from  their  subjects  by  a 
peculiar  dress,  that  there  should  be  a 
peculiar luxury and variety in the dressing 
and serving of their viands, and that they 
should meet with no denial in the pursuit of 
their  amours,  however  lawless.  These 
habits having given rise in one case to envy 
and offense and in the other to an outburst 
of  hatred  and  passionate  resentment,  the 
kingship changed into a tyranny; the first 
steps toward its  overthrow were taken by 
the subjects, and conspiracies began to be 
formed.
Polyb. 6.7.6-8
111 Remember Xenophanes, fr. 18 DK: οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖς ὑπέδειξαν, / ἀλλὰ χρόνωι 
ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον (Stob. 1.8.2).  Democritus and Polybius represent two variations on 
what was already an old theme.
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(b) ὅτε δὲ διαδέξαιντο πάλιν παῖδες παρὰ 
πατέρων  τὴν  τοιαύτην  ἐξουσίαν,  ἄπειροι 
μὲν  ὄντες  κακῶν,  ἄπειροι  δὲ  καθόλου 
πολιτικῆς  ἰσότητος  καὶ  παρρησίας, 
τεθραμμένοι  δ'  ἐξ  ἀρχῆς  ἐν  ταῖς  τῶν 
πατέρων  ἐξουσίαις  καὶ  προαγωγαῖς, 
ὁρμήσαντες  οἱ  μὲν  ἐπὶ  πλεονεξίαν  καὶ 
φιλαργυρίαν  ἄδικον,  οἱ  δ'  ἐπὶ  μέθας  καὶ 
τὰς ἅμα ταύταις ἀπλήστους εὐωχίας, οἱ δ' 
ἐπὶ  τὰς τῶν γυναικῶν ὕβρεις καὶ παίδων 
ἁρπαγάς,  μετέστησαν  μὲν  τὴν  ἀριστο-
κρατίαν  εἰς  ὀλιγαρχίαν,  ταχὺ  δὲ  κατεσ-
κεύασαν  ἐν  τοῖς  πλήθεσι  πάλιν  τὰ 
παραπλήσια  τοῖς  ἄρτι  ῥηθεῖσι·  διὸ  καὶ 
παραπλήσιον  συνέβαινε  τὸ  τέλος  αὐτῶν 
γίνεσθαι  τῆς  καταστροφῆς  τοῖς  περὶ  τοὺς 
τυράννους ἀτυχήμασιν. 
But here again when children inherited this 
position of authority [in the aristocracy that 
succeeds  kingship]  from  their  fathers, 
having  no  experience  of  misfortune  and 
none at all of civil equality and liberty of 
speech, and having been brought up from 
the cradle amid the evidences of power and 
high  position  of  their  fathers,  they 
abandoned themselves to greed of gain and 
unscrupulous  moneymaking,  others  to 
indulgence  in  wine  and  the  convivial 
excess  which  accompanies  it,  and  others 
again  to  the  violation  of  women  and  the 
rape  of  boys;  and  thus  converting  the 
aristocracy into an oligarchy [they] aroused 
in  the  people  feelings  similar  to  those  of 
which I just spoke, and in consequence met 
with the same disastrous end as the tyrant. 
Polyb. 6.8.4-6  
(c) ὅταν  δ'  ἐπιγένωνται  νέοι  καὶ  παισὶ 
παίδων  πάλιν  ἡ  δημοκρατία  παραδοθῆι, 
τότ'  οὐκέτι  διὰ  τὸ  σύνηθες  ἐν  μεγάλωι 
τιθέμενοι τὸ τῆς ἰσηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας 
ζητοῦσι πλέον ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν· μάλιστα 
δ'  εἰς  τοῦτ'  ἐμπίπτουσιν  οἱ  ταῖς  οὐσίαις 
ὑπερέχοντες.  λοιπὸν ὅταν  ὁρμήσωσιν  ἐπὶ 
τὸ  φιλαρχεῖν  καὶ  μὴ δύνωνται  δι'  αὑτῶν 
καὶ διὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς τυγχάνειν τούτων, 
διαφθείρουσι τὰς οὐσίας, δελεάζοντες καὶ 
λυμαινόμενοι  τὰ  πλήθη  κατὰ  πάντα 
τρόπον. ἐξ ὧν ὅταν ἅπαξ δωροδόκους καὶ 
δωροφάγους  καρασκευάσωσι  τοὺς  πολ-
λοὺς διὰ τὴν ἄφρονα δοξοφαγίαν, τότ' ἤδη 
πάλιν τὸ μὲν τῆς δημοκρατίας καταλύεται, 
μεθίσταται δ' εἰς βίαν καὶ χειροκρατίαν ἡ 
δημοκρατία. 
But when a new generation arises and the 
democracy  falls  into  the  hands  of  the 
grandchildren  of  its  founders,  they  have 
become  so  accustomed  to  freedom  and 
equality  that  they  no  longer  value  them, 
and begin to aim at preeminence; and it is 
chiefly those of ample fortune who fall into 
this  error.  So when they begin to lust  for 
power  and  cannot  attain  it  through 
themselves  or  their  own  good  qualities, 
they  ruin  their  estates,  tempting  and 
corrupting  the  people  in  every  possible 
way. And hence when by their foolish thirst 
for reputation they have created among the 
masses an appetite for gifts and the habit of 
receiving  them,  democracy  in  its  turn  is 
abolished and changes into a rule of force 
and violence.
Polyb. 6.9.5-7
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In Polybius' narrative, human culture evolves predictably in response to material excess 
(περιουσία,112 ἐξουσίαι καὶ προαγωγαί,113 οὐσίαι114), material excess which children born 
into authority inevitably handle worse than their parents.  This recurring failure of the 
heirs to an established regime causes it to collapse and make way for a new one (that is 
different but still subject to the weakness that destroyed its predecessor).  
Compare the following fragments of Democritus that (a) recognize the role of 
material excess in the evolution of human culture and (b) discuss how different 
generations respond to wealth: 
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
(a1) Δημόκριτος  ...  μουσικήν  φησι 
νεωτέραν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδίδωσι 
λέγων μὴ ἀποκρῖναι τἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ ἐκ 
τοῦ περιεῦντος ἤδη γενέσθαι.
Democritus  ...  says  that  music  is  more 
recent, and identifies its cause, saying that 
it  was  not  singled  out  by  necessity,  but 
arose as a result of plenty.115
Democritus, fr. B144 DK
     = fr. 213 Taylor
     = fr. 568 Luria
Philod.  De musica 4.31, p. 108.29 Kemke; 
Herculaneum pap. 1497, col. 36.29-39
112 τότε δὴ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἑπόμενοι διὰ τὴν περιουσίαν ἐξάλλους μὲν ἐσθῆτας ὑπέλαβον δεῖν ἔχειν τοὺς 
ἡγουμένους κτλ. (a).  The περιουσία invoked here exists after the kings have provided for all their 
subjects' material needs, including a physical habitat and the means to defend it: τόπους τε 
διαφέροντας ὀχυρούμενοι καὶ τειχίζοντες καὶ χώραν κατακτώμενοι, τὸ μὲν τῆς ἀσφαλείας χάριν, τὸ 
δὲ τῆς δαψιλείας τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς ὑποτεταγμένοις (Polyb. 6.7.4).
113 τεθραμμένοι δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν ταῖς τῶν πατέρων ἐξουσίαις καὶ προαγωγαῖς, ὁρμήσαντες οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ 
πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαργυρίαν ἄδικον (b).  For the implication of material abundance in these words, see 
LSJ s.v. ἐξουσία (iii) and προαγωγή (ii), which cite examples from the fifth, fourth, and third centuries. 
Paton supports this implication in context by translating τεθραμμένοι δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν ταῖς τῶν πατέρων 
ἐξουσίαις καὶ προαγωγαῖς as “having been brought up from the cradle amid the evidences of power 
and high position of their fathers” (311).  Material goods are always prominent among the evidences of 
political power. 
114 μάλιστα δ' εἰς τοῦτ' ἐμπίπτουσιν οἱ ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπερέχοντες (c).
115 For the complete fragment, see page 191 above.
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(b1) τοῖς παισὶ μάλιστα χρὴ τῶν ἀνυστῶν 
δατεῖσθαι  τὰ  χρήματα,  καὶ  ἅμα  ἐπι-
μελεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, μή τι ἀτηρὸν ποιέωσι διὰ 
χειρὸς  ἔχοντες·  ἅμα  μὲν  γὰρ  πολλὸν 
φειδότεροι  γίγνονται  ἐς  τὰ  χρήματα  καὶ 
προθυμότεροι  κτᾶσθαι,  καὶ  ἀγωνίζονται 
ἀλλήλοισιν.  ἐν  γὰρ  τῶι  ξυνῶι  τὰ 
τελεύμενα  οὐκ  ἀνιᾶι  ὥσπερ  ἰδίηι  οὐδ' 
εὐθυμεῖ  τὰ  ἐπικτώμενα,  ἀλλὰ  πολλῶι 
ἧσσον.
Those  who can  should  as  far  as  possible 
divide  their  wealth  among  their  children, 
and at the same time keep an eye on them, 
to make sure that they do not do anything 
foolish when they get their hands on it. For 
at the same time they become much more 
thrifty over money and eager to get it, and 
they compete with one another.  For what is 
spent in common does not hurt so much as 
what  one  spends  for  oneself,  nor  does 
profit  made  in  common  gladden  one  so 
much, but much less.
Democritus, fr. B279 DK
     = fr. D143 Taylor
     = fr. 715 Luria
Stob. 4.26.25
(b2) οἱ  τῶν  φειδωλῶν  παῖδες  ἀμαθέες 
γινόμενοι,  ὥσπερ  οἱ  ὀρχησταὶ  οἱ  ἐς  τὰς 
μαχαίρας ὀρούοντες, ἢν ἑνὸς μούνου <μὴ> 
τύχωσι  καταφερόμενοι,  ἔνθα  δεῖ  τοὺς 
πόδας  ἐρεῖσαι,  ἀπόλλυνται  χαλεπὸν  δὲ 
τυχεῖν  ἑνός·  τὸ  γὰρ  ἴχνιον  μοῦνον 
λέλειπται τῶν ποδῶν οὕτω δὲ καὶ  οὗτοι, 
ἢν  ἁμάρτωσι  τοῦ  πατρικοῦ  τύπου  τοῦ 
ἐπιμελέος  καὶ  φειδωλοῦ,  φιλέουσι  δια-
φθείρεσθαι.
If the children of the thrifty turn out stupid, 
they are like people dancing on swords; if 
they make even one mistake in putting their 
foot down, they are lost (and it is difficult 
to find the precise place, for only the size 
of a footprint is left free). In the same way, 
if those people fail to acquire their father's 
cautious and thrifty character, they are apt 
to be ruined.
Democritus, fr. B228 DK
     = fr. D92 Taylor
     = fr. 629 Luria
Stob. 3.16.18
    
We have already noticed (a) the distinction Democritus draws between necessities (things 
that animal and human life requires absolutely, e.g. food) and luxuries (things that arise 
as part of life without being necessary, e.g. music).116  There are several fragments that 
116 See pages 173-184 above.
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show this distinction as categorical for the atomist.117  Fr. 568 Luria makes plain that the 
distinction is also chronological: necessities arise prior to luxuries in human culture (as in 
the Polybian Kulturgeschichte, wherein the first rulers of a particular regime always look 
to essential concerns before their descendants get distracted and cultivate the luxury that 
leads to envy that ultimately dissolves the regime).  Likewise, we have already noted that 
Democritus showed special interest in (b) the getting and rearing of human children.  Frr. 
629 and 715 Luria show the atomist taking a position on inheritance that is very close to 
the position Polybius takes on rulers who inherit authority from their parents.  Parents 
have to watch their children carefully, and there is great danger that the latter may not 
develop the moral character needed to manage their material inheritance well (the same 
danger that causes cyclical revolutions in the Polybian πόλις).  In this context, there are 
several additional testimonia from the Democritean corpus that warrant (re)examination: 
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
(a2)  ἀνθρώποισι  τῶν  ἀναγκαίων  δοκεῖ 
εἶναι  παῖδας  κτήσασθαι  ἀπὸ  φύσιος  καὶ 
καταστάσιός τινος ἀρχαίης.
People consider having children to be one 
of the necessities because of nature and a 
certain ancient institution. (my translation)
Democritus, fr. 278 DK
     = fr. D142 Taylor
     = fr. 562 Luria
Stob. 4.24.33
117 See e.g. frr. 646 Luria (wherein the atomist concludes that hard labor and/or suffering should be 
expended only for necessities), 717 Luria (where refusing to attend to necessities is called irrational), 
and 732 Luria (wherein the atomist recommends satisfying the absolute human need for sustenance and 
sleep with the most basic food and bed).
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(a3) Δημόκριτος δὲ γάμον καὶ παιδοποιίαν 
παραιτεῖται  διὰ  τὰς  πολλὰς  ἐξ  αὐτῶν 
ἀηδίας  τε  καὶ  ἀφολκὰς  ἀπο  τῶν  ἀναγ-
καιοτέρων.  
Democritus  advised  against  marriage  and 
having  children  as  causing  much  un-
pleasantness  and  distraction  from  more 
essential things.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A170 DK 
     = fr. 191 Taylor
     = fr. 723 Luria
Clem. Strom. 2.138
(b3) οὐ  δοκεῖ  μοι  χρῆναι  παῖδας  κτᾶσθαι· 
ἐνορῶ γὰρ ἐν παίδων κτήσει πολλοὺς μὲν 
καὶ μεγάλους κινδύνους, πολλὰς δὲ λύπας, 
ὀλίγα δὲ τὰ εὐθηλέοντα καὶ ταῦτα λεπτά τε 
καὶ ἀσθενέα.
I  do  not  think  that  one  should  have 
children; for in having children I see many 
great dangers and much distress,  and few 
blessings  and  those  meagre  and  weak. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B276 DK
     = fr. D140 Taylor
     = fr. 722 Luria
Stob. 4.24.31
(b4) ὅτεωι  χρήμη  τεά  ἐστι  παῖδα  ποιή-
σασθαι,  ἐκ  τῶν  φίλων  τεύ  μοι  δοκεῖ 
ἄμεινον  εἶναι.  καὶ  τῶι  μὲν  παῖς  ἔστι 
τοιοῦτος,  οἷον  ἂν  βούληται·  ἔστι  γὰρ 
ἐκλέξασθαι  οἷον  ἐθέλει·  καὶ  ὃς  ἂν  δοκῆι 
ἐπιτήδειος εἶναι, κἂν μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν 
ἕποιτο. καὶ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅσον 
ἐνταῦθα  μὲν  ἔστι  τὸν  παῖδα  λαβεῖν 
καταθύμιον ἐκ πολλῶν, οἷον ἂν δέηι. ἢν δέ 
τις  ποιῆται  ἀπὸ  ἑωυτοῦ,  πολλοὶ  ἔνεισι 
κίνδυνοι·  ἀνάγκη  γάρ,  ὃς  ἂν  γένηται, 
τούτωι χρῆσθαι.
If anyone needs to have a child, it seems to 
me better that  he should choose from his 
friends' children.  That way he will get the 
sort  of child he wants,  for he can choose 
the  one  he  likes;  and the  one  that  seems 
suitable will follow his bidding as far as its 
nature  allows.  And  this  is  a  great 
difference,  in  that  he  can  choose  from 
many the one he prefers,  according as he 
thinks it should be. But if he has one of his 
own, there are many dangers; for he has to 
make do with the one that is born to him. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B277 DK
     = fr. D141 Taylor
     = fr. 724 Luria
Stob. 4.24.32
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(c) τράπεζαν  πολυτελέα  μὲν  τύχη  παρα-
τίθησιν, αὐταρκέα δὲ σωφροσύνη.
Fortune provides a lavish table, self-control 
a sufficient one.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B210 DK 
     = fr. D74 Taylor
     = fr. 759 Luria
Stob. 3.5.26
 
From Democritus' perspective, getting children is habit that people appear to cultivate 
naturally (ἀπὸ φύσιος) as a necessity (one of the ἀναγκαῖα in a2).  This natural habit is a 
potential source of great disaster: getting one's own children inherently distracts from τὰ 
ἀναγκαιότερα (a3), offering greater risk than reward, more opportunity for introducing 
weakness than for cultivating strength (b3)118—just as in the narrative of Polybius, where 
circumstances inevitably distract sons from the essential habits that maintain the regime 
undergirding their fathers' power.  It is worth noting here that much of the moral counsel 
preserved in the Democritean corpus (as extant) appears calculated to help humans avoid 
being distracted away from necessities (food, shelter, safety, and the commonweal to 
maintain these) by luxuries (excessive wealth, and the private ambition that desires it 
and/or envies others who possess it),119 i.e. to prevent the same kind of moral catastrophe 
that Polybius identifies as being responsible for recurring social and political instability in 
118 See also fr. 721 Luria: τεκνοτροφίη σφαλερόν· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτυχίην ἀγῶνος μεστὴν καὶ φροντίδος 
κέκτηται, τὴν δὲ ἀποτυχίην ἀνυπέρθετον ἑτέρηι ὀδύνηι (Stob. 4.24.29).
119 See e.g. frr. 595 Luria (wherein the most important civic virtue is avoiding φιλονικίη), 633 Luria 
(wherein citizens become ὁμόνοοι by sharing material goods generously with one another as they are 
able), 679 Luria (wherein φιλονικίη is denounced as mindless ignorance of one's own best interest), 
713 Luria (wherein great achievements in the πόλεις are only possible because of ὁμονοίη), 732 Luria 
(wherein the sparest diet is recommended to satisfy legitimate human needs), 759 Luria (wherein lavish 
fortune is contrasted unfavorably with ascetic wisdom), and 776 Luria (wherein the human ψυχή is 
indicted for wasting the σῶμα with unnecessary and extravagant passions that lead to its untimely 
malaise and demise).
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his πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις (6.9.10).  
Thus, in b4 above, Democritus encourages the man who must have children to 
adopt rather than get his own, allowing him to circumvent the accident of birth (the same 
accident that wreaks havoc with the Polybian πόλις when a son incapable of succeeding 
his father inherits).  Rather than beget a son naturally and gamble on his acquiring the 
moral character necessary to take his father's place (as the rulers of each failed state do in 
the story of Polybius), accepting the surfeit or loss that historical accident delivers (in c), 
Democritus encourages readers to cultivate self-control (σωφροσύνη), taming the 
necessity of having descendants by taking measures to see that those descendants are 
morally qualified to inherit their father's place in society and keep its inherently mutable 
form (early atomist ῥυσμός) from deteriorating irreparably (as every πολιτεία does in the 
cycle described by Polybius).  Confronting the same moral dilemma that faces Polybius, 
Democritus recommends a solution consistent with his view of human character, a view 
that embraces determinism (humans will get children) without making it absolute (the 
individual can choose which children he raises as heirs to his position in society: he does 
not have to pick his personal biological offspring).  
Note that this position is consistent with the supple determinism discussed at 
length in chapter 2.  In fr. 103 Luria,120 human nature is determined by necessity (which 
puts like atoms with like in fr. 316 Luria121) such that every human being is invariably an 
animal (a temporary cloud of body-atoms and soul-atoms existing by the ingestion and 
120 Quoted above on pages 125-126.
121 Quoted above on page 127.
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expulsion of atoms via processes like respiration), but certain of his characteristics—e.g. 
the number of his fingers and the location of his dwelling—remain subject to variation 
(which can be minimal, e.g. between eight and twelve fingers, or maximal, e.g. between 
one end of the habitable world and its polar opposite).  Reading fr. 682 Luria122 in this 
context, the shape (ῥυσμός) of the individual human being is invariably animal (in that it 
requires respiration and similar processes to survive), but not invariably ten-fingered 
(finger counts vary) or Abderite (geographical location varies).  Often, the variable 
aspects of human shape are left to accident (e.g. the lucky coincidence that showed the 
first muleteers how to breed their beasts of burden123), which strikes us with atomic 
εἴδωλα that may be good or bad for the shape of our individual and collective bodies.124  
Instruction, on the other hand, gives us the opportunity to mould our variable shape 
(ῥυσμός) intentionally,125 inducing it—through contact with specific atomic εἴδωλα)—to 
evolve in desired ways (acquiring useful physical traits and moral habits that it might not 
get through accidental environmental stimulation).  In this paradigm, the collective is like 
the individual.126  As the invariable shape of an individual human being is animal, so the 
invariable shape of an individual human society is an animal collective—a group of 
animals drawn together by their mutual likeness (following the familiar physical and 
biological rule from fr. 316 Luria that like invariably congregates with like).127  As nature 
122 Quoted above on page 223.
123 See the presentation of fr. 561 Luria on page 211 above.
124 See pages 227-239 above.
125 Note that it does not alter our invariable shape, which remains animal as long as we live, changing only 
when necessity dissolves the cloud of atoms that constitutes us as individuals and/or groups.
126 See note 110 above.
127 See also frr. 595, 713 Luria.  Incidentally, the existence of a collective is also the only ubiquitous 
continuity in the account of Polybius, the only feature that all of his πολιτεῖαι share (whether we are 
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necessarily works to shape the individual with random atomic εἴδωλα that happen to 
strike it, so it works to shape society via random accident.  As instructing the individual 
offers an alternative means of changing his shape (in fr. 682 Luria), so teaching a group 
offers an alternative means of changing its shape (as imagined in fr. 613 Luria, where the 
atomist wants to change the ῥυσμός of the Greek πόλις so that good rulers are not 
punished, or in fr. 561 Luria, where breeding mules becomes a habit of mankind rather 
than of just one man). 
Returning to b4 (fr. 724 Luria), we see Democritus advocating that human 
character (individual and/or collective) be moulded such that we cultivate child-rearing—
a necessary part of our natural shape as animals (a2)—differently, with an eye toward 
minimizing the historical risks that both he and Polybius identify in leaving reproduction 
to untutored nature, which does not always shape us in ways conducive to our own best 
interest (as individuals or societies).  We want stable people with regular shape to form 
stable societies with regular shape, but as Democritus says briefly128 and Polybius 
illustrates at length, nature produces variations129 that historically prove chaotic 
talking about primitive monarchy, advanced democracy, or any of the degenerate transitional states). 
128 When he recognizes natural child-rearing as a source of ἀηδίαι (a3), ἀφολκαὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων 
(a3), λῦπαι (b3), and κίνδυνοι (b3, b4).  
129 Note here the presence of books titled (i) Περὶ τῶν διαφερόντων ῥυσμῶν and (ii) Περὶ ἀμειψιρυσμιῶν 
among the physical works attributed to Democritus by Thrasyllus (fr. cxv Luria = Diog. 9.45-49).  
Since we already know that Democritus contemplated human beings as mutable ῥυσμοί, whether as 
individuals (fr. 682 Luria) or groups (fr. 613 Luria), it is obvious that he had ideas about (i) the 
different shapes of humanity and (ii) how those shapes change.  Describing the evolution of human 
groups, Democritus might have developed these ideas into a recursive narrative like the one crafted by 
Polybius (who identifies all the different political shapes possible in human social experience and then 
shows how they change into one another continually over time via natural processes like those familiar 
to the Critical Tradition).  While it lacks conclusive support, this idea is not far-fetched: remember that 
the doxographical tradition has the early atomists describing κόσμοι as being born, growing, decaying, 
and dying to provide the raw materials for new worlds (see frr. 300 and 349 Luria)—i.e. composing an 
evolutionary history for the physical universe very like Polybius' evolutionary history of the human 
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(deforming and destroying the individuals and societies unfortunate enough to experience 
them).  For Democritus, this is where instruction intervenes, offering students a way to 
reform natural human ῥυσμός so that it avoids harmful deformation that is unnecessary 
(i.e. harmful deformation that is not built into its invariable animal shape, which demands 
the death and dissolution of the animal or group of animals that possess it without 
determining precisely when or how these harmful deformations occur).  Democritus 
advises that people prefer rational adoption to irrational begetting, taking advantage of 
the variability necessity allows here to choose the self-sufficient table of σωφροσύνη 
rather than the extravagant (πολυτελής) table of τύχη (c), where the rulers of Polybius 
inevitably sup to the ruin of their own shape and the shape of the collective they govern.  
It is surely significant that the atomist and and the historian coincide so neatly here that 
Democritus appears to be offering (in more than one ethical fragment) a carefully 
conceived cure for the precise moral disease Polybius describes.  
While none of the evidence points conclusively to Democritus being one of the 
unnamed others that Polybius cites as sources alongside Plato (6.5.1), it does indicate that 
Polybius' Kulturgeschichte has much to teach us about Democritus.  It is possible (and 
given the number of close coincidences, even very likely) that the lost Democritean 
narrative(s) describing the origins and development of human culture looked much like 
the historical account of human political institutions provided by Polybius.  Unique 
ethical universe (in which societies constantly arise, grow, decay, and die giving birth to new societies). 
Cole (1967) thinks that Polybius' history derives from Democritus, and discusses at length the likeness 
between Democritean physical κόσμος and communal ῥυσμός (which he finds reflected in Polybius) in 
his eight chapter (107-130), where he finds the atoms that make up the former analoguous to the people 
who make up the latter.  I endorse his arguments without relying on them for my work here, which 
stands on its own and does not need to make Polybius a direct heir of Democritus.
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among the authors examined to this point, Polybius offers a Kulturgeschichte that the 
atomist might conceivably have written himself (though it omits or glosses over crucial 
details, like humans acquiring culture directly from animals).130  Unlike the earlier 
accounts examined, Polybius' offers both a narrative framework (the conception of 
human cultural evolution as an ongoing series of responses to impersonal αἰτίαι that recur 
in accordance with εἰκός) and concrete details—(i) fundamental human ἀσθένεια, (ii) 
δικαιοσύνη that evolves naturally from recurring circumstances, (iii) predictable human 
responses to material abundance (περιουσία)—that Democritus himself appears to have 
used in building his own Kulturgeschichte.  Reading Polybius has allowed us to come up 
with a clearer idea of how the atomist might have anticipated the historian in crafting 
these elements into coherent narrative(s) deriving from an early atomist perspective (in 
which necessity determines all events laxly by sorting like with like).  Like Polybius, 
Democritus appears to have imagined humanity evolving culture without divine 
intervention as a response to recurring circumstances, a natural response necessarily 
determined by human nature's fundamental weakness (the ἀσθένεια that makes human 
life fragile, brief, and disastrous in fr. 646 Luria) and strength (the plasticity that allows 
us to learn from impressions our environment makes in our souls, responding to the 
atomic εἴδωλα that we encounter by developing in ourselves new thoughts, new words, 
and new habits—i.e. new νόμοι that might become entrenched in our community and 
130 Cole (1967) ends up arguing that Polybius' account is Democritean (130), and my analysis supports his 
thesis (without depending on it or deriving from it: our respective investigations into the coincidences 
between Democritus and Polybius stand alone and deserve to be evaluated separately).
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even change its shape as contemplated in fr. 613 Luria131).  Reading the historian against 
the Critical thinker shows us how pieces of the original early atomist διάκοσμος scattered 
through the extant atomist corpus still cohere intelligently, even if the precise nature of 
their original coherence(s) remains obscure.  Thus, while it is true that we do not know 
exactly what Democritus said in books like the Μικρὸς διάκοσμος, it is not true that we 
have no idea what he might have said—or that what idea we have shows no evidence for 
any relationship whatever between early atomist ethics and physics.132  
Thus far, my research into the Critical Tradition shows (i) that Democritus was 
not out of step with his Critical peers in composing Kulturgeschichte grounded in a 
physical cosmogony (quite the contrary); (ii) that several chronological contemporaries of 
the atomist (e.g. Arcesilaus, Protagoras, and Plato) wrote Kulturgeschichte that agree 
broadly with the approach to cultural history evident in his fragments; and (iii) that later 
historians (e.g. Polybius) had access to accounts even more strikingly similar to what we 
find today in those fragments (accounts that might have included books like Democritus' 
Μικρὸς διάκοσμος).  Even if the trail of early atomist Kulturgeschichte ended here, with 
Polybius as our clearest witness to the kind of origin and development story Democritus 
composed about human ethics, it would not be cold; but it goes on. 
131 Compare how the Polybian society evolves new laws every time it experiences a regime change, i.e. 
new ways of maintaing the social cohesion necessary to keep the πόλις together so that the individual 
citizens survive.
132 Remember Barnes (1982), who puts the wrong idea so neatly and succinctly: “[P]hysics and ethics 
were so successfully compartmentalized in Democritus' capacious mind that he never attended to the 
larger issues which their cohabitation produces” (535).
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(5) Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica 1.7-8.  Composing his universal 
history in the first century BCE, Diodorus offers a window onto ancient Kulturgeschichte 
even later (and thus further removed from early atomism) than that provided by Polybius. 
Still, certain aspects of Diodorus' narrative remind the reader pointedly of Democritus in 
ways that echo and go beyond what we have already seen in this chapter.  While Polybius 
appears very close to Democritus as a cultural historian (as we have already seen above), 
he comes short of matching him perfectly in at least two important ways: (i) he never 
invokes material necessity (ἀνάγκη) as an important αἰτία (as we would expect an early 
atomist to do133); and (ii) he offers no clear idea of how animals might be responsible for 
teaching human beings culture (as in Democritus, frr. 559 and 561 Luria, quoted above 
on page 190).  Diodorus' Kulturgeschichte offers something to supply at least the first of 
these deficiencies in Polybius, since the historian assigns the most prominent etiological 
role in his story to a materialist necessity that appears perfectly congruent with the early 
atomist necessity discussed above in chapter 2.
Like Polybius, Diodorus credits his account to unnamed predecessors whose work 
he epitomizes,134 and he treats humankind as an animal species.135  Unlike Polybius, he 
133 See chapter 2.2.1-2 above, and remember that according to Leucippus, nothing happens without 
necessity: οὐδὲν χρῆμα ματὴν γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης (fr. 22 Luria = Aet. 
1.25.4; Stob. 1.4.7c).  Leucippus' πάντα includes the evolution of human beings and their culture.  
134 These sources clearly stand in the Critical Tradition.  Their account of human evolution begins in 
typical Critical fashion (documented above in chapter 1) with the origin and development of the world 
(κόσμος) from primordial element(s): οἱ δὲ γεννητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν εἶναι [sc. τὸν κόσμον] νομίσαντες 
ἔφησαν ὁμοίως ἐκείνωι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τυχεῖν τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις.  κατὰ γὰρ 
τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῶν ὅλων σύστασιν μίαν ἔχειν ἰδέαν οὐρανόν τε καὶ γῆν, μεμιγμένης αὐτῶν τῆς φύσεως· 
μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαστάντων τῶν σωμάτων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸν μὲν κόσμον περιλαβεῖν ἅπασαν τὴν 
ὁρωμένην ἐν αὐτῶι σύνταξιν (1.6.3-1.7.1).
135 Diod. 1.7.3-7.  Man is just another ἐπίγειον ζῶιον born from the primeval earth as the sun dries it.
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begins as a Critical thinker would, with a cosmogony136 that incorporates zoogony.  Like 
the zoogonies of Democritus137 and Archelaus,138 his finds the origin of life in primeval 
mud.139  After emerging from this mud, Diodoran humanity evolves in familiar ways:
TEXT (Bertrac) TRANSLATION (Oldfather)
τοὺς δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γεννηθέντας τῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων φασὶν ἐν ἀτάκτωι καὶ θηριώδει βίωι 
καθεστῶτας  σποράδην  ἐπὶ  τὰς  νομὰς 
ἐξιέναι, καὶ προσφέρεσθαι τῆς τε βοτάνης 
τὴν  προσηνεστάτην  καὶ  τοὺς  αὐτομάτους 
ἀπὸ τῶν δένδρων καρπούς.  καὶ πολεμου-
μένους  μὲν  ὑπὸ  τῶν  θηρίων  ἀλλήλοις 
βοηθεῖν  ὑπὸ  τοῦ  συμφέροντος  διδασκο-
μένους,  ἀθροιζομένους δὲ  διὰ  τὸν φόβον 
ἐπιγινώσκειν  ἐκ  τοῦ  κατὰ  μικρὸν  τοὺς 
ἀλλήλων  τύπους.  τῆς  φωνῆς  δ'  ἀσήμου 
καὶ συγκεχυμένης ὑπαρχούσης ἐκ τοῦ κατ' 
ὀλίγον  διαρθροῦν  τὰς  λέξεις,  καὶ  πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους τιθέντας σύμβολα περὶ ἑκάστου 
τῶν ὑποκειμένων γνώριμον σφίσιν αὐτοῖς 
ποιῆσαι  τὴν  περὶ  ἁπάντων  ἑρμηνείαν. 
τοιούτων δὲ συστημάτων γινομένων καθ' 
ἅπασαν  τὴν  οἰκουμένην,  οὐχ  ὁμόφωνον 
πάντας ἔχειν τὴν διάλεκτον, ἑκάστων ὡς 
ἔτυχε  συνταξάντων  τὰς  λέξεις·  διὸ  καὶ 
παντοίους τε ὑπάρξαι χαρακτῆρας διαλέκ-
των  καὶ  τὰ  πρῶτα  γενόμενα  συστήματα 
τῶν  ἁπάντων  ἐθνῶν  ἀρχέγονα  γενέσθαι. 
τοὺς οὖν πρώτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς 
τῶν  πρὸς  βίον  χρησίμων  εὑρημένου 
ἐπιπόνως  διάγειν,  γυμνοὺς  μὲν  ἐσθῆτος 
ὄντας,  οἰκήσεως  δὲ  καὶ  πυρὸς  ἀήθεις, 
τροφῆς δ' ἡμέρου παντελῶς ἀνεννοήτους. 
But the first men to be born, they say, led 
an undisciplined and bestial life, setting out 
one by one to secure their sustenance and 
taking  for  their  food  both  the  tenderest 
herbs  and  the  fruits  of  wild  trees.  Then, 
since they were attacked by the wild beasts, 
they  came  to  each  other's  aid,  being 
instructed  by  expediency,  and  when 
gathered together in this way by reason of 
their fear, they gradually came to recognize 
their mutual characteristics. And though the 
sounds  which  they  made  were  at  first 
unintelligible  and indistinct,  yet  gradually 
they  came  to  give  articulation  to  their 
speech, and by agreeing with one another 
upon  symbols  for  each  thing  which 
presented  itself  to  them,  made  known 
among themselves  the  significance  which 
was to be attached to each term. But since 
groups of this kind arose over every part of 
the  inhabited  world,  not  all  men  had the 
same language,  inasmuch  as  every  group 
organized  the  elements  of  its  speech  by 
mere chance. This is the explanation of the 
present existence of every conceivable kind 
of language, and, furthermore, out of these 
first  groups  to  be  formed  came  all  the 
original nations of the world. Now the first 
136 Note that this cosmogony generates the world by means of a vortex (δίνη in Diod. 1.7.1) that sorts 
heavy matter downwards (to create earth and animals) and lighter matter upwards (to create the 
heavens), echoing the early atomists (chapter 2 above) and Anaxagoras (chapter 1.3.6 above). 
137 See the testimonia gathered in fr. 514 Luria, cited in full on page 146 above.
138 See page 193 above.
139 The sun-ripened soil membranes from which the first animals emerge derive from τὸ δὲ ἰλυῶδες καὶ 
θολερὸν μετὰ τῆς τῶν ὑγρῶν συγκρίσεως ... τὴν γῆν πηλώδη καὶ παντελῶς ἁπαλήν (Diod. 1.7.2-3). 
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καὶ γὰρ τὴν συγκομιδὴν τῆς ἀγρίας τροφῆς 
ἀγνοοῦντας μηδεμίαν τῶν καρπῶν εἰς τὰς 
ἐνδείας  ποιεῖσθαι  παράθεσιν·  διὸ  καὶ 
πολλοὺς  αὐτῶν  ἀπόλλυσθαι  κατὰ  τοὺς 
χειμῶνας διά τε τὸ ψῦχος καὶ τὴν σπάνιν 
τῆς τροφῆς. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κατ' ὀλίγον ὑπὸ τῆς 
πείρας  διδασκομένους  εἴς  τε  τὰ  σπήλαια 
καταφεύγειν  ἐν  τῶι  χειμῶνι  καὶ  τῶν 
καρπῶν  τοὺς  φυλάττεσθαι  δυναμένους 
ἀποτίθεσθαι. γνωσθέντος δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ 
τῶν ἄλλων τῶν χρησίμων κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ 
τὰς  τέχνας  ἐξευρεθῆναι  καὶ  τἄλλα  τὰ 
δυνάμενα  τὸν  κοινὸν  βίον  ὠφελῆσαι. 
καθόλου  γὰρ  πάντων  τὴν  χρείαν  αὐτὴν 
διδάσκαλον γενέσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὑφ-
ηγουμένην οἰκείως  τὴν ἑκάστου μάθησιν 
εὐφυεῖ  ζώιωι  καὶ  συνεργοὺς  ἔχοντι  πρὸς 
ἅπαντα  χεῖρας  καὶ  λόγον  καὶ  ψυχῆς 
ἀγχίνοιαν.
men, since none of the things useful for life 
had  yet  been  discovered,  led  a  wretched 
existence,  having  no  clothing  to  cover 
them, knowing not the use of dwelling and 
fire,  and  also  being  totally  ignorant  of 
cultivated  food.  For  since  they  were 
ignorant of the harvesting of the wild food, 
they  laid  by  no store  of  its  fruits  against 
their needs; consequently large numbers of 
them perished in the winters because of the 
cold  and  lack  of  food.  Little  by  little, 
however,  experience  taught  them  both  to 
take to the caves in winter and to store such 
fruits  as  could  be  preserved.  And  when 
they had become acquainted with fire and 
other  useful  things,  the  arts  also  and 
whatever  else  is  capable  of  furthering 
man's social life were gradually discovered. 
Indeed, speaking generally, in all things it 
was  necessity  itself  that  became  man's 
teacher,  supplying  in  appropriate  fashion 
instruction  in  every  matter  to  a  creature 
which  was  well  endowed  by  nature  and 
had,  as  its  assistants  for  every  purpose, 
hands and speech and sagacity of mind.
Diod. 1.8.1-9
 
Once again (as in the myth of Protagoras, the account of Polybius, and the Democritean 
frr. 646 and 595 Luria), humanity finds itself in a situation of acute physical weakness 
that the invention of society alleviates.  The war between humanity and other animals, 
familiar to us from the myth of Protagoras,140 reappears here as the initial impetus acting 
upon human weakness to create the first communities, but Diodorus is careful to specify 
that individual people only band together after they have observed the consequences of 
140 See Plato, Protag. 322b (quoted with context on page 197 above): ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ 
τὸ πανταχῆι αὐτῶν ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι ... ἐζήτουν δὴ ἀθροίζεσθαι καὶ σώιζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις. 
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fighting alone (καὶ πολεμουμένους μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων ἀλλήλοις βοηθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ 
συμφέροντος διδασκομένους, ἀθροιζομένους δὲ διὰ τὸν φόβον).  Thus, like Polybius' 
primitive humans,141 those in Diodorus learn from their environment, becoming students 
of circumstantial necessity (ὑπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος διδασκομένους) much as Democritus 
imagines men being opportunistic students of the animals (in frr. 559 and 561 Luria).  
Once united in community, Diodorus' primitives continue their course of study 
(πάντων τὴν χρείαν αὐτὴν διδάσκαλον γενέσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), learning agriculture 
(among other things) from observing the recursive pattern of nature and cultivating habits 
that maximize benefits and minimize deficits to themselves within that pattern (καὶ γὰρ 
τὴν συγκομιδὴν τῆς ἀγρίας τροφῆς ἀγνοοῦντας ... ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κατ' ὀλίγον ὑπὸ τῆς πείρας 
διδασκομένους εἴς τε τὰ σπήλαια καταφεύγειν ἐν τῶι χειμῶνι καὶ τῶν καρπῶν τοὺς 
φυλάττεσθαι δυναμένους ἀποτίθεσθαι).142  This is essentially the same approach to ethics 
that we have already seen Democritus adopting in frr. 562, 722-724, and 759 Luria.143  In 
Diodorus as in Democritus, it exists explicitly within a world-order (διάκοσμος in the 
Critical Tradition) defined and determined by material necessity (τὸ συμφέρον and χρεία 
in Diodorus, ἀνάγκη and associated terms in Democritus).  Consider the following early 
141 Recall how they learned justice and other moral values from observing others being mistreated.  A 
slight difference between Polybius and Diodorus here is that the Sicilian gives more attention to the 
non-human elements of the primitive environment (e.g. in explaining the origin of agriculture, which 
requires people to notice that food can survive under certain conditions); this makes sense, since 
Polybius' focus on political culture is narrower than Diodorus' attempt to account for all culture. 
142 In early atomist terms, the recursive pattern of nature in one place would be a κόσμος, within which 
human beings naturally come together to form ῥυθμοί.  Both κόσμοι and ῥυθμοί evolve over time, 
changing shape as the atoms within them move about. 
143 See the discussion on pages 236-252 above.  According to fr. 759 Luria, prudence consists in learning 
to cultivate self-sufficiency (e.g. the food storage that Diodorus' primitives eventually learn to put by) 
as a replacement for whatever nature may provide (e.g. abundant food in summer, famine in winter).
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atomist testimonia, some new and some already familiar from earlier discussions:
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
(a) Λεύκιππος πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην, τὴν δ' 
αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν εἱμαρμένην. λέγει γὰρ ἐν 
τῶι Περὶ νοῦ· οὐδὲν χρῆμα ματὴν γίνεται, 
ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης.
Leucippo sostiene che tutto è in virtù della 
Necessità, e che quest'ultima  è il destino. 
Infatti, nell'opera intitolata Sull'Intelligenza 
afferma:  «nulla  avviene  invano,  ma  tutto 
deriva  dalla  causa  e  dalla  necessita». 
(Luria, Krivushina)
Leucippus, fr. B2 DK
     = fr. L1 Taylor
     = fr. 22 Luria
Aet. 1.25.4; Stob. 1.4.7c
(b) «καὶ γὰρ ζῶια, φησίν, ὁμογενέσι ζώιοις 
συναγελάζεται  ὡς  περιστεραὶ  περιστεραῖς 
καὶ  γέρανοι γεράνοις καὶ  ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἀλόγων ὡσαύτως.  <ὡσαύτως>  δὲ  καὶ  ἐπὶ 
τῶν ἀψύχων ... »
For “Animals flock together,” [Democritus] 
says, “with animals of the same kind, doves 
with  doves  and  cranes  with  cranes  and 
similarly with the other irrational creatures, 
and  so  with  non-living  things  too  …” 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B164 DK
     = fr. D6 Taylor
     = fr. 316 Luria
Sext. Adv. Math. 7.116
(c) γινώσκειν  χρεὼν  ἀνθρωπίνην  βιοτὴν 
ἀφαυρήν  τε  ἐοῦσαν  καὶ  ὀλιγοχρόνιον  ... 
ὅκως ἄν τις μετρίης τε κτήσιος ἐπιμέληται 
καὶ  μετρῆται  ἐπὶ  τοῖς  ἀναγκαίοις  ἡ 
ταλαιπωρίη.
Bisogna  prendere  consapevolezza  della 
fragilità e della brevità della vita umana ... 
in  modo  da  curarsi  di  avere  beni  di 
proprietà  misurati  e  da commisurare  le 
tribolazioni inevitabili alle necessità vitali. 
(Luria, Krivushina)
Democritus, fr. B285 DK
     = fr. D150 Taylor
     = fr. 646 Luria
Stob. 4.34.65
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(d) ἀλογιστίη  μὴ  ξυγχωρέειν  ταῖσι  κατὰ 
τὸν βίον ἀνάγκαις.
Not making way for the necessities of life 
is a lack of calculation. (my translation)
Democritus, fr. B289 DK
     = fr. D154 Taylor
     = fr. 717 Luria
Stob. 4.44.64
(e) ἐπιρυσμίη ἑκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις. Opinion is for everyone a reshaping. (Bett)
Democritus, fr. B7 DK
     = fr. D20, 179a Taylor
     = fr. 49 Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 7.137
(f) ὅρος συμφόρων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων τέρψις 
καὶ ἀτερπίη.
Pleasure  and  lack  of  pleasure  mark  the 
boundary  between  what  is  profitable  and 
what is not.  (my translation)
Democritus, fr. B188 DK
     = fr. D26 Taylor
     = fr. 734 Luria
Stob. 3.1.46
(g) ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι. 
καὶ  γὰρ  ἡ  διδαχὴ  μεταρυσμοῖ  τὸν  ἄν-
θρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ
Nature  and  teaching  are  similar,  for 
teaching  reshapes  the  man,  and  in  re-
shaping makes his nature.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B33 DK
     = fr. D28 Taylor
     = fr. 682 Luria
Clem. Strom. 4.151; Stob. 2.31.65; 
Theodoret. 4.1, p. 100 Räder
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(h) κατ'  αὐτὸν  (Δημόκριτον)  ...  εἶναι 
κριτήρια ... αἱρέσεως δὲ καὶ φυγῆς τὰ πάθη· 
τὸ  μὲν  γὰρ  ὧι  προσοικειούμεθα,  τοῦτο 
αἱρετόν  ἐστιν,  τὸ  δὲ  ὧι  προσαλλοτριού-
μεθα, τοῦτο φευκτόν ἐστιν.
According  to  him  (i.e.  Democritus),  our 
experiences are means for judging whether 
to choose something or avoid it. The thing 
that  we  associate  with  regularly  must  be 
chosen,  while  the  thing  from  which  we 
withdraw ourselves must be avoided.  (my 
translation)
Democritus, fr. A111 DK
     = fr. 734 Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 7.140
Summarizing our understanding of these fragments provides a neat illustration of how the 
Diodoran perspective on human culture converges with the Democritean.  Fragment (a) 
reminds us that everything in the early atomist multiverse occurs by necessity (οὐδὲν 
χρῆμα ματὴν γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ' ἀνάγκης).  Fragment (b) provides 
an illustration of what necessity does to constitute order: it sorts like particles with like 
(whether atoms of a kind or atomic clouds of a kind).  As a result of this sorting process, 
worlds come into being—worlds populated by different species of animals, including 
human beings.  As temporary configurations of atoms, worlds and the animals (including 
humans) within them are mortal: human life in particular is precarious (c), subject to 
sudden death when certain conditions are not met (e.g. when a person cannot breathe any 
more, when a person cannot find food, or when a person receives a mortal wound).  
These conditions mean that certain things become necessities for mankind (e.g. air for 
respiration, food for digestion, physical integrity for good health), things that mankind 
cannot afford to ignore (d) if it wants to survive (i.e. avoid cutting its mortal life short 
unnecessarily: eventually, all men must die).  
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Because of their physical constitution, which exists as a product of necessity, 
humans are equipped with an innate ability to notice and respond to their environment, 
forming opinions (e) from their impressions of it, opinions that drive them away from 
certain things (atomic clouds in particular shapes) and toward others: generally speaking, 
the things that they need are pleasant (e.g. good air, good food, and physical health), 
while the things that they do not need (e.g. bad air, bad food, and physical disease) are 
not (f).  Men can deliberately cultivate this aptitude for distinguishing the needful from 
the dangerous, augmenting by instruction the natural endowment bestowed upon them by 
material necessity (g).  As necessity puts like particles with like (b), so (h) Sextus has 
Democritus observing that man gravitates toward things (atomic clouds in particular 
shapes) like himself, things to which he has grown accustomed (i.e. air that he is used to 
breathing a certain way, food that he is used to eating a certain way, or physical health 
that he is used to enjoying in a certain shape), and away from things unlike himself, 
things to which he is not used (e.g. strange air, strange food, or unusual human shapes 
that do not match his impression of physical health).  Assuming that this witness is 
genuine (as we have no reason not to), Democritus seems to be saying that people learn 
from atomist ἀνάγκη in the present just as Diodorus imagines their ancestors learning 
from τὸ συμφέρον and χρεία in the past, when human observation and instruction 
(facilitated by the invention of language) created and perpetuated τέχναι (e.g. agriculture) 
that minister to necessary human needs and insure human life against natural disasters 
(e.g. famine in winter).
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It is important to notice that the likeness between Democritean necessity and 
Diodoran want is not merely rhetorical.  Each concept arises as the humanly relevant 
expression of a materialistic reality embodied in a Critical cosmogony.  For Diodorus as 
for Democritus, material reality (φύσις) in the form of a cosmogonic δίνη creates the 
world, forming human beings as animals at once mortal and moral.  In the διάκοσμος 
imagined by either Critical thinker, human existence appears absolutely bounded by 
death (all men must die) and habit (all men must have habits, including some that are 
absolutely essential if the individual wants to postpone unnecessary death): note that both 
thinkers see a clear distinction existing between some human habits that are necessary144 
and others that are not.145  Habit is mutable for either, as long as the needs essential for 
human survival are served.146  The coincidence here is strong, with two concepts of 
material necessity (early atomist ἀνάγκη and Diodoran χρεία) mediating two functionally 
identical conceptions of human morality as inherently fixed (where necessity makes it 
invariably mortal) and flexible (where necessity does not predetermine the issue of its 
144 In Democritus, these habits are the ones that serve ἀνάγκαι (fr. 717 Luria) and τὰ ἀναγκαῖα (frr. 568, 
646 Luria) or ἀναγκαιότερα (fr. 723 Luria).  In Diodorus, these habits are τὰ πρὸς βίον χρήσιμα that 
minister to essential human needs for shelter and food (1.8.5-7). 
145 In Democritus, these habits are the ones that arise ἐκ τοῦ περιεῦντος ἤδη, like music (fr. 568 Luria).  In 
Diodorus, they are the arts that help the city (τἄλλα τὰ δυνάμενα τὸν κοινὸν βίον ὠφελῆσαι) once the 
truly essential arts (τὰ πρὸς βίον χρήσιμα) have established it (1.8.7). 
146 Witness Democritus' proposals to alter the widespread human habit of getting and raising one's own 
children (frr. 562, 722-724 Luria) as well as the Greek habit of subjecting just magistrates to unjust 
scrutiny after the completion of their term in office (fr. 613 Luria).  Witness how separate languages 
develop in Diodorus.  As isolated communities accidentally attribute meaning to different sounds over 
time, different languages necessarily take shape (1.8.3-4).  All the Diodoran communities develop 
language as an essential human habit, but the particular form that every individual language takes is 
plastic, evolving randomly (ὡς ἔτυχε) and gradually (κατ' ὀλίγον in 1.8.3) over time—just like the 
other human arts, both essential and ancillary, which develop historically ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κατ' ὀλίγον in 
1.8.7.  Diodorus thus conceives human culture the same way Democritus does, as something inherently 
flexible and adaptive within the broad parameters laid down by material necessity.
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mortality minutely or precisely).  If Diodorus does not owe anything in his account 
directly to Democritus, he at least comes from a Critical perspective very close to the 
atomist, so close that Democritus' remark about music fits neatly into the Sicilian's 
Kulturgeschichte (with music arising as one of the arts that benefits the city without being 
necessary for its survival).147  Diodorus' discussion of human language (1.8.3-4 above) 
provides further corroboration (of the likeness between early atomist ἀνάγκη and the 
Sicilian's χρεία), coinciding neatly with the developed linguistic perspective attributed to 
Democritus by Proclus in fr. 563 Luria.148
In this fragment, Proclus notes that several authorities (including the later atomist 
Epicurus) construe human language as an expression of reality whose historical forms are 
not arbitrary (οὐκ ἄρα, φησὶ Πυθαγόρας, τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστὶ τὸ ὀνοματουργεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ 
τὸν νοῦν ὁρῶντος καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων· φύσει ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα).  In contrast with 
147 Compare fr. 568 Luria with Diodorus 1.8.7.  While Polybius comes very close to Democritus, the 
conception of necessary and unnecessary habits in Diodorus is one important factor making his 
Kulturgeschichte closer than the Polybian to extant remains of early atomist Kulturgeschichte.  
Speaking generally, it is accurate to say that the perspective on human culture that we see darkly in 
Democritus' fragments looks similar to the clearer perspective offered by Polybius and very similar to 
the one preserved by Diodorus.
148 ὅτι τῆς Κρατύλου δόξης γέγονε Πυθαγόρας τε καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τῆς 
Ἑρμογένους ... διὰ δὲ τοῦ θεμένου τὰ ὀνόματα τὴν ψυχὴν ἠινίττετο (Πυθαγόρας), ἥτις ἀπὸ νοῦ 
ὑπέστη· καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐκ ἔστιν ὥσπερ ὁ νοῦς πρώτως, ἔχει δ' αὐτῶν εἰκόνας καὶ λόγους 
οὐσιώδεις διεξοδικοὺς οἷον ἀγάλματα τῶν ὄντων ὥσπερ τὰ ὀνόματα ἀπομιμούμενα τὰ νοερὰ εἴδη, 
τοὺς ἀριθμούς·  τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πᾶσιν ἀπὸ νοῦ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν γινώσκοντος καὶ σοφοῦ, τὸ δ' ὀνομάζεσθαι 
ἀπὸ ψυχῆς τῆς νοῦν μιμουμένης. οὐκ ἄρα, φησὶ Πυθαγόρας, τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστὶ τὸ ὀνοματουργεῖν, 
ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν νοῦν ὁρῶντος καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων· φύσει ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα. ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος θέσει 
λέγων τὰ ὀνόματα διὰ τεσσάρων ἐπιχειρημάτων τοῦτο κατεσκεύαζεν· ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας· τὰ γὰρ 
διάφορα πράγματα τῶι αὐτῶι καλοῦνται ὀνόματι· οὐκ ἄρα φύσει τὸ ὄνομα· καὶ ἐκ τῆς πολυωνυμίας· εἰ 
γὰρ τὰ διάφορα ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν πρᾶγμα ἐφαρμόσουσιν, καὶ ἐπάλληλα, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· 
τρίτον ἐκ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων μεταθέσεως. διὰ τί γὰρ τὸν Ἀριστοκλέα μὲν Πλάτωνα, τὸν δὲ Τύρταμον 
Θεόφραστον μετωνομάσαμεν, εἰ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα; ἐκ δὲ τῆς τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλλείψεως· διὰ τί ἀπὸ μὲν 
τῆς φρονήσεως λέγομεν φρονεῖν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς δικαιοσύνης οὐκέτι παρονομάζομεν; τύχηι ἄρα καὶ οὐ 
φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα. καλεῖ δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπιχείρημα πολύσημον, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἰσόρροπον, 
τὸ δὲ τρίτον μετώνυμον, τὸ δὲ τέταρτον νώνυμον (Procl. in Crat. 16 p. 5, 25 Pasquali, cited below). 
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this position, Democritus sees the connection between reality (atoms and void) and 
language as an arbitrary one,149 with the association between historical forms of language 
and particular phenomena occuring by accident (τύχηι ἄρα καὶ οὐ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα).  
Where Epicurus would see a necessary connection between the word ἄνθρωπος in Greek 
and human nature in the world (such that one inherently implies the other in some way), 
Democritus would say that the relationship between the word and its referent is purely 
accidental: the Greek word for human might just as well be something else (as occurs in 
different languages), and even in Greek ἄνθρωπος might refer to something other than 
human being.  Democritus offers four proofs for his position: 
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος θέσει λέγων τὰ ὀνόματα 
διὰ τεσσάρων ἐπιχειρημάτων τοῦτο κατεσ-
κεύαζεν·  ἐκ  τῆς  ὁμωνυμίας·  τὰ  γὰρ 
διάφορα  πράγματα  τῶι  αὐτῶι  καλοῦνται 
ὀνόματι·  οὐκ ἄρα φύσει  τὸ ὄνομα·  καὶ ἐκ 
τῆς  πολυωνυμίας·  εἰ  γὰρ  τὰ  διάφορα 
ὀνόματα  ἐπὶ  τὸ  αὐτὸ  καὶ  ἕν  πρᾶγμα 
ἐφαρμόσουσιν,  καὶ  ἐπάλληλα,  ὅπερ 
ἀδύνατον·  τρίτον  ἐκ  τῆς  τῶν  ὀνομάτων 
μεταθέσεως.  διὰ  τί  γὰρ  τὸν  Ἀριστοκλέα 
μὲν Πλάτωνα, τὸν δὲ Τύρταμον Θεόφρασ-
τον μετωνομάσαμεν, εἰ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα; 
ἐκ  δὲ  τῆς  τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλλείψεως·  διὰ  τί 
ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως λέγομεν φρονεῖν, 
ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς δικαιοσύνης οὐκέτι παρονομά-
ζομεν; τύχηι ἄρα καὶ οὐ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα. 
καλεῖ  δὲ  ὁ  αὐτὸς  τὸ  μὲν  πρῶτον 
ἐπιχείρημα  πολύσημον,  τὸ  δὲ  δεύτερον 
ἰσόρροπον, τὸ δὲ τρίτον μετώνυμον, τὸ δὲ 
Democritus supported his view that names 
belong  to  things  by  convention  by  four 
arguments.  First,  that  from  homonymy: 
different  things  are  called  by  the  same 
name, so the name does not belong to them 
by nature.  Then, that from polyonymy: if 
different names fit one and the same thing, 
they  must  fit  one  another,  which  is 
impossible.  Third,  that  from  change  of 
names: why was Aristocles' name changed 
to Plato, and Tyrtamus' to Theophrastus, if 
names  apply  by  nature?  Then,  that  from 
absence of similar terms: why do we form 
the verb 'think'  from 'thought,'  but do not 
form  any  verb  from  'justice'?  Names, 
therefore, apply by chance, not by nature. 
He  himself  calls  the  first  argument  'the 
ambiguous,'  the  second  'the  equivalent,' 
<the  third  'the  name-changing'>,  and  the 
149 This position follows naturally from the Democritean doctrine that ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους καὶ 
κενόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα νενομίσθαι (Diog. 9.44 = DK68A1).  Like taste, temperature, and color, 
language exists in the realm of accidental convention (the νόμος invoked in fr. 55 Luria).
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τέταρτον νώνυμον. fourth 'the anonymous.'
Democritus, fr. B26 DK
     = fr. 167 Taylor
     = fr. 563 Luria
Procl. in Crat. 16 p. 5, 25 Pasquali
 
Democritus' proofs are all empirical, arising from historical observations.  The atomist 
sees human language existing such that (i) the same phenomenon can be designated by 
different words (e.g. the same human being might be referred to by the words παῖς, 
ἄνθρωπος, or ἀνήρ); (ii) if the connection between word and referent were inherent, then 
words like παῖς, ἄνθρωπος, and ἀνήρ would all be obvious equivalents, as they are not; 
(iii) name-changes do not correspond to fundamental changes in nature (i.e. Aristocles 
did not become a fundamentally different person when he acquired the nickname Plato); 
(iv) finally, the atomist observes that language does not work regularly (e.g. deriving 
verbs from nouns the same way in every case).  All these observations presume a careful  
historical investigation of language by Democritus, with accident somehow responsible 
for the historical associations we observe between words and their referents (τύχηι ἄρα 
καὶ οὐ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα).  This is where Diodorus' discussion of the origins of human 
languages becomes interesting.
We know that Democritus told stories making accident responsible for historical 
phenomena (e.g. the invention of the mule in fr. 561 Luria).  We know that Diodorus 
preserves a narrative making accident responsible for the historical phenomenon of 
human languagues (quoted again here for ease of reference):  
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TEXT (Bertrac) TRANSLATION (Oldfather)
τῆς  φωνῆς  δ'  ἀσήμου  καὶ  συγκεχυμένης 
ὑπαρχούσης ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ὀλίγον διαρθροῦν 
τὰς  λέξεις,  καὶ  πρὸς  ἀλλήλους  τιθέντας 
σύμβολα  περὶ  ἑκάστου  τῶν  ὑποκειμένων 
γνώριμον σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι τὴν περὶ 
ἁπάντων  ἑρμηνείαν.  τοιούτων  δὲ  συστη-
μάτων  γινομένων  καθ'  ἅπασαν  τὴν 
οἰκουμένην,  οὐχ ὁμόφωνον πάντας ἔχειν 
τὴν  διάλεκτον,  ἑκάστων  ὡς  ἔτυχε  συν-
ταξάντων τὰς λέξεις· διὸ καὶ παντοίους τε 
ὑπάρξαι  χαρακτῆρας  διαλέκτων  καὶ  τὰ 
πρῶτα γενόμενα συστήματα τῶν ἁπάντων 
ἐθνῶν ἀρχέγονα γενέσθαι. 
And though the sounds which  they made 
were  at  first  unintelligible  and  indistinct, 
yet gradually they came to give articulation 
to their speech, and by agreeing with one 
another upon symbols for each thing which 
presented  itself  to  them,  made  known 
among themselves  the  significance  which 
was to be attached to each term. But since 
groups of this kind arose over every part of 
the  inhabited  world,  not  all  men  had the 
same language,  inasmuch  as  every  group 
organized  the  elements  of  its  speech  by 
mere chance. This is the explanation of the 
present existence of every conceivable kind 
of language, and, furthermore, out of these 
first  groups  to  be  formed  came  all  the 
original nations of the world.
Diod. 1.8.3-4
Diodorus' account shows necessary awareness of the historical features of language to 
which Democritus draws attention in his proofs.  For Diodorus, human language begins 
everywhere as meaningless undifferentiated sound (τῆς φωνῆς δ' ἀσήμου καὶ συγκεχυ-
μένης ὑπαρχούσης), which particular communities separate differently, forming discrete 
words and languages as accident directs (ἑκάστων ὡς ἔτυχε συνταξάντων τὰς λέξεις).  
Every community is familiar with the natural phenomenon of humanity, but there is no 
regular rhyme or reason to the word(s) they create to refer to this constant reality: some 
invent one word (e.g. Greek ἄνθρωπος), and others another (e.g. Latin homo).  In this 
narrative, the relationship between words and their referents is fundamentally arbitrary 
(exactly as in Democritus).  Given what we know about Democritus—viz. that he wrote a 
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Critical Kulturgeschichte driven by humanity's ability to learn from accidents that occur 
in keeping with necessity (frr. 559, 561, 568 Luria) and had a well developed historical 
perspective on human language (fr. 563 Luria)—it appears very likely that the atomist 
composed an account of the origins and development of human language(s) and that that 
account was very like the one given by Diodorus.
The close coincidence between Democritus and Diodorus, closer even than the 
coincidence between the atomist and Polybius, raises questions.  Given Diodorus' own 
admissions,150 it is no surprise that modern scholarship treats his work as derivative, 
owing a significant part of its material to earlier sources whom he epitomizes and 
integrates with one another.  In the case of the Kulturgeschichte under discussion here, 
some scholars have traced it back to Democritus directly, through Hecataeus of Abdera 
(fl. 4th century BCE), whose history of Egypt appears to have been an important source 
for Diodorus.  This position was taken first by Reinhardt (1912), who was followed by 
Uxkull-Gyllenband (1924), Diels and Kranz (1952), and Cole (1967).  Spoerri (1959) 
contests it vigorously, noting that Diodorus' account shows significant resonance with 
other (non-atomist, non-Abderite) sources contemporary and earlier.151  From the 
150 Like the one cited in note 134 above.  In the case of the cosmogony and Kulturgeschichte, there are 
significant textual clues corroborating that Diodorus himself is not responsible for all the ideas or their 
expression.  For a precise account of this evidence, see Cole (1967), 174-192.
151 Remember that the cosmogony in Diodorus also resembles that of Anaxagoras quite closely (more in 
that atoms and void are never explicitly invoked by the Sicilian).  Anaxagoras also appears to have 
made an explicit connection between human intelligence and hands (Aristot. De part. animal. 4.10. 
687a7), reminding us of Diod. 1.8.9.  There is no compelling reason to prefer Democritus over 
Anaxagoras as Diodorus' source, and the Clazomenian is not the only other source possible: other 
candidates include our friend Archelaus (cited above in this chapter) or an early (ca. 440-350 BCE) 
author in the Hippocratic tradition (De prisca medic. 3 = Corp. medic. Gr. 1.1, p. 38).  The latter 
possibility is especially intriguing owing to the resonance that Democritus finds in the Hippocratic 
corpus (resonance which we will explore in the following chapter).  
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perspective of this study, establishing the precise genealogy of Diodorus' narrative is not 
necessary.  It is enough to observe that it comes from the Critical Tradition and resonates 
significantly with extant fragments of Democritus, allowing us to imagine better how the 
early atomist Kulturgeschichte would have looked.  
Even if the story of human cultural evolution in Diodorus is not directly from 
Democritus (as it may be), it still comes from a perspective very close to his.152  Both the 
historian and the atomist imagine mankind growing up as children of nature—an animal 
species that responds to its environment by developing some habits that are necessary 
(the ones that preserve life) and others that are not (the ones that adorn it).  The 
development of these habits occurs over time as accident (e.g. seeing an ass impregnate a 
mare, uttering sounds while trying to communicate) inspires innovation (mule-breeding, 
language) in an indefinite loop whose progression is well summed up in the dictum of 
Democritus: ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ (fr. 682 Luria).153  Nature creates man (as atoms 
and void come together of necessity), and man creates nature (as learning alters the shape 
of his atomic cloud and other clouds around it154).  What better teacher of physiopoiesis 
152 This reading of Diodorus' Kulturgeschichte seems like the one Cole wishes he had made in the late 
afterword (pub. 1990) to his study.  Recognizing and documenting the Critical Tradition allows me to 
make it more easily than Cole could, since his work does not offer a clear concept of the Critical 
Tradition (especially as it exists prior to Democritus).  I do not say this to disparage his work, which is 
undeniably excellent, only to show where I have learned from it and improved upon it. 
153 An even better Democritean summary of the historical perspective that Diodorus represents occurs in 
an Arabic version of Galen (cited here in Walzer's translation): “For as Democritus says, experience 
and vicissitudes have taught men this, and it is from their wealth of experience that mean have learned 
to perform things as they do” (De medica exper. 9.5 p. 145b = Kitāb Gālinūs fi-t-tagriba at-tibbija, ed. 
R. Walzer, 19.99 = Democritus, fr. B5 DK, fr. 558 Luria).  There is no reason to doubt the fidelity of 
the Arabic tradition, which squares perfectly with other testimonia in this instance and is generally as 
likely to preserve Democritus accurately as John Stobaeus: see Rodriguez Adrados (2001), 94-104. 
154 Learning to breed mules changes both the thoughts inside human minds (an atomic evolution for 
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could man find than nature herself, the physical necessity that made him and all the world 
around him (as in Diodorus 1.8.8-9)?  How would nature teach man?  Might she not 
reach him through the behavior of other animals, the same ones that are mankind's first 
tutors in the civilized arts according to Democritus (fr. 559 Luria)?  The likeness between 
Democritus and Diodorus here (in these matters of fundamental importance to both) is 
striking and pervasive, even if Spoerri (1959) is right to recognize that the historian need 
not be drawing solely or uniquely upon the published work of the atomist.155    
(6) Lucretius, De rerum natura 5.925-1457.  The final example of Kultur-
geschichte under review in this chapter comes from Titus Lucretius Carus (first century 
BCE), the mysterious Latin poet156 whose versified summary of Epicureanism remains our 
most extensive continuous treatment of ancient atomism extant.  While Epicurus is the 
primary source for this account,157 we find ample evidence (both throughout the poem 
and in the Kulturgeschichte) to confirm the judgment of Cicero that Democritus was vir 
magnus in primis cuius fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos inrigavit (De nat. deor. 1.43.120 
= Democritus, fr. xcvii Luria, fr. 172c Taylor, fr. A74 DK).  
Democritus) and physical realities in the human environment (more atomic evolutions), which 
eventually includes many more mules, with everything that entails in terms of the work that these 
animals facilitate, the resources that their upkeep requires, and any other consequences that their 
continual proximity to human beings may occasion.
155 The good sense of Spoerri's position only increases when we consider (1) that Diodorus himself makes 
the source of his Kulturgeschichte an indefinite plurality (see note 134 again) and (2) that he elsewhere 
(1.39 = fr. 411 Luria) does not hesitate to cite Democritus explicitly when he draws upon him uniquely 
(to explain the seasonal flooding of the Nile).
156 Mysterious because we know so little about his life and/or the historical context for his work.
157 See Lucr. 2.292-293, 3.1-30, 3.1042-1044, 5.55-56, and Clay (1983), 13-53.  Accepting the primacy of 
Epicurus as Lucretius' inspiration, Clay nevertheless recognizes other sources, especially Empedocles, 
whom the Latin poet cites by name with approval (e.g. in 1.716-733).  Lucretius treats Democritus in 
similar fashion, making the early atomist responsible for doctrines (3.370-373, 5.620-624) and an 
ethical exemplum (3.1039-1041) that resonate well with the more modern message of Epicurus.  
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The fifth book of Lucretius' poem provides an Epicurean version of the Critical 
narrative of origin and development that we have already become familiar with: it opens 
with an atomist cosmogony (5.91-770), which gives rise to zoogony and anthropogony 
(5.772-924), and concludes with an extensive atomist Kulturgeschichte (5.925-1457).  
Like the Democritean κόσμος, the Lucretian mundus arises from atoms (multa primordia 
rerum in 5.187; corpora in 5.355 et passim) clashing in the void (inane in 5.355 et 
passim).  Engaged in an endless conflict characterized by aimless collision,158 some of 
Lucretius' atoms inevitably form a localized tempestas molesque (5.436) in which they 
are sorted spontaneously according to a natural pattern familiar from chapter 2: 
TEXT (Bailey) TRANSLATION (Bailey)
diffugere inde loci partes coepere paresque  
/  cum  paribus  iungi  res  et  discludere  
mundum / membraque dividere et magnas  
disponere partis,  /  hoc est,  a terris altum  
secernere  caelum,  /  et  sorsum  mare,  uti  
secreto  umore  pateret,  /  sorsus  item puri  
secretique aetheris ignes.
From this mass [the primeval  tempestas or 
moles in 5.436] parts began to fly off hither 
and  thither,  and  like  things  to  unite  with 
like,  and  so  to  unfold  a  world,  and  to 
sunder  its  members  and  dispose  its  great 
parts, that is, to mark off the high heaven 
from the earth, and the sea by itself, so that 
it  might spread out with its moisture kept 
apart, and likewise the fires of the sky by 
themselves, unmixed and kept apart.
Lucr. 5.443-448 
158 Lucretius summarizes the atomist theory of cosmogony by accidental atomic collisions early in the 
book: namque ita multa modis multis primordia rerum / ex infinito iam tempore percita plagis / 
ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri / omnimodisque coire atque omnia pertemptare, / 
quaecumque inter se possent congressa creare, / ut non sit mirum si in talis disposituras / deciderunt 
quoque in talis venere meatus, / qualibus haec rerum geritur nunc summa novando (5.187-194). He 
characterizes the endless clash of atoms as a war later: inter se cum maxima mundi / pugnent membra, 
pio nequaquam concita bello (5.380-381).  There is no question of an almighty Anaxagorean mind or 
Xenophanean god guiding this process intelligently: nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum / ordine  
se suo quaeque sagaci mente locarunt / nec quos quaeque darent motus pepigere profecto, / sed quia 
multa modis multis primordia rerum / ex infinito iam tempore percita plagis / ponderibusque suis 
consuerunt concita ferri / omnimodisque coire atque omnia pertemptare (5.419-425).  Compare this 
with chapter 2, and you will find the Epicurean poet very close to Democritus (and Leucippus).
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Like parts go with like, resolving the initial chaos of the tempestas into the regular turbo 
(5.624) of the familiar, ordered mundus (with heavy, earthy particles at the bottom and 
lighter particles revolving above in the atmosphere and heavens).  This is recognizably 
the same cosmogony as the early atomist one in chapter 2, where like particles go with 
like in the δίνη that creates our world.159  The only difference is the clinamen (Epicurus' 
παρέγκλισις),160 the random atomic swerve that does not even appear explicitly here.161 
159 Remember the Democritean frr. DK68B164 (= fr. 316 Luria) and B167 (= fr. 288 Luria), where 
necessity is the vortex (δίνη, δῖνος) that creates the world by sorting like with like («ὡς ἂν συναγωγόν 
τι ἐχούσης τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐν τούτοις ὁμοιότητος» in fr. 316 Luria, quoted on pages 127-138 
above, with extensive discussion following).  See note 34 in chapter 2. 
160 In truth, we do not know precisely what Epicurus called the swerve.  Diogenes of Oenoanda refers to 
the swerve as a παρενκλιτικὴ κείνησις (fr. 54, col. 3, no. 6 Smith).  Aetius uses the more abbreviated 
παρέγκλισις (1.12.5, 311.15 Diels), which modern scholarship has transferred tentatively to Epicurus 
as the Epicurean Greek word most likely to be translated as clinamen.  See Epicurus, frr. 280-281 
Usener, Bailey (1926, 184-185, 216, 339-340), Bailey (1928, 316-327), Chilton (1971, 15, 84), and 
Sedley in Macchiaroli (1983, 11-15).
161 It appears once, earlier in the poem: sed ne mens ipsa necessum / intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus 
agendis / et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique, / id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum / nec regione  
loci certa nec tempore certo (Lucr. 2.289-293).  The entire passage (Lucr. 2.216-293) reveals the 
swerve as an Epicurean formalization of the supple determinism we already noticed in early atomism 
(at least as conceived by Democritus: see chapter 2.2.1-2 above).  On my reading, then, Bailey (1928, 
321) is wrong to accept Epicurean rhetoric (such as that produced by Diogenes of Oenoanda) that 
reduces Democritus to a hard determinist who must be refuted, and Sedley (in Macchiarolli [1983], 11-
51) is right to point out that what Epicurus counters with the swerve is not necessarily Democritus 
himself, but certain extreme conclusions that some Democriteans (e.g. students of the early atomist 
who believe in hard determinism) might reach.  Epicurus does not deviate markedly from the physical 
or even ethical program of Democritus.  Rather, he comes up with a formal means (the swerve) to 
codify the indeterminacy observable in nature.  He is building on the model of Democritus, not refuting 
it.  This interpretation agrees with the testimony of Cicero: Quid enim est in physicis Epicuri non a 
Democrito? Nam etsi quaedam commutavit, ut quod paulo ante de inclinatione atomorum dixi, tamen 
pleraque dicit eadem, atomos inane imagines, infinitatem locorum innumerabilitatemque mundorum, 
eorum ortus interitus, omnia fere quibus naturae ratio continetur (De nat. deor. 1.26.73 = Democritus, 
fr. A51 DK, fr. xcix Luria, and Epicurus, fr. 233 Usener).  Formalizing the randomness in the atomist 
universe (by defining it as a particular atomic event and pointing at it with a special word like 
παρέγκλισις) does not fundamentally alter it.  Such formalization does lend itself to the erection of the 
straw Democritus mocked by ancient Epicureans and many modern scholars—the Democritus whose 
mind was so tidy and compartmentalized, according to Barnes (1982, 535), that he failed to notice how 
his determinist physics make his extensive ethical writings pointless.  Where is there room in this 
caricature for the man who wrote extensively on biology and ethics, fields where randomness was 
rampant in antiquity as today?  Where is there room in it for the man who doubted simple narratives of 
causation enough to put truth beyond human reach and who devoted an entire book to criticizing his 
own positions (as though they might require revision)?  I confess I do not see it.
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The zoogony that follows is similarly Democritean.  As in Diodorus (1.7.3-7) and 
Democritus (fr. 514 Luria), so here animal life originates from wet earth, which produces 
plants (5.783-796) and then all kinds of animals as the sun shines down upon it.162  Not 
all the live offspring of Mother Earth (linquitur ut merito maternum nomen adepta / terra 
sit: 5.795-796) prove viable: some are monsters that arise briefly and then go extinct163 
(though Lucretius is careful to make clear that his earth-born monsters are not traditional 
monsters of Greek myth, human-animal hybrids which are categorically impossible164). 
Like the other viable animal species that survive and manage to reproduce, 
Lucretius' primeval humans are born from the earth (5.823).  The first generations are 
162 multaque nunc etiam existunt animalia terris / imbribus et calido solis concreta vapore; / quo minus 
est mirum si tum sunt plura coorta / et maiora, nova tellure atque aethere adulta (5.797-800).  
Lucretius imagines the earth producing birds first, then other animals.  As in Diodorus (σηπεδόνας 
ὑμέσι λεπτοῖς περιεχομένας in 1.7.3), so in Lucretius the first generation of animals gestates in earthen 
wombs (uteri in 5.808) imagined as growing in primeval equivalents to the contemporary swamp, 
where spontaneous generation of small animals was thought to occur still (ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἕλεσι καὶ τοῖς 
λιμνάζουσι τῶν τόπων ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὁρᾶσθαι γινόμενον in Diod. 1.7.3; cf. Lucr. 5.799 quoted above).  
The likeness between this account of biological generation and the early atomist account of the 
universe (which is wrapped in an atomic membrane in Diog. 9.32 = DK67A1, DK68A1, fr. 382 Luria) 
leads some (notably Diels and Luria) to trace it back to Democritus.  It recurs elsewhere in antiquity, 
e.g. in Hermipp. De astrol. (Ioann. Catrares) 2.1.6-13 (p. 33 Kroll) and Tzetzes Schol. ad Hesiod. 
(Gaisford Poet. Gr. Min. 3.58), texts which appear appended to DK68B5 and in fr. 515 Luria (alongside 
the witness to Democritus' belief in spontaneous generation in Columella 9.14.6). 
163 Remember the monsters of Empedocles, documented on page 71 above in chapter 1.3.5.
164 Lucr. 5.837-924.  Compare this with Democritus, fr. 103 Luria, in which humanity has a generic shape 
that exists necessarily within certain limits.  While some variation in human shape occurs (e.g. the man 
with more or less than five fingers on each hand), it is not completely random.  Another fragment to 
consider here is Democritus, fr. 621 Luria, in which it is always right to kill animals wreaking havoc 
against justice “in every world” (ἐν παντὶ κόσμωι).  From testimonia like these, it seems that ancient 
atomists (Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius) imagined some absolute limits (referred to 
as ἀνάγκη by Democritus and Leucippus, as foedus naturae in Lucr. 5.924) obtaining across different 
worlds (such that generic knowledge is in some sense possible: i.e. it is possible to know on some level 
what ἄνθρωπος is without having seen every instance of it in every κόσμος).  Whether we perceive 
these limits or not—and it would seem that we cannot perceive them perfectly (Democritus, frr. 51, 79-
80 Luria)—they exist throughout the atomist multiverse, with the result that Lucretius can confidently 
dismiss the traditional centaur as a complete physical impossibility, since its parts would necessarily 
age differently (per the foedus naturae): the equine parts would always mature too soon for the human 
and spell the sterile demise of the unnatural animal before it had time to exist as the adult centaur of 
myth, which is (only) a figment of the human imagination (5.878-924).
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physically and ethically different from their descendants, having a much hardier physical 
constitution (at genus humanum multo fuit illud in arvis / durius: 5.925-926) and living 
asocially, with minimal conspecific interaction:
TEXT (Bailey) TRANSLATION (Bailey)
multaque  per  caelum  solis  volventia  
lustra  /  vulgivago  vitam  tractabant  more  
ferarum  /  …  /  quod  sol  atque  imbres  
dederant, quod terra crearat / sponte sua,  
satis id placabat pectora donum / … / nec  
commune bonum poterant  spectare neque 
ullis / moribus inter se scibant nec legibus  
uti.  /  quod  cuique  obtulerat  praedae  
fortuna, ferebat /  sponte sua sibi  quisque  
valere et vivere doctus. / et Venus in silvis  
iungebat  corpora amantum;  /  conciliabat  
enim  vel  mutua  quamque  cupido  /  vel  
violenta viri vis atque impensa libido / vel  
pretium,  glandes  atque  arbita  vel  pira  
lecta.
And during many lustres of the sun rolling 
through the sky they prolonged their lives 
after the roving manner of wild beasts … 
What sun and rains had brought  to  birth, 
what earth had created unasked, such gift 
was enough to please their  hearts  … Nor 
could they look to the common weal, nor 
had they knowledge to make mutual use of 
any  customs  or  laws.   Whatever  booty 
chance had offered to each, he bore it off; 
for each was taught at his own will to live 
and  thrive  for  himself  alone.  And  Venus 
would unite lovers in the woods; for each 
woman  was  wooed  either  by  mutual 
passion,  or  by the man's  fierce force and 
reckless  lust,  or  by  a  price,  acorns  and 
arbute-berries or choice pears.
Lucr. 5.931-932, 937-938, 958-965
Ignorant of civilization—the human collective and the arts that serve it—Lucretius' 
primitives live animally (vulgivago more ferarum), accepting whatever good or ill fate165 
165 Note that the hostility of other animals plays a familiar role in this part of Lucretius' story: wild beasts 
often drive the first men from their primitive, impermanent dwellings and devour those unfortunate 
enough to be caught (5.982-998).  Unlike Protagoras (per Plato), Lucretius does not make resisting 
animal aggression a principal cause driving the evolution of human civilization; instead, he points out 
that the civilization that makes us safer from animal attacks renders us ultimately more vulnerable to 
mass slaughter as a result of warfare and seafaring, two of the behaviors characteristic of civilization: 
at non multa virum sub signis milia ducta / una dies dabat exitio nec turbida ponti / aequora lidebant 
navis ad saxa virosque (5.999-1001).  A running theme of book 5 is that human happiness does not 
necessarily improve with the development of new technology and ways of living (e.g. Lucr. 5.1007-
1008, 1117-1119, 1131-1135, 1430-1435; this attitude is also evident in the Democritean corpus, e.g. 
frr. 643, 643d, 651, 652, 653, 750a Luria).  Note that Lucr. 5.1117-1119 comes remarkably close to 
being a Latin version of fr. 643d Luria.  The debt of Epicureanism to earlier atomism is evident here. 
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they happen upon (quod cuique obtulerat praedae fortuna, ferebat).  Every human being 
necessarily shifts for himself, learning from individual experience how to survive and 
thrive on his own (sponte sua sibi quisque valere et vivere doctus).  This roving animal 
life is lonely but not entirely without social interaction: it includes procreation (et Venus 
in silvis iungebat corpora amantum), which ultimately gives rise to the first civilization, 
when some fortunate lovers acquire the means (houses, clothing of animal skins, and fire 
in 5.1011) to live together with their offspring long enough to become families, settle 
permanently in one place, and form the first civil societies, which are held together by 
friendship (amicitia) that gives rise naturally to communal agreements (foedera): 
TEXT (Bailey) TRANSLATION (Bailey)
postquam  …  prolemque  ex  se  videre  
creatam,  tum  genus  humanum  primum 
mollescere  coepit  …  et  Venus  imminuit  
viris puerique parentum  / blanditiis facile  
ingenium  fregere  superbum.  /  tunc  et  
amicitiem  coeperunt  iungere  aventes  /  
finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari, / et  
pueros  commendarunt  muliebreque 
saeclum,  /  vocibus  et  gestu  cum  balbe  
significarent  /  imbecillorum  esse  aequum 
misererier omnis.  /  nec tamen omnimodis  
poterat  concordia  gigni,  /  sed  bona  
magnaque  pars  servabat  foedera  caste;  /  
aut  genus  humanum iam tum foret  omne 
peremptum / nec potuisset adhuc perducere  
saecla propago.
Then  after  …  they  saw  children  sprung 
from them, then the first race of men began 
to soften … Venus lessened their strength, 
and children, by their winning ways, easily 
broke  down  the  haughty  will  of  their 
parents. Then, too, neighbors began to form 
friendship  one  with  another,  longing 
neither to hurt nor to be harmed, and they 
commended to mercy children and the race 
of  women,  when  with  cries  and  gestures 
they taught by broken words that 'tis right 
for all men to have pity on the weak. Yet 
not in all ways could unity be begotten, but 
a  good  part,  the  larger  part,  would  keep 
their  compacts loyally;  or else the human 
race would even then have been destroyed, 
nor  could  breeding  have  prolonged  the 
generations until now.
Lucr. 5.1011-1027
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Once a commune bonum exists, the most inventive individual inevitably acquires royal 
authority, which he uses to distribute rewards among his friends.  In this way, the first 
government is formed, a primitive kingdom (5.1105-1112).  At first, the criteria that 
determine one's position in society are physical beauty and strength, but wealth in the 
form of accumulated property (and precious metal) eventually becomes more important.  
When the number of wealthy people competing for places at the top of society increases, 
owing to the desire of individual men to control their fortune,166 the primitive kingdom 
disintegrates into civil war, which eventually leads people to accept the rule of law as 
supreme, rather than designate some individual or group as having innate authority owing 
to their characteristics (5.1113-1116, 1136-1150).  Fear of lawful punishment becomes the 
only check on the individual human's desire to dominate, and the evolution of the modern 
state (with laws appointing magistrates to administer punishment to the jealous vigilante) 
is complete (5.1151-1155).  The power of Venus and amicitia that initially created society 
gives way to metus (and the stage is set for an Epicurean withdrawal from public life). 
The Epicurean story of human social evolution preserved by Lucretius offers an 
interesting insight from the perspective of this study.  Lucretius' hard primitives are 
drawn together initially by the same natural tendency (referred to poetically as Venus) 
that draws all life to propagate itself (per te quoniam genus omne animantum concipitur 
visitque exortum lumina solis: 1.4-5).  Once together, these primitives inevitably notice 
and react to one another.  They begin to soften, making themselves vulnerable to one 
166 at claros homines voluerunt se atque potentis, / ut fundamento stabili fortuna maneret / et placidam 
possent opulenti degere vitam (Lucr. 5.1120-1122).
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another and coming up with agreements (foedera in 5.1025 above) designed to tame their 
innate animal wildness (which would not necessarily take pity on the weak or cultivate 
friendship without an immediate reward in view).167  This Epicurean narrative is 
remarkably close to the Democritean one(s) evident in frr. 620-623 Luria (on the nature 
of δίκη as it applies to humans and animals)168 and especially in fr. 562 Luria (on the 
getting of offspring in animals and humans).169  In Democritus, as in Lucretius, nature 
(ἀνάγκη) creates man with an automatic animal tendency (to self-preservation in frr. 620-
623 Luria, procreation in fr. 562 Luria) that man domesticates and reshapes into a 
deliberate moral habit (the νόμοι πάτριοι in fr. 623 Luria, a νομίζον in fr. 562 Luria).  
Lucretius' story of the evolution of language provides another clear instance of this 
Democritean narrative pattern (i.e. nature gives man automatic, unpremeditated animal 
tendencies that he cultivates and turns into deliberate moral habits): 
TEXT (Bailey) TRANSLATION (Bailey)
at varios linguae sonitus natura subegit  /  
mittere et utilitas expressit nomina rerum,  
non alia longe ratione atque ipsa videtur /  
protrahere  ad  gestum  pueros  infantia  
linguae,  /  cum  facit  ut  digito  quae  sint  
praesentia  monstrent.  /  sentit  enim  vis  
quisque  suas  quoad  possit  abuti.  /  …  /  
postremo quid in hac mirabile tantoperest  
re, / si genus humanum, cui vox et lingua  
vigeret,  /  pro  vario  sensu  varia  res  voce  
notaret?  /  cum  pecudes  mutae,  cum 
denique saecla ferarum / dissimilis soleant  
voces  variasque  ciere,  /  cum  metus  aut  
But the diverse sounds of the tongue nature 
constrained men to  utter,  and  use  shaped 
names of things, in a manner not far other 
than  the  very  speechlessness  of  their 
tongue  is  seen  to  lead  children  on  to 
gesture, when it makes them point out with 
the  finger  the things  that  are  before their 
eyes.  For everyone feels  to  what  purpose 
he can use his own powers … Lastly, what 
is there so marvellous in this, if the human 
race, with strong voice and tongue, should 
mark  off  things  with  diverse  sounds  for 
diverse feelings? For the dumb cattle, yea 
167 Note the similarity with Polyb. 6.6.1-7, quoted and discussed above on pages 225-241.
168 The fragments are quoted and discussed above on pages 185-198.
169 The fragment is quoted and discussed above on pages 188-199.
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dolor est et cum iam gaudia gliscunt. / … /  
ergo  si  varii  sensus  animalia  cogunt,  /  
muta  tamen  cum  sint,  varias  emittere  
voces,  /  quanto  mortalis  magis  aequumst  
tum potuisse / dissimilis alia atque alia res  
voce notare! 
and  the  races  of  wild  beasts  are  wont  to 
give forth diverse unlike sounds, when they 
are in fear or pain, or again when their joys 
grow strong … And so, if diverse feelings 
constrain animals,  though they are  dumb, 
to  utter  diverse  sounds,  how  much  more 
likely  is  it  that  mortals  should  then  have 
been  able  to  mark  off  things  unlike  with 
one sound and another!
Lucr. 5.1028-1090
Nature forces men and animals to make sounds, vocalizing in response to their perception 
of the evolving reality around them.  Humans in proximity to each other notice their 
vocalizations and make them regular, creating the patterns of sound we call language.170  
Once formed, these regular sonar patterns perpetuate themselves through communities 
that use them naturally, as people use them to interact.  This is essentially the vision of 
human learning represented in Democritus, fr. 682 Luria, where nature and instruction are 
alike in that both mould the plastic shape of humanity.171  Nature shapes us such that we 
vocalize (or defend ourselves, or procreate).  Instruction then shapes us such that we 
speak (or defend ourselves within certain limits, or expect benefit from our offspring).  
This fundamental insight is as important to Lucretius (and Epicurus) as to Democritus, as 
further investigation of Lucretius' Kulturgeschichte makes clear.  
170 Lucretius makes language a communal discovery rather than an individual one, denying the pervasive 
ancient myth that made language and other cultural artifacts gifts from single inventors, whether 
human or divine (5.1041-1055).  The difference that ancient students (e.g. Proclus, in Crat. 16 p. 5, 25 
Pasquali = Democritus, fr. 563 Luria, quoted and discussed above on pages 255-265) find between 
Epicurean and Democritean perspectives on language does not arise explicitly here, though if we read 
other sources (e.g. Epicurus, Ad Herod. 75-76) it becomes clear that Epicurus saw the connection 
between word and referent as a natural one (such that there is a natural human vox associated with 
every human sensus), where Democritus saw it as purely arbitrary (such that there is no natural 
association between particular words in any language and their referents).  See Cole (1967), 61-63.  
171 See pages 259-269 above.
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Like the other Kulturgeschichten examined in this chapter, Lucretius' explains 
human cultural evolution as a cumulative, collective response to environmental stimuli.  
Certain recurring natural phenomena (e.g. procreation or vocalization in the parts of the 
narrative examined above) become αἰτίαι for moral habits that men organize and 
systematize (e.g. to create civil society or language in the way already discussed).  This is 
particularly clear when we consider Lucretius' accounts of the artes (other than language 
or government by law) that make civilized life possible for humanity.  Like Diodorus, 
Lucretius imagines nature herself as mankind's first tutor in developing these arts.  The 
instruction that Lucretian nature gives to her human pupils reminds us very much of 
Democritean Kulturgeschichte, as it remains extant.  This is particularly true when we 
consider how Lucretius describes the development of (i) cooking, (ii) agriculture, (iii) 
metallurgy, and (iv) music.  Each of these artes emerges as people notice certain events 
occurring naturally and conceive conscious plans for replicating and improving nature's 
performance (such that consequences favorable to human survival and enjoyment are 
maximized while those unfavorable are avoided or minimized).
(i) Consider the origin of cooking:
TEXT (Bailey) TRANSLATION (Bailey)
fulmen detulit in terram mortalibus ignem /  
primitus,  inde  omnis  flammarum  diditur  
ardor.  /  multa  videmus  caelestibus  incita  
flammis / fulgere, cum caeli donavit plaga  
vapore. / et ramosa tamen cum ventis pulsa  
vacillans  /  aestuat  in  ramos  incumbens  
arboris arbor, / exprimitur validis extritus  
viribus  ignis,  /  emicat  interdum  flammai  
It was the lightning that first of all brought 
fire to earth for mortals, and from it all the 
heat of flames is spread abroad. For we see 
many things flare up, kindled with flames 
from heaven, when a stroke from the sky 
has  brought  the  gift  of  heat.  Yet  again, 
when  a  branching  tree  is  lashed  by  the 
winds  and  sways  to  and  fro,  reeling  and 
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fervidus ardor, / mutua dum inter se rami  
stirpesque  teruntur.  /  quorum  utrumque  
dedisse  potest  mortalibus  ignem.  /  inde  
cibum coquere ac flammae mollire vapore /  
sol  docuit,  quoniam  mitescere  multa  
videbant / verberibus radiorum atque aestu  
victa per agros.
pressing  on  the  branches  of  another  tree, 
fire is struck out by the strong force of the 
rubbing,  anon  the  fiery  heat  of  flame 
sparkles out, while branches and trunks rub 
each  against  the  other.  Either  of  these 
happenings may have given fire to mortals. 
And then the sun taught them to cook food 
and  soften  it  by  the  heat  of  flame,  since 
they  saw  many  things  among  the  fields 
grow mellow, vanquished by the lashing of 
his rays and by the heat.
Lucr. 5.1092-1104
   
Human beings first acquire fire, either from lightning or from tree branches rubbing 
together.  (Notice that Lucretius is careful not to make either of these natural events the 
sole source for fire: both recur such that either would offer early humans multiple 
opportunities to acquire fire.  There is not one identifiable source here for humanity's 
acquisition of fire, but a family of sources defined by fires that occur in nature.172  
Humans find natural fire, notice what it requires to exist, and domesticate it, replicating 
in the hearth what they observe nature doing with lightning or spontaneous combustion.)  
Once they have fire, the sun teaches them how to use it: when they see solar heat cooking 
things naturally in the fields, they begin to use the heat of domestic fire to cook things at 
the hearth.  Thus nature gives men fire and shows them how to use it.
172 For more about atomist skepticism regarding our ability to identify specific causes precisely, see 
chapter 2.2.1-2 above.  This episode in Lucretius offers a concrete instance of how ancient atomism 
deals with causation (i.e. by appealing to probability rather than to some formal theory affecting to 
identify particular effects with specific causes).  Where nature creates man with certain needs, tastes, 
and tendencies, and creates fire in his environment, ancient atomists would say, humans will likely 
acquire fire, at some time, by taking advantage of some natural circumstance.  Where there are multiple 
natural circumstances providing fire constantly, any of these is as likely as another to be the origin of 
domestic fire in a given human community.  This is an indifference argument, regarding which see 
chapter 2.2.2 (c) above. 
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(ii) Agriculture and (iii) metallurgy arise in the same way:
TEXT (Bailey) TRANSLATION (Bailey)
(ii) at specimen sationis et insitionis origo /  
ipsa fuit  rerum primum natura creatrix,  /  
arboribus  quoniam  bacae  glandesque  
caducae  /  tempestiva  dabant  pullorum 
examina  subter;  /  unde  etiam  libitumst  
stirpis committere ramis / et nova defodere  
in terram virgulta per agros. / inde aliam 
atque aliam culturam dulcis agelli / temp-
tabant fructusque feros mansuescere terra /  
cernebant indulgendo blandeque colendo. /  
inque  dies  magis  in  montem  succedere  
silvas / cogebant infraque locum concedere  
cultis, / prata lacus rivos segetes vinetaque  
laeta  /  collibus  et  campis  ut  haberent,  
atque olearum / caerula distinguens inter  
plaga  currere  posset  /  per  tumulos  et  
convallis camposque profusa; ut nunc esse  
vides vario distincta lepore / omnia, quae  
pomis intersita dulcibus ornant / arbustis-
que tenent felicibus obsita circum.
But nature herself, creatress of things, was 
first a pattern for sowing and the beginning 
of  grafting,  since  berries  and  nuts  fallen 
from the trees in due time put forth swarms 
of  shoots  beneath;  from nature,  too,  they 
learnt to insert grafts into branches, and to 
plant young saplings in the ground over the 
fields. Then one after another they essayed 
ways of tilling their smiling plot, and saw 
wild fruits  grow tame in the ground with 
tender care and fond tilling.   And day by 
day they would constrain the woods more 
and more to retire up the mountains, and to 
give  up the land beneath to  tilth,  that  on 
hills and plains they might have meadows, 
pools, streams, crops, and glad vineyards, 
and  the  grey  belt  of  olives  might  run 
between with its clear line, speading over 
hillocks  and  hollows  and  plains;  even  as 
now you see all the land clear marked with 
diverse beauties, where men make it bright 
by  planting  it  here  and  there  with  sweet 
fruit-trees,  and  fence  it  by  planting  it  all 
round with fruitful shrubs.
Lucr. 5.1361-1377
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(iii)  quod  superest,  aes  atque  aurum 
ferrumque  repertumst  /  et  simul  argenti  
pondus  plumbique  potestas,  /  ignis  ubi  
ingentis silvas ardore cremarat / montibus  
in  magnis  …  /  …  /  quidquid  id  est,  
quacumque  e  causa  flammeus  ardor  /  
horribili  sonitu  silvas  exederat  altis  /  a  
radicibus  et  terram  percoxerat  igni,  /  
manabat venis ferventibus in loca terrae /  
concava conveniens argenti rivus et auri, /  
aeris  item  et  plumbi.  quae  cum concreta  
videbant  /  posterius  claro  in  terra  
splendere  colore  /  tollebant  nitido  capti  
levique lepore, / et simili formata videbant  
esse  figura  /  atque  lacunarum  fuerant  
vestigia cuique. / tum penetrabat eos posse  
haec  liquefacta  calore  /  quamlibet  in  
formam  et  faciem  decurrere  rerum  /  et  
prorsum quamvis in acuta ac tenvia posse /  
mucronum duci  fastigia  procudendo,  /  ut  
sibi  tela  parent,  silvasque  ut  caedere  
possint  /  materiemque  dolare  et  levia  
radere  tigna  /  et  terebrare  etiam  et  
pertundere  perque  forare.  /  nec  minus  
argento  facere  haec  auroque  parabant  /  
quam validi primum violentis viribus aeris,  
/  nequiquam,  quoniam  cedebat  victa  
potestas,  /  nec  poterant  pariter  durum  
sufferre laborem.
For the rest, copper and gold and iron were 
discovered,  and  with  them the  weight  of 
silver  and the usefulness  of lead,  when a 
fire  had  burnt  down vast  forests  with  its 
heat on mighty mountains … However that 
may be, for whatever cause173 the flaming 
heat  had  eaten  up  the  forests  from  their 
deep roots with terrible crackling, and had 
baked  the  earth  with  fire,  the  streams  of 
silver and gold, and likewise of copper and 
lead,  gathered  together  and  trickled  from 
the boiling veins into hollow places in the 
ground.  And  when  they  saw  them  after-
wards hardened and shining on the ground 
with  brilliant  hue,  they  picked  them  up, 
charmed by their smooth bright beauty, and 
saw that they were shaped with outline like 
that  of  the  several  prints  of  the  hollows. 
Then  it  came  home  to  them  that  these 
metals might be melted by heat, and would 
run into the form and figure of anything, 
and  indeed  might  be  hammered  out  and 
shaped into points and tips, however sharp 
and  fine,  so  that  they  might  fashion 
weapons for themselves, and be able to cut 
down  forests  and  hew  timber  and  plane 
beams smooth, yea, and to bore and punch 
and drill  holes.  And,  first  of  all,  they set 
forth to do this no less with silver and gold 
than  with  the  resistless  strength  of  stout 
copper; all in vain, since their power was 
vanquished and yielded, nor could they like 
others endure the cruel strain.
Lucr. 5.1241-1244, 1252-1270
173 The lines omitted here enumerate different circumstances that might cause the forest fire that reveals 
the idea of metallurgy to mankind.   The circumstances range from natural disasters (e.g. lightning 
igniting a forest by accident) to those created deliberately by humans (e.g. primitive hunting techniques 
calculated to defeat thick underbrush).  The theory of causation evident here is the same one apparent 
in the earlier story of mankind's discovery of fire: see note 172 above in this chapter. 
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Nature offers (ii) a pattern for agriculture (specimen sationis et insitionis), a pattern that 
men perceive and then develop to modern standards by trial and error (inde aliam atque 
aliam culturam dulcis agelli / temptabant fructusque feros mansuescere terra / cernebant  
indulgendo blandeque colendo).  The process takes time (inque dies magis in montem 
succedere silvas / cogebant infraque locum concedere cultis).  In similar fashion, a forest 
fire—which derives from nature either directly (when lightning strikes dry woodland) or 
indirectly (when humans deliberately burn woodland with fire taken from nature)—
introduces mankind to (iii) metals (copper, gold, iron, silver, lead) and to the reality that 
metals can be melted down and moulded.  Seeing molten metal cool in natural trenches, 
whose shape it naturally adopts, men conceive the notion of melting metal on purpose 
(rather than by accident), and shaping it deliberately to make tools (tum penetrabat eos 
posse haec liquefacta calore / quamlibet in formam et faciem decurrere rerum / … / ut 
sibi tela parent).  The image of metal melting and cooling accidentally in the woods 
penetrates their minds174 and gives them an idea for deliberate metallurgy that they 
develop to modern standards by trial and error, using every metal available for every sort 
of tool and seeing for themselves which work and which do not (nec minus argento 
facere haec auroque parabant / quam validi primum violentis viribus aeris, / nequiquam, 
quoniam cedebat victa potestas, / nec poterant pariter durum sufferre laborem).  The 
perfection of metallurgy requires time and experience, which men require to turn the 
unexpected accident of nature into a deliberate human ars.175      
174 A very atomist way of conceiving inspiration: see chapter 2.3 and pages 227-241, 248-263 above.
175 et prior aeris erat quam ferri cognitus usus, / quo facilis magis est natura et copia maior. / aere solum 
terrae tractabant, aereque belli /miscebant fluctus et vulnera vasta serebant / et pecus atque agros 
adimebant. nam facile ollis / omnia cedebant armatis nuda et inerma. / inde minutatim processit 
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The Lucretian natura creatrix that teaches humanity the arts of civilization is 
familiar to us already from Diodorus (1.8.1-9)176 and Democritus (frr. 561, 682 Luria).177  
From the perspective of this study, (iv) music is undoubtedly the most interesting lesson 
that primitive people learn from natura in Lucretius:
TEXT (Bailey) TRANSLATION (Smith [1969])
(iv) at liquidas avium voces imitarier ore /  
ante fuit multo quam levia carmina cantu /  
concelebrare  homines  possent  aurisque  
iuvare. / et zephyri, cava per calamorum,  
sibila  primum  /  agrestis  docuere  cavas  
inflare cicutas.  
People  imitated  with  their  mouths  the 
liquid warblings of birds long before they 
were  able  to  join  together  in  singing 
melodious songs with pleasure to the ear. 
And it was the whistling of the zephyr in 
the  cavities  of  reeds  that  first  taught 
country folk to blow into hollow stalks.
Lucr. 5.1379-1383
Born with the natural capacity of observing reality and responding to it vocally (Lucr. 
5.1028-1029),178 Lucretius' primitives observe birds singing and reproduce the animals' 
efforts as clumsy imitations that practice and time eventually turn into polished carmina 
(5.1029-1030).  This passage offers an Epicurean version of Democritus, fr. 559 Luria, 
ferreus ensis / versaque in opprobrium species est falcis ahenae, / et ferro coepere solum proscindere 
terrae / exaequataque sunt creperi certamina belli (Lucr. 5.1287-1296).  Warfare is another civilized 
art that develops in this way, as people deploy different animals on the battlefield and learn from the 
results which species are really suited to assist human soldiers there (Lucr. 5.1297-1349).
176 Where natural need (χρεία) becomes mankind's teacher (διδάσκαλος), allowing us to develop civilized 
arts (τέχναι) over time.  See pages 246-257 above.
177 In fr. 561, an ass accidentally copulates with a mare in nature, inspiring human observers to breed 
mules deliberately.  See pages 190 and 211 above.  In fr. 682, φύσις gives man a shape that is altered 
over time by διδαχή, presumably as humans (individually and collectively) come into contact with 
atomic images in their environment and react to them (e.g. by turning the accidental mating of ass and 
mare into the deliberate custom of breeding mules).  See pages 250-263 above.  Note that Lucretius 
produces an aphorism that is practically a Latin version of fr. 682: sic unumquicquid paulatim protrahit  
aetas / in medium ratioque in luminis erigit oras (5.1454-1455).  The regular, atelic process of nature 
(φύσις, aetas) gives humanity accidents (mares reproducing with asses, fires kindling in the woods) 
that we, with our perceptive faculties (that recognize and respond to διδαχή and ratio), turn into 
deliberate habits that reshape the process of nature (at least as it plays out around us).  
178 Compare Epicur. Epist. 1.76: τινὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ συνορώμενα πράγματα εἰσφέροντας τοὺς συνειδότας 
παρεγγυῆσαί τινας φθόγγους τοὺς <μὲν> ἀναγκασθέντας ἀναφωνῆσαι ...
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wherein birds (and other λιγυρά in nature) teach human beings to sing: ὧν [τῶν ζωΐων] ὁ 
Δημόκριτος ἀποφαίνει μαθητὰς ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις γεγονότας ἡμᾶς ... καὶ τῶν λιγυρῶν, 
κύκνου καὶ ἀηδόνος, ἐν ὠιδῆι κατὰ μίμησιν (Plut. De sollert. animal. 20 p. 974a).  Given 
what we know of Democritean Kulturgeschichte apart from this dramatic coincidence 
with Epicureanism—viz. that it involves human beings evolving a certain way naturally 
(chapter 2.3 above)179 and then reshaping their nature through teaching (fr. 682 Luria), 
specifically the teaching of animals (frr. 559, 561 Luria)—it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that Lucretius' account of music represents a direct reception of Democritus.  
This appears even more likely when music arises for both as something coincidental, a 
pleasant accident that comes about only after essential needs are met: 
TEXT (text) TRANSLATION (translator)
(iv)  inde minutatim dulcis didicere querel-
las,  /  tibia  quas  fundit  digitis  pulsata  
canentum,  /  avia  per  nemora  ac  silvas  
saltusque  reperta,  /  per  loca  pastorum 
deserta atque otia dia. / … / haec animos  
ollis  mulcebant  atque  iuvabant  /  cum  
satiate cibi; nam tum sunt omnia cordi. / … 
/  tum  ioca,  tum  sermo,  tum  dulces  esse  
cachinni  /  consuerant.  agrestis  enim  tum 
musa  vigebat;  /  tum caput  atque  umeros  
plexis  redimire coronis  /  floribus  et  foliis  
lascivia  laeta  monebat,  /  atque  extra  
numerum  procedere  membra  moventis  /  
duriter  et  duro  terram  pede  pellere  
matrem; / unde oriebantur risus dulcesque  
cachinni,  /  omnia  quod  nova  tum  magis  
haec et mira vigebant. / et vigilantibus hinc  
Then little by little they learned the sweet 
notes that ripple from the plaintive pipe as 
the  player's  fingers  strike  the  stops—the 
pipe invented in pathless woods and forests 
and  forest  glades,  in  the  solitary  spots 
where shepherds rest in the open air. With 
this  music  they  would  soothe  and  charm 
their hearts after  they had eaten their fill; 
for that is the time when everything affords 
pleasure  …  Then  there  would  be  jokes, 
talk,  and  peals  of  pleasant  laughter;  for 
then the rustic muse was at its best. Then, 
prompted  by  playful  gaiety,  they  would 
deck  their  heads  and  shoulders  with 
garlands of interwoven flowers and foliage 
and  move  their  limbs  clumsily  in  an 
unrhythmical dance,  striking mother  earth 
179 Note that both Democritus and Epicurus regard the voice as a stream of particles (ῥεῦμα ἀτόμων in 
Gell. Noct. Att. 5.15.8 = Democritus, fr. 492 Luria), which the individual animal projects from its 
mouth (as crier, speaker, or singer) and receives (as auditor) most through its ears (since there is more 
void in the ear: Democritus, fr. 488 Luria = Theophr. De Sensu 55-57). 
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aderant  solacia  somno,  /  ducere  multi-
modis voces et flectere cantus / et supera  
calamos  unco  percurrere  labro;  /  unde  
etiam vigiles nunc haec accepta tuentur / et  
numerum  servare  genus  didicere,  neque  
hilo  /  maiorem  interea  capiunt  dulcidini'  
fructum  /  quam  silvestre  genus  capiebat  
terrigenarum. (Bailey)
with  clumsy  feet.  These  performances 
would provoke smiles and peals of pleasant 
laughter,  because all such pastimes, being 
new and wonderful, had a greater effect at 
that  time.  And  the  wakeful  would  find 
ready  consolations  for  sleeplessness  in 
guiding  their  voices  through  the  many 
modulations of a song and in running over 
the  reeds  with  pursed  lips.  This  old 
tradition  is  still  kept  up  by  watchmen 
today;  and although they have  learned to 
keep  time,  they  do  not  derive  any  more 
pleasure  from their  music  than  did  those 
woodland  folk,  the  children  of  earth. 
(Smith [1969])
Lucr. 5.1384-1387, 1390-1391, 1397-1411
Δημόκριτος  ...  μουσικήν  φησι  νεωτέραν 
εἶναι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδίδωσι λέγων μὴ 
ἀποκρῖναι  τἀναγκαῖον,  ἀλλὰ  ἐκ  τοῦ 
περιεῦντος ἤδη γενέσθαι.  (Luria)
Democritus  ...  says  that  music  is  more 
recent, and identifies its cause, saying that 
it  was  not  singled  out  by  necessity,  but 
arose as a result of plenty.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B144 DK
     = fr. 213 Taylor
     = fr. 568 Luria
Philod.  De musica 4.31, p. 108.29 Kemke; 
Herculaneum pap. 1497, col. 36.29-39
 
Lucretius' primitives practice music after they have eaten (cum satiate cibi), recognizing 
the Democritean hierarchy between essential arts (that serve human survival directly and 
necessarily: we cannot survive without food)180 and accidental ones (that come into being 
as natural but unnecessary consequences of human beings surviving: we can survive 
without music).  Their musical learning mirrors the Democritean model for cultural 
180 See also Democritus, frr. 562, 646, 717, and 732 Luria, which are discussed at some length on pages 
236-248 above.
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development reflected in frr. 561 and especially 682 Luria: at first, their music is 
unrhythmical (extra numerum) and uncultivated or animal (agrestis musa vigebat); over 
time, it becomes more orderly and human (note the contrast between modern and 
primitive man implicit in Lucretius' reference to the latter as silvestre genus), as learning 
changes nature (numerum servare genus didicere): in Democritean terms, διδαχή alters 
the human ῥυθμός created by φύσις (fr. 682 Luria).  
The resonance between Lucretius and Democritus is too significant and specific to 
be dismissed as empty coincidence, in my opinion.181  From the foregoing discussion, it 
seems clear that Epicurean Kulturgeschichte (of which Lucretius represents our most 
extensive source) borrows from its Democritean predecessor(s) at least (1) the narrative 
template that imagines humanity inheriting its primitive nature through a series of cosmic 
accidents and then reshaping that nature by observing and reacting consciously to its 
accidental environment, i.e. learning (fr. 682 Luria); and (2) the detail that certain specific 
human arts (at least music) originate with humans who observe and react consciously to 
animals engaging in natural activities (frr. 559, 561, 568 Luria).  Among the cultural 
historians here examined, Lucretius thus offers the closest likeness to Democritus that 
remains extant, unless that position should go to Diodorus (as some scholars might still 
reasonably argue).  At the very least, Lucretius shows us that Democritean influence 
remains active and identifiable in Epicurean Kulturgeschichte.
181 This is particularly true in light of other ancient testimony confirming that Epicurus borrowed 
extensively from Democritus, who is supposed to have written many books.  See Democritus, frr. xcv-
cvi (on the relationship between Democritus and Epicurus), and cxv Luria (on Democritus' oeuvre). 
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Summary and Conclusion (3.2.3)
In light of everything this study has revealed thus far—our knowledge of the 
Critical Tradition, our knowledge of Democritus' thought, and our reading of the other 
Kulturgeschichten discussed in this chapter—we discover several critical facts relating to 
Democritean Kulturgeschichte.  These facts are as follows: 
(i) Many writers in the Critical Tradition offer some account of the origin and 
development of human life—an anthropogony that locates mankind in the history of the 
material διάκοσμος, showing how physical elements give birth to human morality.  Some 
writers imagine mankind originating as primitive animals and then differentiating over 
time, changing and developing their primitive animal shape until it becomes recognizably 
human and contemporary (see section 3.1 above).  
(ii) Following Critical precedent, Democritus offered at least one anthropogony 
(imperfectly extant in fr. 514 Luria) that follows earlier authors of the Critical Tradition 
in making human beings primitive animals who differentiate and develop, reshaping their 
original nature in response to their environment (see 3.2 above, and fr. 682 Luria).  
(iii) Democritus' fragments indicate that his discussion of human differentiation 
included a Kulturgeschichte (partially extant in frr. 559, 561, 568, 682 Luria)—similar to 
other Kulturgeschichten that arise within the Critical Tradition as it exists contemporary 
with Democritus (e.g. the Kulturgeschichten of Archelaus, Protagoras, and Plato, 
examined at length in section 3.2.2 above).
(iv) Comparison shows significant resonance between the Democritean corpus 
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and the Kulturgeschichten of his contemporaries in the Critical Tradition: if Archelaus, 
Protagoras, and Plato could compose developed Critical Kulturgeschichten that imagine 
human beings acquiring specific kinds of culture in response to impersonal stimuli in 
their environment (e.g. their own physical weakness, conflict with other animals, and 
intraspecific interaction), then Democritus could as well.  (There is no reason to suppose 
the early atomist's extensive writings neglected what appears to have been a very hot 
topic, even if there were no testimonia confirming that he composed Kulturgeschichte.  
Given that these testimonia exist, it seems highly likely that the atomist had a narrative at 
least as developed as those of Archelaus, Protagoras, and Plato.)  Note that Democritus' 
ethical corpus reveal a perspective on reality similar to those that drive these narratives—
particularly that of Plato, whose εἰκός looks much like the indeterminacy inherent in 
biological manifestations of atomist ἀνάγκη that some later students of Democritus call 
τύχη (e.g. Aelian in fr. 561 Luria).182  
(v) Comparison with select Kulturgeschichten that post-date Democritus reveals 
additional resonance: Polybius, Diodorus, and Lucretius all offer Kulturgeschichten close 
to the Critical Tradition whose narrative development and moral outlook resonate with 
the extant Democritean corpus strongly, sometimes even more than that of the earlier 
authors (e.g. when the relationship between humanity and the environment to which it 
182 See the discussion of supple determinism in chapter 2.2.1-2 above, esp. where it treats frr. 103 and 316 
Luria.  Democritean necessity means that man (like any other animal species) is necessarily possessed 
of certain characteristics (e.g. hands), but it does not mean that every man has the exact same number 
of digits or that all men live in the same geographic location (fr. 103 Luria).  These things are a matter 
of accident, just like the accident that leads to certain men coming up with the idea to breed mules (in 
fr. 561 Luria).  We cannot know which men will have the idea first, only that some will likely see a 
natural mule born and draw conclusions leading to mules being bred artificially. 
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adapts is defined by human opportunism taking advantage of natural accidents, and when 
animals teach us culture).  It is possible that this comes from Democritus being a source 
for Polybius and Diodorus, as he almost certainly is for Lucretius via Epicurus.  
The upshot of this investigation is that Democritean Kulturgeschichte is not really 
as obscure or irrecoverable as it sometimes seems.183  Even if we do not possess enough 
information to say precisely what Democritus wrote about the development of human 
culture in some specific work, we can sketch an accurate picture of the general form his 
narrative(s) most likely took.  Since Democritus' outlook on reality deliberately eschews 
certainty184 and he is supposed to have written at least one book criticizing his own work 
(the Κρατυντήρια),185 it is not wise to imagine him laying down a single, dogmatic 
version of the atomist διάκοσμος.  The most we can hope for is an idea of the kind of 
narrative he would write, given his predilections as they appear in the historical record.  
The appropriate question to answer is not what precisely did Democritus write by way of 
Kulturgeschichte? but what sort of Kulturgeschichte would Democritus write, given what  
we know of him?  The former question cannot be answered.  The latter can, and the 
answer is useful, as I will demonstrate.  
183 E.g. when Cole (1967) fails to establish an unquestionable genealogy for all the Kulturgeschichten he 
interrogates that traces them back inevitably to Democritus.  He fails because the early atomist was 
admittedly not the only thinker interested in cultural history, nor even the only thinker who sought to 
explain cultural history as the result of humans taking opportunistic advantage of natural accidents.  
While Cole's failure makes it inadvisable to attribute any of the extant Kulturgeschichten that he studies 
unreservedly to Democritus, it does not mean that we have no clear idea what the early atomist's ideas 
on cultural history were.  We have enough data to determine what sort of Kulturgeschichte Democritus 
would have written, even though we cannot say whether any of the Kulturgeschichten that resonate 
most with extant fragments of the Democritean corpus derive their existence directly from it.  Neither 
Polybius, nor Diodorus, nor Lucretius can be said to depend wholly on Democritus.
184 See frr. 49, 51, 55, 79-80 Luria, quoted on pages 132 and 174-166 above.
185 ὅπερ ἔστιν ἐπικριτικὰ τῶν προειρημένων (Diog. 9.47 = fr. cxv Luria).
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What follows is a representation of Democritus' Kulturgeschichte (reconstructed 
from the evidence already discussed) and a brief assessment of its importance for our 
understanding of practical Democritean ethics (the subject of the next chapter).  We begin 
with a recapitulation of the early atomist cosmogony (in order to demonstrate clearly the 
nature of the relationship between physics, biology, and ethics in Democritean thought): 
Infinite atoms move endlessly through infinite void, crashing into each other and 
rebounding and/or adhering to form various impermanent compounds.  When enough of 
these compounds come together thus in one particular place, a world (κόσμος) is formed.  
The world exists as a temporary collection of atoms that move relative to one another 
through a series of orderly relationships (defined by the principle that like particles 
necessarily sort themselves with like).186  The collection of atoms that is the world 
develops naturally over time such that it has a beginning (when it emerges from the 
chaos of atoms swirling in the void and grows larger through the acquisition of more 
atoms), a middle (the ἀκμή, when no more atoms can be assimilated to the world and it 
begins to lose atoms instead of adding them), and an end (when the world finally 
dissolves, leaving its atoms to be recycled as part of other worlds).187
As part of its historical development, the world inevitably produces objects, some 
inanimate (like earth, ocean, and sky) and others animate (the animals inhabiting earth, 
ocean, and sky).  All these objects necessarily have a certain shape (ῥυσμός) not to be 
confused with the shape (ῥυσμός) of the individual atoms that make them up at any given 
186 See frr. 315-323 Luria, esp. fr. 316.   
187 See frr. 343-360 Luria, esp. fr. 349.  See also the discussion in chapter 2.2 above. 
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moment in time.  Where the shape of an individual atom is eternal and immutable, as the 
atom itself is,188 the shape of the objects that atoms form are temporal and mutable, 
subject to change in the same way that the world itself is.189  Each object in the world has  
a beginning (when the atoms that compound it come together), an ἀκμή (when it cannot 
grow larger through the accumulation of more atoms and begins to wear down, losing 
atoms to its surrounding environment), and an end (when it dissolves and, if it is animate,  
dies).  The shape of these temporary objects is regular (supple determinism) without 
being utterly or minutely predictable (rigid determinism).190   
Human beings are among the objects that worlds produce over the course of their  
historical development.  Individually, each of us exists as a cloud of atoms with a regular 
shape (ῥυσμός) that changes over time, naturally and necessarily, the same way that the 
shape of other objects changes (whether rocks weathering or animals aging).191  We are 
born (when a critical mass of soul atoms animates the cloud of atoms incorporating a 
human body), reach ἀκμή (when body and soul grow to maturity), decline (when our 
body begins to lose atomic mass), and die (when our body loses a critical mass of soul 
atoms).  In addition to individual shape, human beings have collective shape as well.  
Like other objects in the world, the individual human being naturally and necessarily 
associates with others like himself, forming conspecific societies192 endowed with mutable  
188 See frr. 211-248 Luria, esp. frr. 240-242 (where Democritean usage of the term ῥυσμός to designate 
immutable atomic shape is documented).
189 See frr. 238-248, 288-313, 326 Luria, esp. fr. 326 (where Democritean use of the term ῥυσμός  to 
designate mutable physical shape is documented).  See also the discussion in chapter 2.2 above.
190 See frr. 9, 22-23, 29, 32, 51, 58, 65, 93, 102-103, 184, 215, 291, 316, 382 Luria, esp. frr. 103 and 316.  
See also the discussion in chapter 2.2.1-2 above.
191 See fr. 682 Luria, where nature gives man a ῥυσμός that instruction changes.
192 See fr. 316 Luria.
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shape (ῥυσμός).  Like individual human beings, human societies are temporary clouds of 
moving atoms, clouds whose shape evolves from birth (when a particular social order 
comes into being) to ἀκμή (when a particular social order reaches the pitch of its 
expression) to death (when a particular social order disbands).193  For Democritus, thus, 
human moral behavior (i.e. ethics or culture) exists where the temporary shape of an 
individual human being encounters—and reacts with—temporary shapes in the world 
around it, including (but certainly not limited to) the larger, collective human shape(s) of 
the society (or societies) in which the individual participates.
When human life first comes into existence (arising out of primitive marshes by 
the process of natural and necessary atomic association and evolution that creates 
everything in the world),194 its shape (individual and collective) is wholly natural—like 
that of any other animal.  The first generation of humans arrives with certain innate 
needs (e.g. for protection, nourishment, association with like organisms, and procreation)  
that it satisfies as its environment allows (e.g. through the accidental presence of water, 
food, materials offering shelter, and members of its own animal species that include 
fertile representatives of the opposite sex).195  Initially, primitive human beings satisfy 
these innate needs accidentally and instinctively.  Individual humans experience animal 
emotions (e.g. fear, thirst, hunger, or lust) and chance upon some animal means of sating 
them (e.g. running from danger, confronting danger, drinking water, eating wild food, or 
193 See fr. 613 Luria, where the contemporary Greek πόλις has a ῥυσμός subject to temporal evolution, and 
note that frr. 559, 561, and 568 presume that the shape of collective human culture (society) evolves 
temporally through the acquisition of various new complex habits or τέχναι (weaving, mending, house-
building, music, and mule-breeding).
194 See frr. 316, 514-515 Luria, and the discussion in chapter 2.3 above. 
195 See frr. 316, 562, 568, 646, 717, 723 Luria, and the discussion on pages 248-261 above.
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procreating with an available member of the opposite sex).196  The creation of the first 
society is one result of this natural process, since like inevitably seeks like in the early 
atomist multiverse.197  This primitive human society has a natural, animal shape: it 
instinctively values biological necessities (like protection, water, food, procreation) and 
provides basic means for preserving human access to these.  Initially, it provides such 
means purely by accident, as resources (the material means offering protection, water, 
food, and procreation) exist in the surrounding environment and human beings have the 
luck to stumble across them.198  But necessity inevitably creates human nature such that 
we learn: because of the large proportion of soul atoms that our body contains, we notice  
accidents in nature, seeing particular historical causes that we connect to effects, and we  
naturally generalize from these particulars to come up with plans for the future.199  The 
environment, including other people, inevitably leaves an impression on primitive man, 
individually and collectively, changing his initial animal shape.
As a result of his natural and necessary habit of learning, Democritean man 
196 Democritus appears to regard at least some of the most primitive animal emotions (shared by humans) 
as irrational, e.g. when he refers to coitus as a kind of epilepsy: μικρὰν ἐπιληψίαν τὴν συνουσίαν ὁ 
Ἀβδηρίτης ἔλεγεν (Clem. Paed. 1.94 = fr. 527 Luria).  
197 Primitive human beings band together naturally and necessarily the same way animals and pebbles of a 
kind do in fr. 316 Luria.  Plutarch preserves another very interesting Democritean fragment discussing 
the natural shape of collective human life: ὁ ἥλιος ἀνασχών ... συνώρμησε τῶι φωτὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ 
τὰς νοήσεις τὰς ἁπάντων, ὥς φησι Δημόκριτος νέα ἐφ' ἡμέρηι φρονέοντες ἄνθρωποι τῆι πρὸς ἀλλή-
λοις ὁρμῆι καθάπερ ἀρτήματι συντόνωι σπασθέντες ἄλλος ἀλλαχόθεν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀνίστανται (De 
lat. viv. 5.1129e = fr. 511 Luria, DK68B158).  The natural shape of the universe, marked here by the 
rising (and setting) of the sun, shapes human interaction, naturally drawing us together (as by a cord).  
The natural, animal society that this creates eventually gives rise to a civilized πόλις (as we learn to 
recognize and harmonize our animal shapes so that they function together harmoniously).  
198 I imagine Democritean primitives stumbling upon the necessities of life the same way Democritus 
imagines the first mule-breeders stumbling upon an ass raping a mare (fr. 561 Luria).  This is consonant 
with the picture of human cultural evolution in Diodorus and Lucretius, the two accounts that seem 
closest to Democritus (as he remains extant).  
199 See frr. 561 and 682 Luria, along with the fragments discussed on pages 227-230 above.
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inevitably evolves social mores that add to and refine his innate animal instincts: he 
comes up with deliberate human rules to supplement (and civilize) animal instincts.  
Where his animal nature provides the protective instinct to kill all hostile animals, 
whether human or not, he comes up with νόμοι πάτριοι exempting some of them (e.g. 
those seeking sanctuary in a holy place).200  Where his animal nature provides the 
procreative instinct to produce offspring, he adds the νομίζον that expects children to 
show gratitude to their parents.201  Where his animal nature provides the curiosity that 
makes him look into the environment around him, he turns his observations of natural 
accidents—e.g. spiders weaving and repairing their webs, swallows constructing nests, 
songbirds singing, and asses raping mares—into deliberate human customs (civilized 
τέχναι that deliberately cultivate the recurrence of particular natural accidents whose 
outcomes strike human observers as favorable).202
In Democritean thought, there is a natural order to the change that human shape 
experiences from its origins to the present.  The first habits (νομίζοντα, νόμοι, τέχναι) 
that human beings develop in successful societies are inevitably those associated with 
necessities (ἀνάγκαι, τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, τὰ ἀναγκαιότερα): if primitive humans fail to learn 
how to protect themselves, how to acquire water and food, or how to procreate, then they 
do not survive long enough to form or (at any rate) hand down habits unnecessary for 
survival (e.g. music).203  The former habits are heavily determined by necessity (since 
200 See frr. 620-623 Luria, discussed on pages 185-186 above.
201 See fr. 562 Luria, discussed on pages 188-189, 236-239 above. 
202 See frr. 559, 561 Luria.
203 See frr. 568, 646, 717, 723 Luria.
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humanity perishes without them: we must have some kind of food in order to live), while 
the latter are not (since they are not requisite for survival: we do not need any music in 
order to live).  The latter arise from excess (ἐκ τοῦ περιεῦντος in fr. 568 Luria), as 
unnecessary but pleasant additions to the habits that minister directly to necessity.  In 
this paradigm adopted by Democritus, human pleasure, individual and collective, 
becomes a significant αἰτία driving our cultural evolution: necessity creates mankind 
such that we naturally and necessarily seek the pleasure of survival (e.g. pleasure that 
comes from being protected, nourished, and procreating) as well as the pleasure 
incidental to survival (e.g. the pleasure that comes from music).  Our animal shape, 
individual and collective, naturally and necessarily values pleasure in certain ways (in 
order that we may survive), and so our human shape, individual and collective, must 
value it as well.204  This is the foundation of practical Democritean ethics, which 
addresses the nature of human pleasure and the proper way to cultivate it—how to 
pursue it (as of necessity we must) without deforming or destroying human shape 
(individual and collective) beyond hope of repair.205 
There are two essential conclusions to draw from this chapter.  (1) Democritean 
Kulturgeschichte is not lost to scholarship.  The summary above offers a large body of 
evidence for Democritus' well-developed ideas on the origin(s) and development of 
human culture.  While it is not determinable (given the current state of the evidence) 
whether Democritus composed a single, continous account of human cultural evolution 
204 ὅρος συμφόρων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων τέρψις καὶ ἀτερπίη (Stob. 3.1.46 = fr. 734 Luria, DK68B188).  See 
pages 248-252 above.
205 Remember that human life is precarious and fragile in fr. 646 Luria.
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that traced its every development in an authoritative fashion, what evidence we possess 
strongly suggests that he consciously crafted a complex, coherent worldview (a Critical 
διάκοσμος) which informed his discussion(s) of human culture as it exists in the past, the 
present, and/or the future.206  (2) As extant in the early atomist corpus, that worldview 
evinces a strong connection between early atomist physics and Democritean ethics: the 
physics create the worldview in which the ethics have meaning.  Lacking the perspective 
afforded by that worldview, many scholars—e.g. Dyroff (1899), Zeller (1919-1923), 
Bailey (1928), Alfieri (1936), Stella (1947), Mesiano (1951), Barnes (1982), and Taylor 
(1967, 1999, 2007)—have denied the existence of any significant coherence between 
atomism and the Democritean ethical corpus.  The chapter that follows will show where 
these moderns go wrong: it will offer an original interpretation of Democritus' ethics that 
improves the quality of our understanding more than any other reading to date207 and that 
depends fundamentally on the worldview presumed by early atomist physics. 
206 The doxography ascribes several lost books to Democritus that might have contained such a narrative.  
These include the Μέγας διάκοσμος, the Μικρὸς διάκοσμος, the Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσιος ἢ Περὶ σαρκός 
(Diog. 9.46 = fr. cxv Luria), and the Περὶ φύσεως κόσμου (Suda, s.v. Δημόκριτος = fr. cxvi Luria).  
Note that Thrasyllus (quoted by Diogenes) lists the Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσιος ἢ Περὶ σαρκός as the second 
volume in a series of two: the title of its prequel is given as Περὶ φύσεως (perhaps an explanation of 
physical cosmology that the second volume developed to include human and animal life, i.e. σάρξ), 
which could be the same title that the Suda records as Περὶ φύσεως κόσμου.   
207 Including those readings that (correctly) see coherence between early atomist physics and Democritean 
ethics, e.g. Natorp (1893), Reinhardt (1912), Uxkull-Gyllenband (1924), Vlastos (1945, 1946), Mugler 
(1959), Luria (1964), Cole (1967), Sassi (1978), Mueller (1980), Thrams (1986), and Warren (2002).  
Even though their interpretive instinct is correct, these readings miss the fact that Democritus works 
inside the Critical Tradition, and they all overlook important characteristics of his worldview (a Critical 
διάκοσμος) as it appears in the early atomist fragments and testimonia.  Like the scholars who deny any 
coherence between early atomist physics and Democritean ethics, those who assert coherence lack the 
perspective that sees Democritus as a Critical thinker.  This study remedies that defect.
287
CHAPTER 4. HAPPY POVERTY:  A NEW INTERPRETATION OF 
DEMOCRITEAN ETHICS
Seeing Past the Straw Man of the Epicureans (4.1)
The previous chapters have articulated an original approach to understanding 
Democritean ethics, an approach that aims (as others before it) to see what the atomist 
was trying to say in the ethical fragments that remain extant in the historical record.  
Before we interrogate those fragments more closely, investigating how Democritus 
finished building his atomist διάκοσμος on the foundation we have already discovered 
him creating, it is natural to wonder why others before us have failed to develop (or even 
missed entirely) some of the critical insights I have offered (and will yet offer).  How 
does this study view the tradition of scholarship on Democritus?  We are now in a good 
position to answer this important question explicitly.
Modern scholarship has not yet produced a unified vision of Democritus' ethical 
thought that all researchers accept as authoritative.  The earliest modern researchers do 
not address the relationship between early atomist ethics and physics directly: they are 
more interested in deciding which fragments extant are genuine and then assigning these 
to titles in the Democritean oeuvre that seem most likely to trace their origin back to the 
atomist.1  Though it offers valuable insights,2 their work manifests a strong tendency to 
1 E.g. Lortzing (1873), Hirzel (1879).  Hirzel anticipates the position taken by Warren (2002), in which 
early atomist ethics and physics are loosely (but uncritically and undefinably) related.  
2 Hirzel (1879) remains a cogent, thorough guide to the relationship between Seneca's De tranquillitate 
and Democritus' Περὶ εὐθυμίης.  The general tenor of his research (which notices marked similarities 
between the moral outlook of Seneca and that of Democritus) appears vindicated in later work: see 
Stewart (1958), which offers evidence for the possibility that Seneca's borrowings from Democritus 
owe something to Cynic middle-men.
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obscure any original coherence between early atomist physics and ethics, since they are 
determined to attribute every saying of Democritus to a single title represented in the 
doxography: any saying that appears physical they derive from a single Democritean 
work assumed to treat physics (e.g. one of the books Thrasyllus lists among τὰ φυσικά), 
while all sayings deemed ethical they derive from attested ethical titles (e.g. the books 
that Thrasyllus catalogues among τὰ ἠθικά).3  The naïve partition that results between 
physical and ethical doctrines through this method is belied by the information gathered 
in the preceding chapters, which show that Democritus' ideas about ethics and physics 
cohere together very well as extant, even if we cannot point with definitive certainty 
toward any single tome in his vanished oeuvre as a source for all of them (though the best 
candidate for such an epitome of early atomism is probably the Μικρὸς διάκοσμος, which 
Thrasyllus names a physical work).  
Later researchers have grappled explicitly with the relationship between early 
atomist physics and ethics.  Some of them look into the Democritean ethical fragments 
and see coherence with early atomist physics (and I agree with this general conclusion, 
although they do not arrive at it the way I do).4  Others do not (and I appreciate their 
reluctance, given that the case for unity in Democritean thought has not been argued in 
the best way possible, a situation that this study seeks to remedy).5  Some say that there is 
no hope of coming down firmly on one side or the other (and while I acknowledge that 
3 Diog. 9. 46-47 = fr. cxv Luria.
4 E.g. Natorp (1893), Reinhardt (1912), Uxkull-Gyllenband (1924), Vlastos (1945, 1946), Mugler 
(1959), Luria (1964), Cole (1967), Sassi (1978), Mueller (1980), Thrams (1986), Warren (2002).   
5 E.g. Dyroff (1899), Zeller (1919-1923), Bailey (1928), Alfieri (1936), Stella (1942), Mesiano (1951), 
Taylor (1967, 1999, 2007).
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the divergence among published opinions makes this a viable judgement, I do not agree 
that our evidence favors both sides of the discussion equally: to me it seems demonstrable 
that Democritus most likely treated physics and ethics as part and parcel of the same 
overarching worldview—the early atomist διάκοσμος whose foundations I have set forth 
in the preceding chapters).6  All approaches to date that I am aware of have missed the 
existence and significance of the Critical διάκοσμος, which emerges as the chief 
contribution of this study.  Why?  If the perspective adopted by this study is correct (as I 
believe), why should it escape the notice of scholarship for so long (with more than a 
century separating my work from that of pioneers like Natorp and Dyroff)?  The most 
likely answer to this question that I can find lies in the past, specifically in atomism as it 
was re-imagined by Epicurus and/or his followers (though they do not appear to be solely 
responsible, as we will see).
Epicurus (341-270 BCE) borrowed much of his atomist outlook on the world from 
Democritus,7 but he also added various innovations of his own (e.g. the perspective on 
language that sees a natural connection inherent between word and referent where 
Democritus sees only an accidental one8).  The most famous of Epicurus' innovations is 
6 Thus Warren (2002), who decides to treat Democritean ethics and physics as loosely coherent without 
attempting to define their relationship dogmatically.  Others—e.g. Colvin (1974), Procopé (1989, 
1990), Lanzillota (2001)—avoid the problem by dealing solely with the ethical fragments, leaving the 
physics entirely out of their scholarship.  As a practical way to study the ethics without getting bogged 
down in arguments over how the physics might or might not be involved, this approach has proven 
quite useful.  Still, it obscures the ancient message of the fragments, importing alien discontinuities 
between physics and ethics into the seamless unity between these two that is characteristic of the 
Critical διάκοσμος (as we see clearly in chapters 1-2 above).  
7 We have already encountered the famous judgement of Cicero, that Democritus was vir magnus in 
primis cuius fontibus Epicurus hortulos suos inrigavit (De nat. deor. 1.43.120 = Democritus, fr. xcvii 
Luria, fr. 172c Taylor, fr. A74 DK).  This judgement is corroborated abundantly in the historical record: 
see frr. xcv-cvi Luria.
8 See pages 254-264 above.  This difference between Epicurus and Democritus is particularly interesting 
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undoubtedly the swerve, an addition to traditional atomist physics whose function was to 
make indeterminacy a formal, explicit part of the atomist worldview (at its most 
fundamental level: where Leucippus and Democritus build the multiverse from atoms, 
void, and necessity, Epicurus ends up building it from atoms, void, and the swerve).  It is 
unfortunate that no explicit explanation of the swerve survives in the extant fragments of 
Epicurus' written oeuvre.9  Nevertheless, his ancient students offer valuable insight into 
what their master accomplished with the swerve, insight that tallies well with what little 
remains of Epicurus' own words close to this subject.  Consider the following exempla:
TEXT (text) TRANSLATION (translator)
(a) οὐ γὰρ ἀθροισμὸν δεῖ μόνον γενέσθαι 
οὐδὲ  δῖνον  ἐν  ὧι  ἐνδέχεται  κόσμον 
γίνεσθαι  κενῶι  κατὰ  τὸ  δοξαζόμενον  ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης,  αὔξεσθαί  τε,  ἕως  ἂν  ἑτέρωι 
προσκούσηι,  καθάπερ  τῶν  φυσικῶν 
καλουμενῶν  φησί  τις.  τοῦτο  γὰρ  μαχό-
μενόν  ἐστι  τοῖς  φαινομένοις. (Bailey  
[1926])
Denn  es  genügt  nicht  nur,  daß  eine 
Ansammlung  stattfindet  oder  einfach  ein 
Wirbel  im  Leeren,  in  welchem  dann  ein 
Kosmos ensteht auf Grund von Notwendig-
keit, wie man meint, und in dem er wächst, 
bis er mit einem anderen zusammstöße, wie 
einer  der  sogenannten  Naturphilosophen 
meint.  Denn  dies  widersprucht  den  Phä-
nomenen. (Gigon) 
Epicur. Epist. 2.90
in light of the discussion that follows in this section.  Even though Epicurus appears below (e.g. in the 
writings of Diogenes Oenoandensis cited infra) as the champion of indeterminism against Democritean 
determinism, his perspective on language is more deterministic than that of his predecessor.  This is 
just another clue that those who paint Democritus as a hard determinist miss something important in his 
work. Why would the early atomist make the connection between word and referent arbitrary and 
accidental if he didn't believe in the possibility of arbitrary, accidental events (as part of nature or 
necessity)? Readers like Diogenes Oenoandensis (and Epicurus, to the extent that Diogenes accurately 
reflects his viewpoint) have to make Democritus an absent-minded idiot—thus Barnes (1982, 535)—in 
order to reconcile his supposed denial of all indeterminacy (as a physicist) with his persistent, attested 
affirmation of indeterminacy (as a linguist, a biologist, a cultural historian, and a moralist). 
9 Time has been kinder to the writings of Epicurus than those of Democritus, but even so the larger part 
of the later atomist's extensive oeuvre has perished.
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(b1) [τὰ  δ]ὲ̣ [πρῶτα  σώματα,  ἃ  κ]α̣ὶ 
στοι[χεῖα  προ]σαγορ̣[ε]ύεται,  ἐξ  ἀρ[χης] 
μ̣ὲν  ὑφεστηκότα  [καὶ  ὄ]ντα  ἄφθαρτα, 
γεννῶν[τα δὲ]  τὰ πράγματα,  τίνα  [ἐστί]ν, 
πα̣ραθήσομεν προ[διαλ]υ̣σάμενοι τὰς  ἑτέ-
[ρων] δ̣όξας … Δημόκριτος δὲ ὁ Ἀβδηρείτης 
εἶπε μὲν ἀτόμους φύσεις, καλῶς γε ποιῶν· 
ἐπεὶ  δὲ  περὶ  αὐτῶν ἐσφάλη τινά,  ἐν  ταῖς 
ἡμετέραις  δόξαις  ἐπισκεφθήσεται.  (Smith  
[1993])
And  we  will  explain  the  nature  of  those 
entities  which  are  called  the  elements  of 
things,  existing  as  they  do  from  the 
beginning and being indestructible and yet 
productive  of  things;  but  first  we  will 
dispose  of  the  opinions  of  others   … 
Democritus of Abdera did well to speak of 
'indivisible  natures',  but  since  he  went 
wrong  about  them  in  certain  respects  he 
will  be  considered  among  our  opinions. 
(Chilton) 
Diog. Oenoand. fr. 6, coll. 1-3 Smith
     = fr. 5, coll. 1-3 Chilton
(b2) ἐσφάλη  δ'  ἀνα̣ξίως  ἑαυτοῦ  καὶ 
Δημόκριτος,  τὰς  ἀτόμους  μόνα̣ς  κατ' 
ἀλήθειαν εἰπὼν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι, τὰ 
δὲ λοιπὰ ν̣ομιστὶ ἅπαντα. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν σὸν 
λόγον, ὦ Δημόκριτε, οὐχ ὅπως τὸ ἀληθὲς 
εὑρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ζῆν δυνησόμεθα, μήτε τὸ̣ 
π̣ῦρ φυλαττόμενοι [μήτε τ]ὴν σφαγὴν μήτ' 
[ἄλλην τινὰ δύνα]μι[ν] (Smith [1993])
But  Democritus  also made a  mistake  un-
worthy of himself when he said that only 
the atoms really exist in objects, all the rest 
merely existing by convention.  For accor-
ding  to  your  argument,  Democritus,  far 
from  discovering  the  truth  we  shall  not 
even be able to live, being unable to guard 
ourselves either against fire or slaughter or 
… (Chilton) 
Diog. Oenoand. fr. 7, coll. 2-3 Smith
     = fr. 6, coll. 2-3 Chilton
(b3) ἂν  γὰ̣[ρ]  τῶι  Δη̣μο̣κρίτο̣υ  τις̣ χ[ρ]ή-
σηται  λόγωι,  μηδε̣μ̣ίαν  μὲν  ἐ̣λευθέ̣ραν 
[φ]άσκων ταῖς ἀτόμ[οι]ς κείνησιν εἶναι διὰ
τὴν  πρὸς  ἀλλήλας  σύ[ν]κρουσιν  αὐτῶν, 
ἔνθ̣ε̣ν  δὲ  φαίνεσθαι  κατ[η]ν̣ανκασμένως 
πά̣[ν]τ̣α κεινεῖσθαι, φή[σομ]ε̣ν πρὸς αὐτόν, 
ὡ̣[ς  «οὐκ]  οἶδας,  ὅστις  ποτὲ  εἶ,  καὶ 
ἐλευθέραν  τιν̣ὰ̣ ἐν  ταῖς  ἀτόμοις  κείνησιν 
εἶναι,  ἣ[ν]  Δημόκριτος  μὲν  οὐχ  εὗρεν, 
Ἐπίκουρος  δὲ  εἰς  φῶς̣ ἤγαγεν,  παρεν-
κλιτικὴν  ὑπάρχουσαν̣,  ὡς  ἐκ  τῶν 
φαινομένων  δείκνυσιν;» τὸ  δὲ  μέ̣γ̣ιστον: 
πιστευθείσης γὰρ εἱμαρμένης αἴρεται π̣ᾶ̣σ̣α 
If  someone  makes  use  of  the  theory  of 
Democritus,  saying  that  there  is  no  free 
movement  for  the atoms because  of  their 
collisions with one another, from which it 
is  clear  that  all  things  are  moved  by 
necessity, we shall say to him, 'Do you not 
know, whoever you may be, that there is a 
kind of free movement in the atoms, which 
Democritus  did  not  discover  but  which 
Epicurus  brought  to  light,  an  inherent 
swerve, as he shows from the phenomena? 
The most important point is this: if destiny 
is believed in, all admonition and rebuke is 
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νουθεσ̣[ί]α  καὶ  ἐπιτείμησις  καὶ  τοὺς 
πονηροὺς [ἔξεστι δικαίως κολάζειν] (Smith  
[1993])
done away with, and not even evil-doers … 
(Chilton) 
Diog. Oenoand. fr. 54, coll. 2-3 Smith
     = fr. 32, coll. 2-3 Chilton
(c1) corpora  cum  deorsum  rectum  per  
inane  feruntur  /  ponderibus  propriis,  
incerto  tempore  ferme  /  incertisque  locis  
spatio  depellere  paulum,   /  tantum  quod  
momen mutatum dicere possis. / quod nisi  
declinare  solerent,  omnia  deorsum,  /  
imbris  uti  guttae,  caderent  per  inane  
profundum, / nec foret offensus natus nec  
plaga creata /  principiis:  ita  nil  umquam 
natura creasset.  (Bailey) 
When  the  atoms  are  being  drawn  down-
ward through the void by their property of 
weight,  at  absolutely  unpredictable  times 
and places they deflect slightly from their 
straight  course,  to  a  degree that  could be 
described as no more than a shift of move-
ment.  If they were not apt to swerve, all 
would  fall  downward  through  the  un-
fathomable  void  like  drops  of  rain;  no 
collisions between primary elements would 
occur,  and  no  blows  would  be  effected, 
with  the  result  that  nature  would  never 
have created anything. (Smith [1969])  
Lucr. 2.216-224    
(c2)  denique  si  semper  motus  conectitur  
omnis  /  et  vetere exoritur  <motu> novus  
ordine  certo  /  nec  declinando  faciunt  
primordia  motus  /  principium  quoddam 
quod fati  foedera rumpat, /  ex infinito ne  
causam causa sequatur, / libera per terras  
unde  haec  animantibus  exstat,  unde  est  
haec,  inquam, fatis  avulsa voluntas  /  per  
quam  progredimur  quo  ducit  quemque  
voluntas,  /  declinamus  item  motus  nec  
tempore certo / nec regione loci certa, sed  
ubi ipsa tulit mens?  (Bailey)
Moreover, if all movements are invariably 
interlinked,  if  new movement  arises  from 
the old in unalterable succession, if there is 
no atomic swerve to initiate movement that 
can  annul  the  decrees  of  destiny  and 
prevent the existence of an endless chain of 
causation,  what  is  the  source  of  this  free 
will possessed by living creatures all over 
the earth? What, I ask, is the source of this 
power of will wrested from destiny, which 
enables  each  of  us  to  advance  where 
pleasure  leads  us,  and  to  alter  our 
movements not at a fixed time or place, but 
at the direction of our own minds?  (Smith  
[1969])  
Lucr. 2.251-260 
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(c3)  quare  in  seminibus  quoque  idem 
fateare  necessest,  /  esse  aliam  praeter  
plagas et pondera causam / motibus, unde  
haec  est  nobis  innata  potestas,  /  de  nilo  
quoniam fieri nihil posse videmus. / pondus  
enim  prohibet  ne  plagis  omnia  fiant  /  
externa  quasi  vi.  sed  ne  mens  ipsa  
necessum  /  intestinum  habeat  cunctis  in  
rebus  agendis  /  et  devicta  quasi  cogatur  
ferre patique, / id facit exiguum clinamen  
principiorum / nec regione loci certa nec  
tempore certo.  (Bailey) 
Thus you are obliged to acknowledge that 
the seeds have the same ability,  and that, 
besides  blows  and  weight,  they  have 
another  cause  of  motion  from which  this 
innate power of ours is derived, since we 
see that nothing can come into being from 
nothing. Weight ensures that all movements 
are not caused by blows, that is to say by 
external force. But the factor that saves the 
mind itself from being governed in all its 
actions by an internal necessity, and from 
being constrained to submit passively to its 
domination,  is  the  minute  swerve  of  the 
atoms  at  unpredictable  places  and  times. 
(Smith [1969])  
Lucr. 2.284-293  
 
Epicurus appears on record disagreeing explicitly with an unnamed Critical thinker10 who 
explains our world as the result of a material vortex occurring in the void according to 
necessity (οὐ γὰρ ἀθροισμὸν δεῖ μόνον γενέσθαι οὐδὲ δῖνον ἐν ὧι ἐνδέχεται κόσμον 
γίνεσθαι κενῶι κατὰ τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἐξ ἀνάγκης [a]).  The obvious target for Epicurus' 
disapproval here is Democritus (see chapter 2), as other scholars have recognized,11 and 
the bone that Epicurus picks with him is that his explanation of the κόσμος is at odds with 
certain φαινόμενα (a).  Since Epicurus is an atomist, these φαινόμενα are presumably 
material events whose occurrence cannot be explained solely (μόνον) as resulting from 
atoms and void reacting according to necessity (ἀνάγκη).  In other words, the early 
10 καθάπερ τῶν φυσικῶν καλουμενῶν φησί τις (a).  Like Aristotle (e.g. De resp. 4.471b30; Metaph. 
986b14, 1005a34), Epicurus refers to Critical thinkers as φυσικοί (though he begrudges them that title, 
since he finds their idea of φύσις to be at odds with empirical reality, the φαινόμενα against which he 
sees them fighting).  They explain nature unnaturally, by ignoring integral manifestations of it.
11 E.g. Bailey (1926), 285.  Democritus is the most prolific author on record defending a Critical world-
view like the one that Epicurus finds deficient, and his atomist narrative is the one that Epicurus ends 
up adopting and correcting to tell his own story of the natural order and mankind's place in it.
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atomist idea that worlds arise from atoms, void, and necessity is incomplete.  Some other 
ingredient has to be added to the right-thinking atomist's recipe for producing a κόσμος 
like the one we observe around us.  What is that ingredient?  
Judging from the testimony of Epicureans like Diogenes Oenoandensis and 
Lucretius,12 Epicurus thinks that it is the random swerve of individual atoms: ἐλεύθερα 
τὶς ἐν ταῖς ἀτόμοις κείνησις (b3); exiguum clinamen principiorum, nec regione loci certa 
nec tempore certo (c3).  The φαινόμενα saved by this swerve are moral choices, acts of 
human and animal will that show inherent indeterminacy13—unpredictable variability that 
Epicurus apparently found lacking in the worldview(s) of his predecessors.  In brief, 
Epicurus indicts Democritus as an exponent of what this study calls rigid determinism.14  
From Epicurus' point of view, Democritus becomes complicit in an important mistake.  
Either he himself imagines the world as a place defined minutely and absolutely by rigid 
determinism, or at the very least he misleads others—τις in (b3)—so that they imagine it 
this way.15  Either way, the Democritean διάκοσμος becomes an unrealistic and immoral 
12 Another relatively early and informative witness worth mentioning is Cicero, who refers to the swerve 
as declinatio atomorum in De nat. deor. 1.25.69: Epicurus … invenit quomodo necessitatem effugeret, 
quod videlicet Democritum fugerat: ait atomum cum pondere et gravitate directo deorsus feratur, 
declinare paululum. Sola declinatione atomorum liberam voluntatem servari dicit (Epicurus, fr. 281 
Usener; Democritus, fr. 38 Luria).  See also the quotation from De fato that appears on page 297.
13 πιστευθείσης γὰρ εἱμαρμένης αἴρεται π̣ᾶ̣σ̣α νουθεσ̣[ί]α καὶ ἐπιτείμησις καὶ οὐ̣δ̣ὲ τοῦ πονηροὺς [ἔξεστι 
δικαίως κολάζειν] (b3 );  unde est haec, inquam, fatis avulsa voluntas / per quam progredimur quo ducit 
quemque voluntas, / declinamus item motus nec tempore certo / nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit 
mens? (c2).  We observe moral behavior to be free (thus Lucretius), and if it were not, then there would 
be no point in rewarding or punishing it (thus Diogenes).  For the fact that acts of animal voluntas are 
included in the Epicurean formulation, see Lucr. 2.263-276.  
14 See page 121 above.  The position of Democritus or foolish Democriteans as understood by Epicurus 
looks something like this: every atomic movement occurs as the inevitable, invariable result of 
previous atomic movements, meaning that every event in the history of the world is inevitable and 
invariable: it could never happen otherwise than it does. 
15 Close reading of the fragments of Epicurus' masterwork Περὶ φύσεως suggests that his immediate 
quarrel was not with Democritus directly (meaning that he did not necessarily reduce his predecessor to 
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place, a prison in which living beings find their moral agency blocked at every juncture 
by the chain of an inexorable, invariable material destiny—foedera fati in (c2)—until 
Epicurus invents the swerve to release them (and make the atomist worldview reflect 
φαινόμενα as they actually exist).16  
Diogenes Oenoandensis makes the Epicurean case against early atomism 
especially clear.  According to him, the student of Democritus cannot think of changing 
any kind of moral behavior, since his naively deterministic outlook on the world denies 
the existence of the indefinite variability that makes moral choices possible.  He must 
burn himself or be killed (b2), if that is his material destiny, and criminals must commit 
their crimes, as that is theirs (b3).  No amount of experience or learning will ever set the 
unfortunate pupil of Diogenes' idiotic Democritus free from the mistakes that his atoms 
are bound to make.  If Diogenes is right, then Democritus should have written no ethical 
instructions at all: his physics make ethics utterly pointless (since they can never help us 
do anything that we are not already going to do anyway, given that we are absolutely 
predetermined by the fixed and invariable series of atomic collisions that have occurred 
and will occur throughout the history of our κόσμος).  While it is certainly possible that 
the rigid determinist straw man portrayed by Diogenes in [b] here) but with some student(s) of the 
early atomist's thought.  See Sedley in Macchiarolli (1983), 30-40.  That said, Epicurus does not appear 
to have admired the early atomist much: he is remembered to have called him Ληρόκριτος, “nonsense-
judger” (Diog. 10.8).  This study challenges the rhetorical position taken by Epicurus (and his 
followers modern and ancient) by noting that it was not the original position of Democritus, that we 
have enough information now about the rhetorical environment of the early atomist to create a more 
sympathetic (and more coherent) portrait of him (and the relationship between material necessity and 
human moral freedom as he imagined it) than Epicureanism permits.       
16 The swerve thus becomes the engine driving the Epicurean narrative of origin and development, 
playing the decisive cosmogonic role that the early atomists assigned to necessity: quod nisi declinare 
solerent, omnia deorsum, / imbris uti guttae, caderent per inane profundum, / nec foret offensus natus 
nec plaga creata / principiis: ita nil umquam natura creasset (c1).
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some ancient people may have understood Democritus to be in truth the rigid determinist 
fool that Diogenes derides, this study has argued vigorously against accepting this 
reductive, polemical caricature uncritically as an accurate portrait.  As a supplement to 
the arguments already offered,17 I append here a few significant comments from a non-
partisan ancient source familiar (at least to some extent) with the published work of both 
Democritus and Epicurus:
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (my translations)
Hanc  Epicurus  rationem  (sc.  τὴν  παρέγ-
κλισιν)  induxit  ob eam rem, quod veritus  
est, ne, si semper atomus gravitate ferretur  
naturali ac necessaria, nihil liberum nobis  
esset,  cum  ita  moveretur  animus,  ut  
atomorum motu cogeretur. Id Democritus,  
auctor atomorum, accipere maluit,  neces-
sitate  omnia  fieri,  quam  a  corporibus  
individuis naturalis motus avellere. 
Epicurus introduced this idea (the swerve) 
for the following reason: he feared that if 
the atom were carried about always by its 
natural and necessary weight, there would 
be no freedom left for us, since our mind 
would  be  moved as  the  motion  of  atoms 
forced  it.  Democritus,  the  inventor  of 
atoms,  preferred  to  accept  that  all  things 
happen  because  of  necessity  rather  than 
strip natural motions away from individual 
material bodies.
Democritus, fr. 38 Luria
     = fr. 74b Taylor     
     = Epicurus, fr. 281 Usener
Cic. De fato 23
ideo enim ille summum bonum εὐθυμίαν et  
saepe  ἀθαμβίαν appellat,  id  est  animum 
terrore  liberum.  Sed  haec  etsi  praeclare,  
nondum  tamen  perpolita;  pauca  enim  
neque ea ipsa enucleate ab hoc de virtute  
quidem dicta.
Therefore  Democritus calls  the  greatest 
good  'contentment'  and  often  calls  it 
'absence of perturbation',  meaning a mind 
free from dread.  But even if he puts things 
brilliantly, nevertheless he does not polish 
them thoroughly, for indeed we have only a 
few words from him about virtue, and these 
are not uttered plainly. 
Democritus, fr. A169 DK
17 See chapter 2.2.1-2 above.
297
     = fr. 188a Taylor
     = fr. 741 Luria
Cic. De fin. 5.29.87-88
In Cicero's eyes,18 the difference between Epicurus and Democritus is rhetorical: trying to 
explain the same phenomena—the recursive cycles of physical life as manifest in the 
turning of the heavens and life-cycles of biological organisms—Epicurus constructs a 
narrative out of words like liberum, where Democritus prefers to speak of necessitas.  
Neither one denies the reality of actual experience.  Democritus does not necessarily 
imagine that every movement in the universe is minutely determined (to the same precise 
degree, regardless of time and circumstance).  Peering at the coming and going of matter 
in his environment—its alterations, transformations, and transmutations—he chooses a 
word like order to describe it, whereas Epicurus, coming later and from a very different 
rhetorical perspective, prefers something closer to chaos.  Then, when the early atomist 
comes to describe the shape humanity finds in the order of matter, he speaks brilliantly, 
briefly, and enigmatically, where (to judge from testimonia) his successor appears to have 
been dull, prolix, and pedantic (laboring to clarify explicitly, in exhaustive detail, the sort 
of moral message that Democritus is content to leave implicit).  
Cicero's commentary points to a very important insight that has been too long 
overlooked.  The messages produced by either atomist, Democritus or Epicurus, are 
18 While some scholars might read Cicero to indicate here that the naturales motus of Democritus' atoms 
amount to rigid determinism, I do not.  For reasons given in chapter 2.2.1-2 above, where I discuss the 
early atomist doctrine of material necessity as it appears throughout the historical record, I find it very 
unlikely that Democritus was a rigid determinist.  Even if Cicero's text can be construed as affirming 
that he interpreted the atomist as a rigid determinist (a construction of Cicero's meaning that I would 
contest), this would not destroy my argument to the contrary in chapters 1-3 above, an argument which 
relies on more than just one brief (and somewhat ambiguous) comment from Cicero.
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shaped by their rhetorical environment—the historical context in which they come to 
exist originally as something relevant and coherent. (i) Democritus speaks of indefinite, 
non-linear order because that is the language of the Critical Tradition: Critical thinkers 
present the διάκοσμος broadly as order, even as they recognize its inherent irregularities 
(later canonized by Epicurus as the swerve).  Democritus' ethics appear brilliant, brief, 
and enigmatic because they come out of the same tradition that gives us Anaximander, 
Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Empedocles (to say nothing of Pythagoras).  (ii) Meanwhile, 
Epicurus speaks of definite, linear chaos because his rhetorical environment is very 
different from that of Democritus.  The Critical Tradition is not determinist in the strict 
sense: it does not separate moral freedom from material necessity absolutely and then 
deliberately prefer the latter.  Nevertheless, by Epicurus' day Critical authorities are 
invoked as rigid determinists, advocates for material necessity against moral freedom.  
This fact explains the cylinder of Chrysippus (who must tame the rigid determinism now 
associated with Heraclitus)19 and the swerve of Epicurus (who distances himself from the 
rigid determinist caricature of Democritus ridiculed by Diogenes Oenoandensis).  As for 
Epicurus' ethics, they appear dull, prolix, and pedantic (especially when compared with 
ethical thought in the Critical Tradition) because these are the rhetorical qualities needed 
to compete on a level footing against Stoics, Peripatetics, and other newcomers vying for 
public favor.  These historical observations seem obvious, and yet modern scholarship 
19 Cic. De fat. 42-43, Gell. Noct. Att. 7.2.11 = frr. 62C.8-9, 62D.4 in Long & Sedley (1987).  Just like the 
Epicurean swerve, the Stoic cylinder invented by Chrysippus represents a linear, definite kind of chaos 
created to defeat the ghost of hard determinism that haunts the Critical Tradition after its heyday, as 
later thinkers, more linear and definitive in their outlook, learn to mistrust (and misinterpret) the non-
linear rhetoric that their Critical predecessors use to describe (rather than define) indefinite order.   
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has persistently failed to distinguish Democritus the Critical thinker (who understands 
that every natural order involves some irregular variability and sees human ἔθος arising 
naturally out of material φύσις) from Democritus the Epicurean straw man (whose rigid 
determinist approach to φύσις makes any meaningful relationship between it and human 
ἔθος impossible).
The chief reason for the blindness of modern scholarship is historical, and quite 
forgivable: the entire Critical Tradition, Democritus included, survives only in scattered 
bits and pieces.  Confronted with these remnants, the first task of scholarship was not to 
rush to a premature synthesis incorporating them all: instead, the first scholars put a great 
deal of necessary effort into identifying and classifying different testimonia relating to 
individual authors.  Because the Critical Tradition contains a wide variety of disparate 
thought, imperfectly preserved, it is only recently that people have begun to talk 
meaningfully about the overarching similarities between its individual exponents that 
make it recognizably coherent as a unitary historical phenomenon (e.g. the likenesses 
between “Ionian” and “Italian” cosmogonies discussed in chapter 1 of this study).20  
Meanwhile, thanks to the hard work of the first modern scholars in this field, the 
fragments of Democritus have been extant in relative abundance (compared to other 
authors in the Critical tradition), demanding some kind of explanation.  Lacking the 
20 E.g. Vlastos (1945, 1946), Sassi (1978), Naddaf (2005), Drozdek (2007).  Contrast this sort of work 
with earlier synoptic treatments, e.g. the work of Diels (1879) or Zeller (1919-1923), which consider 
the Critical Tradition as competing individuals and schools (a perfectly valid perspective) and focus 
most productively on the differences that drive them apart rather than the similarities that bring them 
together.  When the early moderns attempt to synthesize, they usually end up oversimplifying; their 
most useful insights atomize the Critical Tradition, individuating its exponents.  This early trend toward 
atomization is turning now, as more useful syntheses become possible—syntheses that draw historical 
verisimilitude from the atomistic work of the early pioneers like Diels.  
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resources required to approach Democritus from the historical perspective taken by this 
study, earlier researchers necessarily confronted him from different historical outlooks.  
Inevitably, they approached him first as he appeared in the ancient sources that they 
already possessed intact, particularly Epicurean authors (whom historical accident has 
made the only really sympathetic standard-bearers for ancient atomism in the West).  
Thus, already in Natorp (1893), Democritus is presented primarily as a forerunner of later 
thinkers: where his ideas go matters more (because it is easier to see) than where they 
come from.  Given this modern rhetorical bias in favor of telling the story most readily 
evident, it was inevitable that somebody make Democritus into the idiot derided by 
Diogenes Oenoandensis—a naïve fool who preaches rigid determinism (physics) and 
moral freedom (ethics) without noticing that they conflict, thereby giving the latecomer 
Epicurus a perfect rhetorical entrance onto the stage of ancient public life.  
This Epicurean misreading of the early atomist is not entirely unattractive, 
particularly if we are ignorant of the Critical Tradition: it locates Democritus in a well-
known ancient story, providing ready answers to obvious questions.  Why don't the ethics 
and the physics of Democritus agree neatly and clearly with one another in the fragments 
extant?  Why did Epicurus feel a need to set pen to paper (and at such great length), if 
Democritus had already published adequate, authoritative expositions of the atomist 
worldview?  This study has offered some answers to these questions (in this chapter and 
in chapter 2.2.1), but my views are certainly not the only ones that make sense.  Why 
assume that Epicurus and/or the rigid determinists against whom he and his partisans 
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argue misunderstand a source that they may know better (in more complete and coherent 
form) than we do?  Lacking the background of a coherent Critical Tradition, almost all 
modern scholars who interpret the relationship between early atomist ethics and physics 
readily fall into the habit of interpreting Democritus as Epicureans.  Thus, the tradition of 
modern scholarship tracing its lineage to Dyroff (1899)21 discovers that Democritus treats 
physics and ethics schizophrenically, approaching material φύσις as a rigid determinist 
and human ἔθος as a champion of moral freedom—a blatant contradiction that practically 
demands the advent of an Epicurus22—while the tradition tracing its lineage to Natorp 
(1893)23 advances non-schizophrenic readings of the relationship between early atomist 
φύσις and ἔθος that collapse into incoherence whenever their opponents point out that 
they have ignored the unbridgeable chasm between strict physical determinism and moral 
freedom.  In this situation, the real insights that partisans on both sides have into the 
original Democritus inevitably get obscured.
An exemplary instance of the unhelpful Epicureanism in modern scholarship is 
the recent conversation that took place between Vlastos (1945, 1946, 1975) and Taylor 
(1967, 1999).  It began when Vlastos discovered a strong physical subtext underpinning 
Democritus' ethical characterization of εὐθυμία.  This insight remains valuable (and real: 
the ethical fragments frequently speak in ways that complement the physical ones, as we 
21 See note 5 above.
22 Mesiano (1951) offers an especially clear instance of this unfortunate trend in modern scholarship.  
After documenting in great detail the reality that Democritean ethics presume the existence and 
viability of moral will in animal life, he concludes, like a good Epicurean, that this is utterly 
incompatible with Democritean physics (presumed to be strictly deterministic): “la contraddizione tra 
la sua concezione filosofica generale e la sua etica rimane innegabile” (135).
23 See note 4 above.
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have already seen in this study).  Unfortunately, Vlastos phrased his discovery as an 
Epicurean would, in terms that make the early atomist sound like a rigid determinist.24  
Taylor came to Democritus' defense, correctly pointing out that the early atomist's ethics 
give the lie to rigid determinism.  Taylor exonerated Democritus the ethicist of being a 
naïvely rigid determinist, but did so at the expense of denying the real insights that 
Vlastos uncovered—and he did nothing to unseat the Epicurean lie that early atomist 
physics embrace rigid determinism,25 which Vlastos also left intact.  What Vlastos 
stumbled upon was not a schizophrenic using words to mean one thing in physical works 
and another thing in ethical ones—i.e. the Democritus you will still see most clearly in 
Barnes (1982) and Taylor (1999)26—but a typical Critical thinker integrating physics 
(including animal biology and psychology) with ethics.  This study affirms both Vlastos 
(Democritus builds ethics from physics) and Taylor (Democritus does not write ethics as 
a rigid determinist) in this particular quarrel—a feat that it achieves because it discovers 
a legitimate rhetorical position from which to cast doubt on the implicit Epicureanism 
(Democritean physics are characterized by rigid determinism) that still bedevils modern 
attempts to understand Democritus.27  
24 Correctly noting that Democritus defines human health and happiness in terms of κρῆσις (the proper 
mixture of atoms and void, in the language of the early atomists), Vlastos does not go on to show how 
the Critical conception of κρῆσις differs from rigid determinism.  His 1975 republication does nothing 
to address Taylor (1967) at all.
25 Stella (1942), Mesiano (1951), and Taylor are all right when they observe that the ethical fragments of 
Democritus do not reveal rigid determinism: what they do not realize is that this kind of determinism is 
lacking from the physical fragments as well, until later readers (notably Epicureans) discover it there.
26 In his later work, Taylor (2007) continues to read Democritus schizophrenically, separating physical 
νόμος unnaturally from ethical, as though the word should have one meaning in early atomist ethics 
and another in early atomist physics (1-9).  In fact, as this chapter will show, Democritus uses the word 
consistently throughout his extant corpus: the paradox that Taylor (2007) finds in the agreement 
between Democritean νόμος and φύσις is not really a paradox at all. 
27 Others have pioneered the way here, noticing the coherence between Democritean ethics and physics 
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Whether this Epicureanism originates simply with Epicurus or not—as Sedley 
(1983) gives us some reason to doubt that it does28—is ultimately irrelevant.  The take-
away message from this section is that Democritus approaches the world from a 
rhetorical outlook in which there is no obvious dichotomy between material necessity and 
moral freedom.  The opposition of these two abstractions arises after him, as a later 
historical reaction to work like his.  Interesting as this opposition may be from certain 
historical standpoints, it will not be part of Democritus' work as he composed it: it will 
not give us clear insight into the original διάκοσμος imagined by the early atomists.  The 
task of the modern reader of the fragments is to see the sense of Democritus where later 
generations see only the nonsense of Epicurus.  Today, thanks to the work of many 
scholars who have enabled us to investigate and understand the Critical Tradition, this is 
more possible than it has ever been (at least since the original works of Democritus were 
lost to history).  It is my contention that that Tradition offers the best available lens 
through which to view the early atomists' world-building project.  It is not the only lens, 
and there will always be others that offer valuable information, but when it comes to 
deciphering the message(s) originally encoded in the fragments of Democritus, it seems 
clear to me that the most useful comparanda will always be texts and/or pieces of texts 
that come from the historical milieux closest (chronologically and ideologically) to the 
and attempting to make sense of it (see note 4 above), but my study is the first that explains the entire 
early atomist corpus, physics and ethics, as a legacy of the Critical Tradition.  Though Vlastos (1946, 
63-64) anticipates me in acknowledging the existence of what this study calls the Critical Tradition, his 
position fails to recognize the fact that early atomism (like the Critical Tradition) does not explicitly 
embrace hard determinism.  It would not be wrong to regard my study as the Natorpian answer that 
Dyroffian Taylor (1999) expected (in vain) from Vlastos.   
28 See note 15 above.
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early atomist and sound most like him (as he remains extant).  That other scholars have 
missed this approach is not surprising (many of them did their work in a world where it 
was still practically impossible) and does not make their work useless, just incomplete 
(particularly if your goal is to understand the original meaning of early atomism).29
I prefer integration to schizophrenia when it comes to interpreting Democritus, 
favoring Natorp and his followers (particularly Vlastos30) over Dyroff and his, while 
recognizing that both schools offer valuable insights, insights that hitherto fail to coincide 
in objective consensus because everyone ignores the Critical Tradition and rather naively 
reads Epicurean polemics against Democritus as substantially accurate representations of 
early atomist physics as its originators imagined it.  If I succeed in my aim here, the 
impasse between Natorpian and Dyroffian positions will dissipate (and maybe even 
disappear) in future,31 as scholars become more familiar with Democritus (as extant in all 
his fragments, not just a few famous ones) and with his historical milieu (as distinct from 
later milieux in which his work held different significance, including the milieux of 
Epicurus and his followers).
29 This judgement holds true for modern approaches to Democritean ethics that simply ignore the physics 
(and rigid determinism), as well—e.g. Colvin (1974), Procopé (1989, 1990), Lanzillota (2007).  Useful 
as these approaches unquestionably are, they nevertheless studiously avoid confronting the obvious 
clues followed by researchers like Vlastos and Sassi (1978), ceding the field to the Epicureans where it 
does not need to be ceded (any longer). 
30 It would not be wrong to see me as playing Epicurus to Vlastos' Democritus, confirming and clarifying 
at pedantic length the insights that Vlastos expressed briefly (and problematically, since he left the 
early atomist unduly vulnerable to being characterized as a rigid determinist and/or a schizophrenic).
31 The compromising position adopted by Warren (2002)—that there is insufficient textual evidence to 
decide the question in favor of Natorp's or Dyroff's disciples—is unduly negative.  The evidence for 
Natorpian integration against Dyroffian schizophrenia is stronger than he notices, since he does not 
consider the Critical Tradition (or even the full corpus of Democritus' physical fragments: like most 
who study the early atomist, he appears content not to contest the historical correctness of Epicurus' 
critique of Democritean physics, ignoring or writing off problematic testimonia that this study 
discusses in chapter 2.2.1-2).
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A New Reading of Democritean Ethical Theory: Cultivating Good Habits (4.2)
Throughout this study (e.g. chapter 2.2.1-2 and section 4.1 above), I have argued 
that the Critical rhetorical outlook on the world adopted by Democritus does not see an 
unbridgeable chasm between physical determinism (physics) and human moral agency 
(ethics)—that that chasm is a later historical development in atomism, a mistake “healed” 
by the Epicurean swerve, which necessarily validates the anachronistic (mis)reading of 
early atomism that it exists to correct.  If Democritus does not see human moral agency 
existing in opposition to strict physical determinism (whereby natural laws minutely 
dictate organic responses to stimuli by individual organisms), the question naturally 
arises: how does Democritus understand human moral agency?  It is time to answer this 
question by delving deeper into the corpus of ethical thought attributed to Democritus.
We have already noticed that Democritus sees our world existing as a dynamic 
combination of atoms and void—a διάκοσμος that experiences birth, maturation, ἀκμή, 
decline, and death (dissolution into the chaos of atoms and void that exists infinitely and 
eternally outside every temporary orderly arrangement).  Within a διάκοσμος like ours—
one temporal order out of infinitely many others existing prior to it, contemporary with it, 
and after it—atoms and void combine to form temporary shapes (ῥυσμοί), including 
organic shapes like the one we refer to as man (ἄνθρωπος).  These shapes go through 
vicissitudes that are determined by necessity (ἀνάγκη) generally but not particularly: e.g. 
necessity dictates that human shapes will always die, but it does not determine precisely 
or predictably how each and every individual (or group of individuals) will find death.  
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Within the boundaries fixed by necessity, human shape is indeterminate and plastic: it can 
live in a variety of different habitats, cultivate a variety of different habits, and experience 
a wide range of different vicissitudes resulting from particular circumstances invisible 
and unpredictable to the outside observer.32  Confronting this reality as a cultural historian 
(above in chapter 3.2), Democritus imagines human behavior (ethics) evolving naturally 
out of animal biology (physics): primitive man turns instinctive, unpremeditated reactions 
to accidental circumstances into deliberate moral habits (νόμοι).33  The νόμοι that people 
invent in this fashion are not created equal: (i) some are necessary for human survival 
(e.g. the arts that produce food); (ii) others are not (e.g. music).  Implicit here is a basic 
program for judging ethical decisions: the wise moralist must on no account lose touch 
with the νόμοι (i) necessary to human survival.  He must never cultivate νόμος (ii) at the 
expense of νόμος (i).  The programmatic question that arises naturally from Democritean 
ethics (as discussed thus far), then, may be put as follows: how do people cultivate good 
habits—i.e. νόμοι (i) and νόμοι (ii) that do not endanger human survival by undercutting 
νόμοι (i) unnecessarily?  The Democritean corpus offers practical, reasonable answers to 
32 See chapter 2.2.1 above, in particular the discussion(s) of DK68B165 and frr. 103, 316 Luria.
33 E.g. when he creates a conscious habit of parenting out of his untaught animal desire for offspring.  For 
more examples, see chapter 3.2 above.  Notice that there is no categorical distinction evident in 
Democritean thought between ethical νόμος and physical, pace what scholars like Taylor (2007) say 
about the historical opposition between νόμος and φύσις.  From the perspective of the early atomists 
(and of the Critical Tradition in general), this opposition is never absolute.  Nature (φύσις) produces 
animals, including human beings, that develop moral habits (νόμοι) naturally (i.e. physically, as 
expressions of φύσις).  Observation may show that some of these habits are more plastic than others—
the habit of reproducing with members of the same species may be more plastic than the habit of 
recognizing certain colors (compare fr. 561 Luria, quoted above on page 190, with frr. 51, 55, 79, 90, 
93, 382 Luria, quoted above on pages 133-145)—but that does not change the fact that all animal 
habits are natural and naturally malleable (altering in synchrony with the underlying physical nature of 
the animal exhibiting them), and Democritus designates all of them—unproblematically and 
unparadoxically—with the same word νόμος.  It is only from outside the Critical Tradition that 
Democritus' refusal to separate physics and ethics appears odd.
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this question, answers that will ultimately shed light on our original question (how does 
Democritus understand human moral agency?).
How Education Occurs (4.2.1)    
Purveyors of moral wisdom ancient and modern are often accused of incoherence 
and/or banality—not without reason, since making generic normative statements about 
something as particular and indeterminate as everyday human life exposes would-be 
moral instructors to notable risks: on the one hand, their advice may be overly particular, 
mistaking inconsequential details of a specific circumstance for universally meaningful 
information; on the other, it be may be too general and universal to be particularly useful
—a very common vice in ancient wisdom literature.34  Add to this generic difficulty 
inherent in Morallehre the particularly poor preservation of the published Democritean 
corpus and the witness of Cicero that the atomist did not write clearly about virtue,35 and 
it comes as no surprise that some modern scholars have opted to dismiss early atomist 
ethics as irredeemably garbled (in our current texts as perhaps even in the putative 
originals) and/or inconsequential (a poor foretaste of better things to come in the work of 
later thinkers to whom history has been kinder).36  Such assessments of Democritean 
34 A. E. Housman (1883) parodies this kind of wisdom literature aptly, e.g. “O my son, be on the one 
hand good, / And do not on the other hand be bad.”  Any idiot can get the generic rhetorical distinction 
between good and bad right; the problem is knowing where it lies in particular circumstances (e.g. 
when deciding whether to avenge the murder of one's father by killing one's mother).  Ignoring this 
point, much wisdom literature ends up sounding like the imaginary basketball coach who foregoes all 
strategy and naively advises his team to win the game, as though life were that simple.   
35 Sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita; pauca enim neque ea ipsa enucleate ab hoc de 
virtute quidem dicta (De fin. 5.29.87-88 = fr. 741 Luria, quoted in full on page 297 above).
36 See e.g. Bailey (1928): “Democritus' 'ethic' hardly amounts to a moral theory: there is no effort to set 
the picture of the 'cheerful' man on a firm philosophical basis or to link it up in any way with the 
physical system; he is content in a discursive manner to draw a portrait. Epicurus' theory is much 
deeper and broader than this” (522).  Also Procopé (1989): “Scholars have tended to steer clear of … 
Democritus' fragmenta moralia in general, for understandable reasons.  The fragments are not what one 
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ethics are belied by extant fragments that show clear evidence of careful thought (that 
appears notably congruent with the rest of the early atomist corpus).  As they remain 
extant, Democritus' description(s) of and prescription(s) for the human condition appear 
cogent and consistent—agreeing closely with the early atomist διάκοσμος and showing 
that that worldview was not transparently impractical (giving the lie to Epicurean 
assertions that it denies and/or egregiously distorts empirical reality).  
How do people cultivate good habits?  In order to develop good habits, people 
must first have habits.  In the early atomist διάκοσμος, habits (νόμοι) are temporary, 
circumstantial expressions of temporary, mutable shapes (ῥυθμοί).  As we have already 
noticed, these habits—while variable—are not equally variable: (i) some appear essential 
to the integrity of the shape that expresses them (as eating is essential to the integrity of 
the human shape); (ii) others appear accidental to the integrity of the shape that expresses 
them (as music is accidental to the integrity of the human shape).  Successful ethical 
adaptation is about learning to express both kinds of habit (as all shapes do)37 without 
losing track of the first one: the human shape that retains its integrity best is the one that 
does not become so obsessed with music that it forgets to eat.  Here it becomes necessary 
to confront (one more time) the rigid determinist (mis)reading of early atomist theory, a 
(mis)reading which presumes that Democritean necessity demands that the evolution of 
all temporary shapes (including human beings) be absolutely predetermined, such that 
would expect from the great precursor of Epicurus.  They have little to connect them at all obviously 
with atomism.  Unoriginal, often commonplace in content, they also contain disturbing intimations—
some would say 'echoes'—of doctrines associated with later thinkers” (307).  
37 Even the individual atoms in Democritus' multiverse have integral qualities (e.g. their shape) and non-
integral qualities (e.g. their orientation), mirroring the integral and non-integral habits that their 
compounds have: see page 112 above, and Taylor (1999), 71-94, 109 n. 100, 112-124, 233.
309
there is no such thing as deliberately cultivating a good habit in place of a bad one.      
First, it is important to note that this (mis)reading is not entirely without 
foundation in the early atomist corpus.  It is clear that Democritus envisions the human 
shape whose moral habits concern us existing within certain limits.  Its plasticity in any 
historical instance (or series of instances) is not infinite:   
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
(a) γινώσκειν  χρεὼν  ἀνθρωπίνην  βιοτὴν 
ἀφαυρήν  τε  ἐοῦσαν  καὶ  ὀλιγοχρόνιον 
πολλῆισίν  τε  κηρσὶ  συμπεφυρμένην  καὶ 
ἀμηχανίηισιν,  ὅκως  ἄν  τις  μετρίης  τε 
κτήσιος  ἐπιμέληται  καὶ  μετρῆται  ἐπὶ  τοῖς 
ἀναγκαίοις ἡ ταλαιπωρίη.
Bisogna  prendere  consapevolezza  della 
fragilità  e  della  brevità  della  vita  umana, 
che si rivela anche intessuta di molteplici 
sciagure e bisogni,  in modo da curarsi  di 
avere  beni  di  proprietà  misurati  e  da 
commisurare le tribolazioni inevitabili alle 
necessità vitali.  (Luria, Krivushina)
Democritus, fr. B285 DK
     = fr. D150 Taylor
     = fr. 646 Luria
Stob. 4.34.65
(b1) σημεῖον  δ'  ὡς  οὐκ  εἰσὶ  φύσει  τὸ  μὴ 
ταὐτα  πᾶσι  φαίνεσθαι  τοῖς  ζώιοις  ἀλλ'  ὃ 
ἡμῖν  γλυκύ,  τοῦτ'  ἄλλοις  πικρὸν  καὶ 
ἑτέροις  ὀξὺ  καὶ  ἄλλοις  δριμὺ  τοῖς  δὲ 
στρυφνὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δ' ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δ' 
αὐτοὺς  μεταβάλλειν  τῆι  κρήσει  κατὰ  τὰ 
πάθη καὶ τὰς ἡλικίας· ἧι καὶ φανερὸν ὡς ἡ 
διάθεσις αἰτία τῆς φαντασίας. (Diels)
Proof that <the sensory qualities> are not 
objectively  real  is  found  in  the  fact  that 
they  do  not  appear  the  same  to  all 
creatures:  what  is  sweet  to  us  is  bitter  to 
others,  and  still  to  others  it  is  sour  or 
pungent or astringent; and similarly of the 
other  <sensory  qualities>.  Moreover 
Democritus  holds  that  'men  vary  in  their 
composition'  according  to  their  condition 
and age; whence it is evident that a man's 
physical  state  accounts  for  his  inner 
presentation.38 (Stratton, adapted)
Democritus, fr. A135 DK
     = fr. 113 Taylor
38 For more discussion of this and similar testimonia, see chapter 2.3 above.
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     = fr. 441 Luria
Theophr. De sens. 63-64 
(b2) περὶ  δὲ  τοῦ  φρονεῖν  ἐπὶ  τοσοῦτον 
εἴρηκεν  ὅτι  γίνεται  συμμέτρως  ἐχούσης 
τῆς  ψυχῆς  κατὰ  τὴν  κρῆσιν·  ἐὰν  δὲ 
περίθερμός  τις  ἢ  περίψυχρος  γένηται, 
μεταλλάττειν  φησί.  δι'  ὅ  τι  καὶ  τοὺς 
παλαιοὺς καλῶς τοῦθ' ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶν 
ἀλλοφρονεῖν.  ὥστε  φανερόν,  ὅτι  τῆι 
κράσει τοῦ σώματος ποιεῖ τὸ φρονεῖν, ὅπερ 
ἴσως  αὐτῶι  καὶ  κατὰ  λόγον  ἐστί,  σῶμα 
ποιοῦντι τὴν ψυχήν.
Concerning  thought,  Democritus  says 
merely  that  “it  arises  when  the  soul's 
composition is  duly proportioned.”  But  if 
one  becomes  excessively  hot  or  cold,  he 
says,  thinking  is  transformed;  and  it  was 
for  some  such  reason,  the  ancients  well 
believed, that the mind became “deranged.” 
Thus it is clear that he explains thought by 
the  composition  of  the  body—a  view 
perhaps  not  unreasonable  in  one  who 
regards  the  soul  itself  as  corporeal. 
(Stratton)
Democritus, fr. A135 DK
     = fr. 113 Taylor
     = fr. 460 Luria
Theophr. De Sensu 58  
(c) Δημόκριτος  μὲν  γὰρ  εὔχεσθαι  φησι 
δεῖν,  ὅπως  εὐλόγχων  εἰδώλων  τυγχά-
νωμεν,  καὶ  τὰ  σύμφυλα  καὶ  τὰ  χρηστὰ 
μᾶλλον  ἡμῖν  ἐκ  τοῦ  περιέχοντος  ἢ  τὰ 
φαῦλα καὶ τὰ σκαιὰ συμφέρηται.
Democritus  says  we  must  pray  that  we 
meet  with propitious  images  and that  our 
environment brings us congenial and good 
images  rather  than  mean  and  harmful 
ones.39 (my translation)
Democritus, fr. 472a Luria
Plut. Aem. 1.4
Fragments like these offer a window onto the limitations inherent in human shape as 
imagined by Democritus.  Generically speaking, humanity is temporal and mortal (a).  
The atoms that make it up in particular instances react with other atoms around it (in a 
particular environment) to produce various particular sensory qualities (b1)—including 
39 This fragment is just one of several extant that discuss the effect of the environment on human shape 
(individual and collective).  See also frr. 49, 472a (other testimonia), 476, 579 Luria, which are quoted 
above on pages 227-240. 
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the one known as thought (b2)—which become the basis for all behavior (including the 
kind of behavior that recurs).  Interaction between human atoms and atoms in the human 
environment(s) produces human habits, molding individual and collective human shape 
over time.  Humanity can hope that the reaction between itself and its environment yields 
good results in particular instances (c), but it cannot escape the fact that its experience is 
always limited (determined) by its general mortality (all men die, no matter what sensory  
qualities they experience en route to death) and the specific environmental circumstances 
that accompany particular manifestations of that mortality (all men die as a result of 
material circumstances in their vicinity acting upon their mortality: if my circumstances 
do not offer one occasion for death, they offer another, such that no matter what happens 
I always die).  Some (e.g. Epicureans) read fragments like these—fragments that discuss 
the limits of human moral freedom—and see Democritus' human shape as a helpless 
puppet responding automatically and non-stochastically to its environment, which is itself 
merely the puppet of a totalitarian, non-random material necessity.40  
In the mind of these readers, Democritus' careless formulation of the generic truth 
that humanity must die commits him to a rhetorical position that makes it impossible for 
humanity to live: human volition becomes an illusion, since it is merely one in a long 
series of atomic collisions whose relationship is presumed to be linear—such that the first 
40 From this point of view, Democritus sees human beings as just another instance of the Cartesian bête-
machine as it is commonly imagined—viz. a non-stochastic mechanism for converting environmental 
stimuli linearly into behavior (such that every animal motion arises as the inevitable outcome of some 
prior environmental motion demanding it more or less absolutely).  See Cottingham (1978).  While it is 
true that Democritus does become an important figure in the history of this kind of rigid deterministic 
argument (later students of the Critical Tradition do turn it into a fount for rigid determinism), it is not 
historically accurate to regard him as consciously building a view of the world that presumes linearity 
(transparent causation), as the succeeding discussion will demonstrate.   
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collision minutely predetermines the last in the linear series of collisions defining the 
birth, maturation, ἀκμή, decline, and death of a particular κόσμος.  (Recall the Epicurean 
arguments cited in 4.1 above, in particular the damning summation offered by Diogenes 
Oenoandensis.)  This reading of Democritus' position, while not utterly unreasonable or 
inconsistent with itself, is undercut by extant testimonia.41  Though he sees human moral 
freedom as limited, Democritus does not deny its existence:     
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
(d1) ἡ  φύσις  καὶ  ἡ  διδαχὴ  παραπλήσιόν 
ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄν-
θρωπον,  μεταρυσμοῦσα  δὲ  φυσιοποιεῖ 
(Taylor)
Nature  and  teaching  are  similar,  for 
teaching  reshapes  the  man,  and  in  re-
shaping makes his nature.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B33 DK
     = fr. D28 Taylor
     = fr. 682 Luria
Clem. Strom. 4.151; Stob. 2.31.65; 
Theodoret. 4.1, p. 100 Räder
(d2) ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ γίγνεται, ἀπὸ τῶν 
αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθ' 
ἄν,  τῶν  τε  κακῶν  ἐκτὸς  εἴημεν.  αὐτίκα 
ὕδωρ βαθὺ εἰς πολλὰ χρήσιμον καὶ δαὖτε 
κακόν· κίνδυνος γὰρ ἀποπνιγῆναι. μηχανὴ 
οὖν εὑρέθη, νήχεσθαι διδάσκειν.  (Luria)
From the very same things as benefit us we 
may also get evils, and escape from evils. 
For example, deep water is useful for many 
things,  and  then  again  bad;  for  there  is 
danger of drowning. So a remedy has been 
discovered,  teaching  people  to  swim. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B172 DK
     = fr. D37 Taylor
     = fr. 33 Luria
Stob. 2.9.1
41 See chapters 2.2 and 4.1 above. 
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If Democritus were the fool derided by Epicureans, he should not imagine that teaching 
(διδαχή) is significant (d1).  He should not believe in the human ability to invent and 
impart (διδάσκειν) remedies (μηχαναί) for invariable material necessity (d2).  How can 
one teach anything meaningful in a world where the human shapes predetermined to be 
misshapen must be so (as Diogenes Oenoandensis argues)?  How can anyone invent 
remedies for the inevitable?  Here those committed to an Epicurean understanding of 
Democritus throw up their hands and condemn the early atomist for failing to consider 
that his physical outlook makes the world too regular, denying the irregularity observable 
in human life.  How can the perfect order of linear, non-stochastic atomic collisions give 
rise to non-linear, stochastic human morality?  It cannot.  
Unfortunately for those who make this dilemma an original flaw in Democritean 
atomism, nothing in the extant atomist corpus suggests that Democritus imagined atomic 
motion as linear and non-stochastic (as those who make him into a rigid determinist 
inevitably assume).  In simple terms, Democritus does not seem to imagine material 
necessity operating within closed, linear systems (with fixed components whose mutual 
relationships develop uniformly from beginning to ἀκμή to end without any element of 
non-linear uncertainty).  The early atomist multiverse is not a closed system, nor is it a 
breeding ground for closed systems.  It has no limits in space and time.  Occupying 
infinite void, it incorporates an infinite number of atoms that manifest an infinite variety 
of shapes.42  Even if the collective motion of these atoms shows some regularity in the 
42 See chapter 2.1-2.
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existence of generic historical series—e.g. recurrent κόσμοι and the ῥυσμοί that emerge 
within these—in particular instances atomic motion is fundamentally indefinite: there is 
no moment when any particular atom is experiencing a precisely definable motion, and 
nowhere does Democritus indicate that any atomic movement or collision creates or 
causes particular outcomes that are unqualifiedly inevitable.43  Thus, even if atomic 
motion imparts some regularity to phenomena (when we look at these collectively and 
attempt to categorize them generically), it does not foreordain how particular instances of 
these phenomena must play out their temporary existence moment to moment.  The series 
of atomic collisions that defines a particular κόσμος is necessarily regular in some sense: 
barring unforeseen accidents—like a world-sized atom crashing into it from outside44—it 
will pass through natural stages of organic development that terminate inevitably in its 
dissolution.  But unforeseen (and unforeseeable) accidents are always possible in an 
indefinite environment like the early atomist multiverse: infinity brings uncertainty along 
with it.  (That is what infinity is—the lack of boundaries.  How can there be absolute 
certainty of any kind where there are no boundaries?  Epicureans do not bother to ask this 
43 This is an important point.  Aristotle (Phys. 4.8.216a16, with Simpl. ad loc. 679.4 = fr. 314 Luria) 
attacks the early atomists for failing to provide linear, causal explanations for atomic movement.  As a 
phenomenon that occurs constantly throughout the atomic multiverse, which is explicitly unlimited in 
space and time, atomic motion arises from unknown causes (αἰτίαι that Aristotle chides the early 
atomists for failing to provide).  It is thus unmapped “Brownian” motion rather than the mappable 
“Newtonian” motion that proceeds from a known cause or causes along a calculable trajectory toward a 
definite, predictable end.  It is non-linear, stochastic, and irregular in particular instances—until we see 
its cumulative, collective results in historical series and designate their retrospective and generic 
regularity with words like ἀνάγκη.  Democritus does not need to invent the explicit swerve of Epicurus 
because his concept of atomic motion already carries infinite swerves implicit in it.
44 See DK68A40 (quoted on page 114), where Hippolytus remembers Democritus discussing collision 
between κόσμοι as one cause for cosmic demise, and fr. 207 Luria, where Democritus appears on 
record imagining the possibility that atoms as large as κόσμοι exist.  Here as elsewhere, Democritus 
deals in the possible: as he imagines it, his worldview is not a closed system precluding possibilities.  
Like other  Critical διάκοσμοι, his is a speculative description, not a precise definition. 
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question.)  Thus, the regularity of any κόσμος in the early atomist multiverse is not a 
linear, non-stochastic regularity: every κόσμος will dissolve at some point, of necessity, 
but the precise manner of its dissolution is indeterminate.
In the same way, the series of atomic collisions that define any human ῥυσμός is 
generically determined (I will die) and particularly indefinite (how precisely I will die 
remains fundamentally uncertain: I could perish prematurely as the result of an accident,  
or I might die in my bed at the end of a long and full life).  The moral will that arises as 
an emergent property of my human shape is limited.  It cannot abolish the necessary 
reality that I will die.  That said, it is not utterly null: it does have a material effect on the 
state of my human shape as I approach death.  If I experience it in a particular way, i.e. 
learning from instruction (διδαχή, διδάσκειν), I can approach my death (as all mortals 
must) better than I would otherwise.  Even if I cannot learn how to make deep water 
disappear from human experience entirely, I can learn to swim in it and teach the art of 
swimming to other people (μηχανὴ οὖν εὑρέθη, νήχεσθαι διδάσκειν [d2]), altering human 
shape in a material way (ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον [d1]): the physiological 
character of each individual swimmer changes its form as he exerts the physical and 
mental effort required to master the skill of traversing deep water without drowning.  
Democritus' words on swimming (d2) offer valuable insight into the atomist's 
understanding of human morality, confirming and illustrating what we have already seen 
(in this chapter and the preceding one).  In the early atomist διάκοσμος, each individual 
animal shape—including all human ones—exists as a temporary system of atoms flowing 
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together more or less coherently in a restless ocean of atoms that swirl around outside it 
(but not isolated from it).  In this ocean, external atoms impinge on the individual shape 
constantly in waves—the atomic films (εἴδωλα) that emanate from surrounding shapes.45  
These waves influence the movements of the individual shape, exerting determinative 
pressure on its destiny (the manner in which its particular material coherence manifests 
itself, the quality with which that coherence moves from birth toward death).  But the 
issue of that pressure—the response that individual shapes make to it in particular 
instances—is never perfectly regular (minutely calculable, absolutely invariable).  
If my human shape is submerged in deep water, to take the example offered by 
Democritus, then the waves emanating from the water's atomic mass exert determinative 
pressure on my individual destiny: I must swim (and postpone the inevitable dissolution 
of my temporary physical integrity) or drown (and experience my mortality immediately 
rather than postpone it).  These are the limits within which my morality necessarily 
exists.  But my destiny—the outcome of that morality—is never a foregone conclusion, 
with some linear chain of causation determining that I must drown because I have not 
learned to swim (vel sim.).  Anyone with experience in the real world knows that animals 
(including humans) respond stochastically to deep water.  Outcomes are not absolutely 
determined (or determinable) by calculable factors.  If you throw inexperienced animals 
into deep water, some respond by drowning.  Others swim spontaneously (not always as 
well as they will later, assuming they survive and acquire more experience swimming).  
This spontaneous success is the cornerstone of Democritean ethics.  Remember from the 
45 See the testimonia quoted and discussed on pages 174 and (especially) 227-242 above.
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preceding chapter—and (a) in this discussion—that human shape historically finds itself 
limited by particular environmental circumstances (in deep water, so to speak).  It reacts 
instinctively to these circumstances, expressing the momentary convergence between its 
internal atomic state and external atomic waves as movement.  The issue of this 
movement varies stochastically in particular instances: sometimes, it is sudden death (e.g. 
when a drowning animal thrashes about ineffectually and cannot manage to swim).  Other 
times, it is not (e.g. when a drowning animal thrashes about and manages to swim after 
some fashion).  Human shape is materially constituted such that it is inclined to be 
impressed with particular instances of success (we notice the drowning animal that 
thrashes and manages to swim).  Impressed with some particular instance of success, 
human shape naturally seeks to reproduce it, cultivating the random benefit offered by the 
accident until it becomes the predictable profit offered by deliberate habit.  This is exactly 
how Democritus imagines primitive men learning culture from each other and other 
animals: unpremeditated animal behavior (nesting, spinning silk, singing, killing hostile 
species, caring for offspring, vocalizing randomly, asses impregnating mares) leaves a 
material impression on humanity, an impression that is converted over time into a 
conscious and deliberate habit (housebuilding, weaving and mending, song, retributive 
justice, filial duty, language, mule-breeding).46  Impressed by the lucky accident, we 
cultivate it, attempting to tame its wild randomness by making it recur regularly in ways 
that we find beneficial to the integrity of our human shape.  How does this happen?  
46 See chapter 3.2.2-3 above.  Notice that the Democritean Kulturgeschichte becomes impossible if 
Democritus is a rigid determinist: see note 53 below.
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In terms of the atoms that compose our human shape, we express the convergence 
between our unique understanding of past success (material impressions on our atomic 
soul) and external circumstances (material emanations impinging on us) as collective 
atomic movement that takes our material shape toward the recurrence of that success.  
Having avoided death by drowning once, we seek deep water again and again, cultivating 
the convergence between our material selves and that particular material environment that 
finds eventual issue in our learning to swim.  This process of cultivation changes our 
material shape (d1) such that encounters with deep water are less likely to result in sudden 
death for us (dissolution of the atomic bonds that give our shape integrity).  Once we 
become expert swimmers, we can use our experience as a means for transforming others 
in a material way,47 broadcasting our impressions of proper swimming technique the way 
envious people broadcast malevolent impressions in fr. 579 Luria (see page 228), so that 
people in our environment have the chance to turn the lucky accident of not drowning 
into the prudent (cultivated, instructed) habit of being able to swim.48
Note that we are always talking about probabilities here, not certainties (nor 
mathematically computable probabilities49).  That is the meaning of fr. 646 Luria: human 
shape is inherently fragile, such that it can always fall apart, no matter what anyone does 
47 Remember that the soul is as much a material (and impressionable) object for Democritus as the body.  
This does not mean that it is driven by linear causation toward an inevitable doom, pace Epicureans 
(and any others who make Democritus a hard determinist).
48 Thus particular accidents (e.g. a random mating between one particular ass and a particular mare in fr. 
561 Luria) become causes for widespread habits (mule-breeding).  Democritus makes this part of his 
ethics explicit as a general rule in fr. 759 Luria: τράπεζαν πολυτελέα μὲν τύχη παρατίθησιν, αὐταρκέα 
δὲ σωφροσύνη (Stob. 3.5.26).  See pages 236-252 above.
49 These are another instance of the kind of precise uncertainty represented by the Epicurean swerve.  
Such precision appears entirely foreign to Democritus as he remains extant.
319
or does not do (a).  Education (διδαχή, διδάσκειν) just makes us more aware of ways and 
means available to improve individual and collective odds for survival in particular acute 
situations (e.g. when we find ourselves in deep water).  It does not abolish the reality that 
we all die at some point (individually and collectively)—that the material entities we can 
manipulate to prolong human life (the way a swimmer manipulates deep water) can never 
be manipulated such that they lose entirely their ability to cause us harm (d2).  Life is 
built out of death, so that some suffering—including the final experience of material 
dissolution—is always inevitable (a).  Education trains us to meet this reality, exposing 
our perceptive abilities to the lucky accident so that we learn to cultivate it where we find 
it beneficial and avoid it where it appears harmful—without cherishing any naïve hope of 
cheating our inherent mortality by avoiding all suffering entirely.  
From this point of view, the purpose of education is to provide students with 
perceptual experiences that they can use to avoid unnecessary suffering as they swim 
from birth to death in the sea of atoms that constitutes their particular environment (a).  It 
is not about recognizing and/or making peace with human inability to make meaningful 
decisions (as those who want to make Democritus a rigid determinist would expect), and 
the reason for this is not that Democritus forgot that his world-order was non-random 
when he came to consider human moral behavior.50  On the contrary, we can now see 
50 No matter how often Epicureans insist that words like ἀνάγκη necessarily imply linear causality, they 
will be wrong.  When we examine the evidence without accepting their interpretation, we do not see 
Democritus arguing for hard determinism.  It may be useful to remember here that Democritus 
explicitly disavows the idea (affirmed by Epicurus) that words necessarily carry inherent meanings, 
such that a particular word always implies a particular referent (fr. 563 Luria, quoted and discussed 
above on pages 255-268).  For Democritus, words (including ἀνάγκη) are just arbitrary collections of 
sound associated randomly with historical accidents.  They are descriptors (that point inductively 
towards something foreign to them), not definitions (that carry clear truth deduceable directly from 
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clearly that Democritus never imagined a κόσμος in which it would make sense to oppose 
moral freedom to physical determinism: in Democritus' mind, the stochastic experiences 
we call moral freedom arise naturally from physical matter, which determines them 
necessarily and generically but not minutely or particularly.  Human moral freedom, from 
Democritus' point of view, demands determinism (which allows human shape to exist 
coherently and formulate more or less coherent responses to its environment).  But the 
determinism it demands is not an Epicurean straitjacket.  Utter lack of determinism would 
mean the dissolution of all order (of any kind), just as an impossibly rigid determinism 
would spell the demise of every familiar natural order.  The world as we experience it—
and as Democritus imagines it throughout his extant corpus—is neither perfectly regular 
nor perfectly irregular.  It is both regular and not, simultaneously orderly and stochastic.  
Democritus appears quite aware of this empirical reality in the testimonia, whether he 
speaks as a physicist (e.g. frr. 29, 103, 316 Luria),51 as an epistemologist (e.g. frr. 48, 51 
Luria),52 as a cultural historian (e.g. fr. 561 Luria),53 or as a moralist:    
themselves in the absence of inductive experience).  To read Democritus as a clear guide to linear, 
deductive truth (in any field of inquiry) is to misunderstand him profoundly.     
51 See pages 122 (note 212), 125, and 127 above.  Dionysius is substantially correct when he notes that 
Democritus makes τύχη mistress of the multiverse (fr. 29 Luria): the activities that the atomist invokes 
to describe the physical behavior of atoms—e.g. the spontaneous sorting of pebbles on the beach or of 
grain in a sieve (fr. 316 Luria)—are manifestly stochastic without being utterly irregular.
52 See page 198 (note 49) above.  Human beings are separated from clear truth (fr. 48 Luria), which 
eludes them in the abyss (fr. 51 Luria).  No regularity that the human shape perceives is an absolutely 
clear picture of the entire atomic multiverse existing around it infinitely in every direction.  Infinity 
cannot be reduced to limits that human shapes can perceive.  For Democritus, men are necessarily like 
the proverbial company of blind philosophers who attempt to understand and describe the elephant by 
feeling different parts of it and reporting their impressions: every human picture of reality necessarily 
omits data that it cannot receive, impressions that do not reach it, and there is no such thing as a human 
picture of reality that transcends these limitations completely.
53 See page 229 (text) and chapter 3.2.3 (interpretation) above.  The mule is an arbitrary historical 
accident—ἵππον βιασαμένου κατὰ τύχην κυῆσαι—before it becomes a regular feature of humanity's 
cultural environment.  As Democritus tells the story, there was no inevitable chain of events leading 
necessarily to the particular inventor(s) of the mule being in one particular place at one particular time.  
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TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
(d3) ἡ παιδεία εὐτυχοῦσι μέν ἐστι κόσμος, 
ἀτυχοῦσι δὲ καταφύγιον. 
Education is an adornment in good fortune 
and a refuge in misfortune. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B180 DK
     = fr. D45 Taylor,
     = fr. 693 Luria, fr. 21 Gerlach
Stob. 4.34.65
(d4) κρέσσονές εἰσιν αἱ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων 
ἐλπίδες ἢ ὁ τῶν ἀμαθῶν πλοῦτος. 
The expectations of the educated are better 
[mightier] than the wealth of the ignorant. 
(Taylor, supplemented) 
Democritus, fr. B185 DK
     = fr. D50 Taylor,
     = fr. 697 Luria, fr. 31 Gerlach
Stob. 2.31.94
(d5)  καὶ  κυβερνήτης  ἀγαθὸς  ἐνίοτε  ναυ-
αγεῖ, καὶ ἀνὴρ σπουδαῖος ἀτυχεῖ.54
Even  a  good  pilot  wrecks  his  ship  on 
occasion, and a competent man experiences 
misfortune.  (my translation) 
Democritus, fr. 33d Luria
     = fr. 28 Gerlach
Ant. Melissa 1.70 (= PG 136: 981d); CPP 
187 Elt. 
Like the other moral fragments already presented (a, d2), these presume a world in which 
success is relative (momentary, contextual, accidental) and reversible: just as the expert 
Asses in proximity to mares generally (necessarily) have the chance to impregnate them: any instance 
of this where people are present becomes an opportunity for the mule to be (re)invented.  The 
regularity of mule-breeding arises out of an irregularity in human experience with asses and mares. 
54 Gerlach marks the attribution of this fragment to Democritus as dubious (but not necessarily spurious) 
because of its aliena sententiae forma.  I put it forward here as genuine because it agrees precisely with 
the sentiments in (d3) and (d4)—fragments whose authenticity Gerlach, Diels-Kranz, Taylor, and Luria 
all accept—and the rest of the Democritean ethical corpus.  If (d5) is not actually from Democritus, it 
nevertheless captures his understanding of παιδεία accurately: education produces not definite results 
in the particular instance, but better odds in general of acquiring more good than harm from the 
material environment as one moves inevitably toward dissolution. 
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swimmer can still drown in deep water (d2), the expert pilot can still crash his ship (d5).  
The educated man has better expectations (d4) than the blind gambler when he confronts 
the collision between his shape and the material circumstances of his environment, but 
that is not because he must win (and the gambler is not utterly without any hope).55  
Education exists not to eradicate failure (which is ultimately impossible, given that death 
is built into the life of composite beings), but to provide a method for coping with it—a 
refuge (καταφύγιον) where the educated can bear inevitable loss with minimal harm (d3).
The upshot of this discussion is to solidify the conclusion of the previous chapter, 
that Democritus imagines ethics arising naturally from physics.  As the physical order of 
bodies in the early atomist κόσμος is regular generally without being invariable in the 
particular, so the moral order of human ῥυσμοί as conceived by Democritus is regular 
generally without being invariable in the particular.  The material necessity (ἀνάγκη) that 
makes physical order possible inevitably makes moral order possible—and limits every 
instance of its expression (by making human ῥυσμοί mortal and exposing them to more 
or less stochastic variation in the circumstances that surround them).  Just as Democritus 
imagines the collective ῥυσμός of humanity arising from historical interaction(s) between 
individuals and their cosmic environment, so he imagines the ῥυσμός of the individual 
human being arising from his (or her) individual historical interaction(s) with the cosmic 
environment where he (or she) exists.  As the collective shape of human society evolves 
in response to environmental stimuli being received and transmitted (from person to 
55 Recall that the table of τύχη is a rich (polytelic) one in fr. 759 Luria (note 48 above): the really lucky 
gambler might eat there happily over the course of a long and successful life without realizing the 
precariousness of his position.
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person, animals to people, and material experiences to people), so the particular shape of 
the human individual evolves through education (which exists as a collection of 
perceptual experiences that exert material influence on the ability of an individual human 
shape to respond effectively to stimuli in its immediate environment, i.e. to maintain its 
individual integrity in the teeth of environmental threats that are not necessarily lethal).    
This discussion shows that Democritus believed in the capacity of the individual 
human being to improve his habits (the recurring expression of his particular ῥυσμός).  
Good habits are teachable.  If this were as far as Democritus went, then it might be fair to 
conclude with Bailey (1928) that the atomist did not develop a clear theory of ethics
—“Democritus' 'ethic' hardly amounts to a moral theory” (522)—that his description of 
the way in which humans are moral contains no clear or consistent instructions for 
cultivating the right kind of morality.  (Saying what human morality is is not the same 
thing as saying what it ought to be.  Affirming that teaching is possible in particular 
instances is not the same thing as offering specific teachings whose utility you endorse.)  
Unfortunately for those who want to join Bailey in dismissing the early atomist as a 
moral theorist, the corpus of ethical fragments reveals that Democritus had a definite 
strategy for improving human morality—a strategy that is coherent and consistent with 
the early atomist worldview we have been exploring.  It is time to examine that strategy.
The Dangerous Power of Pleasure (4.2.2)         
Implicit in Democritean Kulturgeschichte and the Democritean perspective on 
education explored above there lies a normative judgement of human moral behavior that 
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we have already discussed superficially: good moral behavior occurs as human shapes 
respond to their environment in ways that preserve their integrity from unnecessary 
dissolution (e.g. starving for lack of food or drowning in deep water).  As noted earlier 
(e.g. chapter 3.2.3), this judgement makes ethics a matter of cultivating pleasure (the 
pleasure of survival as an atomic compound) and avoiding pain (the pain of dissolution): 
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
(a1) ὅρος  συμφορέων  καὶ  ἀσυμφορέων 
τέρψις καὶ ἀτερπίη.  (Taylor)
Joy and sorrow are the distinguishing mark 
of things beneficial and harmful. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B188 DK
     = fr. D26 Taylor 
     = fr. 734 Luria
Stob. 3.1.46
(a2) κατ'  αὐτὸν  (Δημόκριτον)  ...  εἶναι 
κριτήρια ... αἱρέσεως δὲ καὶ φυγῆς τὰ πάθη· 
τὸ  μὲν  γὰρ  ὧι  προσοικειούμεθα,  τοῦτο 
αἱρετόν  ἐστιν,  τὸ  δὲ  ὧι  προσαλλοτριού-
μεθα, τοῦτο φευκτόν ἐστιν.  (Luria)
According  to  him  (i.e.  Democritus),  our 
experiences are means for judging whether 
to choose something or avoid it. The thing 
that  we  associate  with  regularly  must  be 
chosen,  while  the  thing  from  which  we 
withdraw ourselves must be avoided.  (my 
translation)
Democritus, fr. A111 DK
     = fr. 734 Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 7.140
Stumbling through the material environment that surrounds humanity and responding to 
the lucky accidents that they encounter in it, survivors naturally perceive things congenial 
to the needs of their particular shape(s).  The pleasure of sating their thirst at a particular 
body of water leaves a material impression that teaches them to seek that water again (a1). 
The pain of being attacked by a particular wild animal teaches them to avoid such shapes 
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in future (a1).  Thus, survivors of the lucky accident naturally and necessarily respond to 
the future with impressions from their past, shunning what has hurt them and embracing 
what has helped (a2).  Particular instances of pleasure lead to general ideas about what is 
good and thence to the habits (νόμοι) that cultivate this good, while particular instances 
of pain lead to general ideas about what is evil and thence to the habits that avoid it (a2).56 
Unfortunately, our general ideas of what is pleasant and what is not inevitably fail 
us at some point, leading us to make potentially fatal moral errors.  Not every particular 
instance of any pleasure is necessary for survival, or even conducive to it: 
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
(a3) εἴ  τις ὑπερβάλλοι τὸ μέτριον, τὰ ἐπι-
τερπέστατα  ἀτερπέστατα  ἂν  γίγνοιτο.57 
(Luria)
If someone were to exceed the appropriate 
measure, the most delightful things would 
become most unpleasant. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B233 DK
     = fr. D97 Taylor
     = fr. 753 Luria
Stob. 3.17.38
56 Pleasure exists as a dynamic material experience here and throughout: kinetic interaction(s) between 
the external and internal environment of the individual human shape create(s) particular perceptual 
experiences referred to generically as pleasure (Democritean ἡδονή, τέρψις). 
57 The message of this particular fragment recurs in one of the terse ethical aphorisms normally assigned 
to Democritus even though their author is sometimes identified (in the sources) as Democrates: ἡδοναὶ 
ἄκαιροι τίκτουσιν ἀηδίας (Democrat. 36 = DK68B71, fr. 755 Luria).  Several gnomes attributed to 
Democrates quote Democritus verbatim or epitomize aphorisms credited to the atomist elsewhere.  For 
good examples of this, see DK68B84, B181, B244, B264, and frr. 599, 678, 752, 783, 784 Luria.  
Stewart (1958, 180) and Procopé (1989, 308) provide some helpful discussion.  Philippson (1924) uses 
this peculiar coincidence to argue that Democrates is an invention of ancient scribes epitomizing 
Democritus and misspelling his name.  His thesis is not as far-fetched as it might at first appear: ancient 
sources represented in the florilegia spell erratically, such that the creation of an otherwise unknown 
Democrates from Democritus is not impossible.  Witness the text of Stob. 3.18.50 as it appears in MS 
L: the scribe writes Δημοκρατ before changing it to Δημόκρατος, which the editor—Wachsmuth (1958) 
3:464—corrects to Δημοκράτης.  Given such uncertainty in our texts, it is easy to see how Democritus 
might have been confused with (an admittedly less famous) Democrates, whether the latter really 
existed as an historical author of ethical aphorisms or not.  In this study, I avoid the problems posed by 
Democrates' historicity and the proper attribution of his aphorisms by refraining from making them the 
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(b1) τὸ χρῆιζον οἶδεν, ὁκόσον χρήιζει, ὁ δὲ 
χρήιζων οὐ γινώσκει.  (DK)
The  thing  that  is  in  need58 knows  how 
much it needs, but the man who is in need 
does not know. (Taylor) 
Democritus, fr. B198 DK
     = fr. D62 Taylor
     = fr. 561a Luria
Stob. 3.4.72
(b2) φειδώ τοι καὶ λιμὸς χρηστή· ἐν καιρῶι 
δὲ  καὶ  δαπανή·  γινώσκειν  δὲ  ἀγαθοῦ.59 
(Taylor)
Thrift and hunger are useful, and expense 
too  at  the  right  time.  It  is  the  mark  of  a 
good man to discern. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B229 DK
     = fr. D93 Taylor
     = fr. 760 Luria
Stob. 3.16.19
(a4)  ὅσοι  ἀπὸ  γαστρὸς  τὰς  ἡδονὰς 
ποιέονται ὑπερβεβληκότες τὸν καιρὸν ἐπὶ 
βρώσεσιν ἢ πόσεσιν ἢ ἀφροδισίοισιν, τοῖσι 
πᾶσιν  αἱ  μὲν  ἡδοναὶ  βραχεῖαί  τε  καὶ  δι' 
ὀλίγου  γίνονται,  ὁκόσον  ἂν  χρόνον 
ἐσθίωσιν  ἢ  πίνωσιν,  αἱ  δὲ  λῦπαι  πολλαί. 
τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν 
πάρεστι  καὶ  ὁκόταν  γένηται  ὁκοίων 
ἐπιθυμέουσι,  διὰ  ταχέος  τε  ἡ  ἡδονὴ 
παροίχεται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν αὐτοῖσι χρηστόν 
ἐστιν ἄλλ' ἡ τέρψις βραχεῖα, καὶ αὖθις τῶν 
αὐτῶν δεῖ. (Luria)
Those who take their pleasures from their 
belly, exceeding what is appropriate in food 
or  drink  or  sex,  to  all  of  them  their 
pleasures are meagre and brief, lasting just 
so long as they are eating and drinking, and 
their pains are many. For this desire for the 
same thing is always with them, even when 
they get what they desire, and the pleasure 
soon passes, and they have no profit except 
brief delight, and then they need the same 
things again. (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B235 DK
sole basis for any of my arguments.  All the ethical aphorisms I use to argue in the text of this study are 
attributed explicitly to Democritus, and I consciously note and justify any fragments whose attribution 
has been challenged (e.g. fr. 33d Luria on page 322 above).    
58 Luria interprets τὸ χρῆιζον as referring implicitly to an animal (ζῶιον), but there is no reason to do so.  
In fact, the images of animate and inanimate objects sorting themselves spontaneously in fr. 316 Luria 
mitigates against such a narrow reading of this aphorism, which appears to focus on ignorance as a 
unique human property (something arising from our particular material constitution that separates us 
from other compound objects extant in nature, whether animate or inanimate). 
59 Compare Wachsmuth (1958) 3:485.
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     = fr. D99 Taylor 
     = fr. 750 Luria
Stob. 3.18.35
(a5)  ἔοικε  παλαιά  τις  αὕτη  τῶι  σώματι 
διαδικασία  πρὸς  τὴν  ψυχὴν  περὶ  τῶν 
παθῶν εἶναι. καὶ Δημόκριτος μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν 
ψυχὴν  ἀναφέρων  <τὸ>  κακοδαιμόν60 
φησίν·  εἰ  τοῦ  σώματος  αὐτῆι  δίκην 
λαχόντος,  παρὰ  πάντα  τὸν  βίον  ὧν 
ὠδύνηται  <καὶ>  κακῶς  πέπονθεν,  αὐτὸς 
γένοιτο  τοῦ  ἐγκλήματος  δι<καστής>,61 
ἡδέως ἂν καταψηφίσασθαι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐφ' 
οἷς  τὰ  μὲν  ἀπώλεσε  τοῦ  σώματος  ταῖς 
ἀμελείαις  καὶ  ἐξέλυσε  ταῖς  μέθαις,  τὰ  δὲ 
κατέφθειρε καὶ διέσπασε ταῖς φιληδονίαις, 
ὥσπερ  ὀργάνου  τινὸς  ἢ  σκεύους  κακῶς 
ἔχοντος  τὸν  χρώμενον  ἀφειδῶς  αἰτιασά-
μενος. (DK, Luria)
The  body  appears  to  have  an  ancient 
dispute  with  the  soul  about  the  passions. 
Democritus, attributing wretchedness to the 
soul,  says,  'If  the  body  brought  a  suit 
against it [i.e. the soul] for all the sufferings 
and ills it had endured throughout its whole 
life, and one had oneself to judge the case, 
one  would  gladly  condemn  the  soul  for 
having ruined certain features of the body 
through  carelessness  and  made  it  soft 
through  drink  and brought  it  to  rack  and 
ruin through love of pleasure, just  as if a 
tool  or  utensil  were  in  a  bad  state  one 
would  blame  the  person  who  used  it 
carelessly.' (Taylor, augmented)
Democritus, fr. B159 DK
     = fr. D34 Taylor
     = fr. 776 Luria
Plut. Fr. De libid. et aegr. 2.1
60 DK restores κακοδαίμων in the MSS to read <τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς> κακοδαιμον<ίας>, a restoration whose 
meaning Luria approves (Diels, audacter fortasse, sed sensum loci bene divinans) even though his 
restoration is more conservative.  I have decided to follow Luria because I prefer more conservative 
restorations in the absence of a clear reason to do otherwise. 
61 Luria restores δι … in the MSS to read δι<αιτητής> instead of δι<καστής> (quoted above), the earlier 
restoration by Tyrwhitt that DK and Taylor accept.  Both restorations are equally appropriate to the 
atomist's cultural milieu (see e.g. Herodot. 1.91; 3.14, 31; 5.95; Plat. Leg. 956c), and they carry more or 
less the same meaning (in general and in this particular context).  I have decided to follow the text of 
DK in this instance because it is more familiar.
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(b3) ἀνοήμονες τῶν ἀπεόντων ὀρέγονται, 
τὰ  δὲ  παρεόντα  καὶ  παρωιχημένων  κερ-
δαλεώτερα ἐόντα ἀμαλδύνουσιν. (Luria)
People without understanding long for the 
things that are not present and squander the 
things  that  are  present,  even  when  these 
latter  are  more  useful  than  what  is  gone. 
(my translation)
Democritus, fr. B202 DK
     = fr. D66 Taylor
     = fr. 794 Luria
Stob. 3.4.76
Even if a pleasure is generally necessary for survival (humans must cultivate the pleasure  
of eating), that does not mean that every particular instance of that pleasure is necessary 
for survival (there are limits to the pleasure of eating: the individual human shape can 
only eat so much food within a certain time-frame before the pleasure of eating starts to 
become painful—and ultimately destructive).  Thus, though pleasure is our guide to 
survival (a1), experience reveals that it is not infallible.  We cannot use it to separate real 
needs perfectly from spurious—an impossible task for humanity (b1).  If we generalize 
too naively from particular instances of it—e.g. concluding from one meal that more food 
will always be more pleasant and cultivating unmitigated gluttony as a habit (a2)—then it 
deserts us eventually (a3) and even turns into pain (a4) that can be lethal (a5).  Unlike the 
uncomprehending fools whose desire for the recurrence of particular instances of past 
pleasure knows no limit (a4, b3),62 Democritus' ἀγαθός (b2) recognizes that no particular 
pleasure exists such that more is always better (a3, b2): he finds unexpected pleasure in 
famine (λιμός) to balance his pleasure in feasting—δαπανή (b2)—lest naive φιληδονίαι 
62 τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πάρεστι καὶ ὁκόταν γένηται ὁκοίων ἐπιθυμέουσι, διὰ 
ταχέος τε ἡ ἡδονὴ παροίχεται (a4). ἀνοήμονες τῶν ἀπεόντων ὀρέγονται, τὰ δὲ παρεόντα καὶ 
παρωιχημένων κερδαλεώτερα ἐόντα ἀμαλδύνουσιν (b3).   
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destroy the integrity of his human shape (a5).  Ignorant (b1) of the precise moment when 
some pleasure that he experiences will turn into potentially lethal pain (a3, a4, a5), he 
cultivates moral habits defined by measure (a3) and thrift (b2)—i.e. as little necessary 
pleasure as possible63—and he keeps his attachment to past instances of pleasure as weak 
as possible (a4, b3), recognizing that the recurrence of familiar pleasures will always at 
some point prove noxious to him (a4).64
As Democritus imagines the human condition, the driving force behind moral 
failure (the untimely disintegration of human shape) is the soul—ψυχή (a5).  From our 
discussion in chapter 2.3 above, we remember this soul exists as a collection of small, 
mercurial atoms that inhabit the atomic shell65 constituted by the body and exert some 
determinative influence on that shell's responses to its material environment.  That 
environment influences the soul by bombarding it—through the body's sensory cortices
—with external particles, atomic clouds (εἴδωλα) that emanate from other compound 
objects and strike the soul in a particular part of a particular κόσμος.  The collision 
between external material shapes (εἴδωλα) and the internal soul finds issue in movement: 
the soul changes its native movement66 in response to external stimulus, which ultimately 
63 This attitude appears clearly limned in frr. 732 Luria (μᾶζα γὰρ καὶ στιβὰς λιμοῦ καὶ κόπου γλυκύτατα 
ἰάματα) and 757 Luria (τῶν ἡδέων τὰ σπανιώτατα γινόμενα μάλιστα τέρπει).   
64 Most advice in the Democritean ethical corpus appears directed at the individual, but the community is 
important to the atomist as well.  For a discussion of the proper relationship between individual and 
collective humanity, see section 4.2.5 below.
65 In frr. 710, 750, 783, and 784 Luria, Democritus refers to the body as a σκῆνος.  This is the Tean word 
for tent, and its occurrence in the fragments is a small confirmation of their authenticity as products of 
Democritus' cultural milieu—since Abdera was a colony of Teos, and the two share many elements of 
culture (including language).  See Procopé (1989), LSJ s.v. σκῆνος, and chapter 1.2 above.   
66 Remember that no atoms in the early atomist multiverse are predictably immobile (note 43 above).  
The atoms of the individual soul in vivo are thus always experiencing some kind of motion. 
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changes the body's movement (since this is a function of soul movement).  Perceiving the 
shape of a tiger in the grass typically makes my soul move such that my body expresses 
itself in movements conventionally designated by words like fear or caution.
In certain situations (e.g. my encounter with the tiger), material necessity dictates 
the nature of my response—the issue of the encounter between the tiger's εἴδωλα, my 
material ψυχή, and my body (σκῆνος)—narrowly.  I must respond to the tiger's shape 
appropriately within a narrow time-frame or run a high risk of disintegrating suddenly 
(when the tiger responds to my εἴδωλα by eating me).  Here the nature of an appropriate 
kinetic response is necessarily limited by particular factors that vary between individual 
organisms and environments—e.g. my inherent aptitude for fighting or fleeing, my 
proximity to the tiger, and the presence or absence of other phenomena in the area (e.g. 
tools, weapons, allies, enemies).  If I am unfit for fighting and my environment offers 
inadequate opportunity for flight or external succor (from allies who might assist me), 
then the issue of my shape meeting the tiger's is probably death or (at least) some severe 
dismemberment (which will deform my human shape and cripple it for the rest of its 
temporal existence, an existence which may be foreshortened).  
Here, in an acute encounter with the possibility of sudden death, the pleasure of 
survival becomes intense—and survivors who meet with a lucky accident cultivate its 
recurrence without obvious ill effects, learning from their impressions to mould human 
shape for fighting, fleeing, and venturing in company into the territory of dangerous wild 
animals.  Once human shape has been thus moulded—such that it consciously possesses 
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the resources historically valuable in defeating an acute κίνδυνος like the tiger—then it 
can only pray, with Democritus,67 that particular instances of that κίνδυνος in its unique 
individual experience happen when it is ready.  I pray that tigers chance upon me only 
when my internal and external circumstances mean that I am able to escape death the way 
other human shapes have done before me.  I pray that they do not find me when the 
relationship between my ψυχή and σκῆνος is seriously disturbed (e.g. by sleep or some 
drug68), that they do not catch me in an environment where the resources I have cultivated 
(weapons, allies, skills for fighting and/or fleeing) are useless.
As extant, Democritus' Morallehre recognizes the importance of learning (taking 
material impressions) from instances of acute danger,69 but his main focus lies elsewhere.  
In what remains of his work, he does not address those people who never see the tiger.  
His instructions for swimming70 are not aimed at those whose first encounter with deep 
water proves fatal. Being foolish, from his perspective, is not the same thing as being 
unlucky (i.e. meeting the tiger or the deep water when one is unprepared to survive the 
encounter because of unpredictable circumstances that influence one's human shape at a 
particular moment).71  Democritus' fools are not those whom the tiger (or the deep water) 
surprises, but those whose successful encounters with particular tigers (or a particular 
67 Remember Democritus' prayer to meet with propitious images in fr. 472a Luria: Δημόκριτος μὲν γὰρ 
εὔχεσθαι φησι δεῖν, ὅπως εὐλόγχων εἰδώλων τυγχάνωμεν, καὶ τὰ σύμφυλα καὶ τὰ χρηστὰ μᾶλλον 
ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἢ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ σκαιὰ συμφέρηται (Plut. Aem. 1.4).
68 Remember that prudent thought can only occur when the soul's mixture is properly balanced— 
συμμέτρως ἐχούσης τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν κρῆσιν (fr. 460 Luria, quoted in full on page 311).  Anything 
that disturbs that (physical) balance in the (material) soul threatens the integrity of human shape. 
69 Human life is inherently and invariably characterized by necessities and disasters that we must be 
concerned to recognize and meet: see frr. 646 Luria (page 310) and 717 Luria (page 250).
70 See fr. 33 Luria, quoted on page 313 above.
71 See fr. 593 Luria, quoted below on page 337 and discussed thereafter. 
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bodies of deep water) impress them with a false and dangerous sense of complacency.72  
Democritus aims to reform those who think cultivating moral success means embracing 
every pleasure uncritically, without limit—the same way we would embrace the pleasure 
of surviving an acute encounter with a tiger or some deep water.  
Encountering acute danger—a tiger or a treacherous body of water—we do not 
naturally wish to suffer any material damage.  In such situations, our natural desire is to 
keep the pleasure of survival utterly unmixed and unlimited—we do not desire to come 
out only partially mauled or half-drowned (even if that is the issue of our efforts).  But 
not all pleasure is like the pleasure of surviving a tiger attack (or death by drowning).  
The pleasure of eating, to give one example offered by Democritus (a4), should not be 
unmixed: unless it is limited by the pain of starving, it becomes fatal.  When we come to 
dine, then, we must desire pain—limiting our eating pleasure and cherishing that limit as 
assiduously as the most intense pleasure, if we want to avoid ruining the integrity of our 
human shape (a5).  This is where the ethics of Democritus become useful, explaining to 
fortunate survivors of acute danger how to disarm the human soul of its natural tendency 
to desire all pleasures unmixed and unlimited—a natural tendency which inclines human 
shape away from acute dangers (like the tiger) and towards more subtle, but no less fatal, 
dangers (like the danger of eating too much and/or starving too little).
72 Thriving at the table of chance (fr. 759 Luria, quoted above in note 48), the foolish do not realize that 
their success is precarious, and so they never bother to acquire σωφροσύνη through education.  In the 
metaphor made famous most recently by Taleb (2010), they are turkeys that take great pleasure living 
as captive dependents until the butcher slaughters them for Thanksgiving. 
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Democritus' Recipe for Human Happiness (4.2.3)
Disarming subtle tendencies toward destruction that lurk in the human soul 
requires some understanding of what these tendencies are—i.e. their pathology—and 
what resources human experience offers us for coping with them.  At what point does the 
soul's experience of pleasure cease to be useful as an indicator of which moral behaviors 
to cultivate?  How do we cultivate the lucky accident that lets us eat—and experience the 
pleasure of eating—without falling prey to the unlucky accident of destroying our health 
through eating too much?  How do we separate the necessary pleasure of eating from the 
unnecessary pleasure of eating too much, the necessary habit (i) of nourishment from the 
unnecessary habit (ii) of gluttony?  The Democritean ethical corpus provides a wealth of 
information showing that the atomist gave questions like these serious thought.  In fact, 
he even offers an answer, a recipe for cultivating moral habits (i) that build the integrity 
of human shape more than they tear it down.  In order to understand this recipe, we must 
remind ourselves of the way that Democritus understands human nature.  We must see his 
portrait of the human condition, his understanding of the human soul (as it exists in 
mankind generically and in each human being particularly).  
We have seen that Democritus conceives human shape (ῥυσμός) as a plastic 
material compound that disintegrates inevitably (like every other material compound in 
the multiverse), experiencing vicissitudes whose only possible outcome is death:
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TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Luria, Krivushina)
(a) γινώσκειν  χρεὼν  ἀνθρωπίνην  βιοτὴν 
ἀφαυρήν  τε  ἐοῦσαν  καὶ  ὀλιγοχρόνιον 
πολλῆισίν  τε  κηρσὶ  συμπεφυρμένην  καὶ 
ἀμηχανίηισιν ... 
Bisogna  prendere  consapevolezza  della 
fragilità  e  della  brevità  della  vita  umana, 
che si rivela anche intessuta di molteplici 
sciagure e bisogni ... 
Democritus, fr. B285 DK
     = fr. D150 Taylor
     = fr. 646 Luria
Stob. 4.34.65
This means that Democritus recognizes absolutely no outcome in human experience that 
is purely positive (in the sense that it strengthens the integrity of human shape without 
also threatening to destroy it): 
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (Taylor)
(b) ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ γίγνεται, ἀπὸ τῶν 
αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθ' 
ἄν,  τῶν  τε  κακῶν  ἐκτὸς  εἴημεν.  αὐτίκα 
ὕδωρ βαθὺ εἰς πολλὰ χρήσιμον καὶ δαὖτε 
κακόν· κίνδυνος γὰρ ἀποπνιγῆναι. μηχανὴ 
οὖν εὑρέθη, νήχεσθαι διδάσκειν.  (Luria)
From the very same things as benefit us we 
may also get evils, and escape from evils. 
For example, deep water is useful for many 
things,  and  then  again  bad;  for  there  is 
danger of drowning. So a remedy has been 
discovered, teaching people to swim.
Democritus, fr. B172 DK
     = fr. D37 Taylor
     = fr. 33 Luria
Stob. 2.9.1
Every evolution in human shape necessarily leaves it exposed to the κῆρες and ἀμηχανίαι 
already mentioned (a).  Inevitably, the material circumstances that create human life also 
destroy it: escaping one death moves us marginally closer toward embracing another one, 
until eventually our ability to resist under pressure is exhausted and we dissolve.  In 
medical terms, the drugs that cure human illness are also poisons capable of causing it.  
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In historical terms, those of us fortunate enough to escape the Charybdis of acute external 
disaster (e.g. the tiger or deep water discussed above) rush headlong into the Scylla of our 
own internal weakness, a fragility that exists inherent in our shape, particularly that inner 
part of our shape that directs our movement—i.e. the soul (ψυχή) that wrecks the body 
with its φιληδονίαι in fr. 776 Luria (quoted on page 328 above).  Numerous fragments 
illustrate how Democritus imagines the soul of the lucky survivor (the man who survives 
external threats against his life) weakening the integrity of his shape, inclining the course 
of his life naturally toward premature ruin:   
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
(c) λέγωμεν οὖν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι πολλὰ μέν, ὦ 
ἄνθρωπε, σοῦ καὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματα καὶ 
πάθη  φύσει  τε  ἀνίησιν  ἐξ  ἑαυτοῦ  καὶ 
προσπίπτοντα  δέχεται  θύραθεν·  ἂν  δὲ 
σαυτὸν ἀνοίξηις ἔνδοθεν, ποικίλον τι καὶ 
πολυπαθὲς  κακῶν  ταμιεῖον  εὑρήσεις  καὶ 
θησαύρισμα,  ὥς  φησι  Δημόκριτος,  οὐκ 
ἔξωθεν ἐπιρρεόντων, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐγγείους 
καὶ αὐτόχθονας πηγὰς ἐχόντων, ἃς ἀνίησιν 
ἡ κακία πολύχυτος καὶ δαψιλὴς οὖσα τοῖς 
πάθεσιν. 
Let  us  say  among  ourselves,  friend,  that 
your  body  produces  many  diseases  and 
affections from its own nature, and that it 
receives many others from outside. If you 
open  yourself  up  on  the  inside,  you  will 
find something elaborate and susceptible of 
many passions,  a  storehouse  and treasury 
of evils, as Democritus says—not the kind 
that flow down upon you from the outside, 
but such as have native and autochthonous 
springs  produced  by  the  evil  that  exists 
diffuse  and  profuse  in  our  emotional 
experiences. (my translation)
Democritus, fr. B149 DK
     = fr. D33 Taylor
     = fr. 776a Luria
Plut. Animine an corp. aff. 2.500d
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(d) ὑγιείην  εὐχῆισι  παρὰ  θεῶν αἰτέονται 
ἄνθρωποι,  τὴν  δὲ  ταύτης  δύναμιν  ἐν 
ἑαυτοῖς  ἔχοντες  οὐκ  ἴσασιν·  ἀκρασίηι  δὲ 
τἀναντία πρήσσοντες  αὐτοὶ  προδόται  τῆς 
ὑγείης τῆισιν ἐπιθυμίηισιν γίνονται.
People  ask  the  gods  for  health  in  their 
prayers, but do not realize that the control 
of  their  health  lies  with  them [lit. inside 
them]; through lack of self-control they act 
in opposition to it and so themselves betray 
their  health  to  their  desires.  (Taylor,  
supplemented)
Democritus, fr. B234 DK
     = fr. D98 Taylor
     = fr. 593 Luria
Stob.  3.18.30;  Maxim.  L.  c.  27.612  (PG 
91:875a);  Ant.  Melissa  1.39.79  (PG 
136:913d); CPP 691
(e)  ἀνοήμονες ῥυσμοῦνται τοῖς τῆς τύχης 
κέρδεσιν, οἱ δὲ τῶν τοιῶνδε δαήμονες τοῖς 
τῆς σοφίης.
The  uncomprehending  are  shaped  by  the 
profits of chance, but those with experience 
of such things are shaped by the profits of 
wisdom. (my translation)
Democritus, fr. B197 DK
     = fr. D61 Taylor
     = fr. 798 Luria
Stob. 3.4.71
(f) ὧν  τὸ  σκῆνος  χρήιζει,  πᾶσι  πάρεστιν 
εὐμαρέως  ἄτερ  μόχθου  καὶ  ταλαιπωρίης· 
ὁκόσα δὲ μόχθου καὶ ταλαιπωρίης χρήιζει 
καὶ βίον ἀλγύνει, τούτων οὐκ ἰμείρεται τὸ 
σκῆνος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς γνώμης κακοθηγίη.73
What the body requires is easily available 
to all without toil and moil; the body does 
not desire things that require toil and moil 
and  make  life  painful,  but  the  ill-honed 
state of mind does. (my translation)
Democritus, fr. B223 DK
     = fr. D87 Taylor
     = fr. 750 Luria
Stob. 3.10.65
73 Luria seems right to prefer the MSS reading κακοθηγίη over emendations (Diels' κακοθιγίη or 
Wilamowitz' κακοηθίη), and I tentatively endorse his derivation of this abstract noun from the Homeric 
verb θήγω, meaning to sharpen (LSJ s.v.).  This usage would agree well with the understanding of 
mind that Democritus expresses elswhere, e.g. fr. 49 Luria: δηλοῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὅτι ἐτεῆι 
οὐδὲν ἴδμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἐπιρυσμίη ἑκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις (Sext. Adv. Math. 7.137).  In human 
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(g) ἡ  τοῦ  πλέονος  ἐπιθυμίη  τὸ  παρεὸν 
ἀπόλλυσι  τῆι  Αἰσωπείηι  κυνὶ  ἰκέλη 
γινομένη.
The desire for more destroys what one has, 
like the dog in Aesop's fable.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B224 DK
     = fr. D88 Taylor
     = fr. 645 Luria
Stob. 3.10.68
(h) οἱ τῶν φειδωλῶν παῖδες ἀμαθέες γινό-
μενοι,  ὥσπερ  οἱ  ὀρχησταὶ  οἱ  ἐς  τὰς 
μαχαίρας ὀρούοντες, ἢν ἑνὸς μούνου <μὴ> 
τύχωσι  καταφερόμενοι,  ἔνθα  δεῖ  τοὺς 
πόδας  ἐρεῖσαι,  ἀπόλλυνται  χαλεπὸν  δὲ 
τυχεῖν  ἑνός·  τὸ  γὰρ  ἴχνιον  μοῦνον 
λέλειπται τῶν ποδῶν οὕτω δὲ καὶ οὗτοι, 
ἢν  ἁμάρτωσι  τοῦ  πατρικοῦ  τύπου  τοῦ 
ἐπιμελέος  καὶ  φειδωλοῦ,  φιλέουσι  δια-
φθείρεσθαι.
If  they  turn  unlearned,  the  children  of 
thrifty  people perish just  like the dancers 
who  plunge  among  the  swords  and  fall 
when  they  miss  the  one  and  only  place 
where they must plant their feet. This place 
is  difficult  to  hit  upon,  for  only  a  small 
track is left behind for the feet, and in the 
same way if these people miss the careful 
and  thrifty  mould  [impression,  engraved 
mark]  of  their  fathers,  they  are  wont  to 
destroy themselves.  (my translation) 
Democritus, fr. B228 DK
     = fr. D92 Taylor
     = fr. 629 Luria
Stob. 3.16.18
Infected by an evil that dwells profuse and diffuse in its innermost nature as a temporary 
material compound, human shape becomes permanently vulnerable.  It carries hidden 
diseases inside, νοσήματα καὶ πάθη that await the right environmental circumstances to 
emerge in morbidly pathological forms (c).  The circumstances that call forth these κακά
—turning them from latent possibilities inherent in generic human shape into malignant 
realities that affect particular instances of human shape—are both (1) external and (2) 
experience as imagined by Democritus, the recurrence of certain material circumstances results 
predictably in thought that is poorly sharpened.  Education consists of reforming human shape (the 
shape of the soul in particular) such that it becomes minimally susceptible to such moments of 
dullness, i.e. minimally liable to misperceive its environment in ways likely to prove destructive.
338
internal.  (1) Sometimes, we fall ill primarily as a result of foreign matter striking us from 
the outside and disfiguring our shape (e.g. when tigers attack or we stumble into deep 
water).  (2) Other times, the primary cause of disease is internal: particles within our 
shape move in ways that threaten its integrity unnecessarily (e.g. when we hallucinate a 
tiger and respond by running scared into a body of deep water, even though we cannot 
swim: our emotional reaction to the imaginary tiger finds kinetic expression in behavior 
that precipitates disintegration needlessly). 
While there is little that human shape can do to control (1) what impinges on it 
from the outside world (i.e. what foreign εἴδωλα it meets and must respond to emotively 
in any particular moment in time),74 it can exert significant control over (2) its inner state 
(i.e. the condition of its soul, an atomic compound whose mutable mixture necessarily 
influences how it perceives and responds to whatever stimuli the environment happens to 
provide).75  Lacking the insight that illness is internal as well as external—that κακά are a 
function of our internal reaction(s) as much as external circumstances—men naively pray 
for health (ὑγιείη) as though it were a purely external benefit arising utterly outside their 
control (d).  Ignoring their opportunity to anticipate disease (which we all carry latent) 
and mitigate its effects through prophylactic alteration of their internal state, they let the 
shape of that state evolve purely—and unnecessarily—by chance (e).  Chance may be 
kind to them, feeding the integrity of their shape well at its rich table,76 but the odds are 
against this because of the diseases latent in that shape (c).  These diseases arise chiefly 
74 See the discussion on pages 332-347 above (citing fr. 472a Luria).
75 See note 68 above, citing fr. 460 Luria.
76 See the discussion of fr. 759 Luria on pages 236-252 above.
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from the soul, which is not inclined to be satisfied with the small, simple pleasures that 
the body requires (d)—pleasures that arise from maintaining basic physical integrity.  
Left to develop its shape purely by chance, the soul of the lucky human survivor easily 
desires more and more of whatever pleasures it encounters en route to survival, until it 
passes the point of safety and destroys the integrity of its shape with the unlimited desire 
for more—ἡ τοῦ πλέονος ἐπιθυμίη (g).
While it is conceivable that the lucky survivor might stumble ἀμαθής upon the 
moral habits necessary to control his pleasures and keep them from being dangerous, it is 
no safe bet that he will.  Consider the children of misers that Democritus discusses in (h): 
they might fortuitously inherit the τύπος of their parents, avoiding potentially lethal 
φιληδονίαι without conscious exertion (in the form of education that would displace their 
ἀμαθία), but this outcome is unlikely.  Circumstances conspire to deform the shape of 
these naively ascetic children, inundating them with pleasures that tempt them away from 
the strait and narrow path whose existence they do not even perceive until they have 
fallen in love with some particular pleasure and cultivated its recurrence to the point of 
destroying themselves.77  As long as they possess no internal psychic defenses against 
φιληδονίαι, no means for rejecting pleasure before it turns to potentially lethal pain, their 
integrity is never safe.  Assuming they are lucky survivors, escaping the acute disasters 
(κῆρες, ἀμηχανίαι) inherent in generic human experience (a), every particular pleasure 
that they experience recommends potentially deadly φιληδονία to them as an unqualified, 
77 χαλεπὸν δὲ τυχεῖν ἑνός (i.e.  ἔνθα δεῖ τοὺς πόδας ἐρεῖσαι) ... ἢν ἁμάρτωσι τοῦ πατρικοῦ τύπου τοῦ 
ἐπιμελέος καὶ φειδωλοῦ, φιλέουσι διαφθείρεσθαι (h).
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unlimited good.78  Ignorant that chance delivers many very different outcomes, they sit at 
its table heedlessly, partaking of pleasures ad libitum without reflecting that too much of 
any particular one might prove fatal (and that people do not always perceive the fatal 
dosage of any seeming pleasure before ingesting it).
What the lucky survivor needs is some conscious strategy for avoiding the danger 
to which his success exposes him (i.e. a some predictably recurring psychic impression 
that directs his shape towards the necessary pleasure of eating without allowing it to be 
lured into the unnecessary pain of gluttony).  In the world as Democritus perceives it, the 
lucky survivor cannot cheat death forever.  Impressed by his successful avoidance of 
acute danger, he cannot help cultivating moral habits that lead him away from pain (e.g. 
things that remind him of tigers) and towards pleasure (e.g. things that remind him of 
food).  He cannot help the fact that his necessary fear of pain and love for pleasure will at 
some point beguile him into moral mistakes (when some medicine necessary for his 
integrity is bitter, or some poison dangerous to his integrity is sweet).  But he can take 
steps to make those mistakes minimally harmful to him, minimally likely to dissolve his 
physical integrity before it must dissolve naturally, as all compound ῥυσμοί in the early 
atomist διάκοσμος do.  He can hedge the bets he must make every time he decides to 
avoid a particular pain or embrace a particular pleasure.  This hopeful reality appears 
throughout the Democritean ethical corpus, implicit in contrasts like the one that we have 
78 Behold ἡ κακία πολύχυτος καὶ δαψιλὴς οὖσα τοῖς πάθεσιν (c): the pleasure of surviving disaster under 
particular circumstances naturally leads to human moral habits calculated to cultivate the recurrence of 
these circumstances (see page 318 above).  But the issue of these experiments in particular instances 
remains uncertain (such that my pleasure in eating yesterday is no guarantee of my pleasure today).
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just seen Democritus make between the ἀνοήμονες who trust themselves blindly to luck 
and the δαήμονες who rely instead on wisdom (e).79  How can the lucky survivor join the 
company of these δαήμονες?  Democritus has an answer for this question, a prescription 
for cultivating reliable human happiness:
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (my translation)
(i) ἀνθρώποισι  γὰρ  εὐθυμίη  γίνεται 
μετριότητι τέρψιος καὶ βίου συμμετρίηι· τὰ 
δ'  ἐλλείποντα  καὶ  ὑπερβάλλοντα  μετα-
πίπτειν  τε  φιλεῖ  καὶ  μεγάλας  κινήσιας 
ἐμποιεῖν  τῆι  ψυχῆι.  αἱ  δ'  ἐκ  μεγάλων 
διαστημάτων  κινούμεναι  τῶν  ψυχέων 
οὔτε εὐσταθέες εἰσὶν οὔτε εὔθυμοι. ἐπὶ τοῖς 
δυνατοῖς  οὖν  δεῖ  ἔχειν  τὴν  γνώμην  καὶ 
τοῖς  παρεοῦσιν  ἀρκέεσθαι  τῶν  μὲν 
ζηλουμένων  καὶ  θαυμαζομένων  ὀλίγην 
μνήμην  ἔχοντα  καὶ  τῆι  διανοίαι  μὴ 
προσεδρεύοντα,  τῶν  δὲ  ταλαιπωρεόντων 
τοὺς  βίους  θεωρέειν,  ἐννοούμενον  ἃ 
πάσχουσι κάρτα, ὅκως ἂν τὰ παρεόντα σοι 
καὶ  ὑπάρχοντα  μεγάλα  καὶ  ζηλωτὰ 
φαίνηται,  καὶ  μηκέτι  πλειόνων  ἐπιθυμέ-
οντι  συμβαίνηι  κακοπαθεῖν  τῆι  ψυχῆι.  ὁ 
γὰρ θαυμάζων τοὺς ἔχοντας καὶ μακαριζο-
μένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆι 
μνήμηι  πᾶσαν  ὥραν  προσεδρεύων  ἀεὶ 
ἐπικαινουργεῖν  ἀναγκάζεται  καὶ  ἐπι-
βάλλεσθαι  δι'  ἐπιθυμίην  τοῦ  τι  πρήσσειν 
ἀνήκεστον ὧν νόμοι κωλύουσιν. διόπερ τὰ 
μὲν  μὴ  δίζεσθαι  χρεών,  ἐπὶ  δὲ  τοῖς 
εὐθυμέεσθαι  χρεών,  παραβάλλοντα  τὸν 
ἑαυτοῦ  βίον  πρὸς  τὸν  τῶν  φαυλότερον 
πρησσόντων  καὶ  μακαρίζειν  ἑωτὸν  ἐν-
Human beings experience cheerfulness [lit.  
a  good  state  of  mind,  soul,  or  spirit]  by 
limiting their pleasure and maintaining  due 
proportion in life. For instances of lack and 
surfeit  are  wont  to  change  the  soul  and 
create  great  movements  in  it,  and  souls 
moved  over  great  intervals  are  not  well-
founded or cheerful [in a good state]. For 
this  reason  it  is  necessary  to  keep  one's 
mind on things that are possible and to be 
satisfied  with  things  as  they  are,  holding 
little memory of  people that are envied and 
admired and refusing to set your thought on 
them. Instead you should contemplate the 
lives of those that fare miserably, reflecting 
on  their  extreme  suffering  so  that  your 
present circumstances and possessions may 
seem  great  and  enviable,  and  your  soul 
may  no  longer  suffer  harm  through  its 
desire for more. For the one who admires 
people that have things and are considered 
happy by other men dwells all the time on 
his mental impression of them. Always he 
is forced to devise new things, attempting 
because  of  his  desire  to  do  something 
pernicious that laws forbid. For this reason 
you  should  not  desire  things  but  become 
content  with  them,  comparing  your  life 
79 See also frr. 32 Luria (where τύχη is contrasted with φρόνησις / ὀξυδερκείη), fr. 609 Luria (where 
ἀναλγησίη is contrasted with φρόνησις), and 759 Luria (where τύχη is contrasted with σωφροσύνη).  
As Democritus offers them, these contrasts assume that people can consciously cultivate moral habits 
that avoid unnecessary evil outcomes (e.g. sickness resulting from gluttony) without precluding 
necessary good ones (e.g. the health that comes from eating).
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θυμεύμενον ἃ πάσχουσιν, ὁκόσωι αὐτέων 
βέλτιον πρήσσει τε καὶ διάγει.  ταύτης γὰρ 
ἐχόμενος  τῆς  γνώμης  εὐθυμότερόν  τε 
διάξεις καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγας κῆρας ἐν τῶι βίωι 
διώσεαι, φθόνον καὶ ζῆλον καὶ δυσμενίην. 
with the life of those who fare worse and 
blessing  your  happiness  as  you  ponder 
what they suffer, how much better you fare 
than they do. Keeping this  state of mind, 
you will live more cheerfully and will drive 
back80 not a few ills in life: envy, rivalry, 
and enmity.     
Democritus, fr. B191 DK
     = fr. D55 Taylor
     = fr. 657 Luria
Stob. 3.1.210
In previous chapters, we have seen how Democritus describes human psychology—how 
the worldview of the early atomist διάκοσμος offers him resources for understanding and 
illustrating what happens when human individuals and communities come into being as 
material shapes, grow to maturity, age into senescence, and die.81  This fragment takes 
that description of human life—a description that aims to portray humanity accurately as 
it exists collectively and individually, in general and in particular—and uses it to provide 
a prescription for living well, i.e. for maximizing human exposure to the state of being 
80 For comparanda justifying my choice of words here, I refer the reader to LSJ, s.v. διωθέω, and to the 
translation offered by Diels, who renders this verb (correctly in my view) as verscheuchen.  Some 
mistakenly translate the verb as though it meant simply to avoid—e.g. respingere (Krivushina) or 
избегнуть (Luria).  Coming from the Latin averto (see LS s.v.), Taylor's avert is much better (and 
technically correct) but still not strong enough in my view, since modern English usage of that verb 
allows too much leeway for a careless reader to presume that Democritus here imagines the εὔθυμος 
evading or preventing κῆρες when the atomist's language has him confronting and displacing them 
physically—e.g. the way soldiers confront enemy defenses on the battlefield (Herodot. 9.102; Xen. 
Cyropaed. 7.5.39; Polyb. 11.1.12) or the way flooding rivers displace salt water where they run into the 
ocean (Polyb. 4.41.4).  The point at issue here is important.  Democritus' εὔθυμος is not a naïve saint 
who remains utterly untouched by dangerous human emotion: he is a wise soldier who knows how to 
neutralize its battalions, a savvy engineer who knows how to dam its incoming tides.       
81 For the Democritean perspective on the ψυχή as it exists in individual organisms (e.g. individual 
human beings), see chapter 2.3-4.  For the Democritean perspective on the ψυχή as it exists in human 
collectives historically (as societies germinate and develop over time), see chapter 3.2-3. 
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that Democritus here calls εὐθυμίη.82  This state of being exists in the human soul, θυμός 
being another word for the part or parts of human shape that permit and facilitate the way 
that shape adapts and evolves in response to external stimuli.  It arises (γίνεται) when 
pleasure is limited (μετριότητι τέρψιος)—by means of a material process that Democritus 
describes much as we would expect him to, given what we know about his outlook on 
human psychology.
Like every process in the early atomist διάκοσμος, this one is driven by material 
necessity (ἀνάγκη).  Of necessity human shape always finds itself swimming more or 
less intact in a sea of evolving physical circumstances.  Of necessity these circumstances 
impress themselves upon it, and it expresses the resulting impressions as movement (both 
internal and external as soul-atoms interact with body-atoms and external atoms to move 
the σκῆνος that gives a particular human shape coherence).  Some circumstances impress 
human shape with its lack of something (τὰ ἐλλείποντα), motivating it to move toward 
that which it perceives itself to want.  Others impress it with surfeit (τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα), 
motivating it to express kinetic avoidance or indifference toward that of which it already 
possesses more than enough.  If human shape is not careful, it lets this generic reality—
82 Here it is helpful to remember that Democritus does not use particular words definitively (to establish 
precisely what the general referent must be in every particular instance) or exclusively (such that he 
cannot use different words to gesture toward the same referent).  In Democritus' formulation (see fr. 
563 Luria, quoted on page 256), words are arbitrary signs pointing toward phenomena that exist 
independent of them: thus there is not necessarily any hard distinction between θυμός and ψυχή in 
Democritean thought, between φρόνησις and εὐθυμίη (and other, similar words Democritus uses to 
designate what happens to human shape when it retains its integrity without unnecessary suffering: 
Arius Didymus' catalogue of different Democritean words for happiness remains extant in Stob. 2.7.31 
= fr. 742 Luria).  What matters for Democritus is not the identity of any particular word, but his 
audience's ability to use it as a window onto empirical reality—the material phenomena that Epicureans 
unfairly accuse him of denying.  
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its natural tendency to perceive lack and surfeit—lure it into destructive habits, when it 
perceives other shapes around it suffering lack or surfeit well and becomes dangerously 
fascinated with attempting to reproduce their experience as its own.  Of necessity, the 
human shape fascinated with some particular circumstance cannot help dwelling on its 
memory (μνήμη) of that circumstance: it is forced (ἀναγκάζεται) to use its impression of 
success to develop new moral habits (ἐπικαινουργεῖν ... καὶ ἐπιβάλλεσθαι δι' ἐπιθυμίην 
τοῦ τι πρήσσειν) from which it hopes to derive the success it sees other shapes enjoying 
(or facilitating for shapes like its own).  Here it runs directly into the trap we have just 
discussed (a, b, c, f, g, h): every human success contains inherent in itself the seeds of 
potentially disastrous failure (a, b); the human shape that cultivates an unlimited appetite 
for the pleasure of success suffers unnecessary (f) harm (κακοπαθεῖν), when the outcome 
of following a particular emotion toward some pleasure or away from some pain proves 
unexpectedly hurtful to it in some particular instance.83  
Here it is useful to recall the inventors of the mule84 and the primitives who learn 
beneficial moral habits from animals.85  Impressed by material circumstances in their 
vicinity that appear favorable (pleasant), these ἄνθρωποι cultivate the recurrence of those 
circumstances in ways that they expect to prove more beneficial than harmful to human 
shape (their own and that of others around them).  In hindsight, we remember these naive 
innovators as successful (μακαριζόμενοι) because their experiments (ἐπικαινουργεῖν)  
turned out well for humanity, but this happy outcome was not inevitable: consider what 
83 As the children of thrifty folk discover when they miss the τύπος of their parents (h).
84 See fr. 561 Luria, quoted on page 229.
85 See fr. 559 Luria, quoted on page 190.
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might happen to the man whose experience with domestic horses inspired him to attempt  
to domesticate the zebra or the hippopotamus.86  Democritus' ethical teaching exists to 
confront the empirical reality that innovations are often more destructive to the integrity 
of human shape (individual and collective) than beneficial.  The same restless ἐπιθυμίη 
that gives us civilization in the last chapter afflicts us with unnecessary pain and suffering 
in this one—unnecessary κακοπαθεῖν that Democritean education aims to correct via 
psychic reformation whose outcome is to blunt desire for innovation enough that the 
human shape does not pursue it with reckless abandon, eating at the polytelic table of 
τύχη rather than the simple but self-sufficient table of σωφροσύνη (fr. 759 Luria).
Democritus' moral injunction for the lucky survivor in (i) is simple: focus your 
mental reflection (γνώμη) on the desirable things you already have (τὰ παρεόντα σοι καὶ 
ὑπάρχοντα) rather than the desirable things you might have (things that make others in 
your vicinity envied and admired ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων).  Cultivate the habit of 
directing psychic desire—the ἐπιθυμίη infecting every human shape—toward things that 
are already part of your particular circumstances.  Resist the temptation to emulative envy 
86 We know Democritus confronted the reality of negative innovation directly: the general principle that 
good and evil arise from the same material circumstances appears clear in fr. 33 Luria (b).  Discussing 
the historical process of trial and error whereby humanity changes its primitive animal νόμοι into 
modern humane ones, the Epicurean Lucretius imagines primitive soldiers attempting to use many 
different wild animals as cavalry, proving by pleasant and unpleasant experience that horses work 
where bulls, boars, and lions do not (5.1297-1349).  It is quite possible that Lucretius borrows this 
particular account of positive and negative innovation directly from Democritus: he offers it as coming 
from another author, whom he does not identify as Epicurus (5.1341-1346).  Even if Democritus is not 
the source for this particular story, as he might not be, it is definitely one that he would endorse.  
Sometimes, the urge to innovate keeps us alive and victorious on the battlefield—e.g. when we ride 
horses and the other side does not (or shows less skillful horsemanship).  Other times, that same urge 
destroys us—e.g. when we attempt to ride bulls, boars, or lions onto the same battlefield.  Lucretius' 
story of failed domestication thus fits right into the Democritean world-view that emerges in this 
chapter, which shows the evil face of ἐπικαινουργεῖν (i) as chapter 3 shows its good face.
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and admiration by comparing yourself not with other survivors who fare better than you 
but with those who fare worse (φαυλότερον).  Impressed with the positive gap between 
your circumstances and those of people faring worse (instead of the negative gap between 
your circumstances and those of people faring better), you will be happy (εὐθυμέεσθαι), 
i.e. maximally content with whatever lot the swirling vortex of material necessity grants 
you and minimally likely to endanger your integrity in that lot by attempting to improve 
it heedlessly, beyond its inherently limited capacity for improvement (a, b).  You will 
respect the native integrity of your particular human shape and guard it prudently against 
the material circumstances that threaten it with unnecessary pain and suffering.  You will 
eat what you need instead of what you (or others around you) may want, comparing the 
modest spread on your prudent table favorably with harsh famine at the table of τύχη 
rather than the deceptive abundance that is also there.  Unlike the hapless children of 
misers (h), you will avoid falling so much in love with the pleasure of desire that you 
cultivate the recurrence of certain material instances of it without any limit, risking loss 
of the goods that necessity makes possible and available87 for you in pursuit of foreign 
goods that she may not deliver (at least not in the form you imagine).88  You will not 
exceed the βίου συμμετρίη that allows human shape to experience the full range of its 
necessary developmental trajectory from birth to maturity to death.  The state of your 
87 τὸ παρεόν (g); τὰ δυνατά, τὰ παρεόντα, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα (i).
88 ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ γίγνεται, ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθ' ἄν (b); διόπερ τὰ 
μὲν μὴ δίζεσθαι χρεών (i).
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mind (θυμός, γνώμη, ψυχή)89 will not be that evil state90 that desires pain and suffering91 
which are not necessary to maintain the integrity of human shape.  Keeping this state of 
mind as you avoid the Charybdis of acute disaster (fatal tiger attacks, death by drowning) 
will leave your shape minimally vulnerable to the Scylla of chronic longing for unlimited 
success—the φιληδονίαι (4.2.2a5) and ἐπιθυμίη (g, i) that also wreck human shape.
Here as throughout the Democritean corpus, human shape (ῥυσμός)—along with 
all of its parts (σκῆνος, θυμός, ψυχή, νόος, γνώμη)—is portrayed as something material.  
Moral behavior exists materially, when certain clouds of atoms relate to one another 
kinetically in ways that human beings like Democritus can describe verbally as good 
(ἀγαθόν) or bad (κακόν).  Success and failure are material outcomes, the physical results 
of particular material circumstances occurring in particular places at particular times.  
When Democritus talks about movements in the soul—e.g. the μεγάλαι κινήσεις caused 
by instances of lack and surfeit in (i)—it seems clear that he refers to actual physical 
movements in a material entity.  Consider these familiar testimonia:
89 Notice that Democritus makes no attempt to differentiate definitively between these words: in (i) he 
uses all three interchangeably in one form or another to talk about the same material phenomena 
(human ῥυσμοί that integrate, grow by assimilation and adaptation, and disintegrate when particular 
clouds of atoms and void interact in the context of a κόσμος).  In light of fr. 563 Luria, this makes 
perfect sense and supports the thesis that Democritean thought shows coherence and consistency even 
if it is extant only in scattered fragments: see note 82 above. 
90 ἡ τῆς γνώμης κακοθηγίη (f).
91 μόχθος καὶ ταλαιπωρίη (f); κακοπαθεῖν (i).
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TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
(j) περὶ  δὲ  τοῦ  φρονεῖν  ἐπὶ  τοσοῦτον 
εἴρηκεν  ὅτι  γίνεται  συμμέτρως  ἐχούσης 
τῆς  ψυχῆς  κατὰ  τὴν  κρῆσιν·  ἐὰν  δὲ 
περίθερμός  τις  ἢ  περίψυχρος  γένηται, 
μεταλλάττειν  φησί.  δι'  ὅ  τι  καὶ  τοὺς 
παλαιοὺς καλῶς τοῦθ' ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶν 
ἀλλοφρονεῖν.  ὥστε  φανερόν,  ὅτι  τῆι 
κράσει τοῦ σώματος ποιεῖ τὸ φρονεῖν, ὅπερ 
ἴσως  αὐτῶι  καὶ  κατὰ  λόγον  ἐστί,  σῶμα 
ποιοῦντι τὴν ψυχήν.
Concerning  thought,  Democritus  says 
merely  that  “it  arises  when  the  soul's 
composition is  duly proportioned.”  But  if 
one  becomes  excessively  hot  or  cold,  he 
says,  thinking  is  transformed;  and  it  was 
for  some  such  reason,  the  ancients  well 
believed, that the mind became “deranged.” 
Thus it is clear that he explains thought by 
the  composition  of  the  body—a  view 
perhaps  not  unreasonable  in  one  who 
regards  the  soul  itself  as  corporeal. 
(Stratton)
Democritus, fr. A135 DK
     = fr. 113 Taylor
     = fr. 460 Luria
Theophr. De Sensu 58  
(k) ὁ  δὲ  Φαβωρῖνος  ...  λόγον  τινὰ  τοῦ 
Δημοκρίτου  παλαιὸν  ὥσπερ  ἐκ  καπνοῦ 
καθελὼν  ἠμαυρωμένον  οἷος  ἦν  ἐκ-
καθαίρειν καὶ διαλαμπρύνειν, ὑποθέμενος 
τοῦτο δὴ τοὐπιδήμιον ὅ φησι Δημόκριτος 
«ἐγκαταβυσσοῦσθαι  τὰ  εἴδωλα  διὰ  τῶν 
πόρων εἰς τὰ σώματα καὶ ποιεῖν τὰς κατὰ 
ὕπνον  ὄψεις  ἐπαναφερόμενα·  φοιτᾶν  δὲ 
ταῦτα πανταχόθεν ἀπιόντα καὶ σκευῶν καὶ 
ἱματίων καὶ φυτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ ζώιων ὑπὸ 
σάλου  πολλοῦ  καὶ  θερμότητος  οὐ  μόνον 
ἔχοντα  μορφοειδεῖς  τοῦ  σώματος  ἐκμε-
μαγμένας  ὁμοιότητας»  (ὡς  Ἐπίκουρος 
οἴεται  μέχρι  τούτου  Δημοκρίτωι  συν-
επόμενος,  ἐνταῦθα  δὲ  προλιπὼν  τὸν 
λόγον),  «ἀλλὰ  καὶ  τῶν  κατὰ  ψυχὴν 
κινημάτων καὶ βουλευμάτων ἑκάστωι καὶ 
ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν ἐμφάσεις ἀναλαμβάνοντα 
συνεφέλκεσθαι  καὶ  προσπίπτοντα  μετὰ 
τούτων  ὥσπερ  ἔμψυχα  φράζειν  καὶ 
διαγγέλλειν  τοῖς  ὑποδεχομένοις  τὰς  τῶν 
μεθιέντων  αὐτὰ  δόξας  καὶ  διαλογισμοὺς 
Favorinus … advanced an old argument of 
Democritus.  Taking it down all blackened 
with  smoke,  as  it  were,  he  set  about 
cleaning  and  polishing  it.  He  used  as 
foundation  the  familiar  commonplace 
found  in  Democritus  that  spectral  films 
penetrate  the  body through the pores  and 
that when they rise they make us see things 
in our sleep. These films that come to us 
emanate  from  everything—from  utensils, 
clothing,  plants,  and  especially  from 
animals,  because of  their  restlessness  and 
their warmth.  The films have not only the 
impressed physical  likeness  in  contour  of 
an  animal—so  far  Epicurus  agrees  with 
Democritus, though he drops the subject at 
this  stage—but they catch up and convey 
by attraction spectral copies of each man's 
mental  impulses,  designs,  moral  qualities, 
and  emotions.  When  they  strike  the 
recipient thus accompanied,  they speak to 
him, as if they were alive, and report to him 
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καὶ ὁρμάς, ὅταν ἐνάρθρους καὶ ἀσυγχύτους 
φυλάττοντα προσμίξηι τὰς εἰκόνας».     
the  thoughts,  reasoning,  and  impulses  of 
those  from whom they  escape,  whenever 
the  copies  are  still  preserved  whole  and 
undistorted till contact is made. (Minar)
Democritus, fr. A77 DK
     = fr. 133a Taylor
     = fr. 476 Luria
 
Plut. Quaest. Conv. 8.10.2 p. 734f-735a   
 
These are just two of many explicit testimonia in the early atomist corpus92 that illustrate 
Democritus' conception of the human shape as something corporeal: a material body 
(σκῆνος, σῶμα) animated by a material soul (θυμός, ψυχή, νόος, γνώμη) that exerts some 
determinative influence over the way in which the entire compound entity (ῥυσμός, 
κρῆσις) responds to physical stimuli in its environment.  Moral experiences93 arise and 
evolve in this shape over time as it responds kinetically to the material impressions its 
environment makes upon it, impressions mediated through continual waves of corporeal 
εἴδωλα that access the soul through pores in the body.  Moral experiences are necessary 
and inevitable, generically speaking: the same ἀνάγκη that creates man in a particular 
geographical location with a certain number of fingers94 obliges him to receive material 
impressions from his environment and respond to them.  Necessity's law of attraction 
(like seeks like)95 means that this environment inevitably offers us things like ourselves—
including other people, whose circumstances reach us as εἴδωλα recommending certain 
92 For more like these, see page 174 and the discussion on pages 227-232 above (of which the present 
discussion represents a reprise).  Consider also the materialist discussion of pleasure in 4.2.2.
93 φρονεῖν, ἀλλοφρονεῖν (j); τὰ κατὰ ψυχὴν κινήματα καὶ βουλεύματα ἑκάστωι καὶ ἤθη καὶ πάθη (k).
94 See fr. 103 Luria, quoted on pages 125-137 above.
95 See fr. 316 Luria, quoted on page 127 above.
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behaviors to us as pleasant and desirable (when we perceive them flourishing at the rich 
table of τύχη and conceive the desire to pull up a chair there ourselves).  
There is no avoiding the necessary reality that human shape encounters things in 
its environment and selectively cultivates what it likes: we will embrace things we like 
and flee things we do not.96  That is how we avoid the Charybdis of acute disaster, an 
immediately bitter pain that we naturally shun.97  But we do not have to embrace and flee 
things blindly, following our desire heedlessly until it proves unexpectedly, unpredictably 
deadly in some particular instance.  We do not have to be the mindless dolts who trust the 
evolution of their shape to luck (e), the foolish people who pray for health and then do 
nothing to cultivate it (d), or the unlucky children of thrifty people who fall in love with 
their own destruction (h).  Democritus gives us a method (i) for taming the Scylla of 
unlimited desire—a materialist διδαχή that moulds our plastic ῥυσμός,98 transforming it 
so that it becomes minimally vulnerable to any harm arising from material instances of 
pleasure its environment may offer.  
Democritus' method (i) does not make moral hazard disappear: remember that life 
is necessarily fraught with κῆρες and ἀμηχανίαι (a), νοσήματα and πάθη (c) that we can 
treat with more or less temporary success but never perfectly heal (since that would mean 
unmaking the necessary mortality of our compound material shape).  It merely improves 
96 See fr. 734 Luria: κατ' αὐτὸν (Δημόκριτον) ... εἶναι κριτήρια ... αἱρέσεως δὲ καὶ φυγῆς τὰ πάθη· τὸ μὲν 
γὰρ ὧι προσοικειούμεθα, τοῦτο αἱρετόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ὧι προσαλλοτριούμεθα, τοῦτο φευκτόν ἐστιν 
(Sext. Adv. math. 7.140). 
97 Speaking generically: our natural tendency to avoid tigers does not mean that we never confront them 
willingly in particular instances, any more than the natural tendency for human beings to have five 
fingers on each hand means that six-fingered men are impossible (fr. 103 Luria). 
98 See fr. 682 Luria: ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ (Clem. Strom. 
4.151; Stob. 2.31.65; Theodoret. 4.1, p. 100 Räder).
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our odds of doing well, helping our shape find its most stable (εὐσταθής) and well-
disposed (εὔθυμος) form—a form that leaves it minimally vulnerable to the vast psychic 
movements that Democritus finds responsible for unnecessary moral shipwreck (i).  
Simplified to its most basic form, Democritus' διδαχή looks like this: obliged as you are 
to witness material circumstances around yourself and cultivate the recurrence of those 
you like, guide your perception towards those things least likely to harm you.  Like the 
things around you that are least likely to kill you prematurely.  Pleasure is something you 
cannot avoid, a poison you must take.  So take the smallest and most infrequent doses of 
it that you can,99 forcing yourself to push away from the deceptively rich table of τύχη by 
deliberately impressing on your mind the worst of what that table has to offer.  Of course 
you will see its best, too, e.g. in the circumstances of those people around you whom 
others envy and admire (i), but you should not let their εἴδωλα become anything more 
than a fleeting ripple in your mind.  Erase the impression they make on you by directing 
your thought (γνώμη) constantly toward the circumstances of the unsuccessful (i).  
See that human life is uniformly short and miserable (a, c).  Rub your face in this 
reality constantly.  Impress it upon your soul until it becomes a μνήμη reshaping your 
ῥυσμός, a recurring psychic πάθος that drives you to eat at the lean table of σωφροσύνη 
instinctively (even though the material instances of pleasure there may appear few and 
unimpressive, at least initially, to someone who has eaten well from the abundant spread 
of τύχη).  In offering this advice, Democritus is simply acting on the observation that 
99 See fr. 757 Luria: τῶν ἡδέων τὰ σπανιώτατα γινόμενα μάλιστα τέρπει (Stob. 3.10.37).
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people who conscientiously prepare themselves for illness (a likely outcome to human 
life) and death (an inevitable one) are more likely to cope well with these circumstances 
than their counterparts who cherish naive hopes of avoiding all suffering until it finds 
them at last, unwary and unready.  People who impress upon their souls the reality that 
every pleasure is sometimes poisonous are less surprised by particular instances of this 
reality—and thus less likely to be harmed by them—than people who naively, foolishly 
assume that human experience includes some πάθη whose outcome is always wholly 
positive (ἀγαθόν), a position which Democritus consistently undermines.100  
In light of the foregoing, it appears that Vlastos (1945, 1946) is correct to describe 
Democritus' great psychic movements (i) as physical phenomena, contra Taylor (1967, 
1999).  In explicit terms, it is very plausible—not implausible, as Taylor (1999, 233) 
maintains—that Democritus originally intended expressions such as μεγάλαι κινήσεις (i) 
and αἱ δ' ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων κινούμεναι τῶν ψυχέων (i) to refer to physical 
motion (specifically cascading series of atomic collisions mediating interaction between 
individual human shapes and their environment).  Given that Democritus speaks of the 
soul as a material object, deliberately construing all its conventional properties (νόμοι)101 
as temporary expressions of an underlying material substrate (j, k), Vlastos' position is 
100 In addition to (a) and (b) in this section, consider fr. 612 Luria (wherein people experience trouble with 
their fellow-citizens whether or not they decide to engage in public business) and fr. 613 Luria 
(wherein rulers are treated unjustly in the current social ῥυθμός regardless of how they perform their 
duties).  The summation of this somewhat pessimistic outlook on the human condition occurs in fr. 12a 
Luria: νόσος οἴκου καὶ βίου γίνεται ὅκωσπερ καὶ σκήνεος (Stob. 4.40.21).  Disease is something that 
follows human shape throughout all its evolutions, always, and even the shape that eats at the table of 
prudence dies eventually, succumbing to the ἀμηχανίαι inherent in all human experience.
101 ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους καὶ κενόν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα νενομίσθαι (DK68A1 = Diog. 9.44). 
«νόμωι γὰρ χροίη, νόμωι γλυκύ, νόμωι πικρόν, ἐτεῆι δ' ἄτομα καὶ κενόν» (fr. 90 Luria = Galen. De 
elem. sec. Hipp. 1.2).  For more testimonia, see pages 133-145 above and (l, m) here. 
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already more probable than Taylor's a priori, and the more testimonia we examine, the 
more conclusive the case against Taylor becomes:     
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
(l) Δημόκριτος  ...  «νόμωι»  γάρ  φησι 
«γλυκύ, [καὶ] νόμωι πικρόν, νόμωι θερμόν, 
νόμωι  ψυχρόν,  νόμωι  χροιή,  ἐτεῆι  δὲ 
ἄτομα καὶ κενόν» (ὅπερ <ἔστι>·  νομίζεται 
μὲν  εἶναι  καὶ  δοξάζεται  τὰ  αἰσθητά,  οὐκ 
ἔστι  δὲ  κατ'  ἀλήθειαν  ταῦτα,  ἀλλὰ  τὰ 
ἄτομα μόνον καὶ τὸ κενόν).  (Luria)
For he says, “By convention sweet and by 
convention  bitter,  by  convention  hot,  by 
convention cold, by convention colour; but 
in reality atoms and void.” That is to say, 
the  sensible  qualities  are  conventionally 
considered  and  thought  to  exist,  but  in 
reality  they  do  not  exist,  but  only  atoms 
and void.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B9 DK
     = fr. 179a Taylor
     = fr. 55 Luria
Sext. Adv. Math. 7.135
(m) σημεῖον  δ'  ὡς  οὐκ  εἰσὶ  φύσει  τὸ  μὴ 
ταὐτα  πᾶσι  φαίνεσθαι  τοῖς  ζώιοις  ἀλλ'  ὃ 
ἡμῖν  γλυκύ,  τοῦτ'  ἄλλοις  πικρὸν  καὶ 
ἑτέροις  ὀξὺ  καὶ  ἄλλοις  δριμὺ  τοῖς  δὲ 
στρυφνὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δ' ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δ' 
αὐτοὺς  μεταβάλλειν  τῆι  κρήσει  κατὰ  τὰ 
πάθη καὶ τὰς ἡλικίας· ἧι καὶ φανερὸν ὡς ἡ 
διάθεσις αἰτία τῆς φαντασίας. (DK)
Proof that <the sensory qualities> are not 
objectively  real  is  found  in  the  fact  that 
they  do  not  appear  the  same  to  all 
creatures:  what  is  sweet  to  us  is  bitter  to 
others,  and  still  to  others  it  is  sour  or 
pungent or astringent; and similarly of the 
other  <sensory  qualities>.  Moreover 
Democritus  holds  that  'men  vary  in  their 
composition'  according  to  their  condition 
and age; whence it is evident that a man's 
physical  state  accounts  for  his  inner 
presentation. (Stratton, adapted)
Democritus, fr. A135 DK
     = fr. 113 Taylor
     = fr. 441 Luria
Theophr. De sens. 63-64 
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(n) κατὰ δὲ ζώιων ἔστιν ὧν φόνου καὶ μὴ 
φόνου ὧδε ἔχει· τὰ ἀδικέοντα καὶ θέλοντα 
ἀδικεῖν  ἀθῶιος  ὁ  κτείνων,  καὶ  πρὸς 
εὐεστοῦν  τοῦτο  ἔρδειν  μᾶλλον  ἢ  μή. 
κτείνειν  χρὴ  τὰ  πημαίνοντα  παρὰ  δίκην 
πάντα  περὶ  παντὸς·  καὶ  ταῦτα  ὁ  ποιῶν 
εὐθυμίης  καὶ  δίκης  καὶ  θάρσεος  καὶ 
κτήσεως  ἐν  παντὶ  κόσμωι  μέζω  μοῖραν 
μεθέξει.  (DK)
Concerning  the  killing  and not  killing  of 
some living things it  stands thus: he who 
kills those which do or attempt to do wrong 
is  free  of  punishment,  and  doing  this 
contributes  more  to  well-being  than  not. 
One  should  kill  in  every  case  everything 
which causes unlawful harm; and he who 
does  this  shall  receive  in  every  form  of 
community a greater share of cheerfulness 
and justice and confidence and possessions. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, frr. 257-258 DK
     = frr. D121-122 Taylor
     = frr. 620-621, 745 Luria
Stob. 4.2.15-16
(o)  ξενιτείη  βίου  αὐτάρκειαν  διδάσκει· 
μᾶζα  γὰρ  καὶ  στιβὰς  λιμοῦ  καὶ  κόπου 
γλυκύτατα ἰάματα.  (Luria)
Foreign  travel  teaches  self-sufficiency; 
barley-bread and straw are the pleasantest 
remedies  for  hunger  and  weariness. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B246 DK
     = fr.  D110 Taylor 
     = fr. 732 Luria
Stob. 3.40.6
(p)  χρημάτων  ὄρεξις,  ἢν  μὴ  ὁρίζηται 
κόρωι,  πενίης  ἐσχάτης  πολλὸν  χαλεπω-
τέρη· μέζονες γὰρ ὀρέξεις μέζονας ἐνδείας 
ποιεῦσιν.  (Luria)
The  desire  for  wealth,  if  not  limited  by 
satiety, is much harder to endure than the 
most  extreme poverty:  for  greater  desires 
create greater lacks.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B219 DK
     = fr. D83 Taylor
     = fr. 631 Luria
Stob. 3.10.43
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(q)  Democritus  ...  (vere  falsone  quaerere  
<nolu>mus)  dicitur  se  oculis  privasse;  
certe  ut  quam  minime  animus  a  
cogitationibus  abduceretur,  patrimoniam 
neglexit,  agros  deseruit  incultos,  quid  
quaerens aliud nisi vitam beatam? Quam si  
etiam in rerum cognitione ponebat, tamen  
ex  illa  investigatione  naturae  consequi  
volebat, bono esset ut animo. ideo enim ille  
summum  bonum  εὐθυμίαν et  saepe 
ἀθαμβίαν appellat,  id est  animum terrore  
liberum. (Luria)
Si  dice  che  Democrito  (non  vogliamo 
disputare  se  ciò  sia  vero  o  falso)  si  sia 
privato della vista; certo è che, al fine dis 
sottrare il meno possibile il suo animo dalla 
riflessione, disprezzò il patrimonio, abban-
donò i propri campi incolti,  che cos' altro 
cercando se non la vita beata? E se anche 
egli  riponeva  questa  vita  beata  nella 
conoscenza delle realtà naturali, tuttavia, da 
tale  indagine  della  natura  voleva  con-
seguire la bontà dell'animo, tant'è vero che 
egli  denomina il  sommo bene  euthymie  e 
spesso anche  athambie, vale a dire: animo 
libero dalla paura. (Luria, Krivushina)
Democritus, fr. A169 DK
     = fr. 188a Taylor
     = fr. 741 Luria
Cic. De fin. 5.29.87
(r)  δοκεῖ  δὲ  αὐτῶι τάδε  ... τέλος δ'  εἶναι 
τὴν  εὐθυμίαν,  οὐ  τὴν  αὐτὴν  οὖσαν  τῆι 
ἡδονῆι,  ὡς  ἔνιοι  παρακούσαντες  εξ-
εδέξαντο,  ἀλλὰ  καθ'  ἣν  γαληνῶς  καὶ 
εὐσταθῶς  ἡ  ψυχὴ  διάγει,  ὑπὸ  μηδενὸς 
ταραττομένη  φόβου  ἢ  δεισιδαιμονίας  ἢ 
ἄλλου  τινὸς  πάθους.  καλεῖ  δ'  αὐτὴν  καὶ 
εὐεστῶ  καὶ  πολλοῖς  ἄλλοις  ὀνόμασι. 
ποιητὰ δὲ νόμιμα εἶναι, φύσει δ' ἄτομα καὶ 
κενόν.  (Marcovich [1999])
His doctrines are as follows … The end is 
cheerfulness,  which  is  not  the  same  as 
pleasure, as some mistakenly took it, but a 
state  in  which  the soul  exists  calmly and 
stably,  not  disturbed  by  any  fear  or 
superstition or any other emotion. He calls 
it  'well-being'  and  many  other  names. 
Conventions are artificial,  atoms and void 
by nature.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A1 DK
     = fr. 6 Taylor
     = fr. 735 Luria
Diog. 9.44-45; Suda s.v. εὐεστώ
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(s)  Δημόκριτος καὶ Πλάτων κοινῶς ἐν τῆι 
ψυχῆι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τίθενται. γέγραφε 
δ'  ὁ  μὲν  οὕτως·  «εὐδαιμονίη  ψυχῆς  (sc. 
ἐστι) καὶ κακοδαιμονίη.» «εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ 
ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδὲ ἐν χρυσῶι· ψυχὴ 
οἰκητήριον δαίμονος.» τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν 
καὶ  εὐθυμίαν  καὶ  εὐεστὼ  καὶ  ἁρμονίαν, 
συμμετρίαν  τε  καὶ  ἀταραξίαν  καλεῖ. 
συνίστασθαι δ' αὐτὴν ἐκ τοῦ διορισμοῦ καὶ 
τῆς  διακρίσεως  τῶν  ἡδονῶν,  καὶ  τοῦτ' 
εἶναι τὸ καλλιστόν τε καὶ συμφορώτατον 
ἀνθρώποις.  (Luria)
Democritus  and Plato both place blessed-
ness  in  the  soul.  The  former  writes  as 
follows:  'Blessedness  and  wretchedness 
belong to the soul';  'Blessedness does not 
reside in herds or in gold; the soul is the 
dwelling-place of the guardian spirit'. And 
he calls blessedness cheerfulness and well-
being and harmony, as well as proportion 
and  freedom  from  trouble,  and  says  it 
arises  from  the  distinction  and  discrimi-
nation  of  pleasures,  and this  is  the  finest 
and  most  beneficial  thing  for  people. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A167, B170-171 DK
     = fr. 189, D24-25 Taylor
     = frr. 742, 777, 780 Luria
Stob. 2.7.31 (e Didymo Areio)
Whether we examine Democritus' words on their own or in light of interpretations from 
ancient readers, it is clear that the human πάθη (m, r)102 the atomist refers to using words 
like happiness,103 prudence,104 self-sufficiency,105 harmony,106 pleasure,107 desire,108 lack109 
and their antonyms110 are material events occurring in the context of physical processes, 
102 Compare νοσήματα καὶ πάθη (c).
103 εὐθυμίη (n, q, r, s), εὐεστώ (n, r, s), ἀθαμβία (q), εὐδαιμονίη (s).  Compare εὐθυμίη, εὐεστώ (i). 
104 φρονεῖν (j).
105 αὐτάρκεια (o).  Compare fr. 759 Luria (cited passim in this section): τράπεζαν πολυτελέα μὲν τύχη 
παρατίθησιν, αὐταρκέα δὲ σωφροσύνη (Stob. 3.5.26).  The σωφροσύνη in fr. 759 Luria is as much a 
material phenomenon as τὸ φρονεῖν in (j).  In fact, from Democritus' point of view (preserved clearly 
in 563 Luria), σωφροσύνη and φρονεῖν are just two of a potentially infinite set of arbitrary verbal 
signals that can be used interchangeably to refer generically to particular instances of a recurring 
material process (the same way ἄνθρωπος and φώς are two words referring generically to particular 
instances of the recurring material process we call man in English).
106 ἁρμονία, συμμετρία (s).  Compare μετριότης, συμμετρίη (i). 
107 ἡδονή, ἡδοναί (r, s).  See section 4.2.2 above.
108 ὄρεξις (p).  Compare ἐπιθυμίη (g, i).
109 λιμός, κόπος (o), πενίη, ἔνδειαι (p).  Compare τὰ ἐλλείποντα (i).
110 κακοδαιμονίη (s), φόβος (r), δεισιδαιμονία (r), κόρος (p).  Compare ἡ τῆς γνώμης κακοθηγίη (f),  
ἀλλοφρονεῖν (j), φθόνος, ζῆλος, δυσμενίη (i).
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temporary vicissitudes that human shape experiences as it evolves in response to ἠθῶν 
καὶ παθῶν ἐμφάσεις (k) impressed upon it by the surrounding environment.  A glance at 
the testimonia is sufficient to reveal the superficial truth of this observation: εὐθυμίη 
results from killing noxious animals (n) and can also occur when a person contemplates 
the nature of things rather than pursue other material negotia (q);111 αὐτάρκεια describes 
what happens when humanity is content to satisfy its material needs with simple material 
commodities (o).  Closer reading of our sources shows that this nexus between material 
process and moral result (τέλος) is pervasive and deliberate, arising from an early atomist 
outlook on material reality—an outlook which deliberately construes all things αἰσθητά 
to humanity as temporal interactions between atoms and void (l).
Whether we are looking at a particular color, tasting a particular flavor (l, m), or 
having some other perceptual experience (including a particular emotional πάθος we 
might describe to someone else using a word like εὐθυμίη), Democritus makes us 
participants in a material process: our temporal physical shape receives material 
impressions (εἴδωλα, τύποι, ἐμφάσεις) from other shapes like it in its environment and 
responds kinetically.  From the perspective of an observer external to some particular 
instance of this process, any value in it remains opaque: the necessary association and 
dissociation of atoms in the void is neither black nor white, neither sweet (γλυκύ) nor 
111 Even if legends about the lives of early philosophers are always historically problematic (as Cicero 
himself recognizes), they often demonstrate how a particular philosopher lived out his own doctrine.  
See Chitwood (2004).  The legend Cicero remembers (q) portrays Democritus following an extreme 
version of the advice he gives in (i), editing his perceptual experiences ascetically in order to avoid 
harming himself unnecessarily.  This confirms the historical accuracy of our reading of Democritean 
ethics (but does not prove it beyond the possibility of refutation) by showing that it was a reading 
shared by ancient readers (with better access to the Democritean oeuvre than we moderns enjoy).   
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bitter (πικρόν), neither good (ἀγαθόν) nor bad (κακόν); it simply exists (l, m).112  It is 
only when we enter the process as participants that it acquires value: atoms of a particular 
kind strike us (a particular material body) in a particular way at a particular time—
precipitating a particular kinetic reaction in us that we indicate for others and ourselves 
generically by using words like black, bitter, or bad.  Inasmuch as human material 
constitution (κρῆσις) varies over time, experiencing different vicissitudes in the cosmic 
whirl of necessity that carries it from birth to death, so our perceptions of value and 
ensuing kinetic responses vary over time and between individuals (m).113  We do not all 
see the same colors, taste the same flavors (m), or receive the same benefits and/or 
deficits114 from the material compounds of atoms and void that strike us along our path 
from birth to death.  And that which appears sweet and life-sustaining to an individual at 
one moment may appear bitter and deadly to him in another (when his material 
circumstances change, as they inevitably do).  
Over the course of human experience, individual and collective, we observe an 
112 ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ γίγνεται, ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθ' ἄν, τῶν τε κακῶν 
ἐκτὸς εἴημεν (b).  Good and bad result from the same generic material things experiencing the same 
generic material processes (which Democritus refers to with words like ἀνάγκη).  Deep water is neither 
good nor bad in itself, generically: its value in particular instances depends on variable material 
circumstances—the state of the weather and the state (κρῆσις, ῥυσμός) of particular animals in it. 
113 Aristotle addresses this position, which Democritus shares with others in the Critical Tradition, in 
Metaph. 4.5.1009b1-15: ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐνίοις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
ἐλήλυθεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι, τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ τοῖς 
μὲν γλυκὺ γευομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ πικρόν, ὥστ’ εἰ πάντες ἔκαμνον ἢ πάντες παρεφρόνουν, 
δύο δ’ ἢ τρεῖς ὑγίαινον ἢ νοῦν εἶχον, δοκεῖν ἂν τούτους κάμνειν καὶ παραφρονεῖν τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους οὔ· 
ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζώιων τἀναντία [περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν] φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ 
ἑκάστωι πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐ ταὐτὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀεὶ δοκεῖν. ποῖα οὖν τούτων ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ, ἄδηλον· 
οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τάδε ἢ τάδε ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ’ ὁμοίως. διὸ Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἤτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς 
ἢ ἡμῖν γ’ ἄδηλον. ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ’ εἶναι 
ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί φασιν (frr. 77, 79-80 Luria).
114 τὰ δ' ἐλλείποντα καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντα (i).
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emergent historical regularity: particular material outcomes recur as individual people 
repeatedly see color, taste flavor, experience emotions, and share their perceptual 
experiences with other human shapes in their vicinity (e.g. through verbal expression).  
Impressed by the recurrence of its perceptual experience, humanity comes up with 
generic ways (νόμοι) of reacting to it, including the νόμος of using verbalizations like 
χροιή (l) and εὐθυμίη (i, n, q, r, s) to refer generically to the outcomes of particular 
material processes that occur and recur—as people repeatedly observe dangerous 
animals, kill them, and experience a powerful emotion (n).  Individuals cultivate private 
νόμοι that shape their individual experience (i.e. the way they perceive their personal 
environment and respond kinetically to it).  In the legend preserved by Cicero, 
Democritus cultivates private νόμοι designed to separate himself from negotia whose 
issue in his experience is terror (q).  Communities similarly propagate νόμοι that shape 
their collective experience (i.e. the way they perceive their public environment and 
respond kinetically to it).  The last chapter discusses various important communal νόμοι, 
e.g. language115 and the laws and customs that pertain to murder (n), child-rearing,116 and 
political authority.117  
From Democritus' perspective, νόμοι are plastic just like the ῥυσμοί that produce 
them and evolve in response to them.  Habits individual and collective come and go, 
changing with time and circumstance just as human shape does (m).  The only thing that 
remains the same is the eternal interchange of atoms and void that keeps on generating 
115 See the discussion of fr. 563 Luria on pages 255-270.
116 See the discussion of frr. 562, 723, and 724 Luria on pages 188-200, 208-209, 236-249. 
117 See the discussion of frr. 613 and 688 Luria on pages 221-224.
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κόσμοι that produce ῥυσμοί that produce νόμοι (l, m).  In the case of human ῥυσμός, 
pleasure is necessarily the material experience driving how νόμοι arise: whether on our 
own or in community, we cannot help feeling pleasure (or the lack of it) in particular 
circumstances and responding with positive cultivation (or negative avoidance) of those 
circumstances that knows no clear limits.118  We also cannot help the fact that simple 
adherence to this natural heuristic—embrace every pleasure without limit as you flee 
every pain—proves historically disastrous, when the πολυτελής table of blind chance 
delivers an outcome that destroys our individual or collective integrity (fr. 759 Luria).  In 
this environment, ethics becomes a matter of recognizing which habits yield the least 
dangerous pleasures in human experience and cultivating those habits preferentially: 
these will necessarily be habits limiting pleasure, for reasons we can see.  As temporal 
shapes holding on to a tenuous physical integrity (a, b) in a sea of constantly evolving 
material circumstances (b, m), we want to make our νόμοι minimally liable to expose us 
to unnecessary μόχθος καὶ ταλαιπωρίη (c)—the untimely κακοπαθεῖν (i) that occurs 
when foolish people cultivate νόμοι whose material consequences are deep-seated 
psychic impressions119 driving them to pursue natural desires without limit (f, g, i, p).120    
118 Our existence as animate material shapes in a material environment mandates that we experience 
perception and respond to it in ways that lead us toward death.  We cannot avoid that necessity, no 
matter what we do.  But we can condition ourselves so that we experience it differently.  Determined 
by φύσις, we nevertheless retain the ability to exert willful change on our circumstances through 
διδαχή, which changes our shape (fr. 682 Luria).  Our moral will is limited, but it is not non-existent: 
we must die, but we need not die of gluttony.  We can make death beautiful for ourselves even though 
we cannot make it disappear from human experience.
119 In the language Democritus uses in (i), such an impression would be a memory (μνήμη) that the 
individual deliberately watches (προσεδρεύω) with his thought (διάνοια). 
120 ὁκόσα δὲ μόχθου καὶ ταλαιπωρίης χρήιζει καὶ βίον ἀλγύνει, τούτων οὐκ ἰμείρεται τὸ σκῆνος, ἀλλ' ἡ 
τῆς γνώμης κακοθηγίη (f).  ἡ τοῦ πλέονος ἐπιθυμίη τὸ παρεὸν ἀπόλλυσι (g).  ἐπὶ τοῖς δυνατοῖς οὖν 
δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην καὶ τοῖς παρεοῦσιν ἀρκέεσθαι ... ὅκως ἂν τὰ παρεόντα σοι καὶ ὑπάρχοντα μεγάλα 
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  Because material human shape varies over time and between individuals (m) and 
incorporates necessary liability to sudden and unpredictable death (a, c), Democritus 
cannot tell us precisely what habits to pursue in the particular circumstances where we 
find ourselves at any given moment.  Not knowing what our particular internal and 
external circumstances are at any particular moment in time and space, he cannot give 
simple, explicit instructions for preserving human integrity from untimely ruin—e.g. eat 
only five measures of honey each day to avoid falling prey to the deadly vice of gluttony.  
The clear universal reality that human shape is necessarily mortal does not make the 
particular incidence of any individual shape's mortality clear or universal: we do not all 
die the same way, and our individual deaths occur in material circumstances that vary 
unpredictably.  For Democritus, this lack of parity between generic universals and their 
particular historical instances is not a problem to be confronted with precise prediction: 
he does not advise us to cultivate good habits by foreseeing precise outcomes accurately 
(such that I eat five tablespoons of honey today because I reckon that four or six would 
upset my precisely calculated βίου συμμετρίη).  Instead of equipping me to foresee and 
consciously forfend every particular instance of untimely death that arises in my material 
circumstances—a task he repeatedly rejects as impossible121—he aims to make me 
maximally resistant to all material threats against my integrity, the vast majority of which 
καὶ ζηλωτὰ φαίνηται, καὶ μηκέτι πλειόνων ἐπιθυμέοντι συμβαίνηι κακοπαθεῖν τῆι ψυχῆι (i).  
χρημάτων ὄρεξις, ἢν μὴ ὁρίζηται κόρωι, πενίης ἐσχάτης πολλὸν χαλεπωτέρη (p). 
121 There are numerous fragments that repeat this refrain.  Here are some we have already cited elsewhere: 
γινώσκειν τε χρή, φησίν, ἄνθρωπον τῶιδε τῶι κανόνι, ὅτι ἐτεῆς ἀπήλλακται (fr. 48 Luria).  δηλοῖ μὲν 
δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὅτι ἐτεῆι οὐδὲν ἴδμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἐπιρυσμίη ἑκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις (fr. 49 
Luria).  ἐτεῆι δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῶι γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια (fr. 51 Luria).  τὸ χρῆιζον οἶδεν, ὁκόσον χρήιζει, 
ὁ δὲ χρήιζων οὐ γινώσκει (fr. 561a Luria). 
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neither he nor I will ever perceive clearly.  This is an important point to notice.
Like Democritus' concept of material necessity (ἀνάγκη) or order (κόσμος) or 
shape (ῥυσμός),122 his recipe for human happiness (i) is generically indicative (cultivate 
this general attitude for this general result) rather than particularly predictive (cultivate 
this particular attitude for this particular result).  Just as the atomist does not affect to 
know the precise outcome of material necessity or order or shape in any individual 
instance,123 so he never pretends to know exactly what material circumstances will result 
in happiness for any particular human shape (individual or collective).  Instead, he uses 
his diacosmic vision of generic human shape to offer a generic strategy for improving its 
mortal experience in particular instances, regardless of outcome (which in time is always 
disintegration and death).  His strategy is not a fixed, linear path leading humanity away 
from known disaster.  Instead, it is an adjustable, non-linear technique124 for teaching 
humanity how to develop whatever νόμοι they need in order to swim through unknown 
and unknowable disaster—the ἀμηχανίαι that are inevitable parts of human experience 
(a).  The happiness (εὐθυμίη) that results from applications of this technique is inevitably 
contextual, subjective, and temporary: like color, taste, and other perceptual experiences, 
it varies between individuals and over time (as the material circumstances of particular 
individuals evolve).  I do not experience happiness today exactly the way I did yesterday, 
122 See chapter 2.2-3 above.
123 Observing that like goes with like as a general rule is not the same thing as knowing precisely how that 
sorting process occurs in every particular instance.  Observing regularity in the universe is not the same 
thing as denying irregularity, unless you are an unwary Epicurean misreading Democritus.
124 Lanzillota (2001) refers to it aptly as a cuadro axiológico.  The word Democritus himself uses in fr. 33 
Luria (see page 313) is μηχανή.
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and your particular path to happiness is never going to be precisely identical to mine.  But 
Democritus thinks he can tell both of us how to be always as happy as we can ever be, as 
happy as our particular material circumstances will permit at any given moment.
The atomist's recipe for happiness presupposes that human shape (ῥυσμός) 
invariably exists within certain limits.  No matter what its particular circumstances are at 
any given moment in time, humanity is always mortal (a temporary cloud of atoms 
moving relative to one another in the void) and mutable (experiencing vicissitudes that 
evolve as it moves internally and externally in response to environmental stimuli).  It 
always responds to environmental stimuli kinetically with attraction or avoidance via a 
material process we describe conventionally with words like emotion (πάθος), pleasure 
(ἡδονή, τέρψις) and/or desire (φιληδονία, ἐπιθυμίη, ὄρεξις).  The νόμοι that humanity 
cultivates, no matter what they are, arise as conventional expressions of this process as it 
occurs in particular historical circumstances.  In concrete terms, human beings invariably 
find themselves in environments replete with stimuli external (food) and internal (hunger) 
that oblige them to develop habits (various cultural traditions for hunting, gathering, and 
cooking food to sate their hunger).  So far, so good.  This is the story we have been 
examining over and over since chapter 3.  The problem we face now is that the incidence 
between generic human limits (we all die) and particular historical circumstances (I am 
hungry right now) is uncertain (will eating this honey make me die prematurely? how 
much should I eat to preserve my health?).  Democritus offers a generic method for 
addressing this uncertainty whenever it arises (you should avoid cultivating the thought 
364
that more pleasure is always better, that limitless desire leads to more happiness: find 
things in your personal circumstances that impress deep on your mind the unpleasant 
falsehood of this thought, a falsehood that appears evident in all material circumstances 
where human shape exists).  It does not matter what my particular material circumstances 
are: they will always offer me material instances of emotion, pleasure, and desire, and I 
should always take as little of every material instance as I can, being maximally content 
with what I have and minimally anxious to acquire more.  
Democritean happiness is not being born in a particular kind of society or eating 
particular foods or having any particular life-experiences of any kind.  It does not matter 
what particular material circumstances deliver emotion, pleasure, and desire to us: what 
matters is that we limit our exposure to those circumstances, conscientiously preferring 
healthy poverty to dangerous wealth as a general rule (o, p).125  Good νόμοι, individual 
and collective, will always cultivate such poverty.  How do humans develop such νόμοι?  
Democritus offers a cogent answer entirely consistent with his atomist physics.  
We should actively look for circumstances in our vicinity that impress upon our 
perceptual sensibility (θυμός, ψυχή) the idea (μνήμη) that every emotion, pleasure, and 
desire is poisonous.  Holding this idea continually in our conscious thought (i),126 we will 
125 The sweetest food is simple (o), and unlimited desire is more harmful than πενίη (p).  The moral virtue 
of poverty is a recurring theme in the ethical testimonia.  See frr. 651-655, 657a, and 737 Luria, esp. fr. 
653: ἢν μὴ πολλῶν ἐπιθυμέηις, τὰ ὀλίγα τοι πολλὰ δόξει· σμικρὰ γὰρ ὄρεξις πενίην ἰσοσθενέα 
πλούτωι ποιέει (Stob. 4.24.25).  Compare (i): ἐπὶ τοῖς δυνατοῖς οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην καὶ τοῖς 
παρεοῦσιν ἀρκέεσθαι ... ὅκως ἂν τὰ παρεόντα σοι καὶ ὑπάρχοντα μεγάλα καὶ ζηλωτὰ φαίνηται.  
Limiting his desire so that it becomes small (σμικρὰ ὄρεξις), the poor sage invariably achieves satiety 
(a subjective emotional experience) more easily, less dangerously, than the rich fool.  The poor sage's 
material circumstances sate him, whereas the rich fool's just make him want more.   
126 Democritus' phrase (i) would be μνήμην ἔχων καὶ τῆι διανοίαι προσεδρεύων.
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instinctively seek to quench every ὄρεξις with κόρος as soon as possible (p), no matter 
what it is.  Following this method, we will be minimally liable to stumble prematurely 
over the limits of our mortality, even though they remain opaque to us as to the atomist.  
We will not experience limitless desires that postpone κόρος indefinitely (p) at the risk of 
destroying our integrity (f, g, i).  For better or worse, Democritus consistently imagines 
human perceptual experience, positive and negative, as a physical process.  The ἠθῶν καὶ 
παθῶν ἐμφάσεις (k) that the environment impresses upon humanity are material images 
(the atomic effluvia referred to most often in the Democritean corpus as εἴδωλα).127  The 
πάθη that human shape suffers in response to these impressions are material experiences 
(c, d, l, m, n, o).  When these πάθη threaten us with destruction,128 Democritus' solution is 
physical: change your shape129 such that it does not deform itself indefinitely in pursuit of 
any particular πάθος; arrest the power that particular πάθη have to move you (b, i); limit 
your shape's experience with pleasure and desire (i, q, r, s) such that you live maximally 
undisturbed by waves of emotion bearing down on you from the environment and rising 
up inside you from the fragility inherent in your mortal shape (a, c).  
Think of the naive stockbroker who builds a lucrative career right up to the 
moment of a significant market reversal.  Assume that this stockbroker makes no effort to 
curb his attachment to the emotions that his career builds inside him until that moment.  
When he receives a material impression showing him the ruin of his wealth, something 
127 See frr. xv, 32, 191, 200, 354, 400, 427, 436, 467, 469-479, 493a, 564, 578, 579, 798, and 828 Luria, as 
well as chapters 2.4 and 3.2.2 (4) above.
128 ἀποπνιγῆναι (b). διαφθείρεσθαι (h).
129 See fr. 682 Luria: ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ (Clem. Strom. 
4.151; Stob. 2.31.65; Theodoret. 4.1, p. 100 Räder).
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happens inside him: he feels powerful emotions (πάθη).  Democritus would say that the 
μέζονες ὀρέξεις he has been cultivating have left him with μέζονας ἐνδείας (p), which 
will inevitably drive him to do something novel and desperate.  That is what powerful 
emotions do: they move us powerfully.  In the stockbroker's case, his emotions may drive 
him to jump off a tall building, rob a bank, or seek another person or persons to punish 
for his ruin—a ruin that is clearly material: all these destructive experiences deform his 
physical shape and the physical shape of others in his vicinity.130  Democritus would say 
the stockbroker's soul moves through a large interval (i) when he perceives ἀμηχανίαι (a) 
suddenly: in a moment he goes from calm to crazy, stirred by the onslaught of unexpected 
material circumstances outside his control.  But if he shaped his soul wisely, impressing it 
with the reality that every trade on the market is truly an encounter with death—a reality 
visible to him in the failure of other stockbrokers in his vicinity (i)—then his experience 
would be different.  He would be less moved (literally) by the concrete manifestation of a 
ruin already foreseen.  Being attacked by wild animals you perceive is not the same as 
being attacked where you mistakenly suppose yourself out of danger.  The unexpected 
attack disturbs human shape with violent emotions, where the expected one does not.131  
The prudent stockbroker would make a deliberate habit of noticing the mortal 
κίνδυνος (b) inherent in his material circumstances.  Realizing that he can never depend 
on the wealth at luck's table (fr. 759 Luria), he would deliberately insulate his soul from 
130 ὁ γὰρ θαυμάζων τοὺς ἔχοντας καὶ μακαριζομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆι μνήμηι πᾶσαν 
ὥραν προσεδρεύων ἀεὶ ἐπικαινουργεῖν ἀναγκάζεται καὶ ἐπιβάλλεσθαι δι' ἐπιθυμίην τοῦ τι πρήσσειν 
ἀνήκεστον ὧν νόμοι κωλύουσιν (i).
131 τέλος δ' εἶναι τὴν εὐθυμίαν … καθ' ἣν γαληνῶς καὶ εὐσταθῶς ἡ ψυχὴ διάγει, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ταραττο-
μένη φόβου ἢ δεισιδαιμονίας ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς πάθους (r).
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it, cultivating habits that preserve his bodily integrity—a naturally limited thing (f, o)— 
rather than habits that increase his psychic addiction to desire, a thing that has no natural 
limits (d, f, g, h, i).132  Occupying itself preferentially with simple somatic desires (f, o) 
sated easily (p), his soul would become εὔθυμος καὶ εὐσταθής (i)—less likely to cause 
unnecessary damage to human integrity, whether his own or that of communities where 
he participates.  Neither the naive stockbroker nor his society benefits when he becomes a 
desperate hedonist (i), broadcasting ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν ἐμφάσεις (k) whose most likely 
outcome is jealous rivalry (when luck blesses his naivete and goads others into dangerous 
emulation)133 or hopeless despair (when luck turns against him or those attempting to 
reproduce his experience for themselves).134  The ἀνοήμων hurts both himself and those 
around him135 when he cultivates νόμοι whose material result is blind hedonism, the 
pursuit of ἡδοναί without any διορισμός (s)—i.e. ἡδοναί that move the human soul more 
132 See also fr. 776 Luria, quoted on page 328.  Perceiving the ruin that occurs at the table of chance, his 
soul would naturally find its εὐδαιμονίη and κακοδαιμονίη somewhere else, in the perception of things 
separate from the βοσκήματα καὶ χρυσός (s) that the table of chance offers unpredictably. 
133 The danger of jealousy is a theme that Democritus visits over and over in the extant ethical corpus, 
where he condemns δυσμενίη (frr. 657, 679 Luria), στάσις (frr. 570, 712 Luria), φιλονικίη (frr. 595, 
679 Luria), and φθόνος (frr. 570, 657, 679, 679a Luria) as evil, recommending instead the ὁμονοίη (frr. 
633, 713 Luria) and ὁμοφροσύνη (fr. 711 Luria) that make good things possible (δυνατόν in fr. 713).
134 See fr. 799 Luria: ἐλπίδες αἱ τῶν ὀρθὰ φρονεόντων ἐφικταί, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀξυνέτων ἀδύνατοι (Stob. 
4.46.18).  Those who rely on luck are always vulnerable to sudden unforeseen disaster.  Their thinking 
is not the φρονεῖν that emerges from proper material κρῆσις (j), but the psychic κακοθηγίη that desires 
unnecessary pain and suffering (f).
135 See fr. 698 Luria: φαύλων ὁμιλίη συνεχὴς ἕξιν κακίης συναύξει (Stob. 2.31.90).  Disease is a material 
condition (frr. 12a, 776a Luria).  Associating with sick people (φαῦλοι) means taking their disease into 
ourselves (through effluvia entering our pores), increasing the condition of disease that dwells already 
in us (cf. the νοσήματα καὶ πάθη we all carry inside in fr. 776a).  Associating with the plague-ridden 
increases the plague inside us; associating with the envious increases our envy.  As medicine intervenes 
to suppress the symptoms of one disease, so moral education intervenes to suppress those of the other: 
ἰατρικὴ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ Δημόκριτον σώματος νόσους ἀκέεται, σοφίη δὲ ψυχὴν παθῶν ἀφαιρεῖται (fr. 
779 Luria = Clem. Paed. 1.6).  Another fragment worth noting here comes from the small corpus of 
ethical aphorisms credited to the shadowy figure Democrates: μεγάλα βλάπτουσι τοὺς ἀξυνέτους οἱ 
ἐπαινέοντες (DK68B113, Democrat. 81).  
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and more, creating inner psychic storms that eventually manifest externally as destructive 
emotional πάθη capable of killing individuals and communities prematurely.136
Democritus' ΔΙΟΡΙΣΜΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΗΔΟΝΩΝ (4.2.4)
In light of the foregoing, how do Dyroffians like Taylor (1967, 1999) miss the 
blatant materialism pervading the Democritean ethical corpus?  The best way to answer 
that question is to consider Taylor's most recent response (1999) to Vlastos (1945, 1946) 
regarding the nature of κρῆσις in the material soul (fr. 460 Luria = 4.2.3j above):
[Democritus'] theory provides no account of what it is for the soul-atoms to be 
harmoniously balanced other than this, that being harmoniously balanced is being 
in whatever state they are in when the person whose soul they constitute is in a 
state of cheerfulness.  There is no independent characterization of harmonious 
balance such that we can say 'harmonious balance consists in one's soul-atoms 
having such and such physical properties, and it is a law of nature that whoever 
has his soul in that state is thereby in a state of cheerfulness' (233).
This interpretation of the ethical fragments is factually correct: nowhere in them does 
Democritus attempt to define εὐθυμίη as a property arising from particular atoms in a 
definite spatiotemporal relationship to one another.137  The μηχανή he offers for achieving 
cheerfulness in fr. 657 Luria (4.2.3i above) does not rely on individual atoms having any 
properties that we can know minutely or definitely: instead it is all about their generic
136 These are the πάθη we refer to with words like hatred, jealousy, and ill-will: see note 133 above. 
137 The atomist does not say, for instance, that the cheerful human shape has precisely 10,000 perfectly 
spherical soul-atoms mixed uniformly throughout the body such that they remain equidistant from one 
another at all times.  His method for achieving happiness (i) does not require anyone to know anything 
particular about the individual atoms composing any particular human soul.  The physical interval 
through which the material soul of our imaginary naive stockbroker moves in 4.2.3 above is not 
precisely measured or measurable.  That does not make it immaterial.
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properties, collective properties that emerge when they combine to create human shape 
that we can perceive.  As Taylor notes elsewhere (1967), particular historical expressions 
of these generic properties are not perfectly regular in real life or the Democritean ethical 
corpus (which mirrors real life in making pleasure an ambiguous thing, a phenomenon 
whose valence varies with time and circumstance).  But none of this denies the ethical 
materialism documented in Democritus by Vlastos and confirmed by this study.  
From the perspective of this study, it appears Taylor and Vlastos are both correct, 
and their disagreement arises from a correctable error in historical attempts to understand 
and interpret Democritus.  Vlastos examines the testimonia and observes, quite correctly, 
that Democritus is a materialist whose physical perspective consciously informs his 
ethics.  Interpreting this information in light of the conventional reading of Democritean 
physics,138 a rigid determinist reading Vlastos never explicitly challenges or refutes,139 
Taylor defends the atomist against the imputation that he must approach human ethics 
deliberately as a rigid determinist, an imputation unsupported in the testimonia, as Taylor 
correctly observes.140  This study solves the dissonance of these two correct positions by 
interpreting Democritus as an exponent of the Critical Tradition, an historical tradition of 
thought wherein marriages of physics and ethics like the one evident in the atomist's 
διάκοσμος occur regularly without demanding rigid determinism.  Like Democritus, the 
138 See chapter 2.2.1-2 above.
139 See section 4.1 above.
140 If Democritus wrote his ethics as a rigid determinist then he would either be a proto-Calvinist (as he is 
not in the fragments extant) or he would be the schizophrenic fool derided by Diogenes Oenoandensis 
in 4.1 above.  Forced by Vlastos to choose between these bad options, Taylor understandably opts to 
make the atomist an Epicurean fool, since we have no good evidence that he was an early anticipation 
of Calvin.  This path is followed by other Dyroffians as well.  See section 4.1 above.
370
Critical Tradition consistently treats human mores as material evolutions in a material 
universe, without denying the empirical phenomena later thinkers indicate with words 
like volition.141  In fact, such phenomena appear integral to Democritus' worldview, as we 
might not expect if we listened too credulously to anti-Democritean criticisms offered by 
later thinkers (notably Aristotelians and Epicureans).
For an extremely relevant illustration of this reality, consider two generic material 
phenomena important in extant Democritean thought: (t) taste (fr. 441 Luria = 4.2.3m); 
and (u) the διορισμός τῶν ἡδονῶν Democritus is said to have identified as τὸ κάλλιστόν 
τε καὶ συμφορώτατον ἀνθρώποις (frr. 742, 777, 780 Luria = 4.2.3s).  If we approach 
these phenomena from an interpretive perspective that considers the unique physical 
properties of individual atoms to be critically significant, we will come away frustrated 
and confused, thinking that Democritus contradicts himself obviously and obscenely.  
Witness Theophrastus' discussion of Democritus on taste, from which we abstract three 
important passages describing (t1) the shape of atoms whose collective impression on 
human shape is a perceptual experience we call sweet; (t2) how Democritus imagines 
subjectivity (the variability of individual material κρῆσις) affecting this process; and (t3 ) 
Theophrastus' criticism of the atomist:
141 See chapter 1 above.
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TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (Stratton)
(t1)  τὸν  δὲ  γλυκὺν  ἐκ  περιφερῶν  συγ-
κεῖσθαι  σχημάτων  οὐκ  ἄγαν  μικρῶν·  διὸ 
καὶ  διαχεῖν  ὅλως τὸ  σῶμα καὶ  οὐ βιαίως 
καὶ  οὐ  ταχὺ  πάντα  περαίνειν·  τοὺς  <δ'> 
ἄλλους ταράττειν, ὅτι διαδύνων πλανᾶι τὰ 
ἄλλα καὶ ὑγραίνει· ὑγραινόμενα δὲ καὶ ἐκ 
τῆς  τάξεως  κινούμενα  συρρεῖν  εἰς  τὴν 
κοιλίαν·  ταύτην  γὰρ  εὐπορώτατον  εἶναι 
διὰ  τὸ  ταύτηι  πλεῖστον  εἶναι  κενόν  ... 
(Luria)
'Sweet'  consists  of  <atomic>  figures  that 
are rounded and not too small; wherefore it 
quite softens the body by its gentle action, 
and unhasteningly makes its way through-
out. Yet it disturbs the other <savours>, for 
it slips in among the other <atomic figures> 
and  “leads  them  from  their  accustomed 
ways” and moistens them. And the <atomic 
figures>  thus  moistened  and  disturbed  in 
their  arrangement  flow  into  the  belly, 
which is the most accessible, since empty 
space is there in greatest measure …
(t2)  ὡσαύτως  δὲ  καὶ  τὰς  ἄλλας  ἑκάστου 
δυνάμεις  ἀποδίδωσιν  ἀνάγων  εἰς  τὰ 
σχήματα.  ἁπάντων  δὲ  τῶν  σχημάτων 
οὐδὲν  ἀκέραιον  εἶναι  καὶ  ἀμιγὲς  τοῖς 
ἄλλοις,  ἀλλ’  ἐν  ἑκάστῳ  πολλὰ  εἶναι  καὶ 
τὸν  αὐτὸν  ἔχειν  λείου  καὶ  τραχέος  καὶ 
περιφεροῦς καὶ ὀξέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. οὗ 
δ’  ἂν  ἐνῇ  πλεῖστον,  τοῦτο  μάλιστα  ἐν-
ισχύειν  πρός  τε  τὴν  αἴσθησιν  καὶ  τὴν 
δύναμιν. ἔτι δὲ εἰς ὁποίαν ἕξιν ἂν εἰσέλθῃ, 
διαφέρειν [γὰρ] οὐκ ὀλίγον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο 
τὸ  αὐτὸ  τἀναντία  καὶ  τἀναντία  τὸ  αὐτὸ 
πάθος ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε.  (Diels) 
In  a  like  manner  he  accounts  for  all  the 
other effects of each <savour> by referring 
them  to  figures.  But  no  one  of  all  the 
figures  is  present,  he  holds,  pure  and 
without  mixture  of  the  others;  on  the 
contrary,  there  is  a  multitude  of  them in 
each  savour,  and  the  self-same  taste 
includes  figures  that  are  smooth,  rough, 
round, sharp, and so on. The preponderant 
figure, however, exerts the most influence 
upon the  faculty of  sense and determines 
the  <savour's>  effect;  and,  moreover,  the 
condition in which it finds <us influences 
the result>. For it makes a great difference 
<what our condition is>,  inasmuch as the 
same  substance  at  times  causes  opposite 
feeling, and opposite substances cause the 
same feeling …
(t3) ὅλως  δὲ  μέγιστον  ἐναντίωμα  καὶ 
κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάντων,  ἅμα μὲν πάθη ποιεῖν 
τῆς  αἰθήσεως,  ἅμα  δὲ  τοῖς  σχήμασι 
διορίζειν·  καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς μὲν 
πικρὸν τοῖς δὲ γλυκὺ τοῖς δ'  ἄλλως·  οὔτε 
γὰρ οἷόν <τε> τὸ σχῆμα πάθος εἶναι οὔτε 
ταὐτὸν τοῖς μὲν σφαιροειδὲς τοῖς δ' ἄλλως 
(ἀνάγκη  δ'  [εἴπερ]  ἴσως,  εἴπερ  τοῖς  μὲν 
γλυκὺ  τοῖς  δὲ  πικρόν)  οὐδὲ  κατὰ  τὰς 
ἡμετέρας  ἕξεις  μεταβάλλειν  τὰς  μορφάς, 
But the one glaring inconsistency running 
through  the  whole  account  is,  that  he  no 
sooner declares <savours> to be subjective 
effects in sense than he distinguishes them 
by their figures; and he thus points out that 
the same substance appears bitter to some 
persons and sweet to others and has still a 
third quality for some other group. For the 
figure  cannot  possibly  be  a  subjective 
effect, nor can one and the same figure be 
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ἁπλῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν σχῆμα καθ' αὑτὸ ἐστι, τὸ 
δὲ γλυκὺ καὶ ὅλως τὸ αἰσθητὸν πρὸς ἄλλο 
καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις, ὥς φησιν.  (Luria)
spherical for certain persons and of another 
shape  for  others  (although  such  an 
assumption were perhaps inevitable if what 
is sweet for some is bitter for others), nor 
can  the  shapes  <of  atoms>  change 
according to differences of state in us. And 
in  general,  the  <atomic>  figure  has  an 
absolute existence, while sweetness and the 
sensuous  object  generally,  as  he  says,  is 
relative and existent in something beyond 
itself.  (Stratton)
Democritus, fr. A135 DK
     = fr. 113 Taylor
     = frr. 441, 496 Luria
Theophr. De sens. 65-69 
Theophrastus' problem (t3) with the atomist's description of taste is a matter of language, 
specifically an issue arising from the unclear nature of the relationship between words 
and their referents.  When Democritus invokes atomic shape to describe sweetness (t1) as 
the subjective result of one sort of atomic shape encountering another (t2), Theophrastus 
assumes that the shapes in question must be immutable and uniform, such that when the 
atomist describes one of them as περιφερές or σφαιροειδές he makes it a definite σχῆμα 
whose contours must be the same for all observers.142  In Theophrastus' mind, words such 
as round or sweet point naturally and inevitably toward a particular objective reality that 
every observer must accept perforce as roundness or sweetness.  When Democritus uses 
such words predicatively of supposedly subjective phenomena, then an objective link 
inherent between the words and their referents refutes ἁπλῶς (t3) his attempt to argue for 
142 οὔτε γὰρ οἷόν <τε> τὸ σχῆμα πάθος εἶναι οὔτε ταὐτὸν τοῖς μὲν σφαιροειδὲς τοῖς δ' ἄλλως (t3).
373
subjectivity.  Spheres are only ever spherical; they do not change shape as geometricians 
grow older or compare notes.143  The moment I call any atomic shape spherical, it cannot 
be subjective, according to Theophrastus.  Democritus' endorsement of the premises 
leading to this logical shipwreck of his theory appears evident in his assertion that the 
shape of individual atoms is immutable.144  But this appearance is an illusion. 
Breaking the spell of Theophrastus' logical refutation is useful because he makes 
Democritus a rigid determinist about taste (γεῦσις) exactly the way Taylor sees Vlastos 
making the atomist a rigid determinist about happiness (the εὐθυμίη that results from a 
διορισμός τῶν ἡδονῶν).  Explaining how Theophrastus misses Democritus' true meaning 
helps us see where Vlastos and Taylor (and the generations of scholars preceding them) 
miss it in the same way.  According to Theophrastus (t3), Democritus' theory of taste 
assumes precise knowledge about immutable atomic shape, such that its description of τὸ 
γλυκύ (t1) becomes an objective formula identifying the precise σχῆμα of atoms whose 
incidence upon the human tongue in an objective plurality—since all substances contain 
different kinds of particles (t2)—causes the objective sensation we all refer to with words 
like sweetness.  The atoms that cause this objective sensation are invariably round and 
middle-sized145 in an objective way, such that a plurality of them in any tastable substance 
invariably means that it must taste sweet.146  But Democritus is not talking precisely or 
143 οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ἕξεις μεταβάλλειν τὰς μορφάς (t3).
144 See frr. 211-248 Luria, esp. frr. 240-242 (where Democritean usage of the term ῥυσμός to designate 
immutable atomic shape is documented).
145 τὸν δὲ γλυκὺν ἐκ περιφερῶν συγκεῖσθαι σχημάτων οὐκ ἄγαν μικρῶν (t1).
146 οὗ δ' ἄν ἐνῆι πλεῖστον, τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐνισχύειν πρός τε τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἔτι δὲ εἰς 
ὁποίαν ἕξιν ἂν εἰσέλθηι (a2).  οὔτε γὰρ οἷόν <τε> τὸ σχῆμα πάθος εἶναι (t3).
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definitively about immutable atomic shape here.  
Consider these testimonia:    
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
(t4)  «ἐτεῆι μέν νυν ὅτι οἷον ἕκαστον ἔστιν 
<ἢ>  οὐκ  ἔστιν  οὐ  συνίεμεν,  πολλαχῆι 
δεδήλωται».
That in reality we do not know what kind 
of  thing  each thing is  or  is  not  has  been 
shown many times.147  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B10 DK
     = fr. D18 Taylor
     = fr. 55 Luria
Sext. Adv. math. 7.136
(t5) Λεύκιππος ... ὑπέθετο ... τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς 
[sc. ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις] σχημάτων ἄπειρον 
τὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοιοῦτον ἢ 
τοιοῦτον  εἶναι  ...  [Λεύκιππος  καὶ 
Δημόκριτος]  τῶν  ἐν  ταῖς  ἀτόμοις 
σχημάτων ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθός φασι διὰ τὸ 
μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοιοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον εἶναι. 
ταύτην  γὰρ  αὐτοὶ  τῆς  ἀπειρίας  αἰτίαν 
ἀποδιδόασι.
Leucippus … held … that the number of 
shapes in the elements was infinite because 
nothing  is  rather  thus  than  thus  … 
[Leucippus  and  Democritus]  say  that  the 
number of shapes in  the atoms is  infinite 
because  nothing  is  rather  thus  than  thus. 
They offer this  as a reason for infinity.148 
(Makin, augmented)
Leucippus, fr. A8 DK
Democritus, fr. A38 DK
     = fr. 2 Luria
Simpl.  in  Phys. 28.4  (=  Theophr.  Phys.  
opin. fr. 8; Dox. 483)
147 Comparable fragments are quoted in note 121 above.  That incomprehensibility of particulars is a 
recurring theme in the Democritean corpus.  
148 This fragment is discussed above in chapter 2.2.2 (c).
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(t6) ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος θέσει λέγων τὰ ὀνό-
ματα  διὰ  τεσσάρων  ἐπιχειρημάτων  τοῦτο 
κατεσκεύαζεν·  ἐκ  τῆς  ὁμωνυμίας·  τὰ  γὰρ 
διάφορα  πράγματα  τῶι  αὐτῶι  καλοῦνται 
ὀνόματι·  οὐκ ἄρα φύσει  τὸ ὄνομα·  καὶ ἐκ 
τῆς  πολυωνυμίας·  εἰ  γὰρ  τὰ  διάφορα 
ὀνόματα  ἐπὶ  τὸ  αὐτὸ  καὶ  ἕν  πρᾶγμα 
ἐφαρμόσουσιν, καὶ ἐπάλληλα, ὅπερ ἀδύνα-
τον ... τύχηι ἄρα καὶ οὐ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα. 
Democritus supported his view that names 
belong  to  things  by  convention  by  four 
arguments.   First,  that  from  homonymy: 
different  things  are  called  by  the  same 
name, so the name does not belong to them 
by nature.  Then, that from polyonymy: if 
different names fit one and the same thing, 
they  must  fit  one  another,  which  is 
impossible  ...  Names,  therefore,  apply  by 
chance, not by nature.  (Taylor) 
Democritus, fr. B26 DK
     = fr. 167 Taylor
     = fr. 563 Luria
Procl. in Crat. 16 p. 5, 25 Pasquali 
If Democritus repeatedly says we do not know what sort each particular thing is (t4 ), why 
would he then pretend to know precisely what sweetness always is (t3)?  Theophrastus 
would have us believe that he simply forgets one observation while making the other,149 
but we have good evidence (t5, t6) that this dismissive approach is not necessary or even 
adequate (as a fair representation of the testimonia available to us).  Though the early 
atomists give each individual atom immutable and permanent shape, they do not make 
that shape one that we can perceive or indicate in any definitively objective way.  On the 
contrary, they posit that their multiverse of infinite atoms and void contains an infinite 
multitude of different atomic shapes—a position they justify by their explicit ignorance 
of atomic shape as it exists in the particular.150  In light of this position, what does 
149 Theophrastus is not the last to say such things.  Remember the Dyroffian Barnes (1982): “[P]hysics and 
ethics were so successfully compartmentalized in Democritus' capacious mind that he never attended to 
the larger issues which their cohabitation produces” (535).
150 τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀτόμοις σχημάτων ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθός φασι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοιοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον 
εἶναι (t5).  This alone would be enough to mount a serious challenge to Theophrastus (t3) even without 
the additional witness of Proclus (t6) to drive the point home.   
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Democritus mean when he describes certain material shapes as sweet (t1, t2)?  What is the 
atomist indicating when he uses words like taste (t) or happiness (u) and then qualifies 
them with other words like sweet (γλυκύς) or cheerful (εὔθυμος)?  The Democritean 
understanding of language preserved by Proclus (t6) facilitates a very helpful answer to 
such questions.
According to Democritus (t6), there is no objective link joining any particular 
word with any particular referent: the association between particular words and referents 
is only an arbitrary historical accident.151  Thus, when the atomist describes any material 
shape verbally (t1), he is never speaking objectively in the manner of Theophrastus (t3).  
Instead he uses words subjectively, as convenient signals for pointing generally—i.e. 
imprecisely and indefinitely—toward his particular experience with certain particular 
material phenomena (referents for the words he is using).  From his subjective experience 
with various composite atomic shapes generally marked as honey (μέλι), he concludes 
that particular instances of such shapes taste sweet sometimes and not others, depending 
on variable material circumstances.152  His subjective description of sweetness (t1) is not 
the objective definition Theophrastus reads (t3).  When the atomist uses words like round 
or not too small to describe individually imperceptible material shapes that appear sweet 
to him en masse, he is speculating subjectively—not defining objectively—and his 
speculation is necessarily imprecise and indefinite, since he cannot perceive individual 
151 τύχηι ἄρα καὶ οὐ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα (t6).
152 διαφέρειν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ τἀναντία, καὶ τἀναντία τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε 
(t2). Compare fr. 56 Luria: ἐκ τοῦ τὸ μέλι τοῖσδε μὲν πικρὸν τοῖσδε δὲ γλυκὺ φαίνεσθαι ὁ μὲν 
Δημόκριτος ἔφη μήτε γλυκὺ αὐτὸ εἶναι μήτε πικρὸν (Sext. Pyrr. hypot. 2.63).
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atoms (t5).  He observes that sweetness strikes him as a powerful sensation, penetrating 
others close to its instance and altering their effect upon him (t1).  Imagining atoms as 
imperceptible pebbles or seeds sorting themselves inside the sieve of his body,153 he 
guesses that the atoms whose collective impact upon him is sweetness must be like the 
pebbles he would call περιφερεῖς, i.e. the smooth and round ones that move more easily 
among other pebbles than those we would describe as rough and angular.  So he uses that 
word to describe them, not because he has impossible insight into the precise shape of 
individual atoms (these or any others) but because he does not.  Round pebbles and seeds 
sifted in the sieve do not adhere to any explicit universal standard for roundness (such 
that I can easily infer the precise shape of one by referring to another): round atoms in the 
mouth of Democritus (t1) are no different.  They are natural shapes, not mathematical 
ones, and the atomist does not pretend to have any precise knowledge about any of them 
in particular: it is only together that they leave any impression on him, and the impression 
they leave is inevitably subjective.
The subjectivity here is total, encompassing both language and the material 
experience (πάθη) that language indicates generically (imprecisely, indefinitely).  What is 
round or not too small (t1) or preponderant (t2) at any given moment in time and space is 
a matter of evolving subjective perspective.154  There being no uniform standard for round 
pebbles in nature,155 individual pebbles can only be round as they compare to one another. 
153 See fr. 316 Luria, quoted above on page 127.
154 The existence of linguistic categories like round or angular does not, for Democritus, imply objective 
rotundity or angularity as real empirical phenomena, independent of subjective experience (t6). 
155 τὰ γὰρ διάφορα πράγματα τῶι αὐτῶι καλοῦνται ὀνόματι· οὐκ ἄρα φύσει τὸ ὄνομα (t6).  Round can 
point to any number of things in nature, such that it carries no definitive objective meaning, no clear 
significance that exists independent of all material context (including the historical context that delivers 
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A particular person might find three pebbles (p1, p2, p3) such that (p2) seemed round in 
comparison to (p1) but not (p3).  Likewise, the recognition of a preponderance of any 
particular kind of thing is necessarily a function of the individual whose perception 
constitutes that recognition.  Unable to see clearly how composite shapes exist at the 
atomic level (t4, t5), Democritus does not pretend to know what particular individuals will 
perceive at any given moment in time and space.  His theory is not a predictive engine 
(for telling me precisely what will occur at any given moment in time and space), but a 
descriptive one (for showing me with words156 how my human experience is at once 
regular and irregular, so that my personal shape may take general precautions that make 
these regularities and irregularities maximally helpful and minimally harmful even as 
outcomes of their particular incidence at any moment remain stubbornly unpredictable).  
Democritus does not tell me precisely what I will perceive.  He does not even 
explain to me in minute detail why I perceive, though he offers some thoughtful opinions 
about how the generic, conventional processes we indicate with words like perception 
exist recurrently (t1, t2).  He tells me how to respond to my perceptions—how to interpret 
them (t) and live with them such that they become maximally useful and minimally 
harmful (u).  Significantly, the comprehensive method (μηχανή) he offers for cultivating 
happiness is fundamentally about perception—specifically the way we recognize and 
respond to all ἡδοναί (u), not just the ones that come to us through the process Greeks 
it to us as a particularly meaningful collection of noises and/or written ciphers).
156 And these words need not always agree mutually, since they are not necessarily linked to whatever 
phenomena they indicate:  εἰ γὰρ τὰ διάφορα ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν πρᾶγμα ἐφαρμόσουσιν, καὶ 
ἐπάλληλα, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον ... τύχηι ἄρα καὶ οὐ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα (t6).  Different historical languages are 
alike (as homologous expressions of human shape) but not mutually coherent or consistent (such that 
the verbal pictures they create become interchangeable).
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call γεῦσις (t).  Like taste, happiness occurs as particular individuals respond in certain 
ways to their material environment, an environment that is generically regular (containing 
things that engage the perceptual sensibilities common to every shape called human) and 
particularly irregular (since individuals never know what material πάθη may engage their 
personal perceptual sensibilities at any particular moment).  Given that happiness only 
exists in particular material circumstances (where particular individuals discover it), the 
subjectivity evident in Democritus' theory of perception (t2) becomes vitally important for 
Democritean ethics, which make individual awareness the catalyst enabling a proper 
διορισμός τῶν ἡδονῶν (u).157  From Democritus' perspective, each human being has a 
moral responsibility to familiarize himself with his unique material integrity—the 
evolving internal κρῆσις that allows him to survive and experience happiness—and to 
cultivate νόμοι that preserve this subjective good more than they undermine it.  
How do we discover this subjective good?  We have already seen that pleasure 
constitutes a necessary but problematic signpost pointing us toward it (4.2.2), and that we 
must limit our pleasure to retain it, cultivating safe poverty rather than dangerous wealth 
(4.2.3).  Now it is time to examine more closely the role of the individual in recognizing 
and respecting the subjective limits he must place on his own pleasure.  How does the 
individual have moral will, according to Democritus?  How does he apply the method set 
forth in fr. 657 Luria (4.2.3i), deliberately shaping himself to avoid exceeding the limits 
that define his subjective physical integrity?  Several testimonia offer information we can 
use to improve and further illustrate the basic answer given to this question in 4.2.3:     
157 See 4.2.3 on the Democritean recipe for happiness, and the discussion that follows.
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TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
(u1)  ἀνθρώποισι  κακὰ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν φύεται, 
ἐπήν τις  τἀγαθὰ μὴ 'πιστῆται  ποδηγετεῖν 
μηδὲ ὀχεῖν εὐπόρως. οὐ δίκαιον ἐν κακοῖσι 
τὰ τοιάδε  κρίνειν,  ἀλλ'  ἐν  ἀγαθοῖσιν  ὦν· 
τοῖς τε ἀγαθοῖσιν οἷόν τε χρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς 
τὰ  κακά,  εἴ  τινι  βουλομένωι  ἀλκήν.158 
(Luria, corrected)
Evil  things  grow  from good  among  men 
when someone does not understand how to 
guide or bear the latter resourcefully.159 It is 
not right to judge such things evil; instead 
one  should  reckon  them  good.  And  it  is 
possible to use good things badly,160 if one 
desires the strength to avert danger. 
(my translation)  
Democritus, fr. B173 DK
     = fr. D38 Taylor
     = fr. 34 Luria
Stob. 2.9.2
(u2) τὰ  μὲν  καλὰ  χρήματα  τοῖς  πόνοις  ἡ 
μάθησις  ἐξεργάζεται,  τὰ  δ'  αἰσχρὰ  ἄνευ 
πόνων αὐτόματα καρποῦται.  καὶ  γὰρ οὖν 
οὐκ ἐθέλοντα πολλάκις ἐξείργει τοιοῦτον 
εἶναι· οὕτω μεγάλης τε τῆς φυτικῆς ἐστί.161 
(Taylor, corrected)
Learning accomplishes fine things through 
taking  pains,  but  it  harvests  ill-favored 
things  spontaneously,  without  pains.  And 
often  it  compels  someone to  be a  certain 
way,  even  against  his  will;  such  is  [the 
power] of great growth. (my translation)
Democritus, fr. B182 DK
     = fr. D47 Taylor
     = frr. 35, 774 Luria
Stob. 2.31.66 
158 There is no reason to deny the reading of the MSS (quoted above), which Diels and others emend 
unnecessarily.  The verb βούλομαι takes an accusative object in Homer; see LSJ s.v. for references. 
159 For this translation of εὐπόρως, see Hippocr. Off. 7 and LSJ s.v. εὔπορος.
160 In justification of this translation of πρὸς τὰ κακά, see LSJ, s.v. πρὸς (7).
161 This fragment has been emended variously by different editors.  I follow Taylor because he stays 
closest to the MSS, which make rather good sense even if the last colon is incomplete as written.  
Taylor punctuates it thus: εἶναι οὕτω † μεγάλης τε τῆς φυτικῆς † ἐστί.  I prefer the punctuation of 
Wachsmuth, who separates the problematic last colon from the rest (as above).  
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(u3) ἐξωτικῶς μὴ πονεῖν162 παῖδες ἀνιέντες 
οὔτε γράμματ' ἂν μάθοιεν οὔτε μουσικὴν 
οὔτε  ἀγωνίην  οὐδ'  ὅπερ  μάλιστα  τὴν 
ἀρετὴν συνέχει, τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι· μάλα γὰρ ἐκ 
τούτων φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἡ αιδώς.  (Luria,  
corrected)
If children neglected to take pains after the 
foreign fashion, they would not learn letters 
or music or gymnastic exercise or respect, 
which  contains  moral  excellence  most  of 
all. For respect especially loves to take rise 
from these things. (my translation)
Democritus, fr. B179 DK
     = fr. D44 Taylor
     = fr. 692 Luria
Stob. 2.31.57
(u4) πάντων  κάκιστον  ἡ  εὐπετείη 
παιδεῦσαι  τὴν νεότητα·  αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν  ἣ 
τίκτει τὰς ἡδονὰς ταύτας, ἐξ ὧν ἡ κακότης 
γίνεται.  (Luria)
Ease  is  the  worst  of  all  teachers  for  the 
young;  for  it  is  that  which  gives  birth  to 
those  pleasures  from  which  wickedness 
arises.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B178 DK
     = fr. D43 Taylor
     = fr. 695 Luria
Stob. 2.31.56
(u5) μηδέν  τι  μᾶλλον  τοὺς  ἀνθρώπους 
αἰδεῖσθαι  ἑωυτοῦ  μηδέ  τι  μᾶλλον  ἐξ-
εργάζεσθαι  κακόν,  εἰ  μέλλει  μηδεὶς 
εἰδήσειν ἢ οἱ πάντες ἄνθρωποι· ἀλλ' ἑωτὸν 
μάλιστα  αἰδεῖσθαι,  καὶ  τοῦτον  νόμον  τῆι 
ψυχῆι  καθεστάναι,  ὥστε  μηδὲν  ποιεῖν 
ἀνεπιτήδειον.  (Luria)
One should  not  feel  shame before  others 
rather  than  before  oneself,  or  be  more 
willing to do something bad if no one will 
know of it than if everyone will. Rather one 
should feel shame before oneself,  and set 
up  this  law in  one's  heart,  to  do  nothing 
unfitting.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B264 DK
     = fr. D128 Taylor
     = fr. 604 Luria
Stob. 4.5.46
162 I prefer the reading of the MSS to emendations by DK (ἔξω τί κως ἢ πονεῖν παῖδες), Wachsmuth 
(ζηλωτικῶς ὁμῆ πονέειν παῖδες), and Luria (ἐξω τι κῶς ἢ πονεῖν <εἰθισμένοι> παῖδες).  No matter how 
this testimonium is read, the positive valuation of τὸ πονεῖν and τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι remains clear.
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(u6) Δημόκριτος [λέγει] πλείους μὲν εἶναι 
τὰς  αἰσθήσεις  τῶν  αἰσθητῶν,  τῶι  δὲ  μὴ 
ἀναλογίζειν  τὰ  αἰσθητὰ  τῶι  πλήθει  λαν-
θάνειν.  (DK)
Democritus says that there are more senses 
than objects of sense, but since the objects 
of  sense  do  not  correspond  [i.e.,  to  the 
senses] their number is uncertain.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. A115 DK
     = fr. 114 Taylor
     = fr. 437 Luria
Aet. 4.10.5; Stob. 1.51.4
(u7) ἄνθρωποι  τὸν  θάνατον  φεύγοντες 
διώκουσιν. 
ἀνοήμονες θάνατον δεδοικότες γηράσκειν 
ἐθέλουσιν.  (Luria)
In fleeing death men seek it.
The unwise wish to grow old through fear 
of death.  (Taylor)
Democritus, frr. B203, B206 DK
     = frr. D67, D70 Taylor
     = fr. 797 Luria
Stob. 3.4.77, 80 
(u8) ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Ἀβδηρῖται τέλος ὑπάρχειν 
διδάσκουσιν·  Δημόκριτος μὲν ἐν τῶι Περὶ 
τέλους  τὴν  εὐθυμίαν,  ἣν  καὶ  εὐεστῶ 
προσηγόρευσεν.  καὶ  πολλάκις  ἐπιλέγει· 
«τέρψις γὰρ καὶ ἀτερπίη οὖρος † τῶν περι-
ηκμακότων».163  (Früchtel et al)
But  the  Abderites  also  teach  that  an  end 
[goal,  outcome]  exists.  In  his  work  On 
Execution,  Democritus  teaches  that  it  is 
cheerfulness,  which  he  calls  well-being. 
Many times he concludes, “Pleasure and its 
lack  are  a  boundary  marking  things  past 
their prime.” (my translation)
Democritus, fr. B4 DK
     = fr. 190 Taylor
     = fr. 734 Luria
Clem. Strom. 2.130  
163 On my reading, emendations of the MSS reading here (e.g. <τῶν τε νέων καὶ> τῶν περιηκμακότων 
DK, <τῶν περιηκμακότων καὶ> τῶν <οὐ> περιηκμακότων Luria) are unnecessary, even if they do not 
disfigure Democritus' meaning.  As it stands, the text occupies its MS line entirely and makes perfect 
sense, confirming other fragments on the same subject (e.g. DK68B188 and A111, quoted on page 325 
above) even if it does not reproduce exactly the Democritean diction or rhetorical construction in 
DK68B188 (as it need not, since we have no reason to think that Democritus was careful to quote 
himself word for word as he expressed the same idea πολλάκις).  For justification of my translating 
τῶν περιηκμακότων as “things past their prime” rather than “in their prime,” see LSJ s.v. περί (III).     
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(u9) θυμῶι μάχεσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν· ἀνδρὸς 
δὲ τὸ κρατέειν εὐλογίστου.  (Luria)
It is hard to fight against spirit [soul, desire, 
will];  but  mastering  it  is  the  mark  of  a 
prudent man.  (Taylor, supplemented)
Democritus, fr. B236 DK
     = fr. D100 Taylor
     = fr. 762 Luria
Stob. 3.20.56 
(u10) ἔστιν οὖν τοῦ προκόπτοντος οὐ μόνον 
δόντα  τῷ  φίλῳ  καὶ  γνώριμον  εὐεργετή-
σαντα μὴ φράσαι πρὸς ἑτέρους, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ψῆφον  ἐν  πολλαῖς  θέμενον  ἀδίκοις 
δικαίαν ... οὗτος γὰρ αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμῶν παρ’ 
ἑαυτῷ  μὴ  καταφρονῶν  ἀλλὰ  χαίρων 
κἀγαπῶν  ὡς  ἱκανὸς  ὢν  μάρτυς  ἅμα  καὶ 
θεατὴς  τῶν  καλῶν  δείκνυσι  τὸν  λόγον 
ἐντὸς ἤδη τρεφόμενον καὶ ῥιζούμενον ἐν 
ἑαυτῷ  καὶ  κατὰ  Δημόκριτον  αὐτὸν  «ἐξ 
ἑαυτοῦ  λαμβάνειν  τὰς  τέρψιας  ἐθιζό-
μενον».  (Babbitt)
It  is  therefore the mark of a  man who is 
making  progress,  not  only  when  he  has 
given to a friend or done a kindness to an 
acquaintance to refrain from telling of it to 
others,164 but  also  when  he  has  given  an 
honest  judgement  amidst  a  numerous and 
dishonest majority … In fact, such a man, 
by  standing  well  in  his  own  estimation, 
inasmuch as he feels no disdain, but only 
pleasure and satisfaction at the thought that 
he is at the same time a competent witness 
and observer  of  honourable  deeds,  shows 
that reason is already growing within him 
and taking root in his own self, and, in the 
words of Democritus, that he is “becoming 
accustomed  to  find  within  himself  the 
sources of enjoyment.” (Babbitt)
Democritus, fr. B146 DK
     = fr. D32 Taylor
     = fr. 790 Luria
Plut. De prof. in virt. 10.81a-b
164 The good man here is one who takes pleasure in doing good himself without informing others.  This is 
precisely the kind of goodness Democritus commends above in (u5).
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(u11)  τὸν δὲ εὐθυμεῖσθαι μέλλοντα χρὴ μὴ 
πολλὰ  πρήσσειν,  μήτε  ἰδίηι  μήτε  ξυνῆι, 
μηδὲ  ἅσσ'  ἂν  πράσσηι,  ὑπέρ  τε  δύναμιν 
αἱρεῖσθαι  τὴν  ἑωυτοῦ  καὶ  φύσιν·  ἀλλὰ 
τοσαύτην  ἔχειν  φυλακήν,  ὥστε  καὶ  τῆς 
τύχης  ἐπιβαλλούσης  καὶ  ἐς  τὸ  πλέον 
ὑπηγεομένης τῶι δοκεῖν, κατατίθεσθαι, καὶ 
μὴ  πλέω  προσάπτεσθαι  τῶν  δυνατῶν.  ἡ 
γὰρ  εὐογκίη  ἀσφαλέστερον  τῆς  μεγαλ-
ογκίης.  (Luria)
He who is going to be cheerful must not do 
many things, either in private or in public 
life, and in his choice of what he does must 
not exceed his own nature and capacity, but 
must  be  watchful,  so  that  when  fortune 
seizes  him  and  urges  him  further  in  his 
imagination, he sets it aside and does not 
attempt more than what is possible. For a 
good amount is safer than a great amount. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B3 DK
     = fr. D27 Taylor
     = fr. 737 Luria
Stob. 4.39.25
These fragments echo familiar themes.  Good and evil consequences arise from the same 
material circumstances (u1).165  Happiness is the goal of human existence, a goal best 
attained through the proper valuation of pleasure (u8)166 because not every instance of 
pleasure is safe or happy (u4).167  Implicit in these recurring themes lies the notion that 
people are capable of valuing pleasure differently, developing different attitudes toward it 
over time (as their material circumstances change) and between individuals (who are 
always unique in their material κρῆσις).  Human moral will in this situation is always an 
expression of perceptual sensibility, a psychosomatic διορισμός that occurs constantly 
and inevitably as individual human shapes perceive phenomena in their material 
165 ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ γίγνεται, ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθ' ἄν, τῶν τε κακῶν 
ἐκτὸς εἴημεν (4.2.3b).  τὸ αὐτὸ τἀναντία, καὶ τἀναντία τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε (t2).
166 τέλος δ' εἶναι τὴν εὐθυμίαν, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν τῆι ἡδονῆι, ὡς ἔνιοι παρακούσαντες εξεδέξαντο, 
ἀλλὰ καθ' ἣν γαληνῶς καὶ εὐσταθῶς ἡ ψυχὴ διάγει, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ταραττομένη φόβου ἢ δεισιδαιμο-
νίας ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς πάθους. καλεῖ δ' αὐτὴν καὶ εὐεστῶ καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι (4.2.3r). τὴν δ' 
εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ εὐθυμίαν καὶ εὐεστὼ καὶ ἁρμονίαν, συμμετρίαν τε καὶ ἀταραξίαν καλεῖ. συνίστασθαι 
δ' αὐτὴν ἐκ τοῦ διορισμοῦ καὶ τῆς διακρίσεως τῶν ἡδονῶν, καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ καλλιστόν τε καὶ 
συμφορώτατον ἀνθρώποις (4.2.3s).  
167 See 4.2.2 above.
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environment and respond with positive cultivation or negative avoidance.  Confronted 
with this reality,  there are two ways we can respond: (1) we can abandon ourselves 
entirely to whatever sensations we experience, eating unlimited pleasure at the table of 
luck and hoping that the outcome strikes us as more pleasant than not;168 or (2) we can 
limit our exposure to pleasure, recognizing that it is not always pleasant (u11).169  The 
fragments in this section (u1-u11) offer us additional perspective on the second option.
The most important insight lurking in these fragments is the perspective they offer 
on the ability of the individual person to exert significant and deliberate influence on the 
evolution of his material shape.  How does Democritus reconcile the determinism evident 
in his materialist physics with the affirmation of human moral autonomy evident170 in his 
ethics?  Read against the other fragments this study has interrogated, these (u1-u11) reveal 
the answer to this question, confirming that the disjunction between ethics and physics in 
Democritus does not exist originally (before Aristotelians, Epicureans, and Dyroffians 
discover it there through their lack of sympathy with the Critical Tradition).
The first significant thing to notice is Democritus' perspective on learning (u2-u5).  
168 We have already cited fr. 759 Luria numerous times: τράπεζαν πολυτελέα μὲν τύχη παρατίθησιν, 
αὐταρκέα δὲ σωφροσύνη (Stob. 3.5.26).  It does not stand alone in the Democritean corpus: parallel 
fragments worth noting are 4.2.3e and fr. 33a Luria: τύχη μεγαλόδωρος, ἀλλ' ἀβέβαιος, φύσις δὲ 
αὐτάρκης· διόπερ νικᾶι τῶι ἥσσονι καὶ βεβαίωι τὸ μεῖζον τῆς ἐλπίδος (Stob. 2.9.5).  
169 See 4.2.3 above, esp. 4.2.3i.
170 Numerous fragments confirm this observation, which is confirmed by multiple readers of the ethical 
fragments, e.g. Natorp (1893), Stella (1942), Mesiano (1951), Colvin (1974).  From this chapter we 
notice the following smoking guns that evince Democritus' belief in human moral volition: γινώσκειν 
χρεὼν ἀνθρωπίνην βιοτὴν ἀφαυρήν τε ἐοῦσαν καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνιον (4.2.3a);  ἐπὶ τοῖς δυνατοῖς οὖν δεῖ 
ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην καὶ τοῖς παρεοῦσιν ἀρκέεσθαι (4.2.3i); ἐξωτικῶς μὴ πονεῖν παῖδες ἀνιέντες οὔτε 
γράμματ' ἂν μάθοιεν οὔτε μουσικὴν οὔτε ἀγωνίην (b3); κτείνειν χρὴ τὰ πημαίνοντα παρὰ δίκην πάντα 
(4.2.3n);  τὸν δὲ εὐθυμεῖσθαι μέλλοντα χρὴ μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν (u11).  Every time the atomist discusses 
what should happen, how people should respond to their material circumstances, he steps irrevocably 
outside any realm of sterile, objective observation wherein things exist unaffected and unaffectable (i.e. 
without any possibility for conscious human intervention).
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Recall that it is impossible to avoid learning something in the Democritean διάκοσμος: 
we are inevitably impressed by material phenomena around us, reacting kinetically with 
fear171 or desire172 as we perceive things to be bad or good for us.173  In keeping with his 
consistent observation that human experience finds the same phenomena beneficial and 
harmful,174 Democritus recognizes that the material consequences of inevitable μάθησις 
are both καλά and αἰσχρά (u2).  Good consequences result when learning involves hard 
work,175 while bad arise when that work is omitted.176  Notice that Democritus never tries 
to define these things (μάθησις, πόνοι, τὰ καλὰ χρήματα, τὰ αἰσχρά) very precisely, as the 
particular results of particular material circumstances (e.g. being born in a particular 
place or pursuing a particular course of study under a particular master).  Instead, the 
atomist focuses consistently on generic process, with hard work emerging as something 
worth cultivating for its generic utility, not for any particular outcome.  That utility is the 
respect177 that loves to arise inside the shape of students who make hard work part of their 
learning experience.178  
According to Democritus (u5), this respect ought to arise as something deliberate, 
personal, and internal—i.e. the result of an individual developing and expressing his own 
171 φόβος (4.2.3r), terror (4.2.3q). 
172 φιληδονία (4.2.2a5), ἐπιθυμίη (4.2.2a4, 4.2.3g, 4.2.3i), ὄρεξις (4.2.3p).
173 See pages 364-369 above and remember that Democritus refers to human shape metaphorically as a 
πολυπαθὲς κακῶν ταμιεῖον in 4.2.3c.  The ἀμαθία that appears in testimonia like 4.2.3h is not a failure 
to absorb any information from the surrounding environment: it is a failure to respond appropriately to 
the information one inevitably absorbs.
174 Witness the discussion of 4.2.3b, (t2), and (u1) on the previous page.
175 πόνοι (u2), πονεῖν (u3).
176 τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἄνευ πόνων αὐτόματα καρποῦται (u2); πάντων κάκιστον ἡ εὐπετείη παιδεῦσαι (u4).
177 αἰδώς (u3), αἰδεῖσθαι (u3, u5).
178 μάλα γὰρ ἐκ τούτων φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἡ αἰδώς (u3).
387
conscious νόμος179 as a deliberate counterweight to the unpremeditated νομίζοντα thrust 
upon him constantly by external circumstances (including people in his immediate 
environment).180  Applying himself diligently to whatever tasks happen to be available 
(particulars are irrelevant), the good student naturally becomes aware of his own unique 
capacity and incapacity as it exists in particular circumstances.  Established in his soul by 
repetitive πόνος, this personal awareness permits him to discern for himself what things 
are possible and impossible, fitting and unfitting (ἀνεπιτήδειον), καλά and αἰσχρά for his 
unique material integrity as it exists at any given moment.181  In the extant corpus of early 
atomist testimonia, Democritus and his doxographers refer to this subjective personal 
awareness of particular good and evil repeatedly using many different words.182  It is the 
subjective φρόνησις that varies in tandem with the individual's material composition 
179 ἀλλ' ἑωυτὸν μάλιστα αἰδεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦτον νόμον τῆι ψυχῆι καθεστάναι, ὥστε μηδὲν ποιεῖν 
ἀνεπιτήδειον (u5).  
180 ἀνθρώποισι τῶν ἀναγκαίων δοκεῖ εἶναι παῖδας κτήσασθαι ἀπὸ φύσιος καὶ καταστάσιός τινος 
ἀρχαίης ... τῶι δὲ δὴ ἀνθρώπωι νομίζον ἤδη πεποίηται, ὥστε καὶ ἐπαύρεσίν τινα γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ 
ἐκγόνου (fr. 562 Luria, quoted on page 188).  Rather than receive νομίζοντα like this one passively 
from his environment, the wise man receives them actively, cultivating psychic impressions of his own 
that deliberately, consciously, and explicitly restrict the power of others to shape his soul with implicit, 
unpremeditated traditions: μηδέν τι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους αἰδεῖσθαι ἑωυτοῦ (u5).  Compare the 
atomist's exhortation to avoid minding the moral exemplum of those others deem successful (4.2.3i).
181 The subjectivity of that integrity makes Democritus' ethics generically indicative (work hard to 
discover what good things you value) rather than particularly prescriptive (work hard to achieve what 
people around you value).  Democritus can tell me that hard work is necessary if I am to develop the 
self-awareness (αἰδώς, φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, σοφίη, ὀξυδερκείη) to discern good and bad for myself.  
He cannot tell me exactly what tasks to pursue (should I work more at letters, music, or gymnastic 
exercises?) or precisely what hard work means for me in every circumstance (should I practice three 
hours a day or eight?).  Finding my unique aptitudes and locating the difference between πόνος and 
εὐπετείη in particular instances is my work, not his—a matter for individual experimentation rather 
than universal prescription.  See 4.2.3 above and 4.2.5 below.
182 Compare the variety of different words the atomist uses to indicate happiness: ideo enim ille summum 
bonum εὐθυμίαν et saepe ἀθαμβίαν appellat (4.2.3q); καλεῖ δ' αὐτὴν καὶ εὐεστῶ καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις 
ὀνόμασι (4.2.3r).  As with happiness, so with respect what matters for Democritus is not the particular 
word one uses (t6) but the material phenomena one indicates with it.  In the case of respect, the 
phenomena all the words (αἰδώς, φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, σοφίη, ὀξυδερκείη) point to is an inner moral 
sensibility that allows the aware individual to maximize personal control over his own happiness.
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(4.2.3j); the σωφροσύνη that keeps the prudent from gorging themselves dangerously at 
luck's table (fr. 759 Luria); the σοφίη that shapes the experienced183 the way luck forms 
the mindless (4.2.3e); the ὀξυδερκείη that nullifies luck's victory over prudence in the 
battle to control human affairs (fr. 32 Luria).  In (u10) it appears as an interior λόγος that 
allows the individual to take pleasure from himself rather than rely on his external 
circumstances (which are fundamentally irregular, unpredictable, and unreliable as they 
exist particularly, no matter what words we use to indicate their generic regularity).  
Learning to take pleasure from himself rather than his fickle circumstances (u10), the self-
aware, self-respecting man naturally insulates that self—his integrity, his soul, and its 
happiness—from the kind of accidents that ruin human shape unnecessarily (see 4.2.3).  
Minding his own subjective nature rather than the appearances around him, he naturally 
avoids attempting things outside his capability, even if they tempt him (u11).  Such is the 
power of habits that arise from learning with πόνοι: they ingrain themselves deep in us, 
giving us an interior φυλακή (u11) that is strong enough to exert significant determinative 
influence over the momentary psychic impulses we call will (or ἐπιθυμίη).184  
In the world-order imagined by Democritus, having a material soul (θυμός, ψυχή) 
charactized by perceptual sensibility means having moral will (ἐπιθυμίη) that evolves as 
circumstances impinge on us and elicit reactions.  The wise man cultivates νόμοι that let 
him oppose the automatic, unpremeditated kinetic expressions of his soul's sensibility: 
183 How does one become one of the δαήμονες (4.2.3e)?  One cultivates hard work (u2-u4).
184 καὶ γὰρ οὖν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα πολλάκις ἐξείργει τοιοῦτον εἶναι· οὕτω μεγάλης τε τῆς φυτικῆς ἐστί (u2);  
θυμῶι μάχεσθαι μὲν χαλεπόν· ἀνδρὸς δὲ τὸ κρατέειν εὐλογίστου (u9).   
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remember τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἄνευ πόνων αὐτόματα καρποῦται (u2).  The human will perceives 
something and automatically wants it, wants to avoid it, or has no interest in it: here the 
wise man intervenes with cultivated mental impressions (material effluences from his 
subjective personal awareness) that let him express or suppress the impulse of his will, 
domesticating it so that it cannot become the kind of violent πάθος that could destroy his 
material integrity prematurely (see 4.2.3 above).  This is the place for moral autonomy in 
Democritus: we cannot escape the reality that external and internal circumstances 
determine our will, pushing us toward automatic, unpremeditated decisions (acceptance, 
avoidance, indifference); but we can cultivate πόνοι whose result will be a subjective 
inner awareness that resists and limits the power of these impulses.  We cannot cancel the 
current of material necessity (ἀνάγκη) as it carries us toward dissolution and death, but 
we can fight it185 when it threatens to end us prematurely.  We must die, but we can make 
our death calm, beautiful, and timely rather than the reverse.    
The process of building subjective personal awareness (αἰδώς, φρόνησις, σοφίη, 
σωφροσύνη, ὀξυδερκείη) through μάθησις is fundamentally a process of recognizing and 
passing judgment on pleasures—i.e. the διορισμός τῶν ἡδονῶν (4.2.3s).  This brings us 
to the second and most important insight that emerges clearly in these fragments (u1-u11): 
not only do pleasure and pain (good and bad, life and death, τὰ μὲν καλὰ χρήματα ... τὰ δ' 
αἰσχρά) arise from the same material phenomena (u1), they coexist simultaneously in all 
material phenomena (u7, u8).  We have already seen Democritus indicating this reality 
185 ἔχειν φυλακήν (u11).  Compare οὐκ ὀλίγας κῆρας ἐν τῶι βίωι διώσεαι (4.2.3i), discussed in note 80.
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clearly in frr. 33 and 646 Luria (4.2.3a-b), and we have discussed the atomist's strategy 
for confronting it, the strategy most clearly set forth in fr. 657 Luria (4.2.3i): limit every 
emotional experience (πάθος).  Frr. 434, 734, and 797 Luria (u6-u8) clarify for us how the 
atomist imagines the generic process of imposing limits on πάθη varying in particular 
circumstances (as different people experience emotion at different times).
The first thing to recognize is that our subjective sensory experience is always 
larger than the limited material shapes that enable it (u6).  As I eat an apple, for instance, I 
experience a range of different tastes, textures, odors, and thoughts.  My singular πάθος 
(this apple is sweet: I like it) is a really a series of continuous πάθη (this apple is sweeter 
than a lemon, but more sour than the last apple I had; it is firm here, but soft there; it is 
ripe here, rotten there: I like it and dislike it).  The place for individual moral agency in 
Democritus arises in the recurrent opportunity that every πάθος offers for discontinuous 
perception (αἴσθησις).  In brief, it is a matter of material necessity that I must have 
sensory experiences (life gives me apples).  It is also a matter of material necessity that 
my experiences will be complex (all apples taste good and bad).  But this does not make 
my particular experience at any moment inalterable.  Instead, every particular experience 
becomes an opportunity for me to notice something new, something that will alter my 
moral will and its kinetic expression in my material shape (what tastes do I notice while 
eating a particular apple? confronted with a barrage of conflicting sensory impressions, 
some pleasant and some not, which ones do I notice as significant? which fleeting ἠθῶν 
καὶ παθῶν ἐμφάσεις do I watch continually with my material understanding until they 
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become substantial μνῆμαι?).  This brings us to the διορισμός τῶν ἡδονῶν.
Like all food, apples are mortally dangerous to human shape: poison is a matter of 
dosage, not substance.  Limiting my exposure to the danger inherent in eating apples is 
something I do naturally when I notice how they always taste both bad and good.  If I 
only perceive how apples taste bad, then I simply avoid eating them, with the result that I 
destroy my material integrity—either by starving to death or by believing foolishly that I 
can find some other food that is not mortally dangerous.  In either case, I become one of 
the ἀνοήμονες who run blindly from one death into the waiting arms of another (u7).  On 
the other hand, if I only perceive how apples taste good, then I simply gorge myself on 
them as much as occasion permits, with the result that I am vulnerable to overdosing and 
destroying my material integrity.  Fleeing death by undiscerning starvation, I embrace 
death by undiscerning gluttony: once again I find myself among Democritus' ἀνοήμονες 
(u7).  The solution to this dilemma (avoidance and indulgence lead to premature death) is 
the insight that Clement finds Democritus expressing repeatedly: τέρψις γὰρ καὶ ἀτερπίη 
οὖρος τῶν περιηκμακότων (u8).  Modern students of early atomism have been too quick 
to emend Clement's text to agree neatly with Stobaeus,186 whose quotation of the atomist 
makes pleasure and its lack a boundary separating what is beneficial from what is not.  In 
fact, as extant in the MSS, Clement preserves a valuable window onto the consequential 
identity between benefit and deficit187 in Democritean ethical thought.  His version of the 
186 ὅρος συμφορέων καὶ ἀσυμφορέων τέρψις καὶ ἀτερπίη (3.1.46 = 4.2.2a1 above).
187 Both can harm us (4.2.3i).  Both can benefit us: φειδώ τοι καὶ λιμὸς χρηστή· ἐν καιρῶι δὲ καὶ δαπανή 
(4.2.2b2).  Happiness arises as we cultivate both such that we become content.  This contentment is 
always subjective rather than objective: πενίη πλοῦτος ὀνόματα ἐνδείης καὶ κόρου· οὔτε οὖν πλούσιος 
<ὁ> ἐνδέων οὔτε πένης ὁ μὴ ἐνδέων (fr. 652 Luria = Stob. 4.33.23).  The wise and happy poverty that 
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saying that Democritus repeated often (and most likely with different words) recognizes 
that the boundary defined by pleasure and non-pleasure separates two kinds of the same 
death from each other.  Pleasure and non-pleasure are not mutually exclusive in terms of 
outcome: too much of either amounts to dangerous excess.188  The wise man notices both 
τέρψις and ἀτερπίη in every situation, cutting every πάθος short whenever too much of 
either relative to the other shows him that his circumstances have moved past ἀκμή (i.e. 
become too rich or too poor, too full or too empty).  He avoids gluttony (eating too many 
apples) and famine (eating too few) as he eats but remains fully aware that the ultimate 
outcome of his gustatory experience is always death.  The subjective ἀκμή he seeks 
between pathological extremes can only delay this inevitability: it can never remove it.
According to Democritus, the fundamental mistake that foolish people make is to 
think that death can be avoided.  Instead of facing the reality that human shape must 
disintegrate and die, they run from it (u7).  Instead of noticing the mortal πάθη that are 
inescapable features of their material environment, permanent limits on human shape 
imposed by necessity, they cherish the naïve delusion that some of these πάθη are not 
really mortal.  They neglect to develop a serviceable φυλακή (u11) against premature 
death because they are too busy desiring an impossible ἀλκή (u1) that will defeat death 
utterly (i.e. eliminate it from human experience).  Imagining that their own emotional 
Democritus consistently recommends is thus available to all people, even those others might call rich.  
It exists not in particular things one has or lacks, but in the way one has or lacks them (i.e. the way one 
manages fundamentally subjective perceptions of lack and satiety in one's material situation).   
188 μεγαλογκίη (u11).  τὰ δ' ἐλλείποντα καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντα μεταπίπτειν τε φιλεῖ καὶ μεγάλας κινήσιας 
ἐμποιεῖν τῆι ψυχῆι. αἱ δ' ἐκ μεγάλων διαστημάτων κινούμεναι τῶν ψυχέων οὔτε εὐσταθέες εἰσὶν οὔτε 
εὔθυμοι (4.2.3i).
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experience might not be mortal, they do not put in the πόνος necessary to impose healthy 
subjective limits on its mortality.  Instead they cherish (u12) unlimited fears (of eternal, 
unmixed ἀτερπίη) and (u13) unlimited desires (for eternal, unmixed τέρψις)—fears and 
desires that increase their likelihood of suffering unnecessary harm (see 4.2.2-3):
TEXT (Luria) TRANSLATION (translator)
(u12)  ἔνιοι  θνητῆς  φύσεως  διάλυσιν  οὐκ 
εἰδότες  ἄνθρωποι,  συνειδήσει  δὲ  τῆς  ἐν 
τῶι βίωι κακοπραγμοσύνης, τὸν τὴς βιοτῆς 
χρόνον ἐκ ταραχαῖς καὶ φόβοις ταλαιπωρέ-
ουσι, ψεύδεα περὶ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν 
μυθοπλαστέοντες χρόνου.
Some people, ignorant of the dissolution of 
mortal nature, but conscious of their evil-
doing in life, trouble their time of life with 
terrors and fears, inventing false tales about 
the time after death.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B297 DK
     = frr. D149, D162 Taylor
     = fr. 583 Luria
Stob. 4.52.40 and 4.34.62; Apostol. 7.16c; 
Arsen. 23.47
(u13) ὁ κατὰ φύσιν πλοῦτος ἄρτωι καὶ ὕδατι 
καὶ  τῆι  τυχούσηι  τοῦ  σώματος  σκέπηι 
συμπεπλήρωται· ὁ δὲ περισσὸς κατὰ ψυχὴν 
ἀπέραντον  ἔχει  κου  τὴν  τῆς  ἐπιθυμίης 
βάσανον. 
La richezza conforme a natura consiste nel 
pane,  nell'acqua e nei vestiti per il corpo. 
Invece,  la  richezza  superflua  è legata  al 
desiderio  smisurato  che  è proprio  dell' 
anima.  (Krivushina, Luria)
Democritus, fr. 750a Luria
     = fr. 64 Gerlach189
Ant. Melissa 1.31.62 (PG 136:884c);  Cod. 
Paris. 1169, f. 84r; AED 81; CP 749 Elt
The cure for dangerous πάθη lies continually available in the subjective capacity each 
individual human being has to recognize the death190 that draws near to him always, in 
189 Gerlach marks the attribution of this fragment as uncertain, but the only explicit attribution in the MSS 
is to the atomist, and its language and message agree neatly with other fragments whose position in the 
Democritean corpus is secure, e.g. frr. 631 Luria (= 4.2.3p), 645 Luria (= 4.2.3g), 657 Luria (= 4.2.3i), 
732 Luria (= 4.2.3o), and 750 Luria (= 4.2.3f).  I accept it as genuine. 
190 διάλυσις (u13), κῆρες καὶ ἀμηχανίαι (4.2.3a), κίνδυνος (4.2.3b), νοσήματα καὶ πάθη ... ἡ κακία 
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every material environment where his mortal shape exists.  Notice the necessary reality 
that death approaches you always, Democritus says, and you will know how to endure 
and even enjoy its onslaught with minimal discomfort and confusion.  Ceasing to imagine 
impossible lives in which you suffer pleasure and non-pleasure unlimited by death, you 
will at last perceive life as it really exists, with limited pleasure and non-pleasure.  No 
matter what your personal environment may contain (particulars are unpredictable and 
irrelevant191), it will lose the power to torment you with infinite fear and desire when you 
see clearly the worst and the best it can ever deliver.  Your ψυχή will become ἄθαμβος, 
εὐσταθής, and εὔθυμος—maximally immune to whatever insults unpredictable particular 
material circumstances may offer before they destroy it utterly.  This is what Democritus 
means when he says good and bad come to mankind from the same things:192 necessity 
offers death to the wise man and the fool in every vicissitude; the wise man develops the 
sharp-sightedness193 to enjoy dying (eating his poisonous apple and savoring every bite) 
while the fool hopes against necessity that he is not really dying, that avoiding mortality 
once means he can avoid it forever194 (he eats poisonous food without real enjoyment 
because he keeps trying to convince himself that it is not really poisonous).  The same 
πολύχυτος καὶ δαψιλὴς οὖσα τοῖς πάθεσιν (4.2.3c), κῆρες ... φθόνος  καὶ ζῆλος καὶ δυσμενίη (4.2.3i).
191 The fundamental intractability of the particular appears clear in both the ethical fragments (e.g. 4.2.1d5, 
4.2.3e-h in this chapter) and the physical (e.g. t4-t5, u6 in this section).  
192 ἀνθρώποισι κακὰ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν φύεται (u1). ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν τἀγαθὰ γίγνεται, ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ 
κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθ' ἄν, τῶν τε κακῶν ἐκτὸς εἴημεν (4.2.3b).
193 ὀξυδερκείη, αἰδώς, φρόνησις, σοφίη, σωφροσύνη.  See page 388 above. 
194 This persistent perceptual error on the part of the fool means that success is bad for him, since 
whenever he sees any material process going well it leads him to suppose that there exists such a thing 
as success without failure, pleasure without non-pleasure, life without death.  Naively wishing to save 
himself from death rather than pass through it (as we all must), he runs the risk of turning good things 
to bad effect: τοῖς τε ἀγαθοῖσιν οἷόν τε χρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ κακά, εἴ τινι βουλομένωι ἀλκήν (u1). 
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generic material circumstances that make the wise man die happy and content make the 
fool die miserable and troubled.  Where the wise man sees death as an end to all fears, the 
fool sees it as a gateway to unbounded fear (u12).  Where the wise man sees that death is 
an end to all pleasure and so becomes content to dally with small delights (the poor but 
sufficient joys that come from satisfying basic bodily requirements195), the fool imagines 
that pleasure might be infinite and so becomes malcontent with safe ἡδοναί.196
Integrating Individual and Community (4.2.5)
Democritus imagines humanity as a generically regular material shape whose 
particular instance invariably finds itself constrained by mortal limits.  These limits are 
generically regular, existing in every human shape as persistent needs for certain material 
experiences—e.g. the experiences we refer to generically as nourishment,197 protection,198 
and procreation.199  In pursuit of necessary material experiences like these, we encounter 
another generically regular experience known as happiness.  According to the atomist, 
this experience arises and persists most often in the particular instances of humanity that 
perceive their mortal limitations in every circumstance, recognizing death as something 
generically inevitable and enjoying each particular instance of survival without expecting 
195 This is the happy poverty recommended in testimonia like u13 (ὁ κατὰ φύσιν πλοῦτος), u11 (εὐογκίη), 
4.2.3o (αὐτάρκεια), 4.2.3f (ὧν τὸ σκῆνος χρήιζει), and 4.2.2b2 (φειδώ τοι καὶ λιμὸς).  See note 125 on 
page 365 above.
196 ἀνοήμονες τῶν ἀπεόντων ὀρέγονται, τὰ δὲ παρεόντα καὶ παρωιχημένων κερδαλεώτερα ἐόντα 
ἀμαλδύνουσιν (4.2.2b3).  ἡ τοῦ πλέονος ἐπιθυμίη τὸ παρεὸν ἀπόλλυσι τῆι Αἰσωπείηι κυνὶ ἰκέλη 
γινομένη (4.2.3g).  ἐπὶ τοῖς δυνατοῖς οὖν δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην καὶ τοῖς παρεοῦσιν ἀρκέεσθαι ... ὅκως 
ἂν τὰ παρεόντα σοι καὶ ὑπάρχοντα μεγάλα καὶ ζηλωτὰ φαίνηται, καὶ μηκέτι πλειόνων ἐπιθυμέοντι 
συμβαίνηι κακοπαθεῖν τῆι ψυχῆι (4.2.3i).  πάντων κάκιστον ἡ εὐπετείη παιδεῦσαι τὴν νεότητα· αὕτη 
γάρ ἐστιν ἣ τίκτει τὰς ἡδονὰς ταύτας, ἐξ ὧν ἡ κακότης γίνεται (u4).
197 See e.g. frr. 732 Luria (4.2.3o) and 750a Luria (4.2.4u13). 
198 See e.g. frr. 620-621, 745 Luria (4.2.3n).
199 See e.g. fr. 562 Luria (3.2.2 [4] a2).
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it (or wanting more of it than is possible for an inherently mortal thing).  At this point in 
our discussion, it is helpful to notice that Democritus regards community as one of the 
essential limitations on human shape (something analogous to nourishment, protection, 
and procreation).  Existing as individuals, we invariably require other humans:
TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
(v1) ἀπορίη ξυνὴ τῆς ἑκάστου χαλεπωτέρη· 
οὐ  γὰρ  ὑπολείπεται  ἐλπὶς  ἐπικουρίης. 
(Luria)
Helplessness  on  the  part  of  all  is  worse 
than  individual  helplessness;  for  there  is 
left no hope of assistance.  (Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B287 DK
     = fr. D152 Taylor
     = fr. 647 Luria
Stob. 4.40.20
(v2) τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν χρεὼν τῶν λοιπῶν 
μέγιστα ἡγεῖσθαι, ὅκως αὔξεται200 εὖ, μήτε 
φιλονικέοντα παρὰ τὸ ἐπεικὲς μήτε ἰσχὺν 
ἑαυτῶι περιτιθέμενον παρὰ τὸ χρηστὸν τὸ 
τοῦ ξυνοῦ.  πόλις γὰρ εὖ ἀγομένη μεγίστη 
ὄρθωσίς ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τούτωι πάντα ἔνι, καὶ 
τούτου  σωιζομένου  πάντα  σώιζεται  καὶ 
τούτου  διαφθειρομένου  τὰ  πάντα  δια-
φθείρεται.  (DK, corrected)
In  order  that  it  may  prosper,  one  should 
consider  the  affairs  of  the  city  as  more 
important than other things, refraining from 
partisan rivalry beyond what is fitting and 
taking no strength to oneself beyond what 
is  useful  to the common weal.  For a city 
well run is the greatest prosperity possible. 
All  things exist  in it  such that when it  is 
saved  they  are  all  saved,  and  when  it  is 
destroyed they all perish.  (my translation)
Democritus, fr. B252 DK
     = fr. D116 Taylor
     = fr. 595 Luria
Stob. 4.1.43
200 Emending this verb to ἄξεται (DK, Taylor, Luria) to agree precisely with the following sentence (πόλις 
γὰρ εὖ ἀγομένη) is unnecessary.  I prefer the reading of the MSS, which resonates with Democritus' 
documented habit of illustrating the mutant existence of compound shapes in the human environment 
with metaphors drawn from biological growth (LSJ s.v. αὐξάνω II) as it occurs in animals and plants: 
ἀνθρώποισι κακὰ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν φύεται (4.2.4u1); οὕτω μεγάλης τε τῆς φυτικῆς ἐστί (4.2.4u2).  Several 
testimonia are also worth noting here (as containing what may be echoes or even quotations of original 
Democritean diction): ὡς ἱκανὸν ὄντα μάρτυν ἅμα τῶν καλῶν καὶ θεατὴν δείκνυσι τὸν λόγον ἐντὸς 
ἤδη τρεφόμενον καὶ ῥιζούμενον ἐν ἑαυτῶι (4.2.4u10); λέγει δὲ ὁμοίως Λευκίππωι ... εἶναι δὲ τῶν 
397
Speaking generically (as Democritus does), the individual does not exist without society.  
Without communal habits for securing human nourishment, protection, and procreation, 
the individual cannot have these things for himself (and develop his own private habits 
for enjoying them).  The destruction of all public life (generically speaking) is necessarily 
the destruction of private life (v1, v2).201  What then is the relationship between the private 
νόμοι that undergird subjective individual awareness (4.2.3-4) and the public νόμοι that 
give collective human shape coherence (as societies rear children together, identify and 
kill mutual enemies, and communicate through language)?  How does the happy poverty 
of Democritus exist in the city of Abdera?  
We have already seen that the habits of the individual man inevitably derive from 
his unique perception of the material environment that surrounds him, an environment 
that includes the habits of other individuals he can observe.202  But the atomist offers 
more insight than this:
κόσμων ἄνισα τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τῆι μὲν πλείους, τῆι δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὔξεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ 
ἀκμάζειν, τοὺς δὲ φθίνειν, καὶ τῆι μὲν γίνεσθαι, τῆι δὲ ἐκλείπειν (fr. 349 Luria = Hippol. Refut. 1.13); 
μικρὰν ἐπιληψίαν τὴν συνουσίαν ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης ἔλεγεν σοφίστης, νόσον ἀνίατον ἡγούμενος ... 
ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐκφύεταί τε καὶ ἀποσπᾶται (fr. 527 Luria = Clem. Paed. 1.94); τὴν μὲν 
περὶ τῶν ἀποθανεῖν δοξάντων ἔπειτα ἀναβιούντων ἵστορίαν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἤθροισαν 
καὶ Δημόκριτος ὁ φύσικος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ Ἄιδου γράμμασιν ... οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος ἦν ἀπόσβεσις, ὡς 
ἔοικεν, τῆς συμπάσης ζωῆς τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μὲν πληγῆς τινος ἴσως καὶ τραύματος παρεῖτο, τῆς 
δὲ ψυχῆς οἱ περὶ τὸν μυελὸν ἔμενον ἔτι δεσμοὶ κατερριζωμένοι καὶ ἡ καρδία τὸ ἐμπύρευμα τῆς ζωῆς 
εἶχεν ἐγκείμενον τῶι βάθει (fr. 585 Luria = Procl. in Plat. Remp. 2.113).
201 There is no individual human being whose life never depends on community at all. 
202 See chapter 3 and the discussion of fr. 657 Luria in 4.2.3 above.
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TEXT (editor) TRANSLATION (translator)
(v3)  τοῖς  χρηστοῖσιν  οὐ συμφέρον ἀμελέ-
οντας τῶν ἑωυτῶν ἄλλα πρήσσειν· τὰ γὰρ 
ἴδια  κακῶς  ἔσχεν.  εἰ  δὲ  ἀμελέοι  τις  τῶν 
δημοσίων, κακῶς ἀκούειν γίγνεται, καὶ ἢν 
μηδὲν μήτε κλέπτηι μήτε ἀδικῆι. ἐπεὶ καὶ 
<μὴ>203 ἀμελέοντι  ἢ  ἀδικέοντι  κίνδυνος 
κακῶς  ἀκούειν  καὶ  δὴ  καὶ  παθεῖν  τι· 
ἀνάγκη δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν, συγγινώσκεσθαι δὲ 
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ εὐπετές.  (Luria)
It is not advantageous for good men to do 
other  things  while  neglecting  their  own 
affairs; for then their own affairs go badly. 
But if someone neglects communal affairs, 
he  acquires  a  bad  reputation,  even  if  he 
does not steal or do any wrong. For even if 
one  does  not  neglect  those  things  or  do 
wrong, one runs a risk or being slandered 
or harmed. One is bound to go wrong, and 
people are not inclined to make allowances. 
(Taylor)
Democritus, fr. B253 DK
     = fr. D117 Taylor
     = fr. 612 Luria
Stob. 4.1.44
(v4) οὐκ ἂν ἐκώλυον οἱ νόμοι ζῆν ἕκαστον 
κατ'  ἰδίην  ἐξουσίην,  εἰ  μὴ  ἕτερος  ἕτερον 
ἐλυμαίνετο·  φθόνος  γὰρ  στάσιος  ἀρχὴν 
ἀπεργάζεται.  (Luria)
The  laws  would  not  prevent  each  person 
from  living  in  accordance  with  his  own 
private ability, if one did not harm another; 
it is envy which prompts the beginning of 
civil strife.  (Taylor, corrected)
Democritus, fr. B245 DK
     = fr. D109 Taylor 
     = fr. 570 Luria
Stob.  3.38.53;  Maxim.  L.  c.  54.658;  Ant. 
Melissa 1.62.109 (PG 91:961a, 136:969a)
203 I suspect this emendation (proposed by Meineke and accepted by DK, Wachsmuth, Luria, and Taylor) 
to be unnecessary, though I have left it in the text because it does not significantly change the meaning 
of the fragment, on my reading.  Omitting it, Democritus' sentence in the MSS could be translated thus: 
“Whether one does nothing or does wrong, one runs the risk of acquiring a bad reputation or suffering 
some repercussion.”  In light of the next sentence, Democritus would still appear to suggest that there 
is no such thing as justice that is not unjust from someone's subjective perspective.  
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(v5)  οἷσιν  ἡδονὴν  ἔχουσιν  αἱ  τῶν  πέλας 
ξυμφοραί, οὐ ξυνιᾶσι μὲν ὡς τὰ τῆς τύχης 
κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ἀπορέουσι δὲ οἰκηίης χαρᾶς. 
(Luria)
Those who take pleasure in their neigbors' 
misfortunes  do  not  realize  that  fortune  is 
common to all, and are incapable of finding 
their own enjoyment.  (Taylor) 
Democritus, fr. B293 DK
     = fr. D158 Taylor
     = fr. 678 Luria
Stob. 4.48.10
(v6)  κρείσσων  ἐπ'  ἀρετὴν  φανεῖται 
προτροπῆι  χρώμενος  καὶ  λόγου  πειθοῖ 
ἤπερ νόμωι καὶ ἀνάγκηι. λάθρηι μὲν γὰρ 
ἁμαρτέειν εἰκὸς τὸν εἰργμένον ἀδικίης ὑπὸ 
νόμου, τὸν δὲ ἐς τὸ δέον ἠγμένον πειθοῖ 
οὐκ  εἰκὸς  οὔτε  λάθρηι  οὔτε  φανερῶς 
ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές. διόπερ συνέσει τε καὶ 
ἐπιστήμηι ὀρθοπραγέων τις ἀνδρεῖος ἅμα 
καὶ εὐθύγνωμος γίγνεται.  (Luria)
Appare  più opportuno  esortare  alla  virtù 
servendosi di ragionamenti persuasivi piut-
tosto che di costrizioni legali. È verosimile, 
infatti, che si lasci andare a compiere ingiu-
stizia di nascosto chi  è sottomesso solo all 
legge, mentre non è verosimile che compia 
azioni  che  violino  i  propri  doveri  né di 
nascosto  né in  pubblico  chi  sia  stato 
persuaso dai  propri  ragionamenti  ad agire 
bene. Pertanto, chi agisce rettamente grazie 
al  proprio  giudizio  e  alla  propria  cono-
scenza  diviene,  simultaneamente,  virtuoso 
e coraggioso.  (Luria, Krivushina) 
Democritus, fr. B181 DK
     = fr. D46 Taylor
     = fr. 607 Luria
Stob. 2.31.59
(v7) ὁ νόμος βούλεται μὲν εὐεργετεῖν βίον 
ἀνθρώπων·  δύναται  δέ,  ὅταν  αὐτοὶ 
βούλωνται  πάσχειν  εὖ·  τοῖσι  γὰρ  πειθο-
μένοισι  τὴν  ἰδίην  ἀρετὴν  ἐνδείκνυται. 
(Luria)
Law desires to bless the life of men, and it 
is  able  to  do  this,  whenever  people  are 
willing to  receive its  benefits.204 To those 
who yield to its persuasion it reveals their 
own unique moral excellence.  
(my translation) 
Democritus, fr. B248 DK
     = fr. D112 Taylor
     = fr. 608 Luria
Stob. 4.1.33
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(v8)  ὁ μὲν εὔθυμος εἰς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος 
δίκαια  καὶ  νόμιμα  καὶ  ὕπαρ  καὶ  ὄναρ 
χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται καὶ ἀνακήδης ἐστίν· 
ὃς δ' ἂν καὶ δίκης ἀλογῆι καὶ τὰ χρὴ ἐόντα 
μὴ  ἔρδηι,  τούτωι  πάντα  τὰ  τοιαῦτα 
ἀτερπείη·205 ὅταν  τευ  ἀναμνησθῆι,  καὶ 
δέδοικε καὶ ἑωυτὸν κακίζει.  
(DK, corrected)
Being  carried  along206 toward  deeds  just 
and lawful both night and day, the happy 
man  rejoices,  enjoys  good  health,  and 
exists  free from anxiety.  But  for  the man 
who takes no account of justice and does 
not do what must be done, all such things 
[i.e. things like happiness, health, and lack 
of worry] are unpleasantness: whenever he 
calls  anything  to  mind,  he  is  fearful  and 
reproaches himself.  (my translation) 
Democritus, fr. B174 DK
     = fr. D39 Taylor
     = fr. 740 Luria
Stob. 2.9.3
In order to interpret these fragments properly, it is necessary to notice that Democritus 
consistently uses the word νόμος to indicate a habit that is conscious—e.g. referring to a 
certain color explicitly with a certain word207 or establishing a deliberate personal habit of 
feeling αἰδώς without an external community to enforce it.208  When he wants to speak of 
unpremeditated habits, habits that arise from animal nature over time with no deliberate 
or explicit purpose, he uses words like κατάστασίς τις ἀρχαίη and νομίζον (fr. 562 
Luria).209  The νόμοι in these fragments (v4, v6, v7) are deliberate habits—calculated 
behaviors that people adhere to purposely.  They exist as mature fruits of historical 
204 See LSJ, s.v. πάσχω IIIb.
205 DK has the superior text overall (avoiding unnecessary emendation of the admittedly difficult text in 
the MSS), but Wachsmuth's punctuation here is better.
206 See LSJ, s.v. ἐπιφέρω III.
207 νόμωι χροιή (4.2.3l).
208 τοῦτον νόμον τῆι ψυχῆι καθεστάναι (4.2.4u5).
209 The unpremeditated nature of procreation as a human habit is confirmed when the atomist refers to it as 
a sort of madness, a less virulent manifestation of the psychosomatic derangement known as epilepsy: 
μικρὰν ἐπιληψίαν τὴν συνουσίαν ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης ἔλεγεν (fr. 527 Luria = Clem. Paed. 1.94). 
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human civilization rather than immature behavioral tendencies latent in humanity's 
animal nature.  Note that the latter (unpremeditated animal tendencies) are always 
ripening into the former (deliberate human habit): the history of human civilization told 
by Democritus is one of νομίζοντα turning into νόμοι as humanity shapes its animal 
nature deliberately over time.210  Now for our interpretation of these fragments.
Given that community is essential to human survival (v1, v2), it comes as no 
surprise that individuals who neglect public affairs (τὰ δημόσια) acquire a bad reputation 
(v3).  Given the importance Democritus gives to subjective individual awareness (as an 
instrument for cultivating the least destructive modes of life available to human shape), it 
is similarly unsurprising that he sees private affairs (τὰ ἴδια) as vitally important (v3).  
How is the individual to have subjective personal awareness if he refuses to notice or 
respond to the unique circumstances that affect him and shape his moral character?  This 
means that Democritus' moral hero211 must participate in both public and private life: each 
sphere of activity contributes something vital to his mortal existence (and the mortal 
existence of other people around him).212  As he decides how to participate in each, what 
public and private habits (νόμοι) to cultivate and how to apply them, he inevitably makes 
mistakes, doing things that hurt himself and others.  Democritus presents this harm as 
something necessary, one of the inevitable diseases infecting human life.213  Since it 
210 See chapter 3.  Note that the development of formal νόμοι in a society does not ever remove νομίζοντα: 
unpremeditated moral behavior is a permanent feature of human behavior, a permanent source of the 
kind of material movement that is constantly altering the shape of humanity.
211 οἱ χρηστοί (v3). [ὁ] κρείσσων ἐπ' ἀρετὴν (v6). ὁ εὔθυμος (v8).
212 Note that Democritus differs here from Epicurus and his followers, who renounce public life as 
something inherently and irredeemably evil (more poisonous than profitable in every instance).
213 ἀνάγκη δὲ ἁμαρτάνειν (v3). See 4.2.3a-c above.
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cannot be avoided, how is it to be borne?214  Our fragments (v4-v8) provide an answer, 
illustrating how Democritus imagines the individual developing useful personal habits 
(repetitive expressions of his unique subjective awareness) through interaction with the 
communal habits (shared law and custom) that give shape to the society he inhabits.
The first thing to recognize is that communal and individual habits, like other 
things in the Democritean διάκοσμος, are uncertain (unpredictable in terms of historical 
existence and outcome) in the particular.215  Even if νόμος exists as a generically good 
thing, its particular instance will always produce more harm than healing in some 
circumstances.  The moral hero's duty is to notice the material circumstances in which a 
νόμος appears good generically (as these circumstances recur in human experience, 
individual and collective) and to choose it there rather than where it proves generically 
evil.216  While this approach does not remove the possibility of νόμος causing harm in 
particular circumstances, it does make that harm less likely and provides resources for 
alleviating it.  Judging from (v4), Democritus perceives communal νόμος (i.e. public law 
or custom) to exist as a generically good thing when it restrains material expressions of 
human envy that lead directly to civil strife.  The moral hero will perceive this generic 
214 Remember here the strategy that Democritus offers for driving back (διωθέω) φθόνος, ζῆλος, and 
δυσμενίη in 4.2.3i.  What is the atomist's strategy for managing the harm that occurs as people attend 
or fail to attend to public and private business?  What can we do to render the mistakes that we must 
make (v3) as harmless as possible to ourselves and other people?
215 ἐτεῆι μέν νυν ὅτι οἷον ἕκαστον ἔστιν <ἢ> οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ συνίεμεν, πολλαχῆι δεδήλωται (4.2.4t4).  For an 
ethical formulation of this constant in the Democritean worldview, see fr. 33b Luria: τόλμα πρήξιος 
ἀρχή, τύχη δὲ τέλεος κυρίη (Stob. 4.10.28).  
216 ἀνθρώποισι κακὰ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν φύεται, ἐπήν τις τἀγαθὰ μὴ 'πιστῆται ποδηγετεῖν μηδὲ ὀχεῖν εὐπόρως. οὐ 
δίκαιον ἐν κακοῖσι τὰ τοιάδε κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀγαθοῖσιν ὦν (4.2.4u1).  The habit of building fires in the 
fireplace is good as long as the chimney is not leaking.  The moral hero notices this and refuses to build 
fires in fireplaces with leaky chimneys.  This does not mean that no fire he lights will ever harm him.
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utility (evident in multiple particular instances in human experience) and will embrace 
public law and/or custom where it prohibits people from committing outrages whose 
likely result is civil war.  Judging from (v6), the utility of communal νόμος as a negative 
instrument preventing civil strife does not make it the best available instrument for 
inciting people positively to just behavior.  Recognizing this, the atomist's moral hero will 
not invoke law as a positive incitement to moral excellence or justice: instead he will use 
rhetorical argument and persuasion,217 appealing to the private morality (individual 
νόμοι) of the person he wishes to influence rather than to public morality (public νόμοι).  
Concrete illustration reveals the distinction the atomist sees here.  Communal law is very 
useful to me when I see you about to strike a fellow citizen dead because you disagree 
with his political views: I incapacitate you and invoke the public law that forbids civil 
strife to justify my intervention.  It becomes less useful to me when your hostility is less 
acutely virulent.  When I find you insulting another citizen verbally for his bad politics, 
the proper course of action is not to incapacitate you and invoke the law against civil 
strife (as previously), but to reason with you and attempt to help you construct private 
habits of civil discourse that will make the disagreement between you and our mutual 
neighbor as peaceful as possible, preventing or at least postponing the need to resort to 
lawful violence—which always threatens the integrity of human shape at least as much as 
it protects it: Democritus' moral hero would always prefer to avoid applying dangerous 
217 λάθρηι μὲν γὰρ ἁμαρτέειν εἰκὸς τὸν εἰργμένον ἀδικίης ὑπὸ νόμου, τὸν δὲ ἐς τὸ δέον ἠγμένον πειθοῖ 
οὐκ εἰκὸς οὔτε λάθρηι οὔτε φανερῶς ἔρδειν τι πλημμελές (v6).  Notice that the likelihood (εἰκός) here 
is the same that we find driving Democritean Kulturgeschichte historically in chapter 3.
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remedies where they are not absolutely necessary.218
So far this discussion corroborates everything we have already learned about 
Democritus' view of human culture.  Like all material expressions of human shape, νόμος 
is plastic and ambivalent—a mutable tool that mutant human nature creates and recreates 
constantly in different forms to serve changing material circumstances.  As there exists no 
single tool that lasts forever and is good for all situations, so there exists no single νόμος 
that will serve all men equally well in every circumstance—no public law that can settle 
all disputes justly for all time, and no private habit that can resolve every moral dilemma.  
But the intent of νόμος is always to be useful: it is crafted to make human life better.219  
Democritus expresses this observation as a truism that needs no qualifications, implying 
that even bad νόμοι carry some latent good in their intention.  Are the laws of a corrupt 
state in any sense good?  What about the habits of a corrupt man?  Democritus suggests 
that they may be, if we use them properly.  No matter what it is (public law or private 
custom), νόμος becomes useful to us when our adherence to it is intentional220—when we 
keep it as people consciously persuaded (πειθόμενοι) of its utility.  Then it shows us our 
218 τοῖς τε ἀγαθοῖσιν οἷόν τε χρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ κακά, εἴ τινι βουλομένωι ἀλκήν (4.2.4u1). ἀφ' ὧν ἡμῖν 
τἀγαθὰ γίγνεται, ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπαυρισκοίμεθ' ἄν, τῶν τε κακῶν ἐκτὸς εἴημεν 
(4.2.3b).  From Democritus' perspective, justice is what occurs when actors perceive what is necessary 
in particular circumstances and do only that, refusing to be turned aside: δίκη μὲν ἐστιν ἔρδειν τὰ χρὴ 
ἐόντα, ἀδικίη δὲ μὴ ἔρδειν τὰ χρὴ ἐόντα, ἀλλὰ παρατρέπεσθαι (fr. 601 Luria = Stob. 4.2.14). In other 
words, the nature of justice depends on the subjective personal awareness of those applying it: if they 
lack the ability to see or carry out what is necessary in certain circumstances, then their justice will be 
unjust in those circumstances (more harmful than helpful).  What turns people aside as they assess what 
must be done in any situation and do it?  Powerful emotions do (see 4.2.3 supra).  Thus, like happiness, 
justice exists most effectively in situations where actors have limited their emotions: δίκης κῦδος 
γνώμης θάρσος καὶ ἀθαμβίη, ἀδικίης δὲ δεῖμα ξυμφορῆς τέρμα (fr. 601 Luria = Stob. 3.7.31).   
219 ὁ νόμος βούλεται μὲν εὐεργετεῖν βίον ἀνθρώπων (v7).
220 ὅταν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται πάσχειν εὖ (v7).
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unique moral excellence.221  What does this mean?  A concrete exemplum illustrates my 
interpretation of Democritus' meaning, an interpretation consistent with everything else 
we have observed thus far in this study.   
Suppose I move to a foreign country whose laws and customs differ significantly 
from my own.  Naturally, some of these laws and customs will make sense to me; I will 
understand their utility.  Others will not; I will see them and react with surprise or even 
disgust.  Democritus would not advise me to suppress my negative reactions completely 
in every circumstance,222 but he would recommend that the best way to exist in my new 
environment would not be to make a point of deliberately flouting its laws and customs 
where they do not suit mine.  Rather than attack strange laws (in a state) or strange habits 
(in some other person), I should be willing to see how these laws and habits persist as 
means toward some end that appears advantageous (to human shape that is not my own, 
individuals and collectives whose integrity resembles mine without being identical to it).  
In seeing and acknowledging foreign goods, I become aware (as perhaps I might not 
otherwise) of my own good, an ἰδίη ἀρετή that my subjective awareness can perceive and 
cultivate deliberately, preferably without disrupting the lives of the other people around 
me.  Interested in maintaining the integrity of the community around me, even when it is 
not a morally perfect community (as none is ever going to be223), I should not deliberately 
construct my personal habits as an attack on the habits of my fellow citizens or the public 
221 τοῖσι γὰρ πειθομένοισι τὴν ἰδίην ἀρετὴν ἐνδείκνυται (v7).
222 See 4.2.4u5 and the discussion on pages 388-393 above.  Self-respect demands that I avoid doing some 
things regardless of what people around me may think (or do in response to my self-motivated action).
223 Remember that humanity is necessarily diseased (imperfect, mortal): see 4.2.3a-c above.
406
law of our shared society.224  Rather than fight others' law or custom as an evil imposition 
on my subjective awareness (and the unique habits this awareness creates as I recognize 
and attempt to secure my own happiness), I should do all in my power to make external 
νόμοι my allies, building my internal, personal νόμοι skillfully and deliberately such that 
they do not bring me into unnecessary conflict with those around me.  If some external 
law or custom requires that I avoid partaking of a certain beverage or carrying a certain 
weapon in public, for example, then I cheerfully and willingly renounce these things and 
find subjective happiness elsewhere (rather than insist on doing what others do not want 
me to do, making my happiness appear obnoxious to the community I inhabit). 
As I pursue this concessive method of crafting the deliberate habits that enable me 
to survive and thrive in a community of foreigners, my situation improves: perceiving me 
as no threat, my community allows me to pursue my own happiness with greater freedom 
than they would if I made a point of opposing them.  Unlike the recklessly disobedient, 
who experience fear and self-reproach every time they notice their own good fortune,225 
wondering if it is about to turn bad as they remember the laws broken to acquire it, I feel 
confident and secure in whatever happiness I may find, knowing that I have taken explicit 
measures to prevent it from threatening or appearing to threaten the material integrity of 
the people around me.  The same generic material circumstances that cause the recklessly 
224 Taking pleasure in my neighbor's displeasure, I inadvertently make my own displeasure pleasant for 
him.  When particular circumstances turn against me unpredictably, as they always will (τὰ τῆς τύχης 
κοινὰ πᾶσιν), he will remember my lack of courtesy and be more likely to respond in kind, enjoying 
my pain rather than trying to alleviate it.  Thus do people without understanding undermine their own 
χαρά needlessly (v5).  For more about the idea of moral reciprocity as it appears in Democritus, who 
construes shared morality as something that arises from people likening the observed experiences of 
others to themselves, see chapter 3.2.2 (4ii) above. 
225 ὅταν τευ ἀναμνησθῆι, καὶ δέδοικε καὶ ἑωυτὸν κακίζει (v8).
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disobedient to fear and reproach themselves cause me to experience joy, good health, and 
freedom from anxiety.226  
The strategy for pursuing happiness evident here (v7, v8) is the same μηχανή we 
have already seen Democritus advocating elsewhere (most notably in 4.2.3i).  Surrounded 
constantly by material events that exert significant determinative pressure on its moral 
expression, the individual human shape should deliberately insulate itself from disturbing 
emotions—the kind that arise regularly from jealous rivalry227 or callous disregard for the 
way other people practice justice and propriety.228  Free to develop our own happiness, we 
should deliberately make it a limited happiness (poor by the standards of unwise people 
whose appetite for more is as insatiable as their fear of loss is unlimited).  Free to develop 
our own habits (νόμοι) for pursuing this happiness, we should deliberately make these as 
unthreatening to other people as possible (since we require cooperation from other people 
as we pursue and enjoy our own happiness: they must at least agree to leave us alone).  
Always we must seek to remove ourselves from suffering too much under the influence 
of external material circumstances (including other people), an influence that we must 
have (happiness is unattainable in isolation from the material universe) but cannot afford 
to receive carelessly.  As with envy, so with law: we suffer each best as we consciously 
limit its ability to disturb our psychic tranquility.  This is true regardless of particulars—
226 ὁ μὲν εὔθυμος … χαίρει τε καὶ ἔρρωται καὶ ἀνακήδης ἐστίν· ὃς δ' ἂν καὶ δίκης ἀλογῆι καὶ τὰ χρὴ ἐόντα 
μὴ ἔρδηι, τούτωι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀτερπείη (v8).
227 φθόνος (v4).  φθόνος, ζῆλος, δυσμενίη (4.2.3i).
228 ὃς δ' ἂν καὶ δίκης ἀλογῆι καὶ τὰ χρὴ ἐόντα μὴ ἔρδηι, τούτωι πάντα ... ἀτερπείη (v8).  ὁ γὰρ θαυμάζων 
τοὺς ἔχοντας καὶ μακαριζομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆι μνήμηι πᾶσαν ὥραν προσεδρεύ-
ων ἀεὶ ἐπικαινουργεῖν ἀναγκάζεται καὶ ἐπιβάλλεσθαι δι' ἐπιθυμίην τοῦ τι πρήσσειν ἀνήκεστον ὧν 
νόμοι κωλύουσιν (4.2.3i).
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i.e. the individual societies or people whose moral habits prove more or less reconcilable 
to our own.  My happiness will not be the same in a tyranny as in a democracy,229 but it 
will always be greater (safer) as I avoid useless confrontation with others where our 
respective νόμοι become incompatible.  The peaceful reconciliation of persuasion 
appears preferable, generally speaking, to the violent discipline of law that requires 
enforcement (v6 ).  We should invoke the latter only when it is absolutely necessary—to 
save the material integrity of the community on which all human happiness (our own 
included) necessarily depends (v2).
Conclusion: Understanding the Democritean ΔΙΑΚΟΣΜΟΣ (4.3)
The first chapter of this study shows that authors working in the Critical Tradition 
consistently create world-systems (διάκοσμοι) in which human ethics exist as conditioned 
expressions of some larger material order that underlies and determines all phenomena 
accessible to human perception and experience—e.g. the cosmic justice and retribution 
imagined by Anaximander, Heraclitus' war, Empedocles' love and strife, the mind of 
Anaxagoras, or the harmony of Philolaus.  In light of this chapter and the two preceding 
it, the atomist διάκοσμος of Democritus definitely appears to exist in this Tradition.  In 
the world-system imagined by Democritus, the larger material order in which human 
ethics arise and exist is necessity (ἀνάγκη).  Democritean physics illustrate what this 
necessity is: an eternal confluence and divergence of matter and empty space that is 
229 Democritus explicitly prefers poverty in a democracy to happiness in a despotic regime: ἡ ἐν 
δημοκρατίηι πενίη τῆς παρὰ τοῖς δυνάστηισι καλεομένης εὐδαιμονίης τοσοῦτόν ἐστι αἱρετωτέρη, 
ὁκόσον ἐλευθερίη δουλείης (Stob. 4.1.42 = fr. 596 Luria). 
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generically regular, such that certain kinds of thing recur predictably,230 and particularly 
irregular, such that we cannot ever perceive precisely (with absolute certainty) how any 
particular thing must exist in any given instance.231  Democritean ethics offer us a strategy 
(μηχανή) for living with this necessity, a method that tames our lack of insight into 
particulars (will this particular experience kill me?) by cultivating a proper regard for the 
generic (how can I make my inability to predict the outcome of this particular experience 
minimally harmful, knowing that I am mortal?).  Thus, contrary to the assertions of 
Epicureans and Dyroffians (see 4.1), Democritus consciously tells a cogent story of 
universal human experience in all the fragments that remain of his lost oeuvre.  That story 
is founded on the common Critical insights (1) that existence is material, and (2) that the 
shapes we perceive in it are mortal.  It construes human morals as historical 
developments in a material process (or processes) determined by an underlying physical 
cause (or causes) whose influence consistently appears regular in general without being 
so in particular.  The sort of material determinism it presumes (referred to as supple 
determinism above in chapter 2) is not transparently self-refuting (whether by self-
contradiction or failure to account for obvious empirical realities in historical human 
experience, including our inability to predict the outcome of particular circumstances 
with accuracy).    
230 Like things always sort themselves with like, but the manner of their association and dissociation in 
individual instances is as unpredictable as the spontaneous sorting of birds in a flock, grain in a sieve, 
or pebbles on the beach (fr. 316 Luria).  Man always occurs as a living being subject to death, but the 
precise circumstances of his life and death vary unpredictably (fr. 103 Luria).  See chapter 2.2.  
231 Two clear expressions of this constant Democritean dogma: ἐτεῆι μέν νυν ὅτι οἷον ἕκαστον ἔστιν <ἢ> 
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ συνίεμεν, πολλαχῆι δεδήλωται (fr. 55 Luria); τόλμα πρήξιος ἀρχή, τύχη δὲ τέλεος κυρίη 
(fr. 33b Luria).  Failure to appreciate this aspect of Democritean thought makes transparent nonsense of 
his physics (4.2.4) as of his ethics (4.1).  
410
Like other διάκοσμοι in the Critical Tradition, the world-order of Democritus 
exists as a rhetorical paradigm for describing all the material phenomena that make up 
human experience, individual and collective.  Democritus explicitly makes his paradigm 
one in which the association between particular words and their referents (the particular 
material phenomena he invokes them to describe) is arbitrary.232  Thus, whether he speaks 
as a physicist or a moralist, he never talks definitively about the particular outcome of 
any particular material process.  He cannot provide precise dimensions for any particular 
instance of the generic material phenomena he refers to with words like ἀνάγκη, κόσμος, 
ῥυσμός, ἄνθρωπος, πενίη, or εὐθυμίη.  In his mouth, words like these are generically 
recognizable signals pointing descriptively—not definitively—at material particulars that 
appear like one another in human experience.  We notice that like things associate with 
like.  Democritus calls this observation ἀνάγκη, without pretending to understand 
precisely how like goes with like in every instance.  We notice that like things associate 
with like in more or less orderly fashion, such that our material environment always 
contains more or less regular objects that move more or less regularly with respect to 
each other.  Democritus calls the order κόσμος and the objects ῥυσμοί.  He never pretends
232 τύχηι ἄρα καὶ οὐ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα (fr. 563 Luria).  This practical attitude toward language is reflected 
throughout the corpus of fragments, where words are consistently employed as subjective descriptions 
rather than objective definitions of empirical reality—e.g. πενίη πλοῦτος ὀνόματα ἐνδείης καὶ κόρου· 
οὔτε οὖν πλούσιος <ὁ> ἐνδέων οὔτε πένης ὁ μὴ ἐνδέων (fr. 652 Luria).  It also tracks the fundamental 
ignorance of objectivity built into Democritean atomism, wherein the only objective realities are matter 
and void; everything else is subjective, existing as nothing but more or less fleeting and contradictory 
material impressions on the impermanent shape of the entity that perceives them: ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν 
ὅλων ἀτόμους καὶ κενόν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα νενομίσθαι (DK68A1). 
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to know precisely what order or shape look like in every instance (such that he or anyone 
else might predict precisely how any single order or shape must integrate or disintegrate). 
We notice that human beings represent particular instances of one sort of object existing 
in more or less regular form and moving more or less regularly.  Democritus refers to the 
generic likeness observed in human particulars with the word ἄνθρωπος.  He never 
suggests that he or anyone else might know precisely how any single human being must 
live or die: in fact, he explicitly denies knowledge of such particulars.233  Finally, we 
observe that particular human beings experience vicissitudes with generic similarity that 
we can describe with words like πενίη or εὐθυμίη.  When Democritus uses such words, 
he is not offering an objective definition (such that poverty means something precise like 
eating two measures of bread and one measure of water each day).  Instead, he merely 
points generically toward particulars that vary irregularly as different individuals 
experience them.  My poverty is not yours any more than my nose is, and Democritus 
never expects it to be.  From his position, the word is useful not as a precise, particular 
definition (for some particular thing he or anyone else has experienced) but as an 
imprecise, generic description (for multiple particular things that different people 
experience recurrently but not identically). 
In Democritus' physics, lack of knowledge about particulars follows from the fact 
that the multiverse is infinite, with an infinite variety of atomic shapes experiencing an 
infinite variety of movements in infinite void.  Regularity that we observe in this physical 
233  Man is something we all know (DK68B165), but none of us knows how each individual man must 
look or live in particular circumstances (fr. 103 Luria).  For more, see note 231 above.
412
infinity is conventional and subjective, not absolute or objective.  All that we can say 
definitively is that all the substance we perceive inevitably disintegrates at some point: 
the persistence of substance in spite of this eternal disintegration leads us to infer some 
permanent matter, as the differentiation and displacement of substance on its path to 
dissolution leads us to infer some permanent lack of matter.  In Democritus' ethics, lack 
of knowledge about particulars means that death is always imminent.  Regularity that we 
observe in particular moral behaviors is conventional and subjective, not absolute or 
objective.  All we can say definitively is (1) that all men die (exactly as all perceivable 
objects disintegrate: note that this empirical observation is the foundation of Democritean 
ethics and physics); (2) that the subjective psychic attitudes one cultivates toward death 
exert powerful influence on the quality of one's life; and (3) that the best method for 
enjoying life (or making a beautiful death, which amounts to the same thing) is always to 
limit one's emotional responses to unknowable particulars as much as possible (so that 
death is expected and welcome in every instance where the mortal human shape may find 
itself).  The lack of particular boundaries in physics translates directly into a lack of 
particular boundaries in ethics.  The same mysterious necessity that makes the worlds and 
their shapes generically regular and particularly irregular also makes human morality 
generically regular (all human beings experience happiness and death) and particularly 
irregular (we do not all experience happiness and death precisely the same way: 
negotiating the historical coincidence between them in particular circumstances so that it  
occurs most pleasantly is an inherently subjective process, one that varies over time and 
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between individuals).  
In physics, the lack of insight into particulars means that perceptions of material 
reality vary over time and between observers.234  In ethics, it means that moral responses 
to these perceptions vary the same way.  Hence the need Democritus discovers for the 
individual to cultivate his own internal awareness (αἰδώς, φρόνησις, σοφίη, σωφροσύνη, 
ὀξυδερκείη)—a moral conscience that shows him his own health and disease as it exists 
uniquely in his particular material environment.  Conscious of his material integrity as 
something unique to himself, he is able to recognize the boundary between pleasure and 
non-pleasure as it exists in his particular circumstances, cultivating personal habits that 
bring him just enough of each to be happy without risking unnecessary death (see 4.2.2-
4).  As he makes these habits, he will deliberately avoid antagonizing people around him 
needlessly: his personal νόμοι will not bring him into unnecessary moral conflict with the 
people around him, people with their own νόμοι individual and collective that he will 
endeavor to respect as much as possible (see 4.2.5).  Particular outcomes of this process 
are unknowable, of course, but its generic outcome is a human being maximally happy 
and/or minimally miserable with whatever material vicissitudes he may experience.  The 
particular happiness of individuals living by Democritus' method will vary considerably, 
as different material circumstances necessarily call for different definitions of τερπίη and 
ἀτερπίη, but the generic happiness that Democritus' method enables will always be one of 
cheerful poverty—the kind of cheerful poverty that occurs as the individual deliberately 
234 τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐνισχύειν πρός τε τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἔτι δὲ εἰς ὁποίαν ἕξιν ἂν εἰσέλθηι· 
διαφέρειν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ τἀναντία, καὶ τἀναντία τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε 
(DK68A135).  See 4.2.4 above.
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avoids excessive emotional exposure to material wealth and dearth, the wealth and dearth 
that consistently make human life unnecessarily bitter and brief for all people in the long 
run even as for some folks they make it exceedingly sweet in the short.  Taking happiness 
from his own subjective satiation rather than looking at others who appear to live better 
than he does, the wise man avoids threatening that happiness, which becomes maximally 
secure and stable, regardless of particular circumstances.  
This is the whole point of Democritus' calculated moral platform—making human 
happiness minimally dependent on the caprice of unknowable particulars.  It is a point 
entirely consistent with his physics.  More than that, it is a point required by his physics, 
which make particulars uniquely real (individual atoms are the only things that exist with 
perfect consistency in the void) and then recognize that they are unknowable (beyond 
intuiting their existence in the most generic way, we cannot tell precisely what individual 
atoms look like or how they move relative to each other in every situation).  The physics 
thus create a world in which the question arises: how to live in a world of unknowable 
particulars?  The ethics answer this question.  
The historical reception of Democritus' διάκοσμος obscures its original coherence, 
introducing a foreign opposition between determinism and moral freedom that makes no 
sense from a Democritean perspective.  To our atomist, there is no such thing as moral 
volition (ἐπιθυμίη, ὄρεξις, αἰδώς, φρόνησις, σοφίη, σωφροσύνη, ὀξυδερκείη) that exists 
utterly unlimited (free, random, unconditioned).  Volition is always determined (limited, 
shaped, conditioned) by material circumstances (I cannot desire something or its lack if I 
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am utterly unaware of it, and my response does not arise as an utterly random event: my 
material constitution conditions it in ways that can be observed, e.g. when I eat honey 
while sick and notice that it tastes different than when I am well).  But that does not mean 
that choice is an illusion, that Democritus perceives humanity lacking any opportunity for 
altering its path to death.  On the contrary, every single perception offers humanity the 
chance to change its death.  Seeing that death approaches me in the form of an oncoming 
train, I can choose voluntarily to step out of the way (as I could not if I did not notice the 
train).  Democritus sees a world full of oncoming trains, instances of death too many and 
varied to be noticed once for all time and all people.235  The existence of this world means 
that the individual must be vigilant all the time, on the lookout for trains only he can see.  
The train that kills you will not always be the one that kills me, even if both of us 
are run down.  Lack of insight into particulars means that you cannot afford to make me 
sole custodian of your mortality, expecting me always to see trains for you.  (How could I 
do this, when I cannot even see every instance of death threatening me?)  This does not 
mean that we should not look out for each other.  On the contrary, mutual surveillance is 
a moral imperative, part of the necessary interdependence that defines humanity.  But we 
should confront death for ourselves.  I should make my own peace with death rather than 
try to make yours, and vice versa.  Confronting my own death, the trains that threaten my 
mortality constantly in every circumstance where I may find myself, I see clearly that 
your happiness is not and cannot be a prescription for mine.  I naturally insulate myself 
235 The generic reality that all men die says nothing about what particular reality will be the occasion of 
our own death, as the generic reality that trains run people down says nothing about which particular 
train might run me down.
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from dangerous emotional responses to what I observe as your happiness (or misery).  
Democritus wants me to perceive this reality constantly, making the voluntary choice to 
notice over and over again how human life is inherently limited, and how my expression 
of its limits differs from yours.  
The more I go out of my way to notice this reality, a reality I might easily ignore 
(as I am constantly ignoring things in my vicinity), the more independent and secure my 
happiness will become.  The more I choose to see how my happiness is not yours, the less 
dangerous to both of us my dependence on you becomes.  Secure in the cheerful poverty 
I build for myself in the face of my unique limitations, I become minimally eager to take 
dangerous risks in order to secure some happiness I perceive you enjoying without me.  
When you are happy, I rejoice without envying your happiness too much.  When you are 
sad, I mourn without gloating too much.  My emotional response to you is tempered in 
every instance by the realization that your happiness is not mine, just as your health is not 
mine nor your death.  My decision to notice this reality exerts a powerful determinative 
influence on the course of my life (my own unique progress toward death): it increases 
my enjoyment by insulating it in every instance from unnecessary interruption, the kind 
of interruption mindless people often experience as φθόνος καὶ ζῆλος καὶ δυσμενίη when 
they envy the excessively and ostentatiously successful or themselves acquire obscene 
success and so inspire envy in other ἀνοήμονες.  
As I repeatedly make the voluntary decision to perceive how cheerful poverty 
represents the best happiness available to me, I produce minimal envy in myself and 
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others—minimal dissatisfaction, minimal desire, minimal and minimally painful death.  
The same material circumstances that cause unnecessary illness and destruction for the 
ἀνοήμονες (when their happiness causes them to envy others or be envied by them) bring 
me health and prosperity (when my happiness is too small to cause envy in myself or 
others but still effective at satisfying essential human needs).  Thus, for Democritus, 
awareness of human limitations produces not impossibly rigid determinism (inevitable 
outcomes that render all choice illusory) but meaningful moral freedom: according to the 
atomist, you are constantly free to notice how you express universal human limitations 
idiosyncratically and to build your own unique happiness accordingly.  You are free to 
perceive that all people die.  Perceiving that we all die, you can also see that not every 
death is inevitable: food in season can save the starving.  Perceiving that we all require 
certain basic necessities in order to avoid premature death (necessities like food, shelter, 
and community), you can deliberately cultivate those things as your environment allows.  
Perceiving that our desires and fears consistently lead us to lose sight of these limited 
necessities and become dangerously obsessed with unlimited wealth and dearth, you can 
deliberately choose to limit your own fear and desire, cultivating a vision of happiness 
that consciously eschews excess and embraces limitation.236  
Take away the limitations that define humanity, and you destroy all this freedom
—just as surely as removing the tendons from my knee would destroy its ability to move. 
For Democritus, life is like my knee—inherently limited, conditioned, and determined.  
236 μετριότης τέρψιος καὶ βίου συμμετρίη (fr. 657 Luria).  οὖρος τῶν περιηκμακότων (fr. 734 Luria). 
εὐογκίη (fr. 737 Luria).  τὸ μέτριον (fr. 753 Luria). 
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This does not mean that the atomist denies phenomena that we indicate with words like 
freedom.237  On the contrary, what freedom there is in the worlds built by necessity exists 
precisely because of limitation.  The freedom of human beings to create many different 
styles of cooking exists as an expression of the limitation that we must all eat in order to 
survive.  My freedom to learn things well by dint of voluntary πόνοι arises from the 
limitation that we must all learn (experiencing μάθησις that alters our material shape).  
My freedom to die beautifully exists as an expression of the limitation that we must all 
die.  Thus, from Democritus' perspective, it is not really correct to speak of an opposition 
between νόμος and φύσις (or ἀνάγκη): that which humanity calls nature (or necessity) 
creates the limitations from which that which we call custom arises and differentiates.238  
Without limitations that exist generically, inherently, and inevitably such that I can refer 
to things with words like nature or necessity and make sense to you, the freedom evident 
in particular outcomes (including what we call habits or culture) could not exist.   
Recognizing that universal limits exist does not commit Democritus to the 
position that these limits are always perfectly regular in particular instances, such that 
words like nature or necessity designate things that can be defined comprehensively—
with the precision characteristic of an elegant algebraic equation that consistently predicts 
the same solution to the same problem.  The Critical Tradition loves to recognize 
universal limitation in human experience without pretending to define it minutely or 
237 See the Epicurean critique of Democritus discussed in 4.1 above.
238 Here I agree entirely with the interpretation offered by Taylor (2007): “[T]here is no deep antithesis 
between our natural capacities and the practices and conventions which, in developing those capacities, 
shape us as moral and social beings” (9).
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absolutely.  When Heraclitus makes war father of all things, for example, he is not 
pretending to know precisely how the tide of cosmic battle turns in every instance (strike 
your forehead on the lintel at noon to initiate the attack that will culminate in your 
achieving perfect insight into the λόγος).  When Empedocles speaks of love uniting the 
world that strife tears apart, he is describing reality generically as a poet (elements exist 
and constitute our changing world-order by associating and dissociating constantly) 
rather than defining it exactly as a chemist (mix the four elements in these precise 
quantities in this precise manner to precipitate the objective physical reality known as 
στοργή).  In the same way, when Democritus says that all things are determined by 
material necessity and/or that atoms have natural motion as an inalienable characteristic, 
he is not pretending the world or anything in it is perfectly regular or predictable.  
Reading the atomist in isolation from his peers in the Critical Tradition makes this reality 
easy to overlook, especially when we read him through the eyes of witnesses like 
Theophrastus and Diogenes Oenoandensis, scholars whose impression of Democritus is 
both foreign (originating outside the Critical Tradition) and hostile (seeking to undercut 
the atomist's claim to offer useful information to conversations about the nature of human 
existence).  This study exists as a deliberate counterweight to such positions—a challenge 
to readers ancient and modern who see the world-order of Democritus as a mess of 
careless contradictions239 rather than a cogent attempt to understand and engage with 
239 Thus Theophrastus: οὔτε γὰρ οἷόν <τε> τὸ σχῆμα πάθος εἶναι οὔτε ταὐτὸν τοῖς μὲν σφαιροειδὲς τοῖς δ' 
ἄλλως (De Sens. 69); Diogenes Oenoandensis: κατὰ γὰρ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ὦ Δημόκριτε, οὐχ ὅπως τὸ 
ἀληθὲς εὑρεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ζῆν δυνησόμεθα (fr. 7, coll. 2-3 Smith); Mesiano (1951): “La contraddizione 
tra la sua concezione filosofica generale e la sua etica rimane innegabile” (135); and Barnes (1982): 
“[P]hysics and ethics were so successfully compartmentalized in Democritus' capacious mind that he 
never attended to the larger issues which their cohabitation produces” (535).
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material reality.  
Against these readers—whether ancient Aristotelians and Epicureans or modern 
Dyroffians—this study maintains that the best interpretation of our available evidence is 
that Democritus followed established tradition in offering a materialist ethic deliberately 
and cogently consistent with his materialist physics.
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